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PRINCIPALS, ACCESSORIES AND SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW: PERCEPTIONS, CONTRADICTIONS AND THE STATUS QUO 
 
Viviane Arnolds 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Since the emergence of international and hybrid criminal judicial bodies, the attribution of 
various modes of liability to perpetrators of the most heinous crimes has occupied a central 
role. However, the impact of modes of liability on the sentence has parted judges in many 
instances. While some judges regard the differentiation between principal perpetrators and 
aiders and abettors as immaterial for sentencing purposes, others have naturally referred to 
the notion that accessories to a crime are entitled to lower sentences. On first sight, in the 
absence of statutory guidance in this regard, both approaches, which derive from domestic 
law, seem to have their place and their advocates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
The Appeals Chamber is of the view that aiding 
and abetting is a form of responsibility which 
generally warrants a lower sentence than is 
appropriate to responsibility as a co-perpetrator. 
     Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, ICTY 20041 
 
The Appeals Chamber considers that, in the 
circumstances of this case, the elevation of 
Ndahimana’s responsibility from that of an aider 
and abettor to that of a participant in a joint 
criminal enterprise results in an increase of his 
overall culpability, which calls for a higher 
sentence. 
 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment, ICTR 20132 
 
 
 
The purpose behind the Prosecution’s approach 
appears to be to classify the participant in a joint 
criminal enterprise who was not the principal 
offender as a “perpetrator” or a “co-
perpetrator”, rather than someone who merely 
aids and abets the principal offender. The 
significance of the distinction appears to be 
derived from the civil law, where a person who 
merely aids and abets the principal offender is 
subject to a lower maximum sentence. The Trial 
Chamber does not accept that this distinction is 
necessary for sentencing in international law, 
and in particular holds that it is irrelevant to the 
sentencing practice of this Tribunal. The Appeals 
Chamber has made it clear that a convicted 
person must be punished for the seriousness of 
the acts which he has done, whatever their 
categorisation. 
        Krnojelac Trial Judgment, ICTY 20023 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
International and hybrid courts and tribunals have become major subjects for the enforcement of 
international criminal law. However, in comparison to domestic courts, the sentencing process in 
international judicial institutions is only barely regulated, leaving judges with immense discretionary 
sentencing powers. This not only impedes predictability, but also endangers consistency in 
international sentencing practice, which is especially true when it comes to the attribution of 
individual criminal responsibility to the perpetrator and its actual implications on the sentence. 
Various modes of liability require different degrees of involvement in the commission of a crime and 
thus a distinct mens rea and actus reus. While the criminal conduct of the principal perpetrator 
constitutes the actus reus of an offence in that he directly commits the crime, the criminal conduct of 
the accessory merely substantially affects the commission of the crime by the principal. Accordingly, 
one would expect that due to the process of differentiation between the degree of the individual’s 
culpability judges are tasked with, the applicable mode of liability entails a corresponding gradation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-32-A (25 February 2004) para 182. 
2 Prosecutor v Ndahimana (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-01-68-A (16 December 2013) para 252. 
3 Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Trial Judgment) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) paras 74, 75. 
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punishment. Following this line of argumentation there would be the presumption that someone who is 
‘merely’ involved as aider and abettor and thus as secondary perpetrator, would be assumed to be less 
involved in the commission of the crime than a primary perpetrator, directly committing the crime.  
 
However, amongst others, two important considerations are in contradiction with this chain of 
reasoning. First, neither of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, nor the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
expressly states that different modes of liability attract pertinent corresponding penalties, varying in 
length. Secondly, considering the fact that the most heinous atrocities are uncommonly committed by 
high-ranking individuals themselves, as these instead mastermind and concert these plans, a simplified 
primary and secondary perpetrator distinction seems rather problematic in the context of international 
criminal justice. Nevertheless, in the past, judges have repeatedly resorted to a principal-accessory 
distinction for sentencing purposes. As a consequence, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in 
respect of modes of liability and their role in the sentencing process seems on first sight rather 
controversial, and the concept of individual criminal responsibility and the attribution of individual 
criminal acts to perpetrators of a crime occupy a solid position in international legal scholarship.4 In 
the absence of statutory guidance, two distinct camps have evolved. On the one hand there are some 
judges who take the stance that adherence to the principal-accessory distinction is of importance for 
sentencing purposes as accessorial liability attracts lower sentences, and on the other hand there are 
judges emphasising that the categorisation of modes of liability is rather immaterial with respect to its 
value for sentencing purposes.  
 
The reason for such confusion is based on the domestic nature of attribution concepts, which is 
manifested in a variety of forms in domestic legal systems. In fact, a principal-accessory distinction is 
well established in a number of jurisdictions5 – various domestic systems, belonging to the Romano-
Germanic tradition explicitly recognise a principle embedding mandatory mitigation for principals,6 
which is based on the premise that that ‘punishment should be inflicted in proportion to the 
blameworthiness of the conduct of each person involved in the commission of the crime’.7 Indeed, 
countries such as Germany and the former Soviet states are ‘committed to the proposition that 
accessories should not be punished as severely as perpetrators’.8 These countries embrace a so-called 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See for instance J Vogel, ‘Individuelle Verantwortlichkeit im Völkerstrafrecht’ (2002) 114 Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 403; G Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’ 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 953; H Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military 
Leaders as Principals to International Crimes, Studies in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Hart 
2010); C Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues 
(Springer 2010); E van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP 2012) 65; H 
Vest. ‘Problems of Participation — Unitarian, Differentiated Approach, or Something Else?’ (2014) 12 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 295. 
5 See inter alia Germany, Spain and several Latin American countries. 
6 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 17. 
7 G Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP 2000) 650. 
8 Ibid. 
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“differentiated” approach. In contrast, Anglo-American countries, but also inter alia, Denmark, Italy 
or France, are committed to the proposition that an accessory to a crime can be punished as severely as 
the principal perpetrator, although in sentencing practice the individual’s role in the commission of the 
offence will frequently be considered at the sentencing stage.9 A detriment of such a unitary model is 
that a person who is less culpable, because he does not share the same intent as the principal 
perpetrator (the intent to commit the offence in question), may be punished as severely as a person 
who causes much greater harm – subject to judicial discretion – due to a significantly higher 
intentional involvement in the commission. This proposition is based on the so-called unitary theory. 
Strictly speaking, the unitary theory can be divided into ‘pure unitary systems’ and ‘functional unitary 
systems’.10 While the former systems, which include for instance Italy and Denmark, do not 
distinguish between principal perpetrators and accessories, the latter, such as Austria and Poland, 
differentiate between principal and accessorial liability, but do not recognise the derivative nature of 
accessorial liability, despite such distinction.11 As Fletcher notes, the reason why Romano-Germanic 
countries have intensively engaged with the law on accessorial liability, at least compared to England, 
is the ‘greater importance they ascribe’ to it and obviously the legal consequences resulting 
therefrom.12 So why do the ad hoc tribunals devote so much time to the distinction between principals 
and accessories? One could be inclined to assume that the categorisation of modes of liability in 
international law and the attention devoted thereto, at least by the ad hoc tribunals, draws on a 
seemingly established principle that the labelling process occupies a central role in the sentencing 
process and indicates the level of culpability. The latter was clearly supported by the Trial Chamber in 
the Krnojelac Trial Judgment, where it held that the distinction between the ‘principal offender, as a 
perpetrator or a co-perpetrator’, from someone who ‘merely aids and abets’, was irrelevant for 
sentencing purposes.13  
 
A similar view was taken in the separate opinion by Judge Hunt in Ojdanić, who states that it was 
‘unwise for this Tribunal [ICTY] to attempt to categorize different types of offenders in this way when 
it is unnecessary to do so for sentencing purposes’.14 Likewise, Judge Fulford emphasised in relation 
to the ICC in his Separate Opinion in the Lubanga Judgment that there was ‘no proper basis for 
concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 25(3)(b)) is a less serious form of 
commission than committing it “through another person” (Article 25(3)(a)), and these two concepts 
self-evidently overlap’.15 He further contended that the creation of a ‘hierarchy of seriousness’ which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A Cassese and others, International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (OUP 2011) 323. 
10 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4), fn 37. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 7) 637, fn 4. 
13 Krnojelac Trial Judgment (n 3) paras 74, 75. 
14 Prosecutor v Milutonovic et al. (Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Dragoljub Ojdanić to 
Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para 31. 
15 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) 
para 8. 
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is ‘dependent on different modes of liability within Article 25(3) of the Statute’ could only be of 
assistance if ‘sentencing was strictly determined by the specific provision on which an individual’s 
conviction is based’ and clarified that at the ICC ‘considerations of this kind do not apply’.16  
 
Likewise, Judge Van den Wyngaert rejects the idea that aiding and abetting ‘may be treated as less 
serious than committing’ under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.17 According to Judge Van den 
Wyngaert, the blameworthiness of a perpetrator is based and therefore dependent upon the ‘factual 
circumstances’ as opposed to the particular mode of liability.18 These statements corroborate the 
position that, in international criminal law, no mandatory increased sentence or mitigation is attached 
to a particular mode of liability, which leads to the rationale that different contributions to a crime are 
equal19 and that the seriousness of the conduct is assessed irrespective of the classification as either 
principal or secondary offender.  
 
While previous studies have confirmed that modes of liability are indeed sentencing predictors, it has 
also been pointed out that their impact on the sentence must not be overestimated and more 
specifically that ‘complicity by no means warrants a lesser sentence in international criminal law’.20 
Nevertheless, the approach of a ‘clear-cut’ distinction between principal and accessorial liability has 
been expressed in several judgments, leading to the impression that some judges do in fact consider 
several modes of liability as determinants when assessing culpability and deciding on the appropriate 
sentence.21 Respectively, there appears to be a broad consensus that aiding and abetting leads to more 
lenient sanctions as opposed to participation in a JCE, which has been designed by the ICTY to hold 
all persons liable who act together to pursue a common plan. According to JCE in its basic form (JCE 
I), (i) a group of persons (ii) must act with a common plan (iii) and the accused must have voluntarily 
contributed within the framework of this common plan.22 There is a consensus that JCE is viewed as a 
form of commission liability;23 however, the participation of the member of the JCE ‘need not involve 
commission of a specific crime under one of those provisions (…), but may take the form of assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid para 9. 
17 Prosecutor v Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert) ICC-01/04-02/12-4, 
(18 December 2012) para 24.  
18 Ibid. 
19 van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 70. 
20 M Aksenova, Complicity in International Criminal Law (PhD Thesis, European University Institute 2014) 
197. 
21 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 235. 
22 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) para 266; This refers to JCE in 
its basic form - JCE II and JCE III will be considered later in more detail. 
23 See below (n 165) and additionally inter alia Krnojelac Trial Judgment (n 3) para 73; Prosecutor v Simić et al. 
(Trial Judgment) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 138; Prosecutor v Stakić (Trial Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 
July 2003) para 432. To the contrary, for a categorisation as accomplice liability, see inter alia Prosecutor v 
Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 220. It has also been stated that JCE: Kvočka et al. 
Trial Judgment (n 22) para 249. For a detailed discussion see also Damgaard (n 4) 198 seq; A Cassese and 
others, Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP 2009) 395. 
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in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose’.24 The actus reus of an aider and 
abettor requires him to provide ‘practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, which has 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime’ but, contrary to a member of JCE an aider and 
abettor ‘does not need to share either at the outset or later, the criminal intent of the perpetrator; he 
only intends to assist the perpetrator in the commission of a crime’.25 Thus, a fundamental difference 
is that ‘although he is cognizant that the perpetrator intends to commit the crime, he does not share the 
mens rea’.26 According to Cassese, ‘[t]his is why, in principle, the criminal liability of the aider and 
abettor is more tenuous (or less weighty) than that of the participant in a common criminal 
enterprise’.27  
 
A landmark decision in the context of the principal-accessory distinction at the ICTY was the 
Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, where the Appeals Chamber reduced the sentence imposed by the Trial 
Chamber from 20 to 15 years, based exclusively on the finding that the convicted person was not a 
participant in a JCE but instead aided and abetted.28 In a similar manner, such differentiation based on 
the proposition that accessories are less culpable and entitled to lower sentences, was also confirmed 
in a number of cases, namely amongst others, Krstić,29 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin,30 Kajelijeli31 and only 
recently the ICTR Appeals Chamber confirmed in Ndahimana that aiders and abettors have a lower 
culpability.32 Accordingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that, with regard to the sentencing practice 
of the ICTY and ICTR, aiding and abetting as a form of secondary perpetration attracts a lower 
sentence. Notwithstanding that, empirical research in respect to the ICTY’s sentencing practice 
revealed that, after appeal, those perpetrators who were responsible as participants in a JCE were 
punished less severely than aiders and abettors.33  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 227. 
25 A Cassese,‘The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’ 
(2007) Journal of International Criminal Justice 5, 109, 116. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 181; ‘the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the sentence needs to be 
adjusted due to the Appeals Chamber’s finding that the Appellant was responsible as an aider and abettor (…) 
instead of being responsible as a co-perpetrator as was found by the Trial Chamber’; Prosecutor v Krstić 
(Appeal Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004) para 268. 
29 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 266, 268, the Appeals Chamber found that the sentence had to be adjusted 
based on its finding that Krstić was responsible as an aider and abettor to genocide and not as co-perpetrator as 
found by the Trial Chamber. 
30 Prosecutor v Mrkšić and Šljivančanin (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009) para 407, the Appeals 
Chamber expressly held that: ‘the fact that an accused did not physically commit a crime’ was in fact ‘relevant to 
the determination of the appropriate sentence’ and that ‘the practice of the International Tribunal clearly 
indicate[d] that aiding and abetting’ was ‘a lower form of liability than ordering, committing or participating in a 
joint criminal enterprise and may as such attract a lesser sentence’. 
31 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003) para 963, the ICTR 
Trial Chamber stated inter alia in Kajelijeli in the context of sentencing practice of the ICTY and ICTR that 
indirect forms of participation would generally result in lower sentences. 
32 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2) para 642. 
33 B Holá and others, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice’ 
(2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 79, 92. 
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While the practice of some hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (SICT) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) has not been greatly affected by this debate, as they seem to have rather paid less attention to 
these issues, the SCSL can be observed to have formerly prevailingly followed the differentiated 
approach favoured by the ad hoc tribunals, while lately expressing preference for the unitary 
approach, akin to the ICC.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
By assessing the relationship between modes of liability and sentence severity, this dissertation 
intends to provide a new outlook on the role of modes of liability within international sentencing 
practice in that it not only examines methodologically the jurisprudence of international and hybrid 
judicial bodies within the timeframe of their emergence up to now, but also identifies and analyses 
possible reasons for the pertinent practice. In line with this, the primary purpose of this dissertation is 
to shed some light on the legal weight ascribed to principal and accessorial liability respectively in 
relation to the punishment. It will be seen that, against the backdrop of statements made by judges, the 
entire picture is far more contradictory than it seems at first glance.  
 
Therefore, potential reasons for such conflicting approaches will be explored. The central research 
question reads as follows: 
 
Is the distinction between the principal perpetrator and the aider and abettor merely a matter of 
terminology and/or a lens through which the nature of the criminal liability of an offender under 
substantive international criminal law is established, or does it also have an impact on the severity of 
the sanction imposed on them in the case of a conviction?  
 
Does the legal relevance ascribed to modes of liability only affect the attribution stage, or does it also 
influence the sentencing stage? Is there a correlation between the mode of liability and the sentence 
severity? Do different modes of liability reflect several degrees of participation and more specifically, 
are accessories perceived to be less blameworthy? On the one hand, assuming that this is the case, the 
degree of culpability would be dependent on the respective mode of liability for which a perpetrator is 
convicted, which should then be reflected in the sentence imposed. When transferring the 
considerations of the domestically originated unitary and differentiated theories respectively to the 
system of international criminal law, a particular concern is the unique nature of international crimes 
in that large-scale international crimes are usually committed on a macro level by a plurality of 
persons acting within a hierarchical structure. Thus, the individuals most responsible and culpable do 
not normally carry out the physical element of the offence. In considering an appropriate theory, be it 
unitary or differentiated, this consideration is of high significance and, in the light of the unique nature 
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of international crimes, a simple “installation” of a domestic doctrine into international criminal 
justice has to be placed under close scrutiny and may ultimately be rendered inadequate. On the other 
hand, if modes of liability shall only describe the specific criminal conduct without implying a degree 
of blameworthiness, then the question is whether one could perceive a mode of liability as a 
requirement, which can simply be ticked in order to establish liability and then ignore the particular 
label in the sentencing process? According to criminal law theory, the main objectives of punishment 
are primarily retribution and deterrence.34 It could be argued that labelling serves this purpose. Do 
modes of liability make sense if the particular label does not affect the sentence? If this is the case then 
all different labels seem rather superfluous. Nevertheless, it ought to be stressed that the sentencing 
process will neither be predictable, nor relatively uniform as long as these different interpretations of 
the classification of modes of liability and their impact on the sentencing process lead to opposed 
applications in practice. 
 
1.2.1 LEGITIMACY TO EMBRACE A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH 
 
When considering the different concepts of individual criminal responsibility the initial question is 
whence the legitimacy to rely on one or the other is derived. Both Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are 
silent on the sources of international criminal law. Therefore, it has been clarified by the ICTY that it 
has to rely on the sources of general international law as set out in Article 38(1) ICJ Statute,35 as these 
are regarded as the most authoritative codified instrument on the sources of international law. 
However, the list provided by Article 38(1) is neither exhaustive,36 nor does it provide for a 
hierarchy.37 Nevertheless, a clear distinction must be drawn between the application of the sources 
listed in Article 38(1), which work in the international legal context of sovereign states based on 
consent,38 and the application of sources in international criminal law, which concerns a relationship 
between the individual and the judiciary. While the ICJ applies, in order to avoid non liquet, all 
available sources of Article 38(1) and even draws on analogies, the latter is strictly forbidden in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 W Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals, The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
(CUP 2006) 554; see also Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment (n 30) paras 414-416.  
35 Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 540. 
36 It can be argued that that the list provided by Article 38(1) (a)-(d) ICJ Statute is not exhaustive as the ICJ has 
itself applied ‘the concept of general international law without reference to customary international law’. Hence, 
this would support the assumption that certain norms, which are not expressly listed in Art 38(1) could be 
considered sources of public international law: O Yasuaki, ‘The ICJ: An Emperor without Clothes? International 
Conflict Resolution, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and the Sources of International Law’ in N Ando and others 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, Volume 1 (Brill Nijhoff 2002), 208 fn 42. It has further been argued 
that there is ‘ample evidence’ that Article 38 is not exhaustive, because the ICJ additionally recognises ius 
cogens, unilateral declarations (which do not lead to the formation of international customary law) and binding 
decisions of international organisations; K Zemanek, ‘Is the Term “Soft Law” Convenient?’ in A Rest and others 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern: In Honour of his 80th Birthday (Brill Nijhoff 1998) 
844; van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4),12. 
37 Notwithstanding the absence of a prescribed hierarchy, the principles lex posterior priori derogate and 
specialia generalibus derogant could ultimately indicate a specific order. 
38 V Degan ‘On the Sources in International Criminal Law’ (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 45, 
50. 
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international criminal law in relation to ‘incrimination of human behaviour’.39 Therefore a distinction 
between international law and international criminal law for the purpose of the applicable law has to 
be drawn.  
The application of customary international law, which plays an essential role in dynamic law-making, 
has been criticised on the basis that the identification of opinio iuris and state practice, and the 
respective weight attached to each, is difficult.40 It could then be argued that this ambiguity leads 
inevitably to the question whether a conflict with nullum crime sine lege arises as a result thereof.41 
Following this line of argumentation it appears that although judicial law-making has played an 
important role in the development of international criminal law and particularly the modes of liability, 
a requirement of foreseeability and thus predictability as to what constitutes criminal conduct is vital. 
Only an exhaustive list enables stability, which is particularly essential in the context of international 
criminal justice. 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the ICC contains a specific provision on sources and therefore 
lacunae are not likely to arise as easily. This is an innovation in international criminal law, as it is the 
first codification of international criminal law sources. Unlike Article 38(1), this provision sets out 
‘the applicable law’ in a hierarchical order. Although Article 21 does not mention customary 
international law expressly, its application may be based on Article 21(1)(b), namely rules of 
international law.42  
Notwithstanding the above, ’judicial law-making’ occupies an essential role in the development in 
international criminal law, and has contributed to the elaboration of concepts of individual criminal 
responsibility.43 This is clearly demonstrated in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals: the ICTY has 
developed the notion of JCE44 in order to establish the individual criminal responsibility of high-level 
leaders, who are rather remote from the actual crime scene. Yet the ICC has largely rejected the JCE 
doctrine and resorted instead to a complex notion based on the concepts of indirect perpetration and 
co-perpetration.45 The two latter concepts are based on the notion of ‘control over the crime’ (‘the 
control theory’), which is rooted in German doctrine and has been developed by the German scholar 
Claus Roxin.46 Based on Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the ICTR and ICTY Statutes respectively, the ad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid 51, 53. 
40	  van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 14.	  
41 Ibid. 
42 W Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP 2010) 391. 
43 van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 14. 
44 See for instance Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23); Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28); The Prosecutor v Obrenović 
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003). 
45 A Herzig, ‘Die Tatherrschaftslehre in der Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs’ (2013) 4 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 189.  
46 See for instance Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 
January 2007) para 330, where it was held that perpetrators are those who ‘physically carry out the objective 
elements of the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crimes, 
control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed’. 
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hoc tribunals differentiate between committing, planning, ordering, instigating and, finally, aiding and 
abetting. Each of these distinct modes entails different actus reus and mens rea requirements.  
Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the ICC Statute distinguishes in detail different modes of individual criminal 
responsibility, thereby supplementing them. There is a position that Article 25(3)(a)-(d) provides a 
hierarchy in that it categorises systematically the modes of liability47 starting with commission 
liability, which entails the highest degree of individual criminal responsibility. Thus, Article 25 (a) 
stipulates that individual criminal responsibility arises if a person ‘[c]ommits such a crime, whether as 
an individual, jointly with another or through another person’. Article 25 then goes on to list various 
forms of instigation and ordering in the second category. The third group contains the modes of aiding 
and abetting and otherwise assisting in the commission or the attempted commission. Finally the 
fourth category refers to the contribution ‘to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime 
by a group of persons acting with a common purpose’.48 Article 25(3)(a) (Second Alternative) 
contains two distinct elements, namely ‘committing’ and ‘jointly with another’. Therefore, one can 
infer from the latter concept, also referred to as co-perpetration, that it entails the objective element, 
namely the physical commission, and the subjective element consisting of the common plan.49 On first 
sight, this concept may seem to be similar or even identical to the JCE doctrine developed by the 
ICTY. However, notwithstanding the fact that the JCE doctrine played a significant role in the 
definition of the concept of joint commission under the ICC Statute, it is a different concept. In 
addition to the basic form of JCE, there are two further forms of the JCE doctrine, namely JCE II and 
III, which share the same actus reus that is required for basic JCE (JCE I), but differ in relation to the 
mens rea requirements.50 Accordingly, it becomes clear that JCE (I and II), as particularly developed 
by the ICTY, is not expressly included in the Statute, but has rather been developed as a form of 
commission51 liability, established in customary international law.52 JCE II pertains to the so-called 
‘concentration camp cases’. In these types of cases, the alleged perpetrators are ‘military 
administrative units’ acting according to a ‘concerted plan’.53 JCE II is very similar to JCE I in that the 
requirements are the same, but in JCE II personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment is 
additionally required.54 JCE III is the most far-reaching category. In addition to the basic requirement 
of JCE I, individual criminal responsibility is already incurred if a crime, which was committed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’ (n 4) 956, 957; Werle distinguishes between four categories of 
modes of liability, each reflecting a different degree of culpability. 
48 Article 25(3)(d) ICC Statute. 
49 Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute (n 4) 958. 
50 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 228. 
51 This categorisation of JCE as either a form of principal liability under ‘commission’ or accomplice liability 
under ‘aiding and abetting’ has led to discussions before the ICTY Trial and Appeals Chamber. For further 
discussion see Damgaard (n 4), 193-211. 
52 G Werle, Völkerstrafrecht (3rd edn, Mohr Siebeck 2012) 219; However, the legal value of the extended form 
of JCE, namely JCE III, has been subject to immense criticism, see Co-Prosecutor v Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng 
Thirith, Khieu Samphan (Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise) Case File/Dossier No. 
002/19-09-2007(ECCC/TC (12 September 2011) para 27. 
53 Eg running concentration camps, see Damgaard (n 4) 141. 
54 Ibid 145. 
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outside the common plan, was a foreseeable possibility caused by the execution of the common plan, 
and the accused was aware of this possible consequence.55 Nonetheless, the concept of co-perpetration 
must be distinguished from JCE I, II and III. While the actus reus under Article 25(3)(a) requires an 
‘essential’ contribution to the realisation of the common plan, which is necessary for the commission 
of the offence, the ICTY has taken the stand that any contribution can be sufficient if it is carried out 
within the common plan.56 Accordingly, it becomes clear that the high threshold of the actus reus of 
the former might be the most striking feature of distinction. It is argued that this requirement is based 
on the interpretation in line with the ‘differentiated participation model’, according to which co-
perpetration as form of commission entails the highest degree of liability.57 This approach supports the 
presumption that various modes of liability are mutually exclusive. Accordingly the principal-
accessory ‘clear cut’ distinction would entail an indication as to the seriousness of the individual’s 
contribution to the crime, which lies in the centre of numerous debates in international criminal law. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
 
This study seeks to investigate whether the distinction between primary and secondary perpetration, 
and more specifically aiding and abetting, in international criminal law is merely terminological or 
whether it is linked to specific penological consequences and to provide a coherent account of the 
current status. The general understanding of the term “accessorial liability” in the international context 
appears to be that it comprises also order-givers and those who incite/solicit. However, each mode of 
liability stands by itself, as each possesses different mens rea and actus reus requirements. The focus 
of this dissertation will lie on aiding and abetting, as it is argued that this is the only mode in the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which is in fact treated as inferior to other modes at the sentencing 
stages. Moreover, as will be seen throughout this work, several criminal codes, such as those of 
Croatia, Serbia and BiH, only consider the aider and abettor to be an ‘accessory’.  
 
In order to understand the prevalence of a respective approach, be it unitary or differentiated, it is vital 
to investigate which justifications have been put forward by judges for embracing either a 
‘differentiated’ or a ‘unitary’ approach in relation to sentencing. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 
• To identify the position of modes of individual criminal responsibility (with emphasis on 
aiding and abetting) within the framework of international sentencing.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 S Wirth, ‘Committing Liability in International Criminal Law’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2009) 334. 
56 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 229 (3); Kvočka et al. Trial Judgment (n 22) para 274: According to the 
Appeals Chamber, ‘it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to the 
furthering of the common plan or purpose’.  
57 Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute (n 4) 961. 
58 The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between aiding and abetting and sentence 
severity against the backdrop of commission liability and sentencing. However, for the sake of good order, all 
other modes are included but their impact on the sentence is only exmained to a very limited extent. 
	   28 
• To identify the origins of individual criminal responsibility linked to selected domestic 
jurisdictions.  
• To examine the relationship between modes of liability and sentence severity in 
international criminal law. 
• To identify and evaluate how much weight judges have attached to different modes of 
liability in the sentencing process, and more specifically whether a differentiated or 
unitary approach is prevalently embraced. Thus the jurisprudence of the following 
tribunals59 will be analysed by placing the justification of a specific approach taken by 
judges (be it unitary or differentiated) under close scrutiny: ICTY, ICTR, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo (Kosovo Panels), the 
War Crimes Chambers for Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCCBiH), the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL), the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili District Court (SPSC), the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal (SICT).60 Particularly with reference to the ad hoc tribunals it is not 
attempted to analyse the ways in which different modes of liability have been interpreted 
and analysed by international, hybrid and domestic courts per se in depth as this has 
already been done thoroughly in other works,61 although these processes may be 
elaborated on, on a contextual basis where appropriate.  
• To compare how international and hybrid courts and tribunals have applied modes of 
liability, in order to identify which impact the respective sentencing practice of the purely 
international tribunals and the ICC has had on hybrid tribunals.  
• To identify cases where principal or accessorial liability has had a significant impact on 
the sentence length.  
• To analyse empirically whether the findings of the foregoing jurisprudential analysis can 
be verified by means of quantitative analyses. This part for statistical reasons restricted to 
the ad hoc tribunals, the WCCBiH and the SPSC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 As will be seen throughout this work, the practice of some hybrid tribunals has not been analysed as 
thoroughly as the approaches embraced by the ad hoc tribunals, for two main reasons: (i) in some instances the 
accessibility of the judgments was very limited (ie the Kosovo Panels, or in relation to the SPSC no appeal 
judgments), (ii) the number of judgments rendered was too low (ECCC, SCSL) or no judgments were rendered 
by the tribunals at the time of writing (STL) or (iii) the issue relating to the question whether accessories are less 
culpable has not been addressed sufficiently or at all and did thus not allow for inferences. The second 
consideration also applies to the ICC although, despite the limited judgments rendered to date, clear opinions 
have been voiced by judges in relation to the issues in question. 
60 Although the SICT is strictly speaking not an internationalised tribunal, as it is integrated into the domestic 
system,60 Article 24 (e) of its Statute requires that the sentencing practice created by ’relevant international 
precedents’ is taken into account; see Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (Cambridge University Press 2010) 194 and S Williams, Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal 
Tribunals (Hart 2012) 117. Similarly the ECCC is, strictly speaking, a domestic court. Due to special 
characteristics (it consists of Cambodian and international Judges, applies Cambodian and international law) it is 
referred to as hybrid/internationalised tribunal.   
61 See inter alia publications enumerated (n 4). 
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• To explore the reasons why judges use contradictory approaches and why a respective 
theory is more or less frequently used.62  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study draws on descriptive, comparative and empirical research and finally includes 
interdisciplinary inquiries. Following a doctrinal and jurisprudential examination, a quantitative 
analysis of the sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the WCCBiH and the SPSC are introduced. 
Moreover partial comparative components are in place when exploring the domestic concepts of 
individual criminal responsibility. It is not attempted to include considerations regarding modes of 
liability from a criminal law theory angle, as this has been done extensively elsewhere.63 Accordingly, 
it can be said that this dissertation seeks to achieve its objectives by engaging jurisprudential, 
empirical and partly interdisciplinary examination. 
 
1.5 TERMINOLOGY 
 
For the purpose of this study it is necessary to clarify the use of the term ‘accessory’ as the ambit of it 
may differ depending on the jurisdictional context. In British and American English the term 
accessory denotes both an ‘“abettor” and “a thing of minor importance”’.64 The term ‘accessory’ has 
been used in a variety of ways. According to Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, ‘American writers 
tend to use accomplice to include all principals and accessories before the fact, but to exclude 
accessories after the fact (…), [o]ther writers use accomplice to include all principals and 
accessories’.65 Additionally, the terms accomplice and accessory have been used as synonyms: 
according to Ashworth and Horder ‘[t]he simplest way of drawing a distinction [between a principal 
and accessories] is to say that a principal is a person whose acts fall within the legal definition of the 
crime, whereas an accomplice (sometimes called an ‘accessory’ or ‘secondary party’) is anyone who 
aids, abets, counsels, or procures a principal’.66 In relation to the ad hoc tribunals, however, it appears 
that there is no consensus concerning the ambit of the term accessory.67 For the purpose of this work 
the term accessory denotes only aiding and abetting, unless expressly specified otherwise. Similarly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Due to the limited information available relating to judges of hybrid tribunals this analysis is restricted to 
ICTY/ICTR and ICC judges. However, all considerations may, subject to some limitations, also apply to 
international judges. 
63 See for instance J Ohlin, ‘Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of 
Liability’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 771; J Ohlin, ‘Towards a Unique Theory of 
International Criminal Sentencing’ in G Sluiter and S Vasiliev (eds), International Criminal Procedure: 
Towards a Coherent Body of Law (Cameron May 2008); van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 
65. 
64 B A Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3rd edn OUP 2011) 12. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Garner (n 64) 12; A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn OUP 2013) 419. See also 
Oxford Dictionary of Law (8th edn OUP 2015). 
67 Furundžija Trial Judgment (n 21) para 257; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Trial Judgment) IT-95-14/2-T 
(26 February 2001) 373: Prosecutor v Orić (Trial Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30 June 2006) 292; Prosecutor v 
Mpambara (Trial Judgment) ICTR-01-65-T (11 September 2006) 37. 
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in view of the quantitative study, where it was necessary to group modes of liability, only aiding and 
abetting is considered to be a mode of “indirect perpetration”, while all other forms of individual 
criminal responsibility are comprised by the term “direct perpetration”.68 
 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although individual criminal responsibility and particularly the application of different modes thereof, 
has been subjected to thorough research,69 empirical and particularly quantitative analyses concerning 
the relationship between modes of liability and sentence severity have been rather scarce. Moreover, 
to the author’s knowledge, such studies do not include all hybrid tribunals subject to this study. It may 
be pointed out that while literature concerning individual criminal responsibility and international 
sentencing is generally extensive, the specific question whether or not a normative distinction between 
the principal perpetrator and the accessory to a crime is merely of terminological nature or whether it 
is linked to corresponding penological consequences has not yet been researched, analysed and thus 
answered as profoundly as in this work. Due to the fact that some of the following, already existing, 
studies only partially cover the issues under study, and instead mainly seek to answer the question of 
consistency, predictability of sentencing and emerging patterns in general, a comprehensive summary 
of utilised research methods and findings would exceed the scope of this work. 
 
To date a few highly valuable empirical analyses70 have been conducted. In 2001 Meernik and King 
conducted the first empirical analysis of the ICTY sentencing practice at that time by using regression 
analysis in order to assess the influence of various sentencing factors, including the mode of liability, 
on the sentence length.71 Thereafter, further, at least partially empirical studies into international 
sentencing practice were conducted by Meernik72 and by Meernik and King together73 and a few years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Chapter 3 II for the justification of the exclusive categorisation as indirect perpetration. 
69 See for instance (n 4). 
70 See J Meernik and K L King‚ The Effectiveness of International Law and the ICTY - Preliminary Results of 
an Empirical Study (2001) International Criminal Law Review 1, 343; J Meernik and K L King, ‘The Sentencing 
Determinants of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Empirical and Doctrinal 
Analysis’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 717; Holá and others, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing 
Predictable?’ (n 33) 79; U Ewald, ‘“Predictably Irrational”- International Sentencing and its Discourse against 
the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on the ICTY Sentencing Practices’ (2010) International 
Criminal Law Review 10, 365; S D’Ascoli Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals 
and Future Perspectives for the ICC (Hart 2010); S Jodoin, ‘Understanding the Behaviour of International 
Courts: An Examination of Decision-Making at the ad hoc and International Criminal Tribunals (2010) Journal 
of International Law and International Relations 6, 1; J Meernik ’Sentencing Rationales and Judicial Decision 
Making at the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2011) Social Science Quarterly 92, 588; B Holá, A Smeulers 
and B Bijleveld ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures’ Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 9, 
411; B Holá, A Smeulers and B Bijleveld, ‘Consistency of International Sentencing: ICTY and ICTR Case 
Study’ (2012) European Journal of International Criminal Justice 9, 541. 
71 Meernik and King, The Effectiveness of International Law and the ICTY (n 70) 343. 
72 J Meernik, ‘Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ Journal of Conflict Resolution (2003) 47, 140; J Meernik ‘Sentencing Rationales and 
Judicial Decision Making at the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2011) Social Science Quarterly 92, 588. 
73 Meernik and King, The Sentencing Determinants (n 70). 
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later by D’Ascoli, Ewald and Jodoin 74 In past years, Holá and others have produced several highly 
valuable empirical studies75 inter alia revolving around the consistency of the international sentencing 
practice. Most of these studies focus on a number of sentencing factors and their role in the sentencing 
process and mostly examine whether international sentencing bears consistency and whether specific 
patterns have emerged. Ewald’s study additionally examines judicial behaviour throughout the 
decision-making, while Jodoin’s analysis explores judges’ behaviour by ‘drawing on different models 
of judicial behaviour developed for domestic courts’.76 Towards the end of the course of writing, in 
2014 Aksenova published her dissertation, Complicity in International Law.77 As part of her work, 
Aksenova also examined inter alia the correlation between modes of liability and sentencing in 
relation to the ad hoc tribunals the SCSL and the ECCC in one chapter. 
 
However, only a limited number of the above studies examined the role of modes of liability 
throughout sentencing. Those which focused on the subject under study, did so to a comparably rather 
limited extent. In her book Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and 
Future Perspectives for the ICC, Sylvia D’Ascoli78 provides a thorough analysis and evaluation of the 
sentencing process of both ad hoc tribunals. Thus D’Ascoli’s study examines the sentencing practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals by means of a doctrinal and empirical analysis in order to verify the influence 
of ‘sentencing determinants’ on the length of the sentence. Although D’Ascoli’s valuable work covers 
a part of the subject under study, she does not differentiate between various modes of liability; a 
distinction is restricted to a differentiation between convictions based on direct and convictions 
grounded on indirect perpetration. None of the aforementioned studies shifted the focus entirely to the 
relationship between modes of liability and sentencing. While Meernik and King,79 as well as Ewald 
and D’Ascoli, only distinguish between individuals found guilty under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) ICTY 
(Articles 6(1) and 6(3) ICTR) Statute respectively, Holá and others differentiate between each mode of 
liability in their studies. Most of the above mentioned studies and more specifically those examining 
whether there is a correlation between the modes of liability and the severity of the sentence, are 
confined to the sentencing practice of the ICTY, ICTR and lately also extended to comprise the SCSL 
and the ECCC. Moreover, they do not thoroughly analyse and evaluate the impact of various modes of 
liability on the length of the sentence. Although Aksenova also embarked on an analysis concerning 
whether there is a correlation between complicity and sentencing at the ad hoc tribunals, the SCSL and 
the ECCC, it must be noted that due to the fact that it is limited to one chapter of her dissertation, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 D’Ascoli (n 70); Ewald N (70); Jodoin (n 70). 
75 See inter alia Holá, Smeulers and Bijleveld ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Practice Predictable?’ (n 33); Holá, 
Smeulers and Bijleveld ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures’ (n 70); Smeulers and Bijleveld, 
‘Consistency of International Sentencing’ (n 70). 
76 Jodoin (n 70) 1. 
77 Aksenova (n 20). 
78 D’Ascoli (n 70). 
79 Meernik and King, The Sentencing Determinants (n 70). 
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not as profound as this work aims to be in relation to the assessment of the relationship between 
principal and accessorial liability and sentence severity. 
 
This dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing a systematic and methodological 
examination of the relationship between modes of individual criminal responsibility and the severity 
of the punishment. It comprises a doctrinal analysis against the backdrop of the ICC, SCSL, Kosovo 
Panels, WCCBiH, SICT, STL, SPSC and ECCC in relation to the treatment of principals and 
accessories in their sentencing practice, provides the opportunity to carry out a precise assessment of 
their actual status and to identify the reasons for the pertinent practice. For statistical reasons, 
explained in Chapter 3, the quantitative analysis will be conducted based on the WCCBiH, SPSC and 
the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
1.7 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
This work consists of four chapters, which can roughly be divided into three parts, namely, (i) a 
comprehensive analysis of the current situation by means of jurisprudential analysis, (ii) statistical 
verification of pertinent results, and finally (iii) an exploration of the rationales behind the respective 
practice. Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the issues 
revolving around the role of modes of liability in international criminal sentencing practice, thereby 
turning to the roots of the concept of individual criminal responsibility and exploring various domestic 
approaches in a comparative inquiry. Chapter 3 consists of two parts, which comprise the 
jurisprudential and the quantitative analyses respectively. Thus, the latter aims to verify the outcome 
of the jurisprudential analysis by assessing the relationship between modes of liability and specifically 
the principal-accessory distinction and the severity of the sentences as handed down by the ad hoc and 
hybrid tribunals. Finally, Chapter 4 explores potential reasons for discrepant approaches from various 
angles. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of different modes of liability. Thus, attention is particularly drawn to 
the distinction of attribution concepts used by the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC and internationalised 
tribunals, eg the concepts of JCE and co-perpetration, indirect perpetration and indirect co-
perpetration. Further, the chapter outlines different participation models deriving from domestic 
criminal law, as international courts and tribunals have frequently adopted some of these concepts. 
This serves as a basis for understanding why various domestic systems include one or the other or 
even a mixed model80 of participation, which is usually reflected in and justified by their sentencing 
practice. Accordingly, a number of domestic concepts are described in the light of their particular 
implication on the sentencing practice. In this context this chapter also seeks to address and underline 
statutory differences of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC and internationalised tribunals concerning the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Modes can be overlapping; see van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 65.  
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application of modes of liability and available sentencing provisions. After an analysis of the 
differences, the chapter points out the problem of international courts “borrowing” domestic concepts 
and “installing” these in a largely different context. A comparative study concerning the role of modes 
of liability in the sentencing process of various domestic legal systems shall thereby help to 
understand conceptual differences, in order to scrutinise pertinent approaches concerning the 
implementation of domestic concepts in international criminal law.  
 
It is argued that a clear pattern has evolved concerning the principal-accessory distinction in an 
international sentencing context in that accessories are, despite some opposing remarks, indeed 
perceived to be less blameworthy. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the framework of current sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, the 
SCSL, the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo, the War Crimes Chambers for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(WCCBiH), the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (SICT), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in the Dili District Court, and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in order to identify which position modes of liability occupy in 
this framework. In addition, a jurisprudential analysis (Part I) identifies and evaluates statements made 
by judges regarding modes of liability, in order to examine the approach taken when sentencing 
perpetrators. Moreover, this chapter is devoted to a quantitative study (Part II) in order to identify and 
verify the findings concerning the influence of various modes of liability on the length of the sentence 
imposed. The techniques used to carry out this study are multiple regression analysis and multilevel 
analysis. These analyses enable the assessment of the relationship between different factors and their 
impact on a dependent variable. Therefore, in order to determine the strongest predictors for the length 
of the sentence, the sentence is the dependent variable. Accordingly, it can be examined which 
combination of factors (as independent variables) maximally relate to the final sentence. It follows that 
the independent variables in this study include amongst others modes of liability, while other 
independent variables comprise factors generally considered to be determinants in international 
criminal sentencing. This facilitates filtering out the impact of modes of liability on the sentence and 
thus provides an answer to the question whether or not accessories are perceived to be less 
blameworthy. 
 
As Chapter 3 addresses, in describing the limitations of this study, the analyses are for statistical 
reasons, only based on sentencing data from the ICTY, ICTR, the SPSC and the WCCBiH. As can be 
seen the quantitative analyses both reveal that accessories are punished more mildly than all other 
perpetrators, thereby verifying the findings of the jurisprudential analyses. 
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Chapter 4 explores the reasons for pertinent practice from various angles. It seeks to take a closer look 
at the composition of the bench and the legal cultural background of judges in cases where modes of 
liability were expressly accorded legal weight in relation to the punishment and thus facilitates an 
examination of whether there is a correlation between the composition of the bench and a 
differentiated approach. Moreover, an interdisciplinary approach takes shape by approaching the 
issues in question under consideration of the psychology of law-making and behavioural economics. 
Other potentially influential factors, such as the role of subconscious behaviour in judicial decision-
making, are explored in order to understand the interplay of several factors which may influence 
judges. It is argued that the reason for an established differentiated theory in the sentencing practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals is rooted in a plurality of factors, which may to a large degree derive from the 
legal cultural background of a judge and ultimately lead to overreliance on previous case law.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS MODES OF ATTRIBUTION: THE 
PRINCIPAL ACCESSORY DIVIDE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes is a long established concept, according 
to which a person is individually criminally responsible if a respective crime can be attributed to this 
person. Attribution of a crime can take place via different models, which have different requirements. 
Accordingly an individual cannot only be held criminally responsible when he ‘materially commits the 
crime’, but also when he contributes to the commission in different ways.81 Generally, attribution of a 
crime requires that certain factors are satisfied, namely that all elements of the actus reus of the crime 
are present and that the individual was in possession of the required mens rea.82 However, in addition 
to the requirements of the substantive crime, the accused must have satisfied the elements of the 
respective mode of liability.83  
 
2.2 INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
I am (…) unpersuaded that it will assist the work of the Court to establish a hierarchy of 
seriousness that is dependent on creating rigorous distinctions between the modes of liability 
within Article 25(3) of the Statute.84 
This recent separate opinion of Judge Fulford in the Lubanga judgment pinpoints the problem, which 
denotes the contrary perceptions relating to the punishment of principals and accessories. 
In international criminal law crimes are frequently carried out by a plurality of persons ‘acting in 
pursuance of a common criminal design’.85 Domestic legal systems have developed different legal 
concepts in order to assess the individual’s role in collectively committed offences and in responding 
with legal consequences thereto.86 Some of these concepts have been partly borrowed by international 
judicial institutions.87  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Cassese and others, Cases and Commentary (n 9) 323. 
82 I Bantekas, International Criminal Law (4th edn, Hart 2010) 51. 
83 Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’ (n 4) 955 seq. 
84 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (n 15) para 9. 
85 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 191; Olásolo Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 
20; van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 65; G Werle, Principles of International Criminal 
Law (2nd edn, TMC Asser Press 2009) 167. 
86 A Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 162. 
87 van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 65. 
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To date, two main approaches can be observed on the international level; on the one hand, the unitary 
approach,88 which converges with the view held inter alia by Judge Fulford89 and Judge Van den 
Wyngaert;90 and on the other hand the differentiated approach.91 The former is followed by a few 
national legal systems,92 which do not distinguish between the principal perpetrator and a participant 
or accessory respectively. As a result, every person who contributes to a crime and possesses the 
required mens rea, irrespective of the derivative nature of the criminal responsibility, is considered to 
be a principal.93 This is, as Olásolo observes, a ‘purely casual approach to the notion of perpetration’.94 
Nevertheless, judges will commonly take into consideration the circumstances of the perpetrator and 
thereby include his actual role and contribution to the commission of the crime in order to assess his 
culpability and to reflect these findings in the final sentence.95  
International judicial institutions typically follow the approach of categorising every charge according 
to the specific mode(s) of liability, despite the lack of any statutory requirement thereof.96 Accordingly 
discussions as to which mode(s) is specifically applicable occupy a solid position in the case law of 
the international criminal courts.97 Yet these detailed considerations are rather a feature of the legal 
systems following a differentiated approach.98 According to the differentiated model, a distinction is 
made between the physical or primary perpetrator and the accessory or participant, whose liability 
derives from the liability of the principal.99 This approach of distinction is manifest in countries such 
as Germany, Spain and Latin America and is of importance as liability as an accessory will normally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Also referred to as “monistic”, see Cassese and others (n 86) 162, fn 1. 
89 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (n 15) para 9. 
90 Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (n 17) para 22: ‘Although I can see that there is a 
conceptual difference between principal and accessorial criminal responsibility (one is direct and the other is 
derivative), I do not believe that this necessarily translates to a different legal treatment of those who are found 
guilty under one or the other form’. At para 23: ‘Like Judge Fulford, I see no proper basis for concluding that 
acting under Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute is less serious than acting under Article 25(3)(a)’. At para 24: ‘The 
same applies to aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute. Although in some legal systems, aiding 
and abetting may be treated as less serious than committing, I see no legal basis for this in the Statute. In fact, I 
fail to see an inherent difference in blameworthiness between aiding and abetting and committing a crime’. 
91 Also referred to as “normative”, see van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 77; or as 
“dualistic”, see Cassese, Cases and Commentary (n 9) 162, fn 1. 
92 Such as Austria, France, Italy, Denmark and the United States of America. 
93 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 19; Cassese, Cassese’s International 
Criminal Law (n 9) 162;  
94 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 19. 
95 J Vogel, How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts: Twelve Models, 
<http://www.defensesociale.org/02/16.pdf> accessed 18 December 2013 p. 152; Cassese and others (n 86) 162. 
96 Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (n 86) 162. Moreover, van Sliedregt notes that in 
international criminal law a differentiated approach is favoured, adding that that this is primarily expressed in the 
language used in the provisions about individual criminal responsibility; see van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal 
Responsibility (n 4) 74. 
97 Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (n 86) 162. 
98 Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (n 86) 162; van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal 
Responsibility (n 4) 66. 
 
	   37 
attract a lower sentence and therefore serve as mitigation.100 As suggested above, international judicial 
institutions can be said to have heavily drawn on such a distinction,101 which could be motivated by 
the fact that the differentiated model is embodied in a number of domestic legal systems and holds a 
solid position in the concept of individual criminal responsibility.102 At the same time the unitary 
approach has not received much attention in international criminal justice.103 Nevertheless it has to be 
highlighted that the statutes of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, as well as those internationalised 
tribunals that are the subject of this study, do not prescribe any particular legal consequence to one or 
the other specific mode of liability as such and therefore do not distinguish between principals and 
accessories in relation to penalties. 
It can be seen that the two main approaches set out above contradict each other and lead to 
inconsistencies in the sentencing practice of58 modern international courts and tribunals. As Stewart 
points out, ‘courts will inevitably take inspiration from domestic standards as practitioners (…) [and] 
draw on domestic concepts in the day-to-day operation of modern international courts’.104 As a result, 
given the variety of domestic approaches, discrepancies are predetermined when various domestic 
legal concepts are “borrowed” interchangeably.  
In order to allocate and grasp the concepts applied by international courts for attributing liability to an 
individual involved in collective criminality, it is essential to understand the domestic practice in 
response to collective criminality and in particular its legal context, ie the implications on the 
sentencing practice. Therefore, various modes of liability as utilised by modern international courts are 
briefly explained and then discussed below within the framework of a principal-accessory distinction. 
Subsequently a closer look at domestic concepts from a comparative perspective seeks to clarify the 
reason for the use of respective participation concepts by international courts and tribunals. 
 
2.2.1 MODES OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE ICTY AND ICTR 
 
The concept of individual criminal responsibility is codified and embodied in Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute and Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, which are essentially identical105 and thus both provide 
that the ICTY and the ICTR respectively have the power to hold individuals individually responsible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 H Olásolo, ‘Current Trends on Modes of Liability for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes’ 
in C Stahn and L van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives in International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser 2009) 
522; Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (n 86) 162. 
101 Cassese and others, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (n 86) 162. See also, H Olásolo, ‘Current Trends 
on Modes of Liability’ (n 100) 523: ‘(…) The Distinction between Principal and Accessorial Liability in Article 
7(1) ICTY Statute has been Consistently Embraced by the ICTY Case Law’. 
102 van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 68. 
103 J G Stewart, The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes, (2 November 2011) Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 9 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953521> accessed January 2013. 
104 Stewart, ‘The End of Modes of Liability’ (n 103). 
105 The only differences are that Article 6 of the ICTR Statute makes reference to Articles 2 to 4 as opposed to 2 
to 5, as is the case in Article 7 of the ICTY Statute; Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals (n 34) 
289, 290. 
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for crimes falling within their jurisdiction. There are a number of models for the attribution of criminal 
conduct; because international criminal law has borrowed and occasionally modified such concepts, a 
comparative study of certain domestic systems in relation to modes of liability and their impact on the 
sentencing process will be inevitable. However, first and foremost it is essential to distinguish the 
modes of individual criminal responsibility, which are frequently employed by the ad hoc tribunals. 
Articles 7(1) ICTY Statute and 6 (1) ICTR Statute provide: 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 (2 to 4) of the present 
Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
 
It follows that according to the foregoing provisions, the modes of liability employed at the ICTY and 
ICTR are (i) planning, (ii) instigating, (iii) ordering, (iv) committing, and (v) aiding and abetting in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime. Moreover, considering that this paper does not seek to 
discuss the boundaries of certain modes of liability, but rather how these have been interpreted in the 
light of a “principal-accessory” distinction and international sentencing practice, each mode is not 
discussed in depth. This has been done thoroughly in other works,106 and therefore a brief overview of 
the modes of liability as utilised in international judicial institutions is given.  
 
2.2.1.1 PLANNING 
The first mode of liability, enumerated in Articles 7(1) and 6(1) is planning. Although it is in principle 
very similar to the Common Law concept of conspiracy and the civil law concept of complicity, 
planning must clearly be distinguished.107 Unlike conspiracy and complicity, planning can constitute 
an act committed by one person alone.108 The ICTR Trial Chamber provided in Akayesu for a 
frequently cited definition of planning, namely: 
Planning can (…) be defined as implying that one or several persons contemplate designing the 
commission of a crime at both, preparatory and execution phases.109 
 
According to the Appeal Chamber in Kordić and Čerkez, the actus reus is established if ‘one or more 
persons design the criminal conduct constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later 
perpetrated’ and that ‘it is sufficient to demonstrate that the planning was a factor substantially 
contributing to such criminal conduct’.110 Further, the Appeals Chamber held that the mens rea of 
planning requires that ‘the perpetrator acted with direct intent in relation to his own planning (…).’111  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See for instance van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4); E van Sliedregt, The Criminal 
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Springer 2003); Olásolo, 
Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4); Damgaard (n 4). 
107 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (September 1998) para 480. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33 (2 August 2001) para 601; Prosecutor v Blaškić (Trial 
Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) paras 278, 279. 
110 See inter alia Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 
2004) para 26. 
111 Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment (n 110) para 26. 
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2.2.1.2 INSTIGATING 
Instigation is held to involve ‘prompting another to commit an offence’,112 through both, an act or an 
omission.113 The ICTR Appeals Chamber held that ‘[t]he mens rea for this mode of responsibility is 
the intent to instigate another person to commit a crime or at a minimum the awareness of substantial 
likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the act or omission instigated’.114 ‘[I]t is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct of 
another person committing the crime’.115 Nevertheless, there is no requirement to prove that the 
offence would not have taken place without the contribution of the instigator.116 
 
2.2.1.3 ORDERING 
The mode of “ordering” requires that the person in question is in possession of authority and utilises it 
in order to instruct another individual to commit a crime.117 Notwithstanding the pre-condition of 
“authority”, there is no requirement which prescribes that the order giver is in a “superior-subordinate” 
relationship with the person receiving the order.118  
 
2.2.1.4 COMMISSION 
Commission does not pose any doubt as to the categorisation into modes attracting principal or 
accessory liability as it is the basic mode giving rise to principal liability. The principal to a crime 
imposes liability by fulfilling the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.119 The ICTR Trial Chamber 
held that the commission of a crime ‘implies, primarily physically perpetrating a crime’.120 It is, 
however, additionally possible to attract such principal liability by omission.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 108) para 482; Prosecutor v Nahimana et al. (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A 
(28. November 2007) para 480; Blaškić Trial Judgment (n 109) para 280.  
113 Blaškić Trial Judgment (n 109) para 280; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment (n 67) para 387.  
114 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment (n 112) para 480.  
115 Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment (n 110) para 27; Prosecutor v Popović et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-05-88-
T (10 June 2010) Volume I, para 1009. 
116 Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment (n 110) para 27. 
117 Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment (n 110) para 28; Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-
29-A, 20 (30 November 2006) para 176; Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski (Appeal Judgment) IT-04-82-A 
(19 May 2010) para 160. Prosecutor v Milošević (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-29/1-A (12 November 2009) para 
290; Prosecutor v Gotovina et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-06-90-T (15 April 2011) Volume II, para 1959. 
118 Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment (n 110) para 28; Prosecutor v Semanza (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-97-20 
A (20 May 2005) para 361: ‘All that it required was the implied existence of a superior-subordinate 
relationship’. Prosecutor v Kalimanzira (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-05-88-A (20 October 2010) para 213.  
119 When considering whether responsibility for participation in a JCE was within the ambit of Article 7(1) ICTR 
Statute, the Appeals Chamber considered the meaning of commission in the Tadić case and stated that, ‘This 
provision covers first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable 
omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law’. Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 188; Kordić 
and Čerkez Trial Judgment (n 67) para 376; Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-
95-1-A (1 June 2001) para 187; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Trial Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-T (17 June 2004) para 
285; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 2006) para 60. 
120 Prosecutor v Kalimanzira (Trial Judgment) ICTR-05-88-T (22 June 2009) para 161; Kalimanzira Appeal 
Judgment (n 118) para 218; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment (n 112) para 482.  
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2.2.1.5 AIDING AND ABETTING 
Another mode enumerated by Articles 7(1) ICTY Statute and 6(1) ICTR Statute respectively, is the 
mode of aiding and abetting, which ‘may occur before, during, or after the commission of the principal 
crime’.121 It contains two different concepts, which must be distinguished from each other.122 While 
aiding can be referred to as assisting someone, abetting was held to involve ‘facilitating the 
commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto’.123 While the actus reus of aiding and abetting124 
entails ‘practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime’,125 the required mens rea is that the aider and abettor had the ‘knowledge 
that these acts assist the commission of the offence’.126 The ICTY Trial Chamber further held in  
Blaškić that the actus reus of aiding and abetting could also be fulfilled through an omission if the 
‘failure to act had a decisive effect on the commission of the crime’ and if the required mens rea was 
present.127 In the Appeals judgment, the Chamber held that, ‘The aider and abettor carries out acts 
specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific 
crime (...), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime’.128 It then 
contrasted the participation in a JCE by stating that ‘it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts 
that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose’.129 The Appeals 
Chamber in Vasiljević confirmed this definition of the mens rea and actus reus of aiding and abetting 
and added the ‘requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor 
assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal. (…)’.130 
In subsequent case law there has been confusion as to whether “specific direction” of an act is an 
essential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.131 While the Trial Chamber held in the 
Perišić case that the specific direction requirement was not a requisite element of the mode of aiding 
and abetting, thereby relying on the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, and Blagojević and Jokić Appeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 48; Gotovina et al. (n 117) Volume 
II, para 1960. 
122 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 108) para 484; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment (n 67) para 389. 
123 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 108) para 484. 
124 However, the mode of aiding and abetting originally derives from English criminal law and denotes four 
separate modes of liability. While aiding means giving support, helping or providing assitstance, abetting refers 
to the act of inciting by aid, or to instigate or encourage. 
125 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment (n 112) para 482; Prosecutor v Simić (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-9-A (28 
November 2006) para 85; Blagojević and Jokić (Appeal Judgment) IT-02-60-A (9 May 2007) para 127. 
126 Furundžija Trial Judgment (n 21) para 249; Blaškić Trial Judgment (n 109) para 283; Gotovina et al. Trial 
Judgment (n 117), para 1960. 
127 Blaškić Trial Judgment (n 109). 
128 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 229 (iii). 
129 Ibid. 
130 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 102. 
131 The discussion revolving around the “specific direction requirement” is extensive and a thorough account of 
the issues exceeds the scope of this essay. See inter alia Prosecutor v Šainović et al. (Appeal Judgment) IT-05-
87-A (23 January 2014) paras 1615 seq. 
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Judgments,132 the Appeals Chamber subsequently found by a majority133 in its 2013 Perišić Appeal 
Judgment that the Trial Chamber erred in law by stating that specific direction was not an element of 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting.134 The Appeal Chamber further underlined the essential nature of 
the ‘specific direction element’135 by emphasising that no conviction for aiding and abetting could be 
entered if the presence of the specific direction requirement was not proven beyond reasonable 
doubt.136 
In the Šainović Appeal Judgment, the Chamber acknowledged the two conflicting approaches between 
the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin and Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgments in relation to the ‘specific 
direction element’ on the one hand and the Perišić Appeal Judgment on the other hand. It first 
considered ‘the jurisprudence of the Tribunal [ICTY] and the ICTR as well as customary international 
law to ascertain where the law stands on the issue of specific direction’.137 The Appeal Chamber then 
turned to previous jurisprudence138 and thus to the definition of aiding and abetting in Tadić, pointing 
out that the definition was made in the context of distinguishing JCE from aiding and abetting and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment (n 30) para 159; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment (n 125) 
paras 182, 185, 189. The Appeals Chamber held in Blagojević and Jokić at para 189: ‘(…) while the Tadić 
definition has not been explicitly departed from, specific direction has not always been included as an element of 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting. This may be explained by the fact that such a finding will often be implicit 
in the finding that the accused has provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator, which had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime. The Appeals Chamber also considers that, to the extent 
specific direction forms an implicit part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, where the accused knowingly 
participated in the commission of an offence and his or her participation substantially affected the commission of 
that offence, the fact that his or her participation amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not 
exculpate the accused’.  
In Prosecutor v Lukić and Lukić (Appeal judgment) IT-98-21/1-A (4 December 2012) para 424, the Appeal 
Chamber relied on the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin (n 30) and Blagojević and Jokić (n 125) Appeal Judgments and 
stated: ‘The Appeals Chamber has previously considered within the discussion of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting the finding that an act or omission of an aider or abettor be “specifically directed” toward the 
furtherance of the crimes of the principal perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that “specific 
direction has not always been included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting”. It further recalls 
its conclusion that such a finding of specific direction “will often be implicit in the finding that the accused has 
provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime”’. In Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, the Appeals Chamber had clarified ‘that “specific direction” is not an 
essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting’.  
133 Judge Liu dissenting. 
134Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment (n 30) para 159. 
135 The Appeal Chamber pointed out that there was a lack of sufficient analysis in order to identify the evidence, 
which proves specific direction. The Appeal Chamber then referred to the Tadić Appeal Judgment, which 
suggested that ‘that specific direction involves finding a closer link between acts of an accused aider and abettor 
and crimes committed by principal perpetrators than is necessary to support conviction under JCE’. Prosecutor v 
Perišić (Appeal Judgment) IT-04-81-A (28 February 2013) para 44. 
136 Perišić Appeal Judgment (n 135) para 36: ‘Accordingly, despite the ambiguity of the Mrkšić and 
Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that specific direction 
remains an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu 
dissenting, thus reaffirms that no conviction for aiding and abetting may be entered if the element of specific 
direction is not established beyond reasonable doubt, either explicitly or implicitly’. See also Šainović et al. 
Appeal Judgment (n 131) para 1618. 
137 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgment (n 131) para 1622. 
138 The Appeals Chamber made inter alia reference to Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/1-
A, (24 March 2000) para 111: ‘Where, in a case before it, the Appeals Chamber is faced with previous decisions 
that are conflicting, it is obliged to determine which decision it will follow, or whether to depart from both 
decisions for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.’ 
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concluded139 that ‘the analysis of the previous case law conducted in the Perišić Appeal Judgment 
relied on the flawed premise that the Tadić Appeal Judgment established a precedent with respect to 
specific direction, often repeating verbatim the language used in the Tadić Appeal Judgment’.140 
Finally, after examining pertinent jurisprudence concerning crimes committed during WWII,141 
followed by an examination of national law142 and “international instruments”143 such as the ILC draft 
code with the intention to identify elements constitution aiding and abetting liability,144 it concluded 
after an examination of 32 jurisdictions,145 that no ‘clear common principle’ could be deduced ‘from 
the major legal systems of the world’ 146 and that ‘“specific direction” was not an element of aiding 
and abetting established in customary international law’.147 Hence, based on the above, the Appeals 
Chamber, Judge Tuzmukhamedov dissenting, ultimately rejected ‘the approach adopted in the Perišić 
Appeal Judgment’.148 
Despite the distinguishing features of the concept, the mode “aiding and abetting” is usually invoked 
‘together as a single broad legal concept’.149 Aiding and abetting is an accessory mode of liability and 
has been treated as such in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. According to the Appeal Chamber in 
Tadić, “The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the 
principal.’150 Moreover, the ICTY Appeals Chamber went further by stating that ‘(...) aiding and 
abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence than is appropriate to 
responsibility as a co-perpetrator’.151 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Judge Tuzmukhamedov dissenting. 
140 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgment (n 131) para 1623. 
141 Ibid para 1627 seq. 
142 Ibid para 1643. 
143 Ibid para 1647. 
144 Ibid. 
145 The Appeals Chamber examined the elements of aiding and abetting liability of the following jurisdictions: 
Mexico, India, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Mali, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Australia, Canada, Ghana, Israel, England, US, Burundi, and 
Germany. 
146 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgment (n 131) para 1644. 
147 Ibid para 1649. 
148 Ibid para 1650. 
149 Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003), para 384, see also fn 639 
making reference to Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law (3rd edn Butterworths Law, 1994) 272, where it is 
stated that aiding and abetting is ‘most universally used conjunctively’. 
150 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 229 (i); Prosecutor v Perišić (Trial Judgment) IT-04-81-T (6 September 
2011) para 127 and see further para 28 of the Perišić Appeal Judgment (n 135). The Appeals Chamber further 
made reference to ICTR practice in relation to the “specific direction” requirement: ‘To date, no judgment of the 
Appeals Chamber has found cogent reasons to depart from the definition of aiding and abetting liability adopted 
in the Tadić Appeal Judgment. Moreover, many subsequent Tribunal and ICTR appeal judgments explicitly 
referred to “specific direction” in enumerating the elements of aiding and abetting, often repeating verbatim the 
Tadić Appeal Judgment’s relevant holding’. For extensive sources see para 28 fn 70. 
151 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 182. 
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2.2.1.6 JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE 
The most heinous crimes – and thus specifically macro crimes on an international level – are generally 
committed by a number of individuals acting together in order to achieve a common goal.152 
Accordingly, the strongest distinctive feature in comparison to a single direct perpetrator, is the fact 
that the initiators or even the most powerful persons involved in such a “system” are frequently 
“behind the scene” and thus locally detached from the place where the offence is committed. Others 
may merely be receivers of orders and act according to instructions given to them.153 In response to 
this reality, the ad hoc tribunals and particularly the ICTY have created, adopted and developed the 
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) in order to attribute criminal liability even to those 
perpetrators absent from the “scene”, thereby reflecting their culpability. This doctrine can be divided 
into three categories, namely JCE I, JCE II and JCE III, and it has its origin in the case law of the 
ICTY.154 The three JCE categories share the same actus reus requirement, according to which a 
plurality of persons must have made at least a significant contribution to a plan,155 which is common to 
all of the individuals involved.156 In relation to the concept of co-perpetration as utilised at the ICC 
one should recall that neither is the individual required to exercise control over the crime, nor does the 
contribution have to be “substantial”.157 However, the mens rea requirements differ in relation to the 
three categories of JCE. The mens rea requirement of JCE I is the intent to commit a specific offence, 
which is common to the other joint perpetrators.158 In relation to JCE II, which regards the so-called 
“concentration camp cases”, the mens rea requirement is that, in addition to the intent, as required for 
JCE I, the accused must have personally known of the ‘system of ill treatment’, and that he intended to 
‘further this common concerted system of ill-treatment’.159 Finally, for JCE III to be applicable, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 M Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Hart 2009) 153. 
153 Ibid 153. 
154 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) paras 227, 228, 229. 
155 However, there may be exceptions to the general rule that the contribution does not have to be substantial; see 
Prosecutor v Kvočka et al. (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-30/1-A (28 February 2005) para 97: ‘However, there may 
be specific cases which require, as an exception to the general rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to 
determine whether he participated in the joint criminal enterprise. In practice, the significance of the accused’s 
contribution will be relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose’. 
156 This frequently cited definition of JCE was laid down in the Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23). According to this 
judgment certain elements must be given in order to incur JCE liability, para 227: ‘In sum, the objective 
elements (actus reus) of this mode of participation in one of the crimes provided for in the Statute (with regard 
to each of the three categories of cases) are as follows: (i) A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a 
military, political or administrative structure, as is clearly shown by the Essen Lynching and the Kurt Goebell 
cases. (ii) The existence of a common plan, design or purpose, which amounts to or involves the commission of a 
crime provided for in the Statute. There is no necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously 
arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from 
the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise. (iii) Participation of 
the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. 
This participation need not involve commission of a specific crime under one of those provisions (for example, 
murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the 
execution of the common plan or purpose’. See also Kvočka et al. Trial Judgment (n 22) para 266. 
157 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment (n 155) paras 97, 98; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment) IT-99-36-A (3 
April 2007) para 430; Wirth (n 55) 332. 
158 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 228. 
159 Ibid. 
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mental element requires that there was the ‘intention to participate in and further the criminal activity 
or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to 
the commission of a crime by the group’.160 It is noteworthy that liability for a crime, which was 
outside the agreed plan, is incurred when the consequences were foreseeable.161 Accordingly, the latter 
is the most far-reaching category of JCE, which has been subject to criticism.162 The ECCC has held 
that JCE III does not constitute customary international law.163 In the context of a normative 
distinction between principals and accessories, the common purpose arguably attracts the most 
attention amongst the different modes of liability. The ICTY particularly has demonstrated in the past 
that it follows a differentiated approach by clearly distinguishing between principals and accessories 
despite the fact that, when looking at the origin JCE doctrine, namely the Tadić case, one can observe 
rather contradictory statements in relation to its classification.164 However, in its subsequent case law, 
the ICTY has expressly stated in a number of cases that participation as a member of a JCE incurs 
principal liability.165 Yet there is still much confusion as to the nature of JCE, as there have been a few 
attempts to follow a rather unitary approach.166 The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac clearly expressed its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 See for instance the Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007(ECCC/TC, 12.09.2011, para 27. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Prosecutor v Milan Milutinović et al. (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – 
Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para 31; H Olásolo, ‘Current Trends on Modes of 
Liability’ (n 100) 523; Damgaard (n 4) 193; Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 188: ‘This provision covers (...) 
the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself (...) However, the commission of one of the crimes 
(...) might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common purpose’. Para 192: ‘Under these 
circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially perform the criminal act 
would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator 
physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, (...) to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors 
might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility’. Cf para 220: ‘(…) the Appeals Chamber holds the 
view that the notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary 
international law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International Tribunal’. In para 
229: ‘In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish between acting in pursuance of a 
common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting. (i) The aider and abettor is always an 
accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal’. 
165 Milan Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction (n 164) para 20; 
Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment (n 155) para 91: ‘(...) The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that joint criminal 
enterprise is simply a means of committing a crime; it is not a crime in itself (...)’. Prosecutor v Krnojelac 
(Appeal Judgment) IT-97-25-A (17 September 2013) para 73: ‘(...) The Chamber views participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” under Article 7(1) of the Statute. (...)’. Vasiljević Appeal 
Judgment (1) para 102: ‘Participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of “commission” under Article 7(1) 
of the Statute. The participant therein is liable as a co-perpetrator of the crime(s). Aiding and abetting the 
commission of a crime is usually considered to incur a lesser degree of individual criminal responsibility than 
committing a crime (...)’. Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment (n 112) para 478 with reference to para 188 of the 
Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23): ‘The Appeals Chamber recalls that commission covers, primarily, the physical 
perpetration of a crime (with a criminal intent) or a culpable omission of an act that is mandated by a rule of 
criminal law, but also participation in a joint criminal enterprise’. See also Olásolo, ‘Current Trends on Modes of 
Liability’ (n 100) 523. 
166 Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Dragoljub Ojdanić to Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (n 14) para 31; H Olásolo, ‘Developments in the Distinction between Principal and Accessorial 
Liability in the Light of the First Case-Law of the ICC’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (Brill 2009) 345. 
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stance by rejecting the idea of embracing a normative approach in relation to modes of liability, as 
follows: 
74 The purpose behind the Prosecution’s approach appears to be to classify the participant in a 
joint criminal enterprise who was not the principal offender as a “perpetrator” or a “co-
perpetrator”, rather than someone who merely aids and abets the principal offender. The 
significance of the distinction appears to be derived from the civil law, where a person who merely 
aids and abets the principal offender is subject to a lower maximum sentence. 
75 The Trial Chamber does not accept that this distinction is necessary for sentencing in 
international law, and in particular holds that it is irrelevant to the sentencing practice of this 
Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber has made it clear that a convicted person must be punished for the 
seriousness of the acts which he has done, whatever their categorisation.167 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, there are two different positions regarding the legal 
consequences attached to either accessories, namely aiders and abettors and principals, particularly if 
they are involved in a JCE. In the Krnojelac Trial Judgment it was held that the distinction between a 
principal and someone who ‘merely aids and abets’ was immaterial for sentencing purposes.168 
Similarly, Judge David Hunt clarified in in his Separate Opinion Challenge by Dragoljub Ojdanić to 
Jurisdiction, that categorisation into different modes of liability for sentencing purposes is 
unnecessary.169  
Notwithstanding that, the position that a principal accessory distinction is material for sentencing 
purposes has been corroborated by a number of judgments. In Vasiljević the Appeals Chamber 
reduced the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber from 20 to 15 years. The sentence was reduced 
purely on the basis that he was held to be an aider and abettor as opposed to a co-perpetrator.170 In a 
similar vein, following an appeal, it was held in Krstić that the sentence had to be adjusted171 on the 
basis that Kristić was found to be an aider and abettor to genocide and not a co-perpetrator, as was 
held by the Trial Chamber. Thus, the Appeals Chamber also relied172 on the Criminal Code of the 
SFRY173 and further stated with reference to Vasiljević that aiding and abetting generally attracts a 
lower sentence than responsibility as a co-perpetrator. Moreover, this approach was demonstrated in 
the very recent case of Ndahimana,174 where the Appeals Chamber increased175 Ndahimana’s sentence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Krnojelac Trial Judgment (n 3) paras 74, 75. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Dragoljub Ojdanić to Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (n 14) para 31. 
170 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 181; Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 268. 
171 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) paras 266, 268. 
172 Ibid para 270: ‘(...) the Appeals Chamber has considered the sentencing practice of the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia applicable in this case, and has taken those practices into account. In particular, the sentence of a 
person who aided a principal perpetrator to commit a crime can be reduced to a sentence less than the one given 
to the principal perpetrator’. 
173 Article 24 CC SFRY: ‘A person, who premeditatedly aided another person in perpetration of a criminal act, 
will be punished as if he had committed it, his sentence can also be reduced’. 
174 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2). 
175 ‘The Appeals Chamber considers that, in the circumstances of this case, the elevation of Ndahimana’s 
responsibility from that of an aider and abettor to that of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise results in an 
increase of his overall culpability which calls for a higher sentence’. Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2) para 
252. 
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from 15 to 25 years based on the finding that he was a member of a JCE, and not merely an aider and 
abettor.176 A more detailed examination in relation to the sentencing practice of international courts 
and tribunals in the context of individual criminal responsibility will be carried out in Chapter 3. 
It appears that, although the majority seems to embrace a differentiated model, the contradictory 
approach of following a unitary system in sentencing practice is clearly present. Hence, this leads 
inevitably to confusion and unpredictability in particular in view of the link to sentencing, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. As van Sliedregt notes, the reason for such contradictory approaches 
is based on the fact that ‘JCE as a unique concept which originates from a mixed civil and common 
law system is composed of elements originating from different legal cultures and applied by persons 
from varying legal backgrounds’.177 While the ICTY has engaged in extensive discussions in relation 
to the nature of the JCE doctrine in the context principal-accessory distinction, the ICTR has come to 
the same conclusion, but with less discussion.178 In Karutunimama, the Appeals Chamber first 
reproduced the ICTY’s finding in Tadić 179 that JCE was a form of commission and then went on to 
clarify that, due to the fact that Articles 7(1) ICTY and 6(1) mirrored each other, it was satisfied that 
the case law of the ICTY should be applied at the ICTR.180 This was thereafter again confirmed in the 
2007 Appeals judgment of Gacumbitsi.181 
 
2.2.2 MODES OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE ICC 
 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute embodies the concept of individual criminal responsibility. While 
paragraph 1 stipulates that natural persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, paragraph 2 
establishes individual criminal responsibility for an individual ‘who commits a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’. Paragraph 3 then goes on to list various modes of liability in detail; 
subsection (a) lists various forms of commission, namely, individual commission, co-perpetration and 
indirect perpetration. Thereafter, in subsection (b) various forms of contribution, ie ordering, soliciting 
and inducing are incriminated.182 According to Werle, Article 25(3) not only lists various modes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 It is worth mentioning that in the Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2) para 252 fn 642 the Appeals Chamber 
clarified that the membership in a JCE constitutes a form of “commission”. Reference was made to Milan 
Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction (n 164) para 20; Tadić 
Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 188 and Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment (n 112) para 478.  
177 E van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide’ (2014) 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 184, 199. 
178 H Olásolo, ‘Current Trends on Modes of Liability’ (n 100) 523. 
179 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23). 
180 Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A (13 
December 2004) para 468: ‘Given the fact that both the ICTY and the ICTR have mirror articles identifying the 
modes of liability by which an individual can incur criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY should be applied to the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute’. 
181 Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment (n 119) para 158: ‘The Appeals Chamber, following ICTY precedent, has 
recognised that an accused before this Tribunal may be found individually responsible for “committing” a crime 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Statute under one of three categories of “joint criminal enterprise” 
(“JCE”) liability (...)’. See also regarding the relevance for the indictment: Prosecutor v Simba (Judgment and 
Sentence) ICTR-2001-76-T (13 December 2005) para 389. 
182 This includes the attempt of any of these forms of participation. 
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participation, but it categorises them into four groups: (i) commission, (ii) ordering and instigating, 
(iii) assistance, and (iv) contributing.183 He further contends that ‘(…) the distinction between different 
modes of participation is not just a question of correct phenomenological description’ but that a ‘value 
oriented hierarchy of participation’ is created.184 This stance clearly opposes Judge Fulford’s position, 
who holds that the forms of participation in Article 25 (3) are not mutually exclusive and do not create 
a hierarchy of seriousness descending from subsection a) to subsection d).185 Similarly Judge van den 
Wyngaert clarified in her concurrent opinion concerning the judgment of Prosecutor v Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui with reference to Judge Fulford’s Separate Opinion186 that despite the fact that there is 
a conceptual difference between principal and accessorial liability, ‘there is no proper basis for 
concluding that acting under Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute is less serious than acting under Article 
25(3)(a)’. 
Initially, the practice of the ICC has demonstrated that judges were inclined to follow a principal-
accessory distinction.187 In the Lubanga decision on Confirmation of Charges188 the Pre Trial Chamber 
made reference to three different approaches, which all serve the distinction between principal and 
accessory, namely the objective approach,189 the subjective approach,190 and the concept of control 
over the crime.191 It thereby clarified that it rejects the objective approach, according to which only 
those individuals who physically carry out the crime can be considered to be principals.192 However, it 
also dismissed the subjective approach, followed by the ICTY, in line with the self-created doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise. Pre Trial Chamber I criticised that the subjective approach shifts the focus 
from the ‘level of contribution to the commission as the distinguishing criterion between principals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’ (n 4) 957. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (n 15) para 8: ‘Some have suggested that Article 25(3) establishes 
a hierarchy of seriousness as regards the various forms of participation in a crime, with Article 25(3)(a) 
constituting the gravest example and Article 25(3)(d) the least serious. I am unable to adopt this approach. In my 
judgment, there is no proper basis for concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 25(3)(b)) 
is a less serious form of commission than committing it “though another person” (Article 25(3)(a)), and these 
two concepts self-evidently overlap. Similarly I am unable to accept that the criminality of accessories (Article 
25(3)(c)) is greater than those who participate within a group (Article 25(3)(d)), particularly since many of 
history’s most serious crimes occurred as the result of the coordinated action of groups of individuals, who 
jointly pursued a common goal’. 
186 Ibid para 9. 
187 van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 79. 
188 Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (n 17) paras 22, 23. 
189 Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges) (n 46) para 328: ‘The objective approach to such a 
distinction focuses on the realisation of one or more of the objective elements of the crime. From this perspective 
only those who carry out one or more of the objective elements of the offence can be considered principals to the 
crime’. 
190 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (n 46) para 329: ‘The subjective approach – which is the 
approach adopted by the jurisprudence of the ICTY through the concept of joint criminal enterprise or the 
common purpose doctrine – moves the focus from the level of contribution to the commission of the offence as 
the distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories and places it instead on the state of mind in which 
the contribution to the crime was made. As a result, only those who make their contribution with the shared 
intent to commit the offence can be considered principals to the crime, regardless of the level of their 
contribution to its commission’. 
191 Ibid paras 330-332. 
192 Ibid para 328. 
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and accessories’ on the perpetrator’s mens rea when he contributed to the crime.193 This leads to the 
result that, irrespective of the gravity of the individual’s contribution, only those who ‘make their 
contribution with a shared intent’ can be labelled as principals to the crime.194 Therefore, the principal 
accessory distinction at the ICC is made on the basis of the “control over the crime theory,” which 
derives from the writings of the German criminal law scholar Claus Roxin. According to Pre Trial 
Chamber I, it includes both a subjective and an objective component and is not restricted to one or the 
other:195  
The notion underpinning this third approach is that principals to a crime are not limited to those 
who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include those who, in 
spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission 
because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed.196 
As can be seen, the ICC did not follow the approach of the ad hoc tribunals and particularly of the 
ICTY at the attribution stage, but it did follow a principal-accessory distinction (at least 
terminologically) based on the differentiated theory. In fact, the approach of the ICC is closely based 
on the German approach, which will be further discussed in the context of the comparative study in 
Chapter 2. 
To date, however, the ICC appears to distance itself from a differentiated approach. In Katanga197 it 
clarified:  
(...) In effect, Article 25 of the Statute merely identifies various forms of unlawful conduct and, 
in that sense, the distinction between the liability of a perpetrator of and an accessory to a crime 
does not under any circumstances constitute a “hierarchy of blameworthiness”, let alone 
enunciate a tariff, not even implicitly. Hence, it is not precluded that having adjudged guilt, a 
bench may choose to mete out mitigated penalties to accessories, although to do so is not 
peremptory. The fact remains that neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
prescribe[s] a rule for the mitigation of penalty for forms of liability other than commission and 
the Chamber sees no automatic correlation between mode of liability and penalty. From this it is 
clear that a perpetrator of a crime is not always viewed as more reprehensible than an 
accessory.198 
Ultimately, the distinction between perpetrator of and accessory to a crime inheres in the Statute 
but does not, nonetheless, entail a hierarchy, whether in respect of guilt or penalty. Each mode of 
liability has different characteristics and legal ramifications which reflect various forms of 
involvement in criminality. However, this does not necessarily signify that accused persons will 
be found less culpable or will incur a lesser penalty.199  
Accordingly it can be seen that the ICC rejects the idea of a principle of mitigation for accessories to a 
crime, although it remains to be seen whether it will continue with this approach in the future. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Ibid para 329. 
194 Ibid para 329. 
195 Ibid para 331. 
196 Ibid para 330. 
197 Prosecutor v Katanga (Trial Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07 (14 March 2014) paras 1386, 1387; see also 
Prosecutor v Katanga (Sentencing Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23 May 2014) para 61. 
198 Katanga Trial Judgment (n 197) para 1386. 
199 Ibid para 1387. 
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2.2.3 INTERNATIONALISED TRIBUNALS AND SPECIAL DOMESTIC COURTS 
 
2.2.3.1 SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (SCSL) 
Due to the fact that section 1 of the English Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 was incorporated into 
the national law of Sierra Leone,200 it is clear that a unitary approach is embraced by the criminal law 
of Sierra Leone. The provisions on individual criminal responsibility are set out in Article 6(1) SCSL 
Statute, which is literally identical to Article 7(1) ICTY and Article 6(1) ICTR. It follows that the 
modes of liability expressly enumerated in Article 6(1) coincide in terms of their interpretation with 
the respective provisions of the ad hoc tribunals. However, the SCSL does not limit itself to the 
statutory prescribed modes of liability, and thus follows the approach of the ad hoc tribunals by 
introducing the doctrine of JCE in its case law. In the Charles Taylor judgment,201 the SCSL resorted 
to ‘Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility’202 when discussing the individual 
criminal liability of Taylor based on JCE. A closer look reveals that the term “applicable law” referred 
to constitutes the pertinent basis of the JCE doctrine, as elaborated by the ICTY.203 Nevertheless, 
Taylor was ultimately not found liable as a participant in a JCE, but as an aider and abettor and for 
planning. In the Taylor Appeals Judgment,204 an extensive discussion revolved around the 
differentiated and unitary approaches. Thus, the SCSL Appeals Chamber made reference to Judge 
Fulford’s Separate Opinion in Lubanga: 
In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the Trial Chamber’s holding that aiding and abetting generally 
warrants [a] lesser sentence than other forms of participation is not consistent with the Statute, 
the Rules and this Appeals Chamber’s holdings. First, the plain language of Article 6(1) of the 
Statute clearly does not refer to or establish a hierarchy of any kind. Second, a hierarchy of 
gravity among forms of criminal participation in Article 8(1) is contrary to the essential 
requirement of individualisation that derives from the mandate of the Court, principles of 
individual criminal liability and the rights of the accused.205  
The Appeals Chamber then went on to reject the ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence, which was put forward by 
the defence and subsequently adopted by the Trial Chamber206 and which derived from the holding in 
Vasiljević.207 It then went even further by criticising the ICTY Appeal Chamber in Vasiljević for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Pursuant to section 74 of the Courts‘ 1965 Act, see Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T (18 
May 2012) inter alia para 6891 fn 15495. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid para 6891 at FN 15495.  
203 Such as, Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 227; Kvočka et al. Trial Judgment (n 22) para 266. 
203 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment (n 155) paras 97, 98; Brđanin Appeal Judgment (n 157) para 430. 
204 Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) SCSL-03-01-A (26 September 2013). 
205 Ibid para 666. 
206 Taylor Trial Judgment (n 200) para 21. 
207 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 182: ‘The Appeals Chamber is of the view that aiding and abetting is a 
form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence than is appropriate to responsibility as a co-
perpetrator. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the sentence to be imposed must reflect the inherent gravity of the 
criminal conduct of an accused. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that the Appellant committed very serious 
crimes. Therefore, taking into account the particular circumstances of this case as well as the form and degree of 
the participation of the Appellant in the crimes, the Appeals Chamber finds that a sentence of 15 years is 
appropriate’. 
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relying on pertinent provisions of national legal systems such as the US and Austria, despite the fact 
that these systems follow a unitary approach as opposed to differentiated.208 Thereafter, the Appeals 
Chamber drew on domestic law, namely section 1 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861,209 
according to which an accessory (before the fact) can incur liability to the same extent as a principal in 
every respect. With this Appeals Judgment, the Appeals Chamber has clearly attempted to distance 
itself from a differentiated approach, which reads as follows: 
In applying the Statute and customary international law, the Appeals Chamber is guided by the 
decisions of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber. The Chamber looks as well to the decisions 
of the Appeals Chamber of the ECCC and STL and other sources of authority. The Appeals 
Chamber, however, is the final arbiter of the law for this Court, and the decisions of other courts 
are only persuasive, not binding, authority. The Appeals Chamber recognises and respects that 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber is the final arbiter of the law for that Court.210 
Notwithstanding that, the above discussion clearly indicates that the case law of the SCSL appears to 
be influenced by the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, and particularly the ICTY, and suggests that 
there is a trend of following the ICC in this regard. Considering the extent of the disputes concerning 
the differentiated and the unitary approach at the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, a more uniform 
approach seems impossible and discrepancies are predetermined. Nevertheless, it should be 
highlighted that the SCSL critically scrutinised the alleged principle in accordance with pertinent 
jurisprudence prior to rejecting it. 
 
2.2.3.2 EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (ECCC) 
The concept of individual criminal responsibility is embodied in Article 29(1) of the ECCC Statute, 
which reads: ‘[a]ny Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the 
crimes referred to in Article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this law shall be individually responsible for the 
crime’.211 Just as with Articles 7(1) ICTY and 6(1) ICTR, Article 29(1) ECCC Statute does not 
expressly include the JCE doctrine.212 It can be observed that the Pre Trial Chamber regards JCE as a 
mode of liability falling within the ambit of commission liability, thereby following the predominant 
approach of the ad hoc tribunals: ‘The Pre-Trial Chamber is of the view that both the domestic form of 
co-perpetration and participation in a JCE are modes of responsibility which fall within the purpose of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Taylor Appeal Judgment (n 204) para 667. 
209 The Accessory and Abettors Act 1861, which applies in Sierra Leone reads as follows: ‘Whosoever shall 
become an Accessory before the Fact to any Felony, whether the same be a Felony at Common Law or by virtue 
of any Act passed or to be passed, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were a 
principal Felon’. 
210 Taylor Appeal Judgment (n 204) para 472. 
211 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Trial Judgment) Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC (26 July 
2010) para 470.  
212 The concept and notion of JCE is not originally embraced by Cambodian national law, but adopted from 
international criminal law; see F Eckelmans, ‘The ECCC in the Context of Cambodian Law’ in H Peng and 
others (eds), Introduction to Cambodian Law (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2012) 462. However, it has been noted 
by the ECCC that the notion of JCE in its “basic and systemic forms” resembles the concept of co-perpetration 
under the Cambodian Penal Code of 1965, it stressed however that the notions are not identical, see Kaing Guek 
Eav alias Duch, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 26 July 2010, para 510. 
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Article 29 of the ECCC Law and are forms of commission’.213 In relation to the applicability of JCE 
III, both the Pre-Trial214 and Trial Chamber215 held that the extended form of JCE did not form a 
principle of customary international law during 1975 -1979 and was therefore not applicable. This was 
only recently confirmed in the Decision on Meas Muth’s motions on the application of JCE III, where 
it was noted that the ‘applicability of JCE III is the subject of an appeal’ and currently ‘pending before 
the Supreme Court Chamber’.216 
 
In a similar manner, it can be observed that, in relation to aiding and abetting liability, the ECCC also 
uses a wording which is very similar to the diction laid down in the Statutes of the ICTR and ICTY.217 
Considering that the ECCC is mostly following the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to 
the attribution of individual criminal responsibility, it appears unlikely in this instance that it will be 
exempted from the confusion and inconsistency revolving around the principal accessory distinction 
and pertinent legal consequences. 
 
2.2.3.3 SPECIAL PANELS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES (SPSC) 
A relatively large number of judgments rendered by the Special Panels for Serious Crimes involve 
low-rank physical perpetrators, charged with murder.218 This is particularly true for trials which took 
place in 2000 and 2001, and the number of such cases descends in 2002.219 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is anchored in section 14.3 of Regulation No. 
2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences. It 
entirely conforms with Article 25 of the Rome Statute. Despite the fact that the ICC approach towards 
different modes of liability has been adopted, reference to the case law of the ad hoc tribunals has 
been made in the past by parties before the Special Panels.220 This is particularly true for the doctrine 
of JCE, which, along with other modes of liability, was thoroughly discussed in the judgment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Co-Prosecutors v Ieng Thirith, Iieng Sary and Khieu Samphan (Public Decision on the Appeals against the 
Co-investigative Judges’ Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)) Criminal Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38) (20 May 2010) para 102. 
214 Ibid paras 75-89. 
215 Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise (n 52) 26-38. 
216 Co-Prosecutors v Meas Muth (Decision on Meas Muth’s motions on the application of JCE III) Criminal 
Case File No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, paras 8, 9. 
217 G Boas and others, Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law, International Criminal Law 
Practitioner Library (Volume 1, CUP 2011) 337. 
218 In such cases defendants are generally charged under S. 8 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and Article 340 of 
the Penal Code of Indonesia. The former provides in the case of murder: ‘For the purposes of the present 
regulation, the provisions of the applicable Penal Code in East Timor shall, as appropriate, apply’. Further, 
Article 340 of the Indonesian Penal Code stipulates that: ‘The person who with deliberate intent and with 
premeditation takes the life of another person, shall, being guilty of murder, be punished by capital punishment 
of life imprisonment or a maximum imprisonment of twenty years’. See also Boas and others, Forms of 
Responsibility (n 217) 377. 
219 See among others, Prosecutor v Joseph Leki (Trial Judgment) Case No.05/2000, SPSC (11 June 2001); 
Prosecutor v Augusto Dos Santos (Trial Judgment) Case No. 06/2001, SPSC (14 May 2002). 
220 Boas and others, Forms of Responsibility (n 217) 133. 
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Prosecutor v Joni Marques et al., one of the most detailed judgments rendered by the Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes.221 Thus, prior to evaluating the evidence and reaching a verdict, the Panel 
recapitulated the submissions of the prosecution and of the defence. It first stated that, according to the 
prosecution, the modes of participation laid down in 14.3(a), (b) and (c) were of ‘particular relevance’ 
to the case, as ‘all of the offences charged have co-accused’.222 The Panel then restated the 
prosecution’s reference to Tadić in relation to the pertinent modes of participation applicable in this 
case. In relation to a principal-accessory distinction, specific reference was made to Tadić, where the 
Appeals Chamber stated that ‘[i]n the light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to 
distinguish between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crimes, and 
aiding and abetting. The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another 
person, the principal (…)’.223 In relation to the consultation of sources, the panel clarified in Marques 
et al. that, when meting out the sentence, it ‘considered all the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances upheld both by the practices of East Timorese courts in applying the Penal Code of 
Indonesia (KUHP) and the standards derived from the ICTY and the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, apart from those provided for under UR-2000/15 as well as under general principles of law 
(...)’.224 
It follows that the following sources for assessment of mitigating and aggravating features were 
consulted by the tribunal: (i) Jurisprudence of the East Timorese courts, (ii) the Indonesian Penal 
Code, (iii) UNTAET Regulation No. 2000, and (iv) general principles of law. Indonesian criminal law 
distinguishes between the punishment of principals and accessories, and hence a differentiated 
approach is embraced. Article 57 of the Indonesian Penal Code provides inter alia that the punishment 
of an accessory shall be mitigated by one third from ‘the maximum of the basic punishments’.225 
Further, according to subsection (2) accessories are entitled to receive a maximum of 15 years, if the 
crime in question gives rise to life imprisonment or capital punishment. 
It has been criticised that there was a lack of clarity concerning the legal reasoning in attributing 
responsibility to each perpetrator, particularly in relation to the distinction between ‘the elements of 
the substantive crime and the elements of one or more of the forms of responsibility’.226 Similarly, to 
the author’s knowledge, no statement was made in relation to the legal consequences attaching to 
either principal or accessorial liability. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Prosecutor v Joni Marques et al. (Trial Judgment) Case No. 09/2000, SPSC (11 December 2001); see also 
Boas and others, Forms of Responsibility (n 217) 133. 
222 Joni Marques et al. Trial Judgment (n 221) 38, 39. 
223 Ibid paras 42 (page 27) citing Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 229 (i). 
224 Ibid para 981. 
225 Article 57 (1) KUHP. 
226 Boas and others, Forms of Responsibility (n 217) 134, 135. 
	   53 
2.2.3.4 SUPREME IRAQI CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (SICT) 
The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal is, strictly speaking, a domestic tribunal. Nevertheless it can be 
seen as a “semi-hybrid” judicial institution and is included for the sake of completeness. The Statute of 
the SICT provides for international provisions and also stipulates the resort to domestic law: 
Article 16 
The Court shall apply the Rules of Procedure stipulated in the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law No. 
23 for the year 1971, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence appended to this 
Statue, which is an indivisible and integral part of the Statue. 
 
Article 17 First:  
In case a stipulation is not found in this Statue and the rules made thereunder, the general 
principles of criminal law applicable in connection with the prosecution and trial of any accused 
person shall be those stipulated in the following laws: 
A. For the period between July 17, 1968 and December 14, 1969, the Baghdadi Criminal Code 
of 1919. 
B. For the period between December 15, 1969 and May 1, 2003, the Criminal Code No. 111 of 
1969, without regard to any amendments made thereafter. 
C. The Military Criminal Code No. 13 for the year 1940, as amended and the Military Criminal 
Procedure Code No. 44 for the year 1941, as amended. 
 
Further, since the amendment of the Statute of the SICT in 2005 and its adoption by Iraq`s 
Transitional National Assembly, Article 15 almost mirrors Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute.227 
Accordingly the same modes of liability are recognised by the SICT. Article 15(2) of the Statute 
clearly makes reference to the application of Iraqi criminal law.228 Hence, the Iraqi Penal Code No. 
111 of 1969 finds application for crimes committed between 15 December 1969 and 1 May 2003. 
Section 5 of the Code governs the liability of parties to a crime, thereby the provisions are divided 
between principal – and accessory modes of liability. Paragraph 47 of the Code, stipulates that the 
following participation modes give rise to principal liability: 
(1) Any person who commits an offence by himself or with others. 
(2) Any person who participates in the commission of an offence of a number of acts and who 
wilfully carries out one of those acts during the commission of that offence. 
(3) Any person who incites another in any way to commit an act contributing to an offence if that 
person is not in any way criminally liable for the offence. 
 
Further, Paragraph 48 enumerates participants in a crime, which are regarded as accessories: 
(1) Any person who incites another to commit an offence and that offence is committed on the 
basis of such incitement. 
(2) Any person who conspires with others to commit an offence and that offence is committed on 
the basis of such conspiracy. 
(3) Any person who knowingly supplies the principal to an offence with a weapon, instrument or 
anything else to commit an offence or deliberately assists him in any other way to carry out those 
acts for which he has received assistance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 There are deviations in subsection (f) relating to attempts. 
228 Article 15(2) SICT: ‘Second: In accordance with this Law, and the provisions of Iraqi criminal law, a person 
shall be criminally responsible if that person (...)’, see also Al Dujail Lawsuit (Case), Case No 1/9 First/2005, 
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This labelling is not final, as the Code further stipulates that: 
An accessory is considered to be a principal to an offence under the provisions of Paragraph 
48, if he is present during the commission of that offence or any act contributing to that 
offence. 
Interestingly, when it comes to the punishment of principals and accessories, the code does not attach 
generic legal consequences – despite the approach of clear distinction and categorisation of modes 
under the headings principal and accessory. This categorical, clear-cut approach is rarely found in 
such a striking style in national penal codes, particularly if the distinction is immaterial for sentencing 
purposes. Paragraph 50, which governs the punishment of principals and accessories, provides: 
(1) Any person who participates in the commission of an offence as principal or accessory is 
punishable by the penalty prescribed for that offence unless otherwise stipulated by law. 
(2) An accessory is punishable by the penalty prescribed by law, even though the principal is not 
punishable due to lack of criminal intent of his part or for other circumstances in respect of him. 
 
Thus, as for the punishment, the code is very clear in relation to the equality of treatment of principals 
and accessories. It does emphasise it even further in Paragraph 51: 
If there exist material circumstances in the offence that would by their nature increase 
or decrease the penalty, then they will affect all parties to the offence, principal or 
accessory, whether they are aware of those circumstances or not (…). 
In the Dujail case, jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on JCE has frequently been referred to and 
relied on when examining the role of the participants in the commission of the crime to direct the 
application of the “common purpose doctrine”, embraced by the Statute of the ICT.229 Yet, upon closer 
examination, one can observe a failure to distinguish and apply adequately concepts of JCE I, II and 
III, in line with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. 230 
 
2.2.3.5 SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON (STL) 
To date, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, having commenced the first trial on 16 January 2014, has 
not yet rendered a verdict. Therefore, examination of the approach, or likely approach, taken 
concerning the issue in question is conducted by means of the available materials. Article 3 of the 
Statute of the STL provides for individual criminal responsibility. Subsection (a) imposes liability on 
principals and accessories, who ‘organised or directed others to commit’ the respective crime. 
Additionally, subsection (b) entails the common purpose doctrine and imposes liability on ‘groups of 
persons acting with a common purpose’. However, according to Article 2 of the Statute, the provisions 
of the Lebanese criminal code referring to complicity are amongst some others applicable.231 
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230 Ibid. 
231 Article 2 (a) Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon reads as follows: ‘The following shall be applicable 
to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred to in article 1, subject to the provisions of this Statute: 
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Therefore, the domestic provisions on participation should be considered in more detail. In relation to 
the punishment of accessories and principals, Article 220 of the Lebanese Criminal Code provides the 
following: 
An accomplice without whose assistance the offence would not have been committed shall be punished as 
if he himself were the perpetrator. Other accomplices shall be punishable by hard labour for life or by 
fixed-term hard labour for 10 to 20 years if the perpetrator is sentenced to death. 
If the perpetrator is sentenced to hard labour for life or life imprisonment, accomplices shall be sentenced 
to the same penalty for 7 to 15 years. In other cases, they shall incur the same penalty as the perpetrator, 
with a reduction in its duration of between one sixth and one third. Preventive measures may be imposed 
on accomplices as though they were the perpetrators of the offence. 
Accordingly, the Lebanese criminal code distinguishes between principals ‘without whose assistance 
the offence would not have been committed’ and vice versa. While setting out that the former 
accomplices are to be punished as principal perpetrators, the others are entitled to mandatory 
mitigation. In the Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, the meaning and applicability of domestic and international modes 
of liability were discussed in depth.232 While Article 2 stipulates that the Tribunal shall consult the 
provisions regarding participation, Article 3 lists the modes of liability drawn on in international 
criminal law.233 Thus, it was first and foremost held that in deciding whether domestic or international 
modes of liability had to be applied, the Trial Judge and the Trial Chamber have to: (i) assess for each 
case, whether a conflict between the respective domestic law norm and the international provision 
exists, (ii) if no collusion between the two bodies of law exists, then Lebanese law is applicable but, if 
there is a clash, (ii) the respective the ‘body of law that would lead to a result more favourable to the 
accused’ is applicable.234 The Appeals Chamber then went on to discuss the modes of ‘[p]erpetration 
and [c]o-perpetration’, ‘[c]omplicity ([a]iding and [a]betting)’ and ‘[p]articipation in a [g]roup with a 
[c]ommon [p]urpose’ in the light of their meaning in domestic and international criminal law.235 
Unsurprisingly perpetration is defined identically in Lebanese and international criminal law. 
However, co-perpetration is termed ‘participation in a group with common purpose’ in Lebanese law: 
(i) while the actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires the 
contribution in form of a ‘substantial assistance’,236 Lebanese law expressly enumerates specific 
means by which assistance can be provided by an accessory and (ii) in international criminal law the 
mens rea requirement constitutes that the accused intended ‘to further the general illegality of the 
principal’s conduct’. Instead, in Lebanese law, the mens rea threshold of an aiding and abetting is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of 
terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes 
and offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and 
conspiracy.’ 
232 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/1 (16 February 2011). 
233 Ibid 4. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
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higher in that an aider and abettor not only has to know of the crime to be committed, he also has ‘to 
share the intent to further that particular crime’.237 
Finally, the question in which relationship the Lebanese concept of “participation in a group with a 
common purpose” stands with the JCE concept modes I and III, was raised. The Appeals Chamber 
concluded that ‘[t]he two bodies of law coincide in requiring a subjective element: both rely on intent 
or advertent recklessness (dolus eventualis)’.238 Thus, Lebanese law and international criminal law 
overlap in punishing the execution of a criminal agreement, where all the participants share the same 
criminal intent although each of them may play a different role in the execution of the crime. The two 
bodies of law also  
overlap in punishing those participants in a criminal enterprise who, although they had not agreed 
upon the perpetration of an “extra” crime, could be expected to know and did know of the 
reasonable possibility that such crime may be committed and willingly took the risk of its 
occurrence (so-called JCE Ill). However, under international criminal law, this notion cannot apply 
to “extra” crimes requiring special intent (as is the case with terrorism).239 
 
2.2.3.6 WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (WCCBIH) 
It is difficult to examine all of the judgments rendered by the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly as those rendered in 2013 and 2014 are largely not translated 
into English; however, despite these instances, the overwhelming majority of judgments rendered by 
the WCCBiH has been examined in relation to the role ascribed to modes of liability. The War Crimes 
Chamber of the State Court generally applies two different criminal codes, namely, the Criminal Code 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Criminal Code of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.240 Articles 29-32 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina241 provide for different 
forms of liability. Article 29242 of the Criminal Code provides that an accomplice to a crime is to be 
punished as principal perpetrator. In a similar manner, Article 30(i)243 stipulates that an inciter is 
subjected to the same penalty as the principal perpetrator who has committed the crime. Furthermore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Ibid . 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
240 OSCE, Moving towards a Harmonized Application of the Law Applicable in War Crimes Cases before Courts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE BiH (August 2008) 5. 
241 For a discussion revolving around the principle of legality and applicable law if the offence in question has 
been committed before it was defined as an offence in the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see 
Prosecutor v Ranko Vuković and Rajko Vuković (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-07/405 (4 February 
2008) 30-33; Prosecutor v Radomir Vuković and Zoran Tomić (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-06/180-2 
(22 April 2010) paras 610-613. 
242 Article 29: ‘If several persons who, by participating in the perpetration of a criminal offence or by taking 
some other act by which a decisive contribution has been made to its perpetration, have jointly perpetrated a 
criminal offence, shall each be punished as prescribed for the criminal offence’. 
243 Article 30(i): ‘(1) Whoever intentionally incites another to perpetrate a criminal offence, shall be punished as 
if he has perpetrated such offence. (2) Whoever intentionally incites another to perpetrate a criminal offence for 
which a punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or a more severe punishment is prescribed by law, 
and the criminal offence has never been attempted, shall be punished as for the attempt of the criminal offence’. 
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Article 31 governs liability of accessories of a crime. While Article 31(2)244 lists examples of the 
provision of help, Article 31(1)245 stipulates that an accessory is to be punished as a principal 
perpetrator, but the judge has the discretion to reduce the sentence. However, it is crucial to 
distinguish discretionary mitigation of the sentence from mandatory mitigation, which attaches in 
certain legal systems such as Germany and Turkey to all accessories.246 Further, Article 180 of the CC 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is derived from Article 7(1) ICTY Statute, applies to criminal 
offences specifically referenced therein and is charged together with Article 29 providing for different 
degrees of liability:247 
(1) A person who planned, instigated, ordered, perpetrated or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a criminal offence referred to in Article 171 (Genocide), 172 
(Crimes against Humanity), 173 (War Crimes against Civilians), 174 (War Crimes against the 
Wounded and Sick), 175 (War Crimes against Prisoners of War), 177 (Unlawful Killing or 
Wounding of the Enemy), 178 (Marauding the Killed and Wounded at the Battlefield) and 179 
(Violating the Laws and Practices of Warfare) of this Code, shall be personally responsible for the 
criminal offence. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official person, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.  
(2) The fact that any of the criminal offences referred to in Article 171 through 175 and Article 
177 through 179 of this Code was perpetrated by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of 
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit 
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
(3) The fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
court determines that justice so requires. 
 
The CC SFRY specifies the jurisdiction over international crimes in Article 142. In addition, Article 
22 expresses a unitary approach by providing that accomplices are to be ‘punished as prescribed for 
the act’. The same applies to the punishment of inciters.248 Article 24(1) supplements Article 22 in that 
it stipulates that the sentence may be mitigated on a discretionary basis.249  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Article 31(2): ‘The following, in particular, shall be considered as helping in the perpetration of a criminal 
offence: giving advice or instructions as to how to perpetrate a criminal offence, supplying the perpetrator with 
tools for perpetrating the criminal offence, removing obstacles to the perpetration of criminal offence, and 
promising, prior to the perpetration of the criminal offence, to conceal the existence of the criminal offence, to 
hide the perpetrator, the tools used for perpetrating the criminal offence, traces of the criminal offence, or goods 
acquired by perpetration of the criminal offence’. 
245 Article 31(1): ‘Whoever intentionally helps another to perpetrate a criminal offence shall be punished as if he 
himself perpetrated such offence, but the punishment may be reduced’. 
246 Except instigators, which are technically regarded as accessories, but trigger principal liability, mandatory 
mitigation applies to the final sentence of an instigator in both criminal law systems, Germany and Turkey. 
247 Prosecutor v Milorad Trbić (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-07/386 (16 October 209) paras 203-205. 
248 Article 23(1) CC SFRY. 
249 Article 24(1) CC SFRY: ‘Anybody who intentionally aids another in the commission of a criminal act shall 
be punished as if he himself had committed it, but his punishment may also be reduced’. 
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In the case of Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić the War Crimes Chamber had to examine the criteria, 
which would lead to more lenient punishment250 of the defendant in accordance with the principle of 
legality inter alia in the context of accomplice liability with regard to the accused Milorad Savić.251 
The Panel first stated the legal basis for doing so was to consider ‘the punishment prescribed for the 
criminal offense at issue’.252 After the Appellate Panel had established that the punishment prescribed 
by the CC BiH was more lenient to the accused, the court turned to examine the applicable provision 
providing for accomplice liability, namely Article 29 CC BiH and the Article 22 of the CC of SFRY. 
In relation to Article 29 the Panel stated that ‘in addition to the joint participation of a number of 
persons in the commission of the offense concerned, it is necessary that the awareness also exists on 
their part that the committed offense represents a common result of their actions’.253 It then contrasted 
this requirement with Article 22 CC SFRY, which was applicable at the time of commission and 
which reads: ‘If several persons jointly commit a criminal act by participating in the act of 
commission or in some other way, each of them shall be punished as prescribed for the act’. Although, 
from the outset, both provisions appear to imply identical legal consequences, the Panel further 
examined the scope of the two provisions and thus went on to point out that they differ fundamentally 
in relation to their definition of accomplice liability in that ‘[t]he difference concerns the fact that 
according to the new code, the notion of complicity is given in a narrower sense, because the 
participation that does not represent an action of execution is now restricted to those contributions that 
in a decisive manner contribute to the criminal offence, which is far more difficult to prove, while the 
earlier code only required that a general contribution to a joint consequence of the offense be 
established’.254 Due to the fact that the Panel had established beyond reasonable doubt that the issue in 
relation to the accused Milorad Savić were his ‘actions of complicity’, it concluded that the applicable 
provisions of the CC BiH were more lenient.255 
In the first instance verdict of Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović, one of the first cases of the War 
Crimes Chamber, the Trial Panel discussed the scope and applicability of JCE and the reference to the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Thereby it first clarified that Article 180 CC BiH had to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 See Prosecutor v Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić (Second Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KRZ-05/96-1 (5 
May 2009) para 162: ‘(…) [B]earing in mind ratio legis of Article 4(2) of the CC BiH pursuant to which 
provides for the application of the law more lenient to the perpetrator rather than the application of a more 
lenient law, the Panel found that that having in mind the direction of meting out the punishment for both 
Accused (in the special maximum direction), the Panel found that the CC BiH is more lenient law in this specific 
case, considering that its maximum is lower in relation to the CC SFRY’. 
251 Ibid para 156: ‘The principle of legality is prescribed by both national Criminal Code (Article 3 of the CC 
BiH) and Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), that has primacy over all laws on 
BiH (Article 2.2 of the Constitution of BiH), and Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)’. 
252 Ibid para 159; cf contrary: Prosecutor v Abduladhim Maktouf (Second Instance Verdict) Case No. KPZ 32/05 
(4 April 2006) 18, where the Panel held that ‘mandatory mitigation of more lenient law’ was not applicable. 
253 Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić Second Instance Verdict (n 250) para 164. 
254 Ibid para 167. 
255 Ibid. 
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charged together with Article 29 CC BiH.256 It then emphasised that, due to the fact that Articles 
180(1) and (2) ‘are derived from and are identical to Article 7 of the ICTY Statute’,257 there is an 
obligation for domestic courts to consider the jurisprudence of international judicial bodies in relation 
to their interpretation of such ‘parent norms’.258 The Trial Panel thereby further explained that ‘when 
Article 7 was copied into the law of BiH, it came with its international origins and its international 
judicial interpretation and definitions’.259 The Trial Panel then referred to Commentary on the 
Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to corroborate that Article 180 integrates 
international law into national law:260 
The provisions of paragraph 1 [of Art 180] are worded exactly the same way as Art 7 paragraph 1 
of the ICTY Statute. It is obvious that the legislator followed the basic rules of criminal liability 
deriving from international criminal law and from the provisions in the ICTY Statute, as well as by 
the provisions in Art 25(3)(a) through (e) of the Rome Statute, as he [the legislator] significantly 
broadened the possible acts of perpetration and of accessory in the perpetration of criminal acts.261 
Thereafter, the Panel engaged in a thorough discussion,262 establishing that systemic JCE liability (JCE 
II) was a rule of customary international law that had been so ‘since before April 1992’,263 and 
consequently emphasised in accordance with the principle of legality that ‘it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the accused would be criminally liable’.264 Furthermore, it pointed out that the 
defendant ‘could reasonably foresee criminal liability arising from activities in maintaining a criminal 
system’ as Article 26 of the Criminal Code of the SFRY established liability for participants and 
organisers of criminal associations.265 Further, the panel made reference to the Commentary on Article 
26 Criminal Code of the SFRY according to which the participant or organiser of a joint criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Prosecutor v Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR/06/275 (28 February 
2008). 
257 Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 256) 103, the Trial Panel further notes with 
reference to the Tadić Appeal Judgment that ‘Article 180(1) became part of the CC of BiH after Article 7(1) had 
been enacted and interpreted by the ICTY to include, specifically, joint criminal enterprise as a mode of co-
perpetration by which personal criminal liability would attach’. 
258 Ibid; the Chamber stated that it is a well-established principle of international law that when international law 
is incorporated into domestic law, ‘Domestic Courts must consider the parent norms of international law and 
their interpretation by international courts’. The Trial Panel made reference to (fn 94): Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (n 85) 80. See also R Gardiner, International Law (Pearson 2003) 156; R Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1994) 206. 
259 Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 256) 103. 
260 Ibid 104; see also inter alia: Prosecutor v Marko Radić et al. (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/139 
(20 February 2009) 174, 175; Prosecutor v Milorad Trbić (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-K-07/386 (16 
October 2009) para 205; Prosecutor v Miladin Stevanović (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/24-2 (29 
July 2008) 91; Prosecutor v Miloš Stupar et al. (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/24 (29 July 2008) 
135. 
261 Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 256) 104. 
262 Discussion concerning the principle of legality in relation to the application of the JCE liability theory 
exceeds the scope of this work; for elaboration see: Mitar Rasević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 
256) 105-109. 
263Ibid 105; Radić Marko et al. First Instance Verdict (n 260) 181: ‘This form of systemic joint criminal 
enterprise as part of customary international law was also accepted and confirmed by the ICTY (…)’; Milorad 
Trbić First Instance Verdict (n 260) para 211: ‘Joint criminal enterprise generally, and basic joint criminal 
enterprise in particular, were already part of customary international law by July 1995, and the elements and 
definition were established’.  
264 Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 256) 106, 107. 
265 Ibid 108. 
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association ‘will be sentenced in the same way as the perpetrator of the crime’.266 The WCCBiH did 
not consider the status of JCE III as it observed that it ‘will fall to other panels’ to examine the 
existence of JCE III in customary international law,267 but held that due to the facts of the case it was 
only concerned with JCE II, which was established in customary international law.268 The practice of 
the WCCBiH in relation to the categorisation of modes of liability into those raising either 
commission or accessorial liability appears to be heavily influenced by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals – at least by those cases where it was held that JCE is a form of commission liability. In the 
case of Radomir Vuković and Zoran Tomić269 the Chamber stated that ‘the jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals (the ICTR, ICTY, Special Court for Sierra Leone and the East Timor 
Special Panels) recognizes joint criminal enterprise as a form of commission liability in the 
commission of crimes recognized under international criminal law’.270 However, according to the 
cases consulted, which involve JCE liability, it is notable that “express-distinctions” between 
principals and accessories can rarely be found and do not occupy an equally prominent position, 
which can be observed in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. One of the reasons could be 
that despite the fact that the two Criminal Codes (CC BiH and CC SFRY) differ in many regards, they 
share the common legal consequence that accessories are to be punished as principals. Moreover, JCE 
liability has been prominently treated as a form of commission liability; it appears that the BiH 
follows this approach. Notwithstanding that, in cases involving accessorial liability such discussions 
can be found, although legal implications may not be expressly mentioned: in the Second Instance 
Verdict of Mirko Pekez et al., the War Crimes Chamber established that Mirko Pekez was responsible 
as an accessory, as opposed to an accomplice, as charged in the indictment. It distinguished these two 
modes by stating that there was no evidence that he participated directly in the killings and that ‘other 
members of the armed group relied to a decisive extent’271 on his contribution. Therefore, the Chamber 
concluded that, because Pekez did not ‘contribute in a decisive manner to the commission’, he could 
not be found guilty as an accomplice. Despite the fact that it was not expressly mentioned that this 
form of liability attracts more lenient sentences, the terminology used implies a lower degree of 
culpability. Generally it can be observed that although the “degree of liability” is taken into 
consideration when meting out the sentence, one cannot deduce that generic legal consequences are 
attached to each mode. Instead, many judgments provide a brief summary of the specific criminal 
conduct, sometimes labelled as an “aggravating or mitigating” feature. Frequently, it is not obvious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Ibid: ‘The Commentaries to this section recite that a perpetrator convicted under this provision: 1) is 
responsible for the acts that are directly included by the plan of the criminal group as well as those acts that are 
the result of this plan if they are of such a nature that their perpetration is in line with the realisation of the goals 
of this group; 2) is liable for the single criminal acts perpetrated, even if he/she himself/herself did not take part 
in the perpetration at all; 3) will be sentenced in the same way as the perpetrator of the crime’.  
267 Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović First Instance Verdict (n 256) 111. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Radomir Vuković and Zoran Tomić First Instance Verdict (n 241). 
270 Ibid para 588. 
271 Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić Second Instance Verdict (n 250) para 106. 
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which impact that the pertinent degree of liability has on the final sentence. Moreover, it must be 
recalled that Articles 31(1) CC BiH and 24(1) CC SFRY provide the judges with the discretion to 
invoke mitigation in cases of aiders and abettors. Therefore, it is possible that although it is not 
mentioned expressly, it is still likely that the judges have considered or applied more lenient sentences 
based inter alia on the finding that the defendant has been found guilty as an accessory. However, in 
some cases express references as to the legal implications of a liability mode can also found at the 
sentencing stage. In the Second Instance verdict of Abduladhim Maktouf, the Panel reduced the 
sentence also based on the fact that the defendant was an accessory.272 Despite the fact that criminal 
responsibility in the stricter sense was not the sole reason for imposing a more lenient sentence, the 
wording suggests that it was a crucial reason, as it held that ‘[c]onsidering the degree of criminal 
responsibility of the Accused and consequences of the criminal offense, and considering the mitigating 
circumstances in favour of the Accused, the Panel applied the provision on reduction of punishment 
and reduced the sentence to the maximum extent possible (…)’.273 When reducing the sentence, the 
Panel did not make explicit reference to Article 31(1), which provides for discretionary mitigation in 
the case of accessories; instead it based its reasoning on Articles 48(1) and 50(1)(a) CC of BiH.274 In 
the case of Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić, discussed above, the Panel based the reduction of the 
punishment additionally on Article 31(1).275 It also pointed out that ‘it was indisputably established 
that in the commission of the criminal offence as charged, the Accused acted wilfully (with direct 
intent) as an accessory, in the manner that he participated in the action of collection of Bosniak 
civilians whereby he aided the direct perpetrators to commit the criminal offense of murder’.276 
Thus, it can be seen that even if certain jurisdictions employ a unitary approach by virtue of pertinent 
criminal law provisions, not providing for mandatory mitigation, it is still possible that a differentiated 
approach is followed, although this may be due to the influence of the ad hoc tribunals. This inevitably 
creates room for inconsistencies in regard to the particular approach taken, be it unitary or 
differentiated – as the discretion to mitigate the sentence leaves inevitably room for both approaches. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Abduladhim Maktouf Second Instance Verdict (n 252) 18: ‘(…) the Panel took into consideration the degree 
of criminal responsibility of the Accused and the fact that he assisted in commission of criminal offence and that 
the Criminal Code of BiH includes possibility of more lenient punishment for accessory in commission of 
criminal offenses (…)’. 
273 Ibid 18. 
274 Ibid 18, 19. 
275 Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić Second Instance Verdict (n 250) para 177: ‘In individualising the sentences, 
the Panel also took into account Article 31(1) of the CC BiH which prescribes that the person who intentionally 
helps another to perpetrate a criminal offence may be punished by a reduced punishment. Therefore, the Panel 
imposed on the accused Pekez a more lenient punishment in relation to the accused Savić, having found that the 
imposed sentences are appropriate to the extent of criminal liability of each Accused individually’. 
276 Ibid para 170. 
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2.2.3.7 KOSOVO PANELS277 
The Kosovo Panels or “64 Panels”278 ‘are formed ad hoc’ and the applicable criminal law is the same 
as enforced in courts279 across Kosovo.280 Initially, according to UNMIK Regulation 1999/24281 courts 
were to apply282 (i) UNMIK Regulations and (ii) the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989.283 In 
order to avoid lacunae, provisions of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were 
applicable, when the former two sources did not provide for specific provisions applicable to the 
specific circumstance in question.284 However, following a criminal justice review, the Provisional 
Criminal Code of Kosovo285 was promulgated286 on 6 July 2003. Finally, in 2013 the Kosovan 
Criminal Code entered into force.  
 
Due to the fact that, at the time of writing, access to the judgments rendered by the Kosovo Panels was 
difficult as they were not publicly available, only a limited number of judgments have been examined. 
As suggested above, the issue revolving around the application of respective criminal law in Kosovo is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 For composition and structure of the Kosovo Panels, applicable law and criminal procedure in general, see: 
OSCE, Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: An Assessment Ten Years on 1999-2009, Department of Human Rights and 
Communities, OSCE Mission in Kosovo (May 2010); OSCE, Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials, A Review, 
Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal Systems Monitoring Section, OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
(September 2002); M E Hartmann, International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, A New Model for Post-
Conflict Peacekeeping, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 112 (October 2003) 11; 
S de Bertodano, ‘Current Developments in Internationalized Courts’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 226, 237 seq; J-C Cady and N Booth, ‘Internationalized Courts in Kosovo: An UNMIK Perspective’ in C 
Romano and others (eds), Internationalized Criminal Courts, SierraLeone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia, 
International Courts and Tribunals Series (OUP 2004) 59 seq; G Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of 
International Criminal Tribunals, A Comparative Study (Brill Nijhoff 2003) 15 seq; S Williams, Hybrid and 
Internationalised Criminal Tribunals (n 34) 79 seq; M Bohlander, ‘The Legal Framework of the Prosecution and 
the Courts’ in K Ambos and M Othman (eds), New Approaches in International Criminal Justice: Kosovo, East 
Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Reihe 
Interdisziplinäre Untersuchungen aus Strafrecht und Kriminologie (2003) 21 seq; I Risch, ‘Some Practical Issues 
Concerning the Development of the Judicial System in Kosovo’ in K Ambos and M Othman (eds), New 
Approaches in International Criminal Justice: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, Max-Planck-
Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Reihe Interdisziplinäre Untersuchungen aus Strafrecht 
und Kriminologie (2003) 61 seq; Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia): The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN 
Justice System (January 2008) 13 seq; See also, Amnesty International ‘Burying the Past, Kosovo: 10 Years of 
Impunity for Enforced Disappearances and Abductions in Kosovo’ (June 2009). 
278 UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (emphasis added) was one of the two crucial regulations which were enacted by 
UNMIK. It entered into force on 15 December 2000 in order to ensure impartiality of judges and prosecutors in 
Kosovan courts.  
279 The cases are heard in the District Courts in Kosovo (Prishtina, Prizren, Peja, Mitrovice, Gjilan), and hearing 
of appeals takes place in the Supreme Court 
280 M E Hartmann ‘International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, A New Model for Post-Conflict 
Peacekeeping’ Special Report 112, United States Institute of Peace (2003) Special Report 11. 
281 As amended by UNMIK/REG/2000/59 27 October 2000. 
282 If a clash occurred between the two sources, UNMIK regulations prevailed. 
283 Section 1.1 REG/19999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo; see also M. Bohlander, ‘The Direct 
Application of International Criminal Law in Kosovo’ (2001/I) 1 Kosovo Legal Studies, 7, 8,9 and A Simmons 
and others, ‘Mixed Tribunals’ in M Bohlander and others, Defense in International Criminal Proceedings (2006 
Martinus Nijhoff) 620. 
284 Section 1.1 (a), (b) UNMIK/REG/1999/24; de Bertodano (n 277) 238; Knoops (n n 277) 16; S Williams (n 
60) 86. 
285 UNMIK/REG2003/25.  
286 Along with the Provisional Code of Kosovo. Both legal instruments comprise law of UNMIK regulations. 
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complex.287 For the purpose of this work it is essential to discuss pertinent provisions of the 
Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK), the Criminal Code of Kosovo as well as the Criminal 
Code of the SFRY respectively, since the former is not applied retroactively.288 The PCCK referred to 
different modes of participation as ‘Collaboration in Criminal Offences’. This section encompasses 
four different modes of liability, namely co-perpetration, incitement, assistance and membership in a 
criminal association. Each of the foregoing provisions indicates how the participant is to be punished: 
Co-Perpetration (Article 23): 
When two or more persons jointly commit a criminal offence by participating in the commission 
of a criminal offence or by substantially contributing to its commission in any other way, each of 
them shall be liable and punished as prescribed for the criminal offence. 
 
Incitement (Article 24): 
Whoever intentionally incites another person to commit a criminal offence shall be punished as if 
he or she committed the criminal offence if the criminal offence was committed under his or her 
influence. 
 
Assistance (Article 25): 
(1) Whoever intentionally assists another person in the commission of a criminal offence shall be 
punished as provided for in Article 65(2) of the present Code. 
(2) Assistance in committing a criminal offence includes giving advice or instruction on how to 
commit a criminal offence, making available for the perpetrator the means to commit a criminal 
offence (…). 
 
Criminal Association (Article 26): (1) Whoever agrees, explicitly or implicitly, with one or more persons 
to commit or to incite the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of at least five 
years and undertakes preparatory acts for the fulfilment of such agreement participates in a criminal 
association and shall be punished for in Article 65(2) of the present Code. 
Thus, it can be observed that the PCCK established that co-perpetrators and inciters were to be 
punished like principals, whereas individuals who gave ‘assistance’ or were members in a ‘criminal 
association’ were to be punished in accordance with Article 65(2), according to which ‘[t]he 
punishment imposed for attempt, assistance and criminal association shall be no more than three-
quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence. In the cases where the 
punishment of a fine has been imposed, the same will apply to the maximum fine provided for by 
law’.289 Hence, according to the PCCK, mandatory mitigation was triggered if an individual was held 
to be an assistant or member of a criminal association. Contrary to the differentiated approach in the 
PCCK, the new Criminal Code of Kosovo embodies a unitary approach akin to the provisions of BiH, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Throrough discussion exceeds the scope of this paper; see further: OSCE, Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: An 
Assessment Ten Years on 199-2009 (n 277); Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials, A Review (n 277) 29-33; M 
Bohlander, ‘The Legal Framework of the Prosecution and the Courts’ (n 277) 24 seq; Cady and Booth (n 277) 
69 seq; Knoops (n 277) 16. 
288 S Nouwen‚ ‘“Hybrid Courts”: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts’ (2006) 2 
Utrecht Law Review 190, 207 fn 157; see also Prosecutor v Momcilo Trajcović (Verdict) Nr. P: 68/2000 (6 
March 2001) District Court of Gilan, 7: ‘Indeed, the Regulation 1999/24 states that the applicable laws in 
Kosovo are those in force on 22 March 1999, but adds that post 1989 laws apply if they address a subject matter 
that is not already covered (section 1.2) or if they contain provisions more favourable to a criminal defendant 
(...)’. 
289 See generally Article 65(1): ‘The punishment imposed on a perpetrator is the punishment prescribed for the 
criminal offence, while a more lenient or severe punishment may be imposed only in accordance with the 
conditions provided for by the present Code’. 
	   64 
Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. However, it also entails a differentiated element in that the code 
expressly provides for corresponding mitigated penalties to the initial minimum term of imprisonment 
if the conditions for mitigation are given. The crux is that, although Article 33(1) provides that 
assistants may be punished more leniently and thus falls within the ambit of Article 75, which sets out 
the conditions for mitigation, this mitigation is still discretionary. Interestingly, Article 74(3), which 
provides examples in relation to mitigating factors, which may be considered, also lists as a potential 
factor ‘the fact that the convicted person participated in the criminal offence not as the principal 
perpetrator but through aiding, abetting, or otherwise assisting another’. When comparing the 
approach of the PCCK with the course taken by pertinent provisions of the Criminal Code of the 
SFRY it becomes apparent that these two approaches are different if not almost obverse. While 
accessories charged under the PCCK are entitled to mandatory mitigation, Articles 22-24 of the 
Criminal Code of the SFRY allot the same punishment to accessories as to principal perpetrators, 
whereas discretionary mitigation may only be available for aiders. As can be seen, the new Criminal 
Code has found a compromise between both approaches. 
In the appeals case of Prosecutor v Krasniqi et al.,290 the Panel discussed liability ‘in complicity or 
within the activity of a criminal group’. Thus, it defined complicity in Article 22 of the Criminal Code 
of SFRYas follows: 
Complicity (Art 22 CC SFRY) can exist in relation to a single crime, committed jointly by several 
persons, each of them on one side is a carrier of the decision and of the will to commit the criminal 
offence and on the other side performs the typical act prohibited by the law (murder, theft) or a 
segment of this, or according to some commentators also an act which falls outside this but 
represents “an essential segment in the process of committing a criminal act”.291 
The panel then clarified that co-perpetrators and instigators are to be distinguished from aiders in 
relation to the severity of the punishment to which they are subjected as the conduct of co-perpetrators 
and instigators ‘is deemed more important’.292 Thus, irrespective of the fact that an aider is not by 
domestic law entitled to mitigation, the Panels clearly demonstrate in this case that a hierarchy of 
modes of liability is present, or at least that accessories to a crime perform a less significant role and 
therefore receive less punishment.293 The Panel then quoted the Confirmation Judge: ‘[a]s already 
stated (…) “the provision of Article 26 CC SFRY is analogous to the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise (or common purpose or design) as interpreted by the ICTY in the Tadić case (…)”’.294 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Prosecutor v Selim Krasniqi, Bedri Zyberaj and Agron Krasniqi (Appeal Verdict) Case No. Ap.-KZ No. 
371/2008 (10 April 2009) Supreme Court of Kosovo. 
291 Ibid 15; the Chamber made reference to Article 22 CC SFRY. 
292 Ibid 15: ‘The law distinguished co-perpetrators (accomplices) from instigators and abettors also in the 
punishment because the conduct of the first ones (to perform the typical criminal act) is deemed more 
important’. 
293 This does not apply to participants in a criminal association: Article 26 CC SFRY, Criminal responsibility 
and punishability of the organisers of criminal associations; see also Selim Krasniqi, Bedri Zyberaj and Agron 
Krasniqi Appeal Verdict (n 290) 15: ‘The notion of “criminal liability and punishability of the organizers of 
criminal associations” (Art 26 CC SFRY) has a different meaning and importance’. 
294 Ibid 16. 
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Thereby it ascertained that Article 26 CC SFRY is substantially the same as Article 26 PCCK295 by 
stating that, ‘[a]part from the different literal formulation of the two legal provision, their identity must 
be seen in the agreement to commit (one or more) criminal offences (26 PCCK) which is the same of 
the criminal design or purpose of committing criminal acts as mentioned in Article 26 CC SFRY’.296  
Having examined this discussion, it is apparent that the Panel did not raise the point of punishment in 
the context of the identity of these two provisions. While Article 26 CC SFRY expressly states that a 
person who engages in a criminal organisation ‘shall be punished as if he himself has committed the 
crime’, Article 26 PCCK lays down that members of a criminal organisation shall be punished in 
accordance with provision 65(2), and therefore ‘the punishment imposed for (…) criminal association 
shall be no more than three-quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence’. 
Nevertheless, the Panel considered ‘the limits imposed by Article 65 PCCK for the participation in the 
criminal association’.297  
In conclusion it can be said that, first of all, the limited access to judgments rendered by the Kosovo 
Panels makes it impossible to extract the particular approach taken by judges in relation to the weight 
attached to modes of liability. Notwithstanding that, it is obvious that the CC of the FSRY and the 
PCCK opt for contrary approaches in this regard, while the new Criminal Code of Kosovo affiliates to 
the approach opted for by the CC SFRY by embracing a unitary approach. Additionally, the ad hoc 
tribunals’ jurisprudence in this regard, which is likely to have wider implications, is immensely 
discrepant, which seems to render it more unlikely that a consistent approach is taken in regard to a 
principal accessory distinction and the potential legal consequences thereof. 
 
2.3 MODES OF LIABILITY AND SENTENCING IN PURELY DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
While at the very beginning of the practice of the Tribunals, reliance on domestic law might have 
sometimes been the only option to avoid lacunae, the Tribunals have by now developed a substantial 
body of case law, thus inviting reference to points of law, despite the lack of binding precedent. The 
question remains as to which path judges should follow in relation to the treatment of accessories at 
the sentencing stage – previous international case law or domestic approaches. In relation to the latter, 
the existence of the two camps – differentiated and unitary – makes it impossible to speak of a 
manifestation as customary international law in relation to one approach. Furthermore, as regards the 
former, it is important to recall that in the absence of statutory guidance, judges have been forced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ibid: ‘Here can be added that the provision of Article 26 CC SFRY is substantially the same of the Article 26 
of PCCK, which punishes the participants in a criminal association because they agree with other persons to 
commit or to incite the commission of a criminal offence and undertake preparatory acts for the fulfilment of 
such agreement. (…) In other words, to make use of an association for the purpose of committing criminal acts 
(26 CC SFRY) is the same as to undertake preparatory acts for the fulfilment of the agreement to commit 
criminal offences (26 PCCK)’. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid 63 (Selim Krasniqi), 71 (Bedri Zyberaj) and 86 (Agron Krasniqi). 
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fall back on domestic solutions, and thus international criminal jurisprudence has legal domestic 
imprints in this regard. As discussed above, the mandatory mitigation for aiders, being one concept, 
embodied in some legal systems, has shaped the approach towards the treatment of accessories in 
international criminal justice.  
 
It is therefore interesting to examine and contrast various domestic modes while at the same time 
exploring the reasons for a respective approach, particularly in relation to the legal consequences 
attached to each mode in a pertinent system. Moreover, it is clear that, as elaborated in Chapter 1, 
Article 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute provides that ‘general principles of law recognised by (…) nations’298 is a 
source of international law. Likewise, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC shall 
resort to ‘general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime’. Accordingly the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility, deeply rooted in national legal systems, has been applied in a variety of ways as set out 
above and a ‘micro-comparative study’299 of such concepts embodied in different legal systems enable 
the reader to (i) see the variety of approaches that different legal systems follow in relation to the 
punishment of accessories; (ii) identify intersection points; and (iii) view different manifestations and 
nuances of the unitary approaches respectively. This will also enable verification of the origins of the 
domestic concepts utilised in international criminal justice. 
 
Due to the fact that there is no consensus as to the exact ambit of commission and accessorial liability, 
respectively, this work includes various modes of participation. It follows that this study sets out the 
actual practice of the selected jurisdictions in relation to the legal relevance ascribed to accessorial 
liability, thereby revealing various facets of the respective approaches. Finally, the unitary approach is 
contrasted with the differentiated approach. This study does not attempt to compare the concepts of 
participation in a crime per se; rather, it is intended to compare the concepts of criminal responsibility 
in relation to their legal implications on the sentence. Notwithstanding that, this will inevitably lead to 
the inclusion (to a rather limited extent) of the functioning of concepts of complicity. While this 
chapter predominantly deals with general norms of attribution and as such with those providing for 
legal consequences, the next chapter is devoted to the sentencing practice in relation to modes of 
secondary liability. 
There is a concern that comparative studies based on domestic systems in this field are to be treated 
with caution. Peter De Cruz notes that ‘(…) there is the question of comparability or transferability of 
concepts and principles. It is certainly doubtful whether domestic law concepts can be transposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 ‘The phrase “general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” refers to principles which find 
expression in the municipal laws of various nations. These principles, therefore, can be ascertained only by the 
comparative method’, P De Cruz, Comparative Law in A Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
25. 
299 See generally De Cruz, Comparative Law in A Changing World, 233 seq. 
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simply into the bases of international law decisions’.300 Indeed, a question of transferability of 
domestic solutions to collective criminality to the international level has to be raised, as crimes within 
the jurisdiction of international(ised) courts and tribunals are collective crimes of a macro dimension 
with unique features. Notwithstanding that, it is not disputed that international courts and tribunals 
have drawn on domestic modes of liability in one or the other form, as noted above. It is therefore 
crucial to understand the origin of these concepts and particularly the specific consequences in the 
domestic system in which they are rooted. Delmas-Marty notes the importance of comparative law due 
to the fact that some of the sources enumerated in Article 38(b)-(d) ICJ Statute, namely customary 
international law and general principles, are to some extent based on domestic law.301 She further 
notes that ‘by allowing the elaboration of hybrid international concepts and by favouring the 
harmonisation of national criminal systems, comparative law could help promote a more pluralist 
conception of international criminal law’.302 Further, Ambos clarifies that international criminal law 
should be grounded in ‘comparative criminal law’ as opposed to one domestic ‘legal tradition’.303 
In relation to most domestic law-related comparative studies for the purpose of advancing 
international criminal law, a few concerns have been raised so far. Badar notes that in many 
comparative studies in the field of international criminal law, scholars have resorted predominately to 
the comparison of Western legal systems, which appears to be ‘illegitimate’ due to a growing 
community or ‘family’ of international law.304 Similarly Drumbl argues that, ‘The entire package of 
international criminal justice remains a reflection of the values of Western retributive criminal 
justice’.305 A further objective of this study is linked to this issue, thereby confirming whether there is 
a substantial reliance on Western concepts on side of modern international courts and tribunals in 
relation to the application of modes of liability and sentencing practice.  
 
 
2.3.1 COUNTRY SELECTION 
 
For the purpose of this comparative study, several distinguishing features have served as guidance. 
First and foremost those countries were chosen, which represent the typical features of civil law 
systems on the one hand and common law systems on the other hand. These two main groups both 
contain domestic systems, which take similar or even different approaches and frequently utilise 
varying terminology, but ultimately reach a similar, or even the same, result. 
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301 M Delmas-Marty, ‘The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception of International Criminal 
Law’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 13, 16. 
302 Ibid 25. 
303 K Ambos, ‘Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law’ (2006) 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 660, 662. 
304 M Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach, 
Studies in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Hart 2013) 3, 4. 
305 A Drumbl, ‘Toward a Criminology of International Crime’ (2003) Washington & Lee Public Law Research 
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Additionally, another decisive factor for the country selection was based on their geographical 
location with the intention to stretch the confined area beyond Western European boundaries. This 
rationale led to the inclusion of countries located inter alia fully or partly in Asia, Africa and the 
Balkans. More specifically, England and Wales, the US and New Zealand provide examples of the 
traditional common law approach. However, France has been chosen in this study, because it is per se 
a civil law country, but embraces a unitary approach. Additional selected jurisdictions are amongst 
others India as a Commonwealth country, and the East Asian countries, China and Japan, influenced 
by German and French law and therefore by jurisdictions following two almost opposing theories 
concerning the treatment of accessories for sentencing purposes. A relevant factor for inclusion was 
also that these three jurisdictions are not embraced by the term “Western legal system”. Germany and 
Turkey serve as examples of the Romano-Germanic306 tradition. Additionally, German law on 
accessorial criminal liability has been particularly relevant in the international context.307 While the 
inclusion of Iceland, belonging to the Nordic countries but probably less prominent and influential, 
allowed an inquiry into a system mixing308 the unitary and differentiated theories, Egypt, as a North 
African country, has been chosen as a civil law country, influenced by French law and embracing a 
unitary approach. Ultimately, particularly in the light of Chapter 4, which analyses the legal cultural 
backgrounds of judges relating to the role they ascribe to modes of liability in sentencing, it should be 
mentioned that the overwhelming majority of these jurisdictions is represented by judges in 
international tribunals. 
This comparative study has been conducted in line with the three-stage approach as suggested by 
Kama: (i) a descriptive phase; (ii) the identification phase; and (iii) the explanatory phase.309 A 
potential difficulty could have arisen through varying uses of terminology; nonetheless, overall, it 
appears that the concepts referring to individual criminal responsibility are relatively uniform in 
relation to their meaning.  
In the light of the ad hoc tribunals’ reliance on national liability concepts310 applicable to domestic 
crimes, only the general provisions of individual criminal responsibility for domestic crimes are 
subject to this comparative study. Thus, relevant incorporated international criminal law provisions 
(BiH), providing for different modes of liability, or a completely new criminal code applicable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 H Olásolo, ‘Developments in the Distinction between Principal and Accessorial Liability’ (n 166) 341; 
Olásolo notes that in these systems ‘the principle of mitigation for accessorial liability is an important additional 
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307 See M Dubber and T Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014) 304: ‘German criminal 
law often is held up as a promising alternative, not only as a more sophisticated, or at least systematic, general 
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contribution of the accessory was essential for the commission of the offence in question. 
309 De Cruz referred to the three-stage approach suggested by Kama, see De Cruz (n 299) 240. 
310 See inter alia Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 182. 
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international crimes (Rwandan Organic Law), are discussed in the relevant context later in this chapter 
and in Chapter 3. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 1, unitary systems can be divided into pure 
unitary systems and functional unitary systems. This work only distinguishes between unitary and 
differentiated systems. Accordingly, only those systems, which provide for mandatory mitigation for 
accessories, are termed differentiated systems. In order to capture a relatively large – even if 
incomplete – picture of the state practice311 in relation to the approaches taken by states in attributing 
liability and punishing various degrees of culpability of perpetrators, the jurisdictions, which were 
included can be broadly categorised into four categories, namely:  
(i) Civil law countries, which represent the typical features in relation to their approach of attributing 
criminal liability, which is significant for sentencing purposes, namely the differentiated approach. 
The countries in this group include Germany, Turkey, Japan and China.  
(ii) The second group consists of common law jurisdictions, which embrace the traditional uniform 
approach. Countries belonging to this group are England, New Zealand, the United States and India.  
 
(iii) The third group includes countries, which belong to either the civil or the common law system, 
but do not follow an approach typical to their civil-common law categorisation. Some of them include 
mixed elements, or follow the approach of their civil or common law “counterparts” respectively. 
(iv) Within these three groups I have created a sub-group, comprised of countries/jurisdictions either 
consulted by the hybrid and/or ad hoc tribunals subject to this study, or generally located within the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly this group has common intersection points with all 
three groups as shown in Table 1 below. However, in order to provide a good overview, these 
jurisdictions are included in Table 2 and their sentencing system in relation to the modes of liability 
are identified, but do not form part of this comparative study in the stricter sense, as they have been 
either addressed at the beginning of this chapter312 in the context of hybrid tribunals and/or are 
scrutinised more closely in the light of the sentencing practice if the personal circumstances which 
relate to the offender have an impact on a more severe or a more lenient punishment, and these 
circumstances constitute an element of the criminal offence, of the hybrid and international tribunals 
in subsequent chapters. 313  
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312 Except for Slovenia, as Slovenia was not as significantly affected by the violence of the Balkan wars (the 
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313 Due to the fact that, for several reasons mentioned throughout this work, not every hybrid tribunal has been 
discussed in the same depth as others or as the ad hoc tribunals in each chapter of this work, the reference to the 
domestic penal codes on the territory of the FSRY or referenced by pertinent hybrid tribunals either takes place 
at the beginning of Chapter 2 or in the context of sentencing in Chapter 3. Some pertinent domestic provisions 
have been addressed in both chapters. 
	   70 
This study only compares provisions of criminal codes, which are to date in force, with the exception 
of the Criminal Code of the Former SFRY (and the PCCK, which was only temporarily in force). See 
Table 1 below for an overview of the categorisation into different groups. Table 1 serves as a mere 
guidepost to illustrate the rationale on which the selection of pertinent jurisdictions for this work is 
based.314  
• Category I: Civil law countries embracing a differentiated approach; 
• Category II: Common law countries following a unitary approach; 
• Category III: Civil law countries, which follow an approach containing either elements of the 
unitary common law approach, or adopting it entirely in relation to sentencing; and 
• Category IV: Jurisdictions consulted by hybrid tribunals (and countries located on the territory 
of the (former) SFRY), which can also be subsumed under Category I-III. In relation to the 
ICTY it has to be noted that, predominantly, the criminal legislation taken into account at the 
sentencing stage is the SFRY criminal code. Nevertheless, domestic criminal courts of 
countries emanating from the former Yugoslavia have been included in this study in order to 
obtain a broader picture. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 For the purpose of the distinction and the subsequent subsumption of Category III under Categories I and II 
countries, which provide for discretionary mitigation (such as, for instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina), have been 
treated as following a unitary approach, the same applies to systems, which generally embrace a unitary 
approach, but impose extra conditions for punishment as a principal, such as Lebanon for instance. Article 220 
of the Lebanese Criminal Code provides that an accessory is punished as a principal if the contribution of the 
secondary perpetrator was essential for the commission. If it was not essential, mitigation is triggered. 
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TABLE 1: CATEGORISATION OF JURISDICTIONS 
 
Category I Category II Category III 
China England Egypt 
Germany315 India France 
Japan New Zealand Iceland 
Turkey United States  
 Category IV  
Indonesia  Iraq 
[Kosovo (PCCK)] Sierra Leone Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  Lebanon 
  Cambodia316 
  Macedonia 
  (Former) SFRY 
  Serbia 
  Montenegro 
  (Slovenia) 
  Croatia 
  Kosovo (new CC) 
  Rwanda317 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 In relation to intentionally committed crimes. 
316 Strictly speaking, it is not possible to categorise the Cambodian legal system as a “pure common law system” 
or as “pure civil law system”. According to Kong Phallack, the Cambodian legal system is a hybrid system in 
that it is a fusion of “Cambodian customs”, the French civil law system and also common law, which has 
influenced the Cambodian system through foreign development aid; K Phallack, ‘Overview of the Cambodian 
Legal and Judicial System and Recent Efforts at Legal and Judicial Reform’ in H Peng and others (eds), 
Introduction to Cambodian Law (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2012) 8. However, according to de Nice and others, 
documents of the trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary (with reference to part II) ‘differs from the style of criminal 
proceedings in common law countries. It is rather in the civil law tradition as found on the European continent, a 
fact that is not surprising since the legal system in Cambodia is based on that of France, which ruled Cambodia 
is a colony since World War II.’ H de Nice and others (eds), Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial 
of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary (University of Pennsylvania Press 2000) 8. Hence, for the purpose of the above 
categorisation, the Cambodian legal system is classified as a civil law system.  
317 For the purpose of this work, the Rwandan legal system will be labelled a civil law legal system, as the ICTR 
Trial Chamber referred to it as such in the Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 108) para 457. However, it has been noted 
that the Rwandan legal system is dual and embodies civil and common law elements. It was ‘heavily based on 
the Belgian civil law system’, notwithstanding that it is said to be moving towards being a common law system; 
see W E Kosar, ‘Rwanda’s Transition from Civil to Common Law’ (2013) 16(3) The Globetrotter, International 
Law Section, Ontario Bar Association 1, 2. 
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2.4 COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
CATEGORY I 
 
2.4.1 CHINA 
 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is embodied in Chapter 2 of the 1997 Criminal 
Code of the People’s Republic of China. While Article 14 under section 1 provides liability for 
principal offenders who intentionally commit a crime, the Articles under section 3 govern criminal 
responsibility for ‘joint crimes’. Article 25 describes joint crimes as crimes committed jointly by two 
or more persons and provides that if such joint crimes are committed negligently as opposed to 
intentionally, each of the individuals who participated in the joint commission shall be punished on the 
basis of the crime(s) he has committed and not as a member of this ‘joint enterprise’.318  
In order for a joint crime to be established, three criteria must be met: (i) a minimum of two 
individuals must be involved in the commission of the crime; (ii) the joint criminal collaboration or 
criminal design must have led to the “harmful acts” and the criminal result of these acts (actus reus); 
and (iii) each individual must possess the same criminal purpose (mens rea).319 Once such a joint 
crime is present, Chinese criminal law distinguishes between three different groups of “joint 
criminals”, namely principals, accessories and coerced perpetrators and instigators. This distinction is 
fundamental as different legal consequences attach to each of these categories.  
A principal perpetrator is defined as someone who plays a central and leading role in a ‘criminal 
group’ and the commission of the joint crime.320 However, according to Article 26, a criminal group is 
only established if its character is “relatively stable” and if it consists of a minimum of three people as 
opposed to only two. If all these criteria are satisfied, a principal, who is also referred to as the 
‘ringleader’ by the criminal code, is punished for every crime committed by the group he leads. The 
code further clarifies that principals who are not ringleaders, because they do not satisfy all of the 
criteria set out above (for instance, the group consists of only two persons), are subject to penalties 
concerning the crimes they participated in and/or organised. The criminal code describes accomplices 
as those who play a secondary or generally inferior role in the joint crime. These accomplices, or 
accessories, are entitled to a mitigation of their sentence or in certain circumstances they may even be 
exempted from punishment.321 Coerced perpetrators are also entitled to mitigation of their sentence, or 
as accessories, they may even be exempted, subject to certain circumstances in relation to the crime 
committed. Finally, the criminal code provides that instigators are to be punished based on their 
individual role in relation to the joint crime. Moreover, the code imposes a more severe penalty if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 See also W Luo, ‘China’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law 
(Stanford University Press 2010) 151. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Article 26 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979. 
321 Article 27. 
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instigated person is below the age of 18. However, if the crime has committed by the instigated 
person, the instigator shall according to the criminal code be entitled to a mitigated sentence.322 
 
2.4.2 GERMANY 
 
The approach of distinguishing between two types of accessories is embraced by the German Criminal 
Code, which follows a differentiated approach in relation to offences committed intentionally and a 
rather unitary approach in relation to administrative offences and those committed negligently.323 
Modes of individual criminal liability in German criminal law are provided for in sections 25-27 of the 
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).324 The Code provides for criminal liability of (i) 
principals;325 (ii) joint criminals;326 (iii) abettors;327 and (iv) aiders.328 Accordingly it can be said that 
the German Criminal Code distinguishes between three groups of modes of liability, namely, 
principals (see i and ii); abettors (see iii); and aiders (see iv above).329 Upon closer look at sections 
25(1) and 25(2) it becomes clear that the “principals” can be divided into three different categories, all 
giving rise to principal liability. These are (i) Mittelbare Täterschaft (“principal proxy”); (ii) 
Nebentäterschaft (“independent multiple principals”); and (iii) Mittäterschaft (“joint principals”).330 
Abetting (see ii above) and aiding (see iv above) are regarded as modes of accessorial liability. At the 
sentencing stage, German criminal law makes use of the distinction in that the sentencing regime 
corresponds with the different categories of participation and provides for specific legal consequences 
thereto. Principals, including all three forms, namely principals by proxy, joint criminals and multiple 
principals, are subject to a sentence as the principal to the crime.331 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Ibid Article 28.  
323 See K Ambos and S Bock, ‘Germany’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic 
and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 321 (the category of “participation” does not exist in relation to 
offences committed negligently); R Rengier, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn CH Beck 2013) 361; T Rotsch, 
“Einheitstäterschaft” statt Tatherrschaft (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 190; see also Bohlander, Principles of German 
Criminal Law (n 152) 154, 155 and particularly 153: ‘In the lowest category of offence, the 
Ordnungswidrigkeiten, the law has abandoned the division between principals and secondary participants and 
adopted the so-called Einheitstäterbegriff or unified perpetrator concept in section 14(1) OWiG. This concept 
considers anyone a principal whose actions helped cause the result or establish the actus reus elements of the 
offence, regardless of the actual weight of their contribution’.  
324 See Rengier (n 323) 36; M Bohlander, The German Criminal Code: A Modern English Translation, Studies 
in International & Comparative Law (Hart 2008). 
325 Ibid 43, section 25(1) Any person who commits the offence himself or through another shall be liable as a 
principal.  
326 Ibid section 25(2): If more than one person commit the offence jointly, each shall be liable as a principal 
(joint principals).  
327 Ibid section 26: Any person who intentionally induces another to intentionally commit an unlawful act 
(abettor) shall be liable to be sentenced as if he were a principal.  
328 Ibid section 27 (1) Any person who intentionally assists another in the intentional commission of an unlawful 
act shall be convicted and sentenced as an aider. (2) The sentence for the aider shall be based on the penalty for a 
principal. It shall be mitigated pursuant to section 49(1).  
329 Ambos and Bock (n 323) 323, 324. 
330 Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (n 324) 154. 
331 Ambos and Bock (n 323) 339. 
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Interestingly, instigators, although not belonging to the first group, but classified as accessories, are 
‘treated as if they were principals’.332 Finally, aiders, who are classed as secondary participants, attract 
lower sentences, as the German Criminal Code provides a mandatory mitigation for this mode of 
liability.333 Accordingly, it is obvious that the reason for such a distinction is deeply rooted and 
reflected in the sentencing framework of the German legal system. 
 
2.4.3 JAPAN 
 
The Japanese Penal Code334 provides in Chapter XI for various modes of participation in a crime, 
namely co-principals;335 inducement;336 and accessoryship.337 Article 60 stipulates that if at least two 
persons commit a crime jointly in concerted action (as co-perpetrators), each of them is considered 
principal to the crime committed. Thus, each person must share the same intent to act jointly and to 
commit the offence in question.338 A further requirement is ‘joint acts of perpetration’;339 however, it 
has been held that “sequential acts” suffice.340 In a similar manner, someone who induces another 
individual to commit a crime will be punished as principal.341 This is also true for someone who 
induces indirectly, in that he induces someone to induce.342 A central requirement for instigation is that 
the instigator has “expressly” suggested the commission of the offence in question, which must have 
then been committed as a result thereof.343  
Article 62 refers to the liability and punishment of accessories. According to subsection (1) an 
individual who aids a principal perpetrator is labelled an accessory. Two criteria have to be fulfilled: 
(i) the person must intend to aid the principal; and (ii) an offence must have taken place.344 Further, 
subsection (2) adds that someone who induces an accessory, as opposed to a principal (see Article 61) 
is entitled to the punishment as accessory. The Criminal Code generally warrants a lower sentence for 
accessories. Article 63 specifies that ‘the punishment of an accessory shall be reduced from the 
punishment of a principal’. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Ibid 339. 
333 Article 27(2) and Article 29(1). 
334 (Japanese) Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907).  
335 Ibid Article 60. 
336 Ibid Article 61. 
337 Ibid Article 62. 
338 Ibid Article 61(1); J O Haley ‘Japan’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative 
Criminal Law (Stanford University Press 2010) 401. 
339 Ibid 401. 
340 Haley (n 338) 401. 
341 Japanese Criminal Code (n 334) Article 61(1); Haley (n 338) 401. 
342 Japanese Criminal Code (n 334) Article 61(2). 
343 Haley (n 338) 401. 
344 Japanese Criminal Code (n 334) Article 61(1); Haley (n 338) 402. 
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2.4.4 TURKEY 
	  
In a similar manner, the Turkish legal system opts for a differentiated model linked with legal 
consequences attaching to each of the modes of liability.345 According to the Turkish Criminal 
Code,346 a perpetrator, defined in Article 37 of the Turkish Penal Code, will be fully liable as the 
‘offender’.347 Moreover, abettors are to the same extent punishable as principals, despite the fact that 
they are classified as secondary participants.348 Aiders are, according to Article 39, punished less 
severely and gain a statutory discount.349  
This discount is dependant on the penalty prescribed by law for the commission of the offence – if the 
crime is subject to aggravated life imprisonment, the mitigated sentence for an aider would be 15-20 
years and if the offence in question ‘requires life imprisonment’ the sentence would add up to 10-15 
years.350 It is noteworthy that this statutory mitigation is mandatory, and accordingly not in the judge’s 
discretion.351 It can therefore be seen that the Turkish approach to individual criminal liability is 
influenced by the German concept of participation, as both follow a differentiated approach.352 
 
CATEGORY II: 
 
2.4.5 ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
Due to the immense influence of the common law doctrine of complicity, particularly on the practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals, England and the US as traditional common law countries are examined in 
more depth.  
In common law, there appears to be a tendency to follow a unitary approach at the sentencing stage. 
English law distinguishes on the one hand between a principal, who commits an offence by himself, 
and on the other hand a ‘secondary party’, who either participates through assisting and encouraging 
by ‘aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring’ or by participating ‘through a membership of a joint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 R Önok, ‘Turkey’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic and Comparative 
Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 467. 
346 Turkish Criminal Code (Law No. 5237 of September 26, 2004, as last amended by Law No. 6217 of March 
31, 2011). 
347 Ibid Article 37 (1). 
348 Önok (n 345) 459. 
349 Article 39 (1) Turkish Criminal Code (n 346): ‘A person encouraging another person to commit offense [sic] 
is sentenced to life imprisonment from fifteen years to twenty years if subject to heavy life imprisonment; and 
from ten years to fifteen years imprisonment if the offense requires life imprisonment’. See also Önok (n 345) 
467. 
350 Article 39 (1) Turkish Penal Code: A person encouraging another person to commit offense [sic] is sentenced 
to life imprisonment from fifteen years to twenty years if subject to heavy life imprisonment; and from ten years 
to fifteen years imprisonment if the offence requires life imprisonment; Önok (n 345) 467. 
351 Önok (n 345) 467. 
352 Ibid 452. 
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enterprise that led to the offence’.353 A secondary party is, according to English law, guilty of a crime 
which has been committed by the primary perpetrator, despite the fact that neither mens rea nor actus 
reus have to be fulfilled directly by the former,354 as the liability of the former is derivative. 
Notwithstanding that, an accessory is to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender. 
An individual can be held liable as a principal in different ways. The straightforward way is if the 
crime is committed directly by himself alone. However, if two or more individuals jointly commit a 
crime, thereby fulfilling the actus reus and mens rea of the crime in question and consequently all 
causing the result of the offence, each of them can be held liable as a principal.355 Notwithstanding 
that, an individual jointly committing a crime with another or several others, can be held liable as a 
principal, or more specifically joint principal (co-perpetrator), even if he only satisfies several but not 
all elements of the required actus reus.356 This is the case if each individual possesses the required 
mens rea for the offence and if the sum of each individual contribution cumulatively leads to the 
fulfilment of the complete actus reus. Moreover, English law recognises “indirect perpetration” based 
on the doctrine of “innocent agency”. In certain circumstances it may be the case that the actus reus is 
not carried out directly or personally by the principal, but instead by another person, namely the 
‘innocent agent’, who does not have the required mens rea ‘or who has some defence’ such as 
insanity.357 Accordingly, principal liability in English law can arise through direct perpetration or 
commission, through joint perpetration or co-perpetration or through innocent agency or indirect 
perpetration. 
Someone who participates through assisting and encouraging in the form of ‘aiding, abetting, 
counselling, or procuring’ is an accessory or secondary party.358 Section 8 of the Accessories and 
Abettors Act 1861, as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977, reads as follows: 
Whoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the 
same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable 
to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal Offender.359 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 A P Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan´s Criminal Law, Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart 2013) 
203; See generally A Hooper and D Ormerod (eds), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2013 (23rd edn, OUP 2012) 
sec A4. 
354 Ibid 205; Ashworth and Horder distinguish between three categories: (i) the principal perpetrator, (ii) the 
accessory who participates in the commission of a crime by ‘aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring (s.8 
Accessories and Abettors Act) and (iii) an individual which participates after the commission of the offence ie 
by way of “helping to conceal its commission’. However, Ashworth and Horder point out that the latter form has 
to be distinguished from the other forms of participation as they are covered by other criminal offences, namely 
attempting to pervert the course of justice and assisting offenders. A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of 
Criminal Law (7th edn OUP 2013) 418, 419. 
355 See for instance Simester and others (n 353) 205 and D Ormerod and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
Law, Cases and Materials (14th edn OUP 2015). 
356 Simester and others (n 353) 205. 
357 Ormerod and Laird (n 355) 211; Ibid Ch 7; See generally, Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law 
Com No 305, 2007) Part 4. 
358 Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) QB 773, 777: ‘The very use of the word “accessory” covers 
aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring. An accessory, by the very nature of the word is someone who, 
having one motive or another, gives his support to an enterprise knowing basically what the enterprise is about’. 
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According to section 44 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980, the same applies to summary offences.360 
Hence, English criminal law stipulates that a secondary party to a crime committed361 shall be 
punished as the primary perpetrator or principal to a crime. 
Prior to the amendment of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 by the Criminal Law Act 1977, 
section 8 of the former provided the following: 
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the Commission of any Misdemeanour, whether the 
same be a Misdemeanour at Common Law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be 
liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal Offender. 
Originally, in common law, crimes were categorised in accordance with their gravity for procedural 
reasons.362 As a result, three different groups of crimes existed, namely treason, felony and 
misdemeanour.363 While felonies were considered to be severe crimes, all other offences were labelled 
misdemeanour.364 A distinctive characteristic of the former was that felons could be arrested without 
charge, had no right to bail and were subject to harsher punishment.365 Today crimes are ‘for 
procedural purposes’ merely classified as either (i) summary, (ii) indictable or (iii) either way 
offences366 as the category of offence describes ‘the type of court hearing in which the crime will be 
tried’.367 The group of indictable offences entails the most severe crimes, such as murder, and can only 
be tried in the Crown Court. Contrary to that, less grave offences can be tried either summarily in 
Magistrates’ Court or either way in the Crown and Magistates’ Court. 
As a consequence to the change in the wording of section 8, whereby ‘misdemeanour’ was replaced 
with ‘any indictable offence’, the applicability of section 8 to the gravest offences, including murder, 
which imposes a mandatory life sentence, is guaranteed. Hallevy notes that section 8 was amended ‘in 
order to include additional liability to the actual perpetration’.368 Furthermore, ‘the rule laid down in 
the 1861 Act’369 has crucial procedural implications in that ‘the prosecution can obtain a conviction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 After amendment by the Criminal Law Act 1977 Chapter 45, section 65(4).  
360 Section 44 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980: ‘(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels and procures the 
commission by another person of a summary offence shall be guilty of the like offence and may be tried 
(whether or not he is charged as a principal) either by a court having jurisdiction to try that other person or by a 
court having by virtue of his own offence jurisdiction to try him. (2) Any offence consisting in aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring the commission of an offence triable either way (other than an offence listed in 
Schedule 1 to this Act) shall by virtue of this subsection be triable either way’. 
361 However, this participation must take place prior to the completion of the offence, see Simester and others (n 
353) 203 seq. 
362 I Marchuk, The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International Criminal Law, A Comparative Law Analysis 
(Springer 2014) 7. 
363 Despite the abolition of the distinction between felony and misdemeanour in English law, it remains in force 
in the criminal law of Sierra Leone, as can be inferred from the Criminal Procedure Act 1965 (inter alia from 
sections 11 and 13). See S v Archilla et al. [2009] SLHC 20, para 4, where the issue of categorising offences into 
felony and misdemeanour was addressed in the context of accessorial liability. 
364 Marchuk (n 362) 7. 
365 Ibid 7. 
366 Ormerod and Laird (n 355) 35. 
367 Ibid. 
368 G Hallevy, The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability (Springer 2012) 11. 
369 Ashworth and Horder (n 354) 421. 
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without specifying in advance whether the allegation is that D is a principal or an accomplice (…)’.370 
Ashworth and Horder make the point that this that this is ‘undoubtedly a great convenience for the 
prosecution’.371 
Despite the fact that the legal consequences attaching to the labels of principal or accessorial liability 
are generally the same, the distinction between principals and accessories can be important. This is 
due to the fact that secondary liability is derivative of principal liability, and thus, the actus reus of the 
offence must have taken place.372 Further, the mens rea requirements of accessories and principals 
respectively differ. Ashworth and Horder note that in order to distinguish between accessories and 
principals, one can say that the ‘principal is a person whose acts fall within the legal definition of the 
crime, whereas an accomplice (sometimes called an ‘accessory’ or ‘secondary party’) is anyone who 
aids, abets, counsels, or procures a principal’.373  
Section 8 embraces four forms of participation as a secondary party, which are all equally recognised 
at common law.374 However, when an individual is charged with one or the other form of participation, 
the pertinent “mode” does not have to be mentioned separately in the charge as all four modes ‘may 
also be used together’.375 Fletcher notes that the Anglo-American common law systems as well as 
French law do make a distinction between ‘someone who procures or commands the act, and someone 
who assists the act by supplying counsel or the means for committing the offense’.376 The modes’ 
meaning overlap to varying degrees.377 Nevertheless, their meanings differ.378 In Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 1 of 1975), the Court of Appeal clarified in relation to the interpretation of Section 8 of 
the 1861 Act that it is approached ‘on the basis that the words should be given their ordinary meaning, 
if possible’.379 There is extensive case law relating to the judicial interpretation of the four modes.380 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Ibid 421; see also R v Gianetto [1997] 1 Cr App R1. 
371 Ashworth and Horder (n 354) 421. 
372 See for instance Thornton v Mitchell (1940) 1 All ER 339. 
373 See R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 para 17, where reference was made to G Williams, ‘Finis for Novus 
Actus?’ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Journal 391, 392: ‘Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or otherwise 
influence) or help. If the instigator were regarded as causing the result he would be a principal, and the 
conceptual division between principals (or, as I prefer to call them, perpetrators) and accessories would vanish. 
Indeed, it was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the crime that the notion of accessories had to 
be developed. This is the irrefragable argument for recognising the novus actus principle as one of the bases of 
our criminal law. The final act is done by the perpetrator, and his guilt pushes the accessories, conceptually 
speaking, into the background. Accessorial liability is, in the traditional theory, “derivative” from that of the 
perpetrator’. 
374 Simester and others (n 353) 208. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 7) 644, 645. 
377 Simester and others (n 353) 208. 
378 See Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 1975 (n 358) 773: ‘We approach section 8 of the Act of 1861 on 
the basis that the words should be given their ordinary meaning, if possible. We approach the section on the 
basis also that if the four words are employed here, “aid, abet, counsel or procure”, the probability is that there is 
a difference between each of those four words and the other three, because, if there were no such difference, then 
Parliament would be wasting time in using four words where two or three would do. Thus, in deciding whether 
that which is assumed to be done under our reference was a criminal offence we approach the section on the 
footing that each word must be given its ordinary meaning’. 
379 Ibid. 
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As Ashworth notes, ‘[i]t appears that one can be convicted of aiding and abetting an offence by 
applauding (…)’. 381 Therefore it makes sense to consider the ambit of each mode and subsequently 
understand the difference between the modes or rather “sub-modes” enumerated in section 8382 before 
considering the legal consequences attached to them. (i) Aiding means giving support, helping or 
providing assistance. However, the mere attempt to help is not sufficient, as there has to ‘be actual 
assistance’.383 (ii) Abetting refers to the act of inciting by aid, or ‘to instigate or to encourage’.384 (iii) 
Counselling implies two different meanings: while it comprehends the ‘provision of advice or 
information’ to the principal, which could also be covered by (i) above,385 it may also include the act 
of ‘“urging” someone to commit an offence’, in which case an overlap with (ii) above can be observed 
and the same is true for (iv) below, but ‘to a lesser extent’.386 Finally, (iv) procuring has been defined 
as ‘to produce by endeavour’387 and as ‘bringing about an offence, as by deceiving another so that the 
other commits the offence’.388 In comparison to the other sub-modes of participation in section 8 of the 
Accessories and Abettors Act, procuring requires the presence of a stronger nexus between the 
procurer and the crime per se,389 because the requirement for the procuring a person to commit a crime 
is that the procurer ‘deliberately induces or influences the principal to commit the offence’.390 These 
modes vary in relation to the timing when the contribution to the crime is made: while pertinent 
contributions taking place at the time when the crime takes place are covered by “aiding” and 
“abetting”, those acts taking place before the commission of the offence are covered by the modes 
“counsel” and “procure”.391 The mens rea requirements for accessories have been described as 
follows:  
(1) the accessory must intend to assist or encourage the principal’s conduct, or in the case of 
procuring, to bring the offence about; and 
(2) the accessory must have knowledge as to the essential elements of the principal’s offence, 
(including any facts as to which the principal bears strict liability). This includes a requirement 
that D must be aware that the principal might act with mens rea when performing the conduct 
which constitutes the principal offence.392 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 A Ashworth, ‘United Kingdom’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal 
Law (Stanford University Press 2010) 539. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. 
383 Simester and others (n 353) 209. 
384 Ibid 210. 
385 Simester and others (n 353) 212; see also Ashworth, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 380) 539. 
386 Simester and others (n 353) 212. 
387 Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 1975 (n 358) 773: ‘To procure means to produce by endeavour. You 
procure a thing by setting out to see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening’. 
388 Ashworth, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 380) 539. 
389 Simester and others (n 353) 214. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 1975 (n 358) 773; C Elliott and F Quinn, Criminal Law (9th edn, 
Pearson 2012) 303. 
392 Ormerod and Laird (n 355) 188. 
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In English law an accessory can also be someone who participates in a joint enterprise, which has been 
subject to debate.393 According to this doctrine, where a plurality of defendants (minimum two) jointly 
acted with a ‘common purpose, and where one of them went beyond that purpose and committed a 
more serious offence, the others were liable to the conviction for that more serious offence if they 
realized that this was a possible consequence of their joint entperprise’.394 Accordingly, the 
Prosecution did not have to prove that the other person(s) who did not commit the other more serious 
offence(s) intended the commission. The Law Commission has pointed out several issues concerning 
the doctrine of secondary liability, which are not discussed here as they exceed the scope of this 
paper.395 
However, only recently, the Supreme Court gave a landmark decision in R v Jogee concerning the 
joint enterprise doctrine, thereby overruling decades of case law in that it recognised ‘the significance 
of reversing a statement of principle which has been made and followed by the Privy Council and the 
House of Lords on a number of occasions’.396 The Supreme Court criticised that ‘the rule [as it is] 
brings the striking anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the case of the accessory 
than in the case of the principal’397 and further observed that ‘[t]he error was to equate foresight with 
intent to assist, as a matter of law’.398 Instead, the Supreme Court pointed out that ‘the correct 
approach is to treat it as evidence of intent’.399 
What becomes clear from the above is that, according to traditional common law, an accessory can 
generally be subjected to the same penalty as a principal, despite a different liability threshold. 
Individual culpability is taken into consideration at the sentencing stage, leaving the judge with the 
discretion to assess blameworthiness and to pronounce the sentence accordingly. Notwithstanding that, 
as the recent Judgment in R v Jogee400 has shown in relation to the doctrine of joint enterprise, there is 
a move towards a more nuanced approach with clearer boundaries. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Ashworth, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 380) 539. 
394 Ibid. 
395 See generally Law Commission, Participating in Crime, 4: ‘The doctrine of secondary liability has developed 
haphazardly and is permeated with uncertainty. Crucially, these features affect not merely the margins of the 
doctrine but key concepts. Two examples are the fault element of secondary liability and the defences that are 
available.’ See also A J Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (4th edn, OUP 2003) 441, as cited by the Law 
Commission on page 4 of their report, Participating in Crime: ‘(…) replete with uncertainties and conflict. It 
betrays the worst features of the common law: what some would regard as flexibility appears here as succession 
of opportunistic decisions by the courts, often extending the law, and resulting in a body of jurisprudence that 
has little coherence.’ See also Ashworth, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 380) 539: ‘English law on accessorial liability is 
in a state of flux.’ 
396 R v Jogee (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 8, para 79. The Supreme Court held that the error was made in the Chan 
Wing Siu case, Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168. 
397 Ibid para 84. 
398 Ibid para 87. 
399 Ibid. 
400 R v Jogee (n 396). 
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2.4.6 INDIA 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, Indian criminal law was primarily 
governed jointly by Hindu and Islamic Law. The Penal Code is amongst others, significantly 
influenced by English criminal law and the French Penal Code.401 It makes a distinction between a 
principal and an abettor.402 Thereby Articles 107 to 120 govern the liability of abettors.403 The former 
under Chapter V of the Penal Code provides for different modes of participation in a crime. In order 
for these provisions to apply, there must be a person who abets (by instigation, conspiracy or 
intentional aid), the abetted act must have taken place, and the legal consequence of such abetment 
must constitute an offence.404 Three forms of abetment are enumerated in Article 107, namely (i) 
abetment by instigation,405 (ii) abetment by conspiracy406 and (iii) abetment by intentional aiding.407 
Thus ‘abetment’ stands as its own offence and is therefore not based on the premise that the abettor 
committed the ‘substantive offence’.408 However, according to the jurisprudence of courts, this is only 
applicable to the modes of conspiracy and instigation, as the third form, “aiding”, implies that an act 
has been committed and the aider has contributed to it by aiding.409 These forms of abetment are 
similar to the English common law term “accessory before the fact”.410 According to section 109, an 
abettor is to be punished as a principal if the commission of the crime was a consequence of his act of 
abetting and if there is no provision expressly providing for a specific punishment. Moreover, section 
111 of the Indian Penal Code provides for cases where a person abetted a specific act, but as a result of 
his abetment another act was undertaken. In this case the abettor is liable to the different act 
committed if it was a ‘probable consequence of the abetment’.411  
Another mode of participation is membership in a joint enterprise, governed by section 34 of the Penal 
Code. The Penal Code labels such participation as ‘acts done by several persons in furtherance of 
common intention’. According to this doctrine, each individual who participates and shares the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 S Yeo, ‘India’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law (Stanford 
University Press 2010) 289. 
402 K Gaur, Textbook on the Indian Penal Code (Universal Law Publishing 1992) 196. 
403 Ibid 196. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Explanation 1 to Article 107 defines an instigator as ‘[a] person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by 
wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts 
to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing’. 
406 Gaur (n 402) 197: ‘A person is said to abet the commission of an offence by conspiracy, if he enters into an 
agreement with one or more persons to do a legal act by illegal means, or to do an illegal act, and some act is 
done in pursuance thereof’. 
407 Section 107 Indian Penal Code of 1860; according to Explanation 2 to section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, 
an aider is defined as follows: ‘Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything 
in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the 
doing of that act’. Yeo (n 401) 289. 
408 Section 107; Yeo (n 401) 289. 
409 Section 107; Jamuna Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1967 SC 553 cited by Yeo (n 401) 289. 
410 Gaur (n 402) 197. 
411 Provision to Article 111 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860. 
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common intention with the objective to further it, is liable as a principal.412 Similarly, a participant 
who acts in furtherance of a common intention or design is punished like a principal. However, in 
order for a participant to be liable he ‘must have been physically or constructively present when the 
offence occurred’.413  
 
2.4.7 NEW ZEALAND 
 
In New Zealand the concept of individual criminal responsibility is embodied in in Part 4 (section 66) 
of the Crimes Act 1961.414 While subsection (1)(a) establishes principal liability, subsection 1(b)-(d) 
and subsection (2) embrace concepts of secondary liability.415 Thus, a distinction is made between the 
two latter categories. Subsection (1)(b)-(d) imposes criminal liability on persons who encourage or 
assist in the commission of a crime: 
(b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the offence; or 
(c) abets any person in the commission of the offence; or 
(d) incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit the offence. 
Moreover, secondary liability can arise under the ‘doctrine of common intention’, which is laid down 
in section 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961.416 According to this concept, liability is imposed on each 
individual: 
Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to 
assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in 
the prosecution of the common purpose if the commission of that offence was known to be a 
probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose.417 
 
Accordingly, the Crimes Act 1961 distinguishes between three categories of participants: the principal 
on the one hand and two different types of secondary parties on the other hand. Despite the different 
requirements of each “label” for imputing liability, once liability is established, all participants are 
convicted for the principal offence418 and therefore a secondary party can be subjected to the same 
penalties as the principal perpetrator.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Section 34 provides: ‘When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention 
of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone’. 
413 Yeo (n 401) 297. 
414 Section 66 of the Crimes Act 1961 No 43: ‘Everyone is a party to and guilty of an offence who (a) actually 
commits the offence; or (b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the offence; or 
(c) abets any person in the commission of the offence; or (d) incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit 
the offence. (2) Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to 
assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in the 
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415 J Tolmie, ‘New Zealand,’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 379. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Article 66(2) Crimes Act 1961. 
418 Tolmie (n 415) 395. 
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Nevertheless the judge has the discretion to take into consideration the relevant factors in order to 
assess each individual’s contribution. 
 
2.4.8 UNITED STATES 
 
The United States generally reflect another typical common law tradition, because the former colonies 
embraced English common law in the eighteenth century.419 The United States embrace 52 diverse 
criminal codes, it is therefore difficult to refer to something such as a general American position on a 
particular issue in question concerning American criminal law,420 which also applies to this this 
comparative study. However, the promulgation of the Model Penal Code by the American Law 
Institute421 immensely advanced the codification of ‘modern’ American criminal law.422 This is 
reflected by the fact that since its introduction in 1962, almost three quarters of American states have 
replaced their criminal codes on the basis of it.423 Dubber clarifies that certain states still continue to 
follow the traditional common law principle in relation to attribution of individual criminal liability.424 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this study, three different sources of American criminal law are 
examined: common law, the Model Penal Code and finally the United States Code. 
At common law perpetrators ‘were punished as either principals or accessories’.425 This distinction did 
not apply to misdemeanour cases, where each participant was considered to be a principal to the 
offence. Thereby principals were sub-categorised as (i) principals in the first degree; and (ii) principals 
in the second degree (aider and abettor);426 while accessories were classified as accessories before the 
fact (aider and abettor);427 and (iv) accessories after the fact.428 Accordingly, the traditional common 
law system distinguished between four categories of participants.429 Thus, both the principal and the 
accessory faced sanctions as ‘felons’.430 Only later a new differentiation emerged whereby 
‘accessories after the fact’ were not considered to be ‘true parties’ as they contributed to the offence 
after it had already been completed.431 The complicity norms of the Model Penal Code432 can be 
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421 Also referred to as ALI. 
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424 M Dubber, ‘Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2007) 977, 980. 
425 L Chiesa, ‘United States’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 469. 
426 W LaFave, Principles of Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (West Group 1978) 513. 
427 The accused was considered to be principal in the second degree if he was present at ‘the scene of the crime’ 
and accessory before the fact if they were not present, see Chiesa (n 425) 474. 
428 Dubber Criminalizing Complicity (n 424) 980; Chiesa (n 425) 470. 
429 LaFave (n 426) 513. 
430 Dubber Criminalizing Complicity (n 424) 984. 
431 Chiesa (n 425) 470. 
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considered as the result of a ‘careful critical analysis’ of the traditional common law complicity 
scheme and the general norms.433 One of the consequences thereof was the abolishment of the 
principal accessory (before the fact) distinction.434  
The Model Penal Code provides that ‘a person is guilty of an offense if he commits it “by his own 
conduct” or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable or both”’.435 It 
defines an accomplice as someone who solicits, ‘aids, agrees to aid or attempts to aid […] in the 
planning or commission of the offense, or […] has a legal duty to prevent the commission, but makes 
no effort to do so.436 
Another source that could be looked at is the United States Code (USC), which defines ‘principals’ in 
Part I Chapter 1 section 2 as follows: 
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.  
 
Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be 
an offense against the United States, is punishable as the principal.437 
Accordingly, an accessory to a crime committed is in theory as severely punished as a principal. 
However, the USC isolates the “accessory after the fact” (as the traditional common law approach) 
from the same legal consequence, by prescribing a mandatory mitigation on the sentencing stage: 
Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, 
relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or 
punishment, is an accessory after the fact. 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall 
be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (…) fined not more 
than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the 
principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more 
than 15 years’.438 
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Hence, the USC provides that the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an accessory after the 
fact is 15 years.  
Irrespective of the three different sources on American complicity law subject to this study, one 
principle, which is common to all three of them, becomes very obvious, namely the intention to grant 
the judge the discretion to punish an accessory, apart from the accessory after the fact, as severely as a 
principal (and in some cases more harshly). There is no prescribed statutory mitigation of punishment, 
as for instance in German criminal law, e contrario judges can in principle mitigate the sentence 
subject to discretion, but they do not have to mitigate the sentence at all. According to Dubber, the 
Model Penal Code’s ‘drafters’ guiding principle was, each person’s criminal liability should reflect his 
individual culpability’.439 Accordingly, the reason for such judicial discretion appears to be the ability 
to assess the individual’s guilt independent of the specific label. This appears logical where the 
defendant, who is charged as aider and abettor, appears to be more blameworthy than the principal, 
or/and possibly insufficient evidence is available to charge him as a principal. Vice versa, it lowers the 
threshold for imputing “principal” liability, which is in fact accessory liability but has the same legal 
effect. The 2010 Federal Sentencing Guideline on assessing the punishment of an aider and abettor 
reads as follows: ‘The offense level is the same level as that for the underlying offense’.  
Moreover, section 2 (a) of Title 18 USC provides that a defendant convicted of aiding and abetting is 
punishable as a principal and thus aiding and abetting the commission of an offence has the same 
offence level as the underlying offence. An adjustment for a mitigating role in accordance with the 
2015 USSC Guidelines Manual (section 3B1.2) may however be applicable. Thereby the sentencing 
judge is given tremendous discretion in deciding whether the accused should be punished as severely 
as the principal or maybe less. This position was inter alia emphasised in the case of People v Shafou, 
where it was stated that: 
Accomplices generally are punished as severely as the principal, on the premise that when a crime 
has been committed, those who aid in its commission should be punished like the principal.440 
 
Yet this is not the maximum punishment an accessory can face. Most US jurisdictions recognise the 
“natural-and-probable-consequences” doctrine, according to which an accomplice is liable for the 
crimes committed by the principal to a crime if these other crimes were ‘a natural and probable 
consequence’ of the original offence – even if they were not desired by the accomplice.441 Again, the 
sentencing judge has wide discretion to sentence the accomplice as principal to each of these pertinent 
crimes, despite the fact that the culpability of an accessory in this specific circumstance is less than the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Dubber Criminalizing Complicity (n 424) 987. 
440 People v Shafou 330 NW 2d 647 416 Mich 113 (1982).  
441 See People v Hoang 13 P.3d 819 (Colo Ct App 2000); J Dressler, ‘Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial 
Assistance as a Lesser Offense’ (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 427, 428. 
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guilt of the principal in the described scenario.442 Hence, it can be said that in the American system, 
accessories (except the accessory after the fact) and principal are subject to the same sanctions. 
 
 
CATEGORY III: 
 
2.4.9 EGYPT 
 
The provisions on individual criminal responsibility are laid down in Part 4 of the Penal Code.443 
Article 39 governs principal liability, referring to persons who directly commit the crime alone, or 
jointly with others (co-perpetration). Moreover, a person who intentionally commits an act which 
leads, in accordance with acts committed by others, to the commission of the crime or the criminal 
result, is also considered to be a principal to the crime. Article 40 of the Penal Code then lists three 
categories of accomplices, namely (i) someone who instigates to the commission of a crime, where the 
act leading to the commission of the crime is caused by the instigation; (ii) someone who jointly with 
another agrees to commit a crime, where the agreement is the cause for the commission of the crime; 
and finally (iii) someone who supports the actual perpetrator(s) by providing them with a weapon or 
other objects, while knowing that these objects will either cause the crime, support the preparation of 
it, or lead to the completion of the pertinent offence.  
Article 41 of the Egyptian Penal Code is devoted to the legal consequences resulting from one mode 
or the other. It provides that accomplices are subject to the same penalty as principals; however, the 
Penal Code provides exceptions:444 if for example the principal’s liability is ‘altered’ due to ‘special 
circumstances’ and the accessory did not have knowledge of these circumstances, his liability is not 
affected by them and he is ‘punished according to the nature and degree of his (…) own intent or 
knowledge’.445 Article 42 provides that the principal’s defence to a crime does not affect the 
accomplice’s liability.446 Moreover, Article 43 governs the situation where an accomplice contributes 
to a crime, through agreement, instigation or other forms of assistance, but as a result of these acts, 
another crime, not intended by the accomplice, is committed.447 If such a scenario arises, the Court of 
Cassation has held that accomplices are liable for unintended crimes, which they should have foreseen 
as a result of their respective form of assistance.448 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 See generally for a critical view of American complicity law among others, Dressler (n 441). 
443 Law No. 58 of 1937 Issuing the Penal Code (as amended up to Law No. 95 of 2003). 
444 Article 41 of the Penal Code; S Reza, ‘Egypt’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook of 
Comparative Criminal Law (Stanford University Press 2010) 189. 
445 Ibid 189. 
446 See also Reza (n 444) 189. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
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Accordingly, it can be observed that the Egyptian Penal Code shares with the law on individual 
criminal responsibility of England and Wales, the unitary approach in that an accessory shall be 
punished like the principal perpetrator. However, contrary to the English concept, the Egyptian Penal 
Code restricts the unfettered discretion of judges by inserting Article 42, which draws a line between a 
principal on the one side and an accessory, who did not share the principal perpetrator’s intent or 
knowledge, on the other side. Although this provision does not spell out a generic legal consequence 
for accessories, akin to a differentiated approach, it can be viewed as providing guidance and limits 
the vast discretion of judges. Despite the fact that the Egyptian law clearly manifests a unitary 
approach, it must be differentiated from the unitary approach as established in the criminal law of 
England and Wales, where such limitation, or guidance, is not expressly pronounced by law. 
 
2.4.10 FRANCE 
 
There are also civil law systems which do not provide for “mitigating punishment” for accessories, 
such as inter alia France, Italy, and Austria, and therefore follow a unitary approach.449 The French 
and Anglo-American systems only provide for one group of accessories.450 The French Criminal Code 
refers to the principal as auteur materiel, which is specified in Article 121-4 of the Code and to 
accomplices as les complices.451 According to Article 121-4 a principal perpetrator is someone who ‘1. 
Commits the criminal conduct; 2. Attempts to commit a serious offence or, in the case provided for by 
the legislation, a major offence’.452 The concept of accomplice liability is mainly embodied in Articles 
121-6 and 121-7 (1) and (2).453 The latter defines accomplices as follows: 
An accomplice to a serious or major offence is the person who knowingly, by help or assistance, 
facilitated its preparation or commission. A person is also an accomplice who by gift, promise, 
threat, order, abuse of authority or power has provoked an offence or gives instructions to commit 
it.454 
 
Accordingly, strictly speaking, French criminal law distinguishes between an accessory who 
‘knowingly, by help or assistance’ furthered the commission of the respective crime and an accessory 
‘who by gift, promise, threat, order, abuse of authority or power (…)’ contributed to the 
commission.455 
 However, both forms trigger accomplice liability and no distinction is made within this category for 
sentencing purposes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 However, judges may still make use of their discretion at the sentencing stage; Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal 
Law (n 7) 636. 
450 Ibid 645. 
451 Articles 121.5, 121.6, 121.7 of the French Criminal Code; C Elliott, ‘France’ in A Reed and M Bohlander 
(eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 273, 274. 
452 Elliott, French Criminal Law (Willan 2001) 84. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Article 121-7 of the French Penal Code; C Elliott ‘France’ in K J Heller and M Dubber (eds), The Handbook 
of Comparative Criminal Law (Stanford University Press 2010) 222; Elliott, French Criminal Law (n 452) 85.  
455 van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(n 106) 62. 
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Three requirements have to be satisfied in order to establish secondary party liability, namely (i) the 
principal perpetrator must have committed the offence; (ii) some sort of complicity must be present; 
and (iii) the secondary party must have the required mental element or mens rea.456 
Article 121-6457 stipulates that accessories are to be punished as principals to the crime.458  
2.4.11 ICELAND 
 
Generally, according to the General Penal Code of Iceland,459 accessories are to be punished as 
principals; however, as will be seen below, this uniform approach is not strict and statutory mitigation 
of the sentence applies to several exceptions. Article 22 of the Penal Code provides that ‘[a]ny person 
who in word or deed provides aid in the commission of a punishable act defined in this Act, or takes, 
by persuasion, exhortation or otherwise a part in committing such act’ is punishable as the principal 
offender. The criminal code provides for mitigated punishment in following situations:460 
(i) the participant’s role in the commission of the crime in question is of “minor nature”, or if 
(ii) the participant strengthens another person’s determination to commit a crime and this 
person’s determination is already formed prior to the participant’s attempt to strengthen it 
(iii) the crime in question has not been committed  
(iv) the intended participation in the crime has failed. 
Moreover, para 3 of Article 22 provides that if one of the situations above is applicable and the 
accessory became involved due to “inadvertence”, he may be exempted from punishment if the 
prescribed penalty for the crime in question does not exceed one year of imprisonment. 
 
Category IV461 
 
2.4.12 SFRY, CROATIA, MONTENEGRO, BIH, SERBIA AND KOSOVO 
 
As laid down in Chapter 2, Article 24 of the criminal code of the SFRY embraces a unitary approach 
in that accessories to a crime may be punished more mildly. It can be clearly seen that the criminal 
codes of Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all seem to have drawn on this 
provision and thus they all embody a unitary approach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Elliott, ‘France’ in Heller and Dubber (n 454) 222; Elliott, French Criminal Law (n 452) 85. 
457 Article 121.6: ‘The accomplice of the offence, as defined in Article 121-7, will be punished as a principal 
offender’. See also 121-7 of the French Criminal Code; Elliott, French Criminal Law (n 452) 84; Elliott, 
‘France’ in Heller and Dubber (n 454) 222. 
458 Elliott, ‘France’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (n 451) 274; Elliott, ‘France’ in Heller and Dubber (n 454) 222. 
459 General Penal Code of Iceland No. 19, February 12, 1940. 
460 Article 22 para 2. 
461 Due to the fact that these jurisdictions have been addressed in detail in Chapter 2, they are only briefly 
referred to here for the sake of completeness, to avoid extensive repetition. 
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Interestingly, the Provisional Code of Kosovo deviated from this approach in that it provided that a 
person who assists another in the “commission of a criminal offence” is entitled to mitigated 
punishment as provided for in Article 65(2) PCCK. Article 65(2) PCCK stipulated that an accessory 
shall not be punished ‘more than three-quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the 
criminal offence’. However, the new Criminal Code of Kosovo, which entered into force in January 
2013, also embodies a unitary approach, although with a differentiated element. Article 33 of the new 
Criminal Code resembles the aforementioned criminal codes, albeit discretionary mitigation is 
regulated in more detail. Accordingly it can be concluded that the above addressed jurisdictions all 
draw on the same principles in that mitigation for accessories may only be invoked on a discretionary 
basis. 
 
2.4.13 CAMBODIA 
 
The Cambodian Criminal Code also opts for a unitary approach. Article 29 of the Cambodian 
Criminal Code refers to an accessory to a crime as an ‘accomplice’.462 Moreover, it provides that an 
accomplice is a ‘person who intentionally facilitates the attempt or the realisation of a felony or a 
misdemeanour by providing his/her help or assistance’.463 With regard to the legal relevance attached 
to the classification as accomplice, Article 29 section 2 continues to clarify that ‘an accomplice of a 
felony or misdemeanour receives the same punishment as the perpetrator’. When taking a closer look 
at the wording, it becomes clear that ‘felony’ and ‘misdemeanour’ are words borrowed from common 
law. Since the Cambodian legal system is hybrid as it entails civil and common law elements, one can 
deduce that the unitary approach opted for in relation to the punishment of accessories is heavily 
influenced by the traditional common law approach in this regard.  
 
2.4.14 SIERRA LEONE 
 
As addressed in Chapter 2, accessories may be punished as principals in accordance with section 1 of 
the Abettors and Accessories Act 1861. 
 
2.4.15 RWANDA 
 
The Rwandan Organic Law incorporates a differentiated approach in that it distinguishes perpetrators 
based on their participation464 for sentencing purposes. 
 
2.4.16 INDONESIA 
 
Article 51 of the Indonesian Penal Code embraces a differentiated approach in that accomplices are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia 2009. 
463 Ibid Article 29. 
464 Prosecutor v Serushago (Trial Judgment) ICTR 98-39-S (5 February 1999) para 17. 
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entitled to one third punishment in relation to the maximum punishment.465 In terms of crimes leading 
to capital punishment or a life sentence, the penalty is limited to a maximum of 15 years’ 
imprisonment.466  
 
2.4.17 IRAQ 
 
The Iraqi criminal code embraces a unitary approach in that it stipulates that ‘[a]ny person who 
participates in the commission of an offence as principal or accessory is punishable by the penalty 
prescribed for that offence unless otherwise stipulated by law’.467 
 
2.4.18 LEBANON 
 
Generally speaking, the Lebanese Criminal Code distinguishes between the punishment of 
perpetrators and the sanctions imposed on accomplices. However, it distinguishes between the 
accomplice ‘without whose assistance the offence would not have taken place’ and the ordinary 
accomplice. According to law, the former shall be punished as if he were the principal perpetrator of 
the offence(s) in question. The latter is punished more mildly. Thus the determination of the exact 
penalty range is dependent on the specific sentence of the principal.468 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
What all the above systems have in common, despite the differences concerning legal consequences, is 
the fact that (i) all of the systems distinguish between principals and/or accessories as primary and 
secondary parties respectively; (iii) even the systems which embrace a unitary approach maintain the 
discretion to mitigate the punishment of aiders; (ii) all of the systems are based on different mens rea 
requirements for principals and accessories, leading to (iii) a different liability threshold for principals 
and accessories; and (iv) some unitary systems embark on a normative distinctions between two 
categories of accessories, implying different generic penalties. While inciters are mostly punished as 
principals, most legal systems offer at least the possibility of discretionary mitigation to aiders. 
Moreover, one can observe that all of the common law systems and a minority of the selected civil law 
systems such as those of Egypt and France assess the culpability of the individual at the sentencing 
stage and not during the attribution or “labelling-process”. Iceland and Lebanon, for instance, mix a 
unitary approach with a differentiated approach. Table 2 below comprises the findings of the 
comparative study relating to the approach embraced in relation to the punishment of participants to an 
offence. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Article 57(1) Indonesian Penal Code. 
466 Article 57(2) Indonesian Penal Code.  
467 Article 50(1) Penal Code 111, as amended 14 March 2010 (Iraq). 
468 Article 220 Lebanese Criminal Code. 
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TABLE 2: THE SENTENCING APPROACH IN PERTINENT JURISDICTIONS 
 
Country 
 
Unitary Approach 
 
Differentiated Approach 
Bosnia and Herzegovina X  
Cambodia X  
China  X 
Croatia X  
Egypt X  
England & Wales X  
France X  
(Former) FSRY X  
Germany  X 
Iceland X  
India X  
Indonesia  X 
Iraq X  
Japan  X 
Kosovo  X 
Lebanon  X* 
Macedonia X  
Montenegro X  
New Zealand X  
Rwanda X  
Serbia X  
Sierra Leone X  
Slovenia X  
Turkey  X 
US X**  
 
*If contribution of the aider not essential, mandatory mitigation 
**Accessory after the fact, mandatory mitigation 
 
Accordingly, the above examination coupled with Table 2 reveals that a variety of “coping-processes” 
for collective criminality exist on the domestic level and that to some extent these mechanisms 
overlap. What each of them has in common is the normative distinction of principals and accessories 
or secondary parties to a crime. The main intersection, however, is whether domestic systems attach 
different legal consequences to either accessories or principals. It is clear that generally civil law 
systems embrace a differentiated approach in relation to sentencing while common law countries 
follow a unitary approach. Nonetheless this distinction must be treated with caution. The civil and 
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common law distinction in this regard serves merely as a broad categorisation, since various legal 
systems such as Austria, Denmark,469 Italy, France and Sweden, amongst a few others, have opted for 
a rather unitary approach despite their civil law tradition. Thus, the degree of culpability is not 
measured and expressed through legally relevant labelling at the attribution stage, but it is rather 
reflected at the sentencing stage. In contrast, Germany, which can be regarded as one of the countries 
referred to as ‘a proxy for the laws of all other countries influenced by these legal systems, and as 
potential building blocks of existing and new universal norms’,470 does not in fact operate a pure 
differentiated approach as certain offences will trigger the application of a unitary attribution 
system.471 This is, however, only the case for certain offences and does not include graver, 
intentionally committed offences. 
It can clearly be seen that, for instance, the German, Turkish and Japanese criminal law systems 
embrace a differentiated approach. Thus, the respective criminal codes provide for a statutory 
mitigation for aiders and at the same time stipulate that abettors/instigators/inducers are to be punished 
as principals despite the fact that they are categorised as accessories. The latter is not true for Japanese 
criminal law, as inducement is a separate form of participation, which differs from the category of 
“accessoryship”. In relation to the punishment of instigators, Chinese criminal law opts for an 
approach which merges features of the differentiated and unitary approaches: while instigators shall 
receive a heavier sentence if they have instigated an individual who is below the age of 18,472 an 
instigator shall generally be punished in relation to the “role he plays” in the commission of the joint 
crime.473 An instigator may also receive mitigated or lighter punishment if the instigated person has 
not committed the crime.474 Generally the Chinese criminal code opts for a differentiated approach by 
providing mitigation or exemption from punishment for accessories. Furthermore, lighter punishment 
or exemption from penalty is prescribed for coerced participants.475  
The Anglo-American common law system follows a unitary approach at the sentencing stage. As seen 
above in relation to England and Wales, America and New Zealand, a differentiated approach is taken 
at the attribution stage, as secondary participation is derivative from the liability of the principal 
offender and a classification into one of the two categories takes place. Notwithstanding that, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 For the law on individual criminal responsibility in Scandinavia, Austria and Germany see K Hamdorf, 
‘Beteiligungsmodelle im Strafrecht: Ein Vergleich von Teilnahme- und Einheitstäter- systemen in Skandinavien, 
Österreich und Deutschland’ in Albin Eser, Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für 
Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht (edition iuscrim 2002). 
470 Y Shany, ‘Seeking Domestic Help: The Role of Domestic Criminal Law in Legitimizing the Work of 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9. 
471 Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (n 152) 154, 155 and 153: ‘In the lowest category of offence, 
the Ordnungswidrigkeiten, the law has abandoned the division between principals and secondary participants 
and adopted the so-called Einheitstäterbegriff or unified perpetrator concept in section 14(1) OWiG. This 
concept considers anyone a principal whose actions helped cause the result or establish the actus reus elements 
of the offence, regardless of the actual weight of their contribution’. 
472 Article 29 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid Article 28. 
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classification as either principal or secondary party has no legal relevance for the final sentence and 
the secondary party can be punished as severely as the principal perpetrator. It will be at the 
sentencing stage where the judge can take into consideration the individual contribution of the 
participant, which will subsequently be reflected in the sentence. Accordingly, it can be said that while 
the unitary approach requires the ‘assessment of individual guilt’ process at the sentencing stage, 
without a particular frame, the differentiated approach requires the process at the attribution stage, 
while the final penalty will be more or less predictable as a result of the labelling process. The Indian 
Penal Code, influenced by common law and the French Criminal Code, employs a very similar 
approach at the “labelling stage” by providing three different categories of accessories (abettors). 
Irrespective of this categorisation each sub-mode raises principal liability in relation to the 
punishment, if the commission of the crime was the consequence of the abetment. Similarly, the 
Egyptian Penal Code provides for three different categories of accessories and stipulates that 
accomplices are subject to the same penalties as principal perpetrators. Further, the Penal Code 
provides more guidance, by stipulating that the accomplice’s liability is to be assessed in accordance 
with the “nature and degree” of his own intent as opposed to the “intent and knowledge” of the 
principal perpetrator.476 
Interestingly, Iceland, despite the fact that it belongs to the “civil law family”, has adopted an 
approach which constitutes elements of both the civil law and common law approach to attribution 
models and their impact on the sentencing. At first glance, it appears that a unitary approach is 
embraced by the Penal Code of Iceland, as Article 22 provides that aiders are punishable as principal 
offenders. However, a closer look reveals that statutory mitigation of the sentence is available for a 
number of situations, for instance, if the contribution of the aider is of ‘minor nature’.477 Hence, 
particularly this circumstance to which statutory mitigation applies, may restrict the unfettered judicial 
discretion at the sentencing stage. This mechanism, according to which the prosecution has to prove 
that the role or rather contribution of the aider was more than of minor nature and thus imposes a 
higher threshold, can serve as an emergency break, preventing the “blanket” conviction of aiders, 
which may lead to an aider’s punishment as principal perpetrator. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 
2, Lebanon follows a unitary approach in relation to accomplices‚ ‘without whose assistance the 
offence would not have been committed’. 478 If their contribution was not required for the commission 
of the offence, the Lebanese criminal code caps the level of punishment of accessories. Accordingly, if 
the principal perpetrator is sentenced to death the accessory can only punished ‘by hard labour for life 
or by fixed-term hard labour for 10 to 20 years’; if the perpetrator is sentenced to the latter, the 
accessory may only be punished for 7 to 15 years.479 Moreover, in other cases concerning the 
accessory, whose contribution was not required for the commission of the offence, the accessory is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Article 211 Penal Code (Egypt). 
477 Article 22(2) Iceland General Penal Code. 
478 Article 220 Lebanese Criminal Code.  
479 Article 220 Lebanese Criminal Code. 
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entitled to a reduction ‘between one sixth and one third’ of the penalty received by the principal 
perpetrator.480 In light of the above examination it becomes clear that the Criminal Law of Iceland and 
Lebanon are examples of a “restricted” unitary approach, by capping the scale of punishment for 
accessories whose role was either “of minor nature” or not required for the commission of the crime. 
Thus, punishment in violation of the principle of individual culpability481 in relation to specific intent 
crimes seems to be prevented, while essential conduct and intention serve as a reference – or rather 
connection point – in relation to the assessment of the culpability and the degree of punishment 
resulting therefrom. 
A closer look at the traditional common law approach and the normative German approach may serve 
to highlight the different implications on accessories and principals respectively. Although the 
individual culpability of the accessory will be taken into account at the sentencing stage, an 
immensely wide discretion on the part of the judge is implied in English courts. While this approach 
sounds very sophisticated by requiring the judge to assess various factors contributing to an 
individual’s blameworthiness in order to ascertain his guilt, it may pose a problem when it comes to 
offences where a statutory minimum penalty is imposed, which is the case concerning the offence of 
murder. A case in which this issue, coupled with a procedural error, can be observed, is the case of R v 
Craig and Bentley, a case of ‘miscarriage of justice’.482 In November 1952, following a police chase, 
Derek William Bentley shouted to Christopher Craig, who had a gun, ‘let him have it’ and 
subsequently Craig shot dead a PC Sidney Miles. Both were found guilty, but Bentley was held to 
have been an accomplice, based on the joint enterprise doctrine. However, while Craig was only 16 
years of age at the time and therefore below the age allowed for a death sentence, Bentley, who was 18 
at the time, was hanged. In 1993 Derek received a partial pardon posthumously and in 1998 the 
conviction was quashed483 on the basis that the judge’s summing up was biased; it was also argued by 
the defence counsel that it was wrong on a point of law484 in relation to the legal principle relating to 
the sanctions faced by an accomplice.485 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Ibid. 
481 The principle of culpability presupposes that a person is first and foremost found guilty before being 
punished. Thus, this individual guilt requires that ‘the crime can be attributed to the offender on the basis of his 
or her blameworthy conduct’. The second requirement denotes the principle of proportionality, which has to be 
established ‘between personal guilt and punishment’; G Werle and B Burghardt, ‘Establishing Degrees of 
Responsibility’ in E van Sliedregt and S Vasiliev (eds), Pluralism in International Law (OUP 2914) 303, 304.  
482 R v Craig and Bentley (1952) The Times 10-13 December; N Lacey and others, Reconstructing Criminal 
Law: Text and Materials (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010) 195; Elliott and Quinn (n 391) 303. 
483 R v Derek William Bentley [1998] EWCA Crim 2561. 
484 See R v Derek William Bentley [1998] EWCA Crim 2561, where reference was made to page 136 A of the 
transcript of the judge’s summing up: ‘Well, now I turn to Bentley. Members of the jury, these two youths are 
tried together, and they are both tried for the murder of the policeman. It is quite unnecessary, where two or 
more persons are engaged together in an unlawful criminal act, to show that the hand of both of them committed 
the act. The simplest illustration I could give you – after all, this is only a matter of common sense – is this: if 
two men go out house-breaking, it is a very common thing for one of them to break into a house and the other to 
stand outside and keep watch, but they are both taking part in the unlawful enterprise, and therefore they are both 
of them guilty, so if one stands outside so that the other may hand out the loot to him, he is not guilty merely of 
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However, the approach to try and punish accessories as principal offenders also has significant 
procedural implications, as the prosecution can convict a defendant without expressly articulating in 
advance whether he is an alleged accomplice or principal.486 This issue was raised in the case of 
Giannetto,487 where the defendant appealed against the conviction of murder. There was no scientific 
evidence corroborating the prosecution case that he had either committed the crime directly himself or 
as an accessory by instructing someone to do so. Instead, the prosecution relied on circumstantial 
evidence. When considering the authorities, the Court of Appeal quoted inter alia from the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Thatcher v R,488 which reflects the legal ‘indifference’ assigned to a 
principal-accessory distinction by common law countries: 
If there is evidence before a jury that points to an accused either committing a crime personally or, 
alternatively, aiding and abetting another to commit the offence, provided the jury is satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did one or the other, it is a “matter of indifference” 
which alternative actually occurred (…) section 21 includes a requirement of jury unanimity as to 
the particular nature of the accused’s participation in the offence. Why should the juror be 
compelled to make a choice on a subject which is a matter of legal indifference?489 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating: 
Having considered the authorities with some care we are satisfied that in the circumstances of this 
case the trial judge was right not to direct the jury that before they could convict they must all be 
satisfied either that the appellant killed his wife or that he got someone else to do so. They were 
entitled to convict if they were all satisfied that if he was not the killer he at least encouraged the 
killing, and accordingly this ground of appeal fails.490 
This poses the question whether it would contravene the requirement to articulate the indictment as 
specifically as possible.491 In Giannetto, the Court of Appeal stated in this regard: 
When the Crown allege fair and square, that on the evidence, the defendant must have committed 
the offence either as principal or as secondary offender, and make it equally clear that they cannot 
say which, the basis on which the jury must be unanimous is that the defendant, having the 
necessary mens rea, by whatever means caused the result which is criminalised by the law. The 
Crown is not required to specify the means, because the legal definition of the crime does not 
require it; and the defendant knows perfectly well what case he has to meet. Of course, if (as will 
very often be so) the Crown nail their colours to a particular mast, their case will, generally, have 
to be established in the terms in which it was put. Our judgment should give no encouragement to 
prosecutors casting around for alternative possibilities where the essential evidence does not show 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
receiving stolen property; he is guilty of breaking-in, because he is a party to the breaking-in; and where two 
people are engaged on a felonious enterprise – and warehouse-breaking is a felony – and one knows that the 
other is carrying a weapon, and there is agreement to use such violence as may be necessary to avoid arrest, and 
this leads to the killing of a person or results in the killing of a person, both are guilty of murder, and it is no 
answer for one to say “I did not think my companion would go as far as he did”; see also G Slapper and D Kelly, 
The English Legal System 2011-2012 (12th edn, Routledge 2011) 262.  
485 Lacey and others (n 482) 195; Elliott and Quinn (n 391) 201. 
486 Ashworth and Horder (n 66) 421. 
487R v Robert Vincent Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 1. 
488 Thatcher v R (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 (Canada). 
489 Giannetto (n 487) 5. 
490 Ibid 7. 
491 See Maxwell v DDP for Northern Ireland [1978] 1 WLR 1350 (HL); Ashworth and Horder (n 66) 421. 
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a clear case against the defendant. But the facts of the present appeal are by no means an instance 
of that. 492 
Clearly, this does not appear to support the formulation of a very detailed indictment, and attempts to 
challenge the foregoing principle based on Article 6(3)(a)493 have been rather unsuccessful.494 
The German differentiated model stands in direct contrast to the unitary model discussed above, as an 
accessory to a crime committed is generically entitled to mitigation495 in accordance with Article 
49(1). Article 49(1) provides a guiding framework in that it is fairly specific: 
 If the law requires or allows for mitigation under this provision, the following shall apply: 
1. Imprisonment of not less than three years shall be substituted for imprisonment for life. 
2. In cases of imprisonment for a fixed term, no more than three quarters of the statutory 
maximum term may be imposed. In case of a fine the same shall apply to the maximum 
number of daily units. 
3. Any increased minimum statutory term of imprisonment shall be reduced as follows: 
a minimum term of ten or five years, to two years; 
a minimum term of three or two years, to six months; 
a minimum term of one year, to three months; 
in all other cases to the statutory minimum.496 
While the above provision clearly restricts the judge’s discretion, it seems fair to say that it facilitates 
both predictability and a rather uniform sentencing practice in relation to cases construed factually in a 
similar manner. However, an argument put forward against this approach concerns adequate reflection 
concerning culpability in certain, rather rare, cases, where the accessory’s culpability is the same or 
even higher than the guilt of the direct perpetrator.497  
This usually involves a scenario where the aider and abettor forces another person to commit a 
specific offence or act. German criminal law does not provide any specific provision for the case 
where an accessory is more blameworthy than the direct perpetrator, which leads to the result that an 
accessory who is highly blameworthy is still entitled to mitigated punishment prescribed by law.498 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Giannetto (n 487) 7. 
493 Article 6(3)(a) Human Rights Act 1998: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him’. 
494 Ashworth and Horder (n 66) 421. 
495 Section 27(2), applying to aiders stipulates: (2) Die Strafe für den Gehilfen richtet sich nach der Strafdrohung 
für den Täter. Sie ist nach section 49 Abs. 1 zu mildern’. Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (n 324) 43: 
section 27(2) ‘The sentence for the aider shall be based on the penalty for a principal. It shall be mitigated 
pursuant to section 49(1)’. 
496 Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (n 324) 50; section 49(1) StGB states: ‘(1) Ist eine Milderung nach 
dieser Vorschrift vorgeschrieben oder zugelassen, so gilt für die Milderung folgendes: 1. An die Stelle von 
lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe tritt Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter drei Jahren. 2. Bei zeitiger Freiheitsstrafe darf 
höchstens auf drei Viertel des angedrohten Höchstmaßes erkannt werde. Bei Geldstrafe gilt dasselbe für die 
Höchstzahl der Tagessätze. 3. Das erhöhte Mindestmaß einer Freiheitsstrafe ermäßigt sich im Falle eines 
Mindestmaßes von 10 oder 15 Jahren auf zwei Jahre, im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von drei oder zwei Jahren auf 
sechs Monate, im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von einem Jahr auf drei Monate, im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von 
einem Jahr auf drei Monate, im übrigen auf das gesetzliche Mindestmaß’. 
497 Ashworth and Horder (n 66) 422.  
498 See in general for penalty ranges in German law, G Schäfer and others, Praxis der Strafzumessung (5th edn, C 
H Beck 2012). 
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the latter case, the judges’ discretion can be highly significant to enable him to impose a sentence 
reflecting the defendant’s degree of culpability. Hence it can be argued that the German approach is 
not capable of reflecting every nuance of the culpability of accessories. While the “assessment of 
individual guilt” approach sounds very sensible, particular where an aider and abettor “appears” to be 
more blameworthy – the label reveals already that “mere appearance” does not make him a principal. 
It does not seem equal to allow the same sentence for a lower liability threshold. Someone who is 
charged as an aider and abettor is potentially not charged as principal due to lack of evidence. The 
presence of this immense discretion can have particularly vast implications in murder cases, as seen 
above. Disregarding such a “label” on the sentencing stage could lead to grave sentencing disparities. 
Ashworth and Horder suggest the introduction of a guideline on the one hand, but to retain the judge’s 
power to ‘impose any lawful sentence on the principal’.499 Thus they suggest that it is crucial to 
respect the defendant’s right to receive proportionate punishment, which correlates with the pertinent 
degree of blameworthiness.500 Such guidelines shall provide that an accessory can only receive up to a 
maximum of half of the sentence of the principal.501 However, Ashworth and Horder also suggest that, 
in the rare situations concerning the “highly blameworthy accessory” who has contributed to the 
offence in a substantially influential manner, courts shall be permitted to exceed the limit imposed by 
the guidelines upon them.502 This approach resembles the theories enshrined in the criminal codes of 
Iceland and Lebanon. Such a “restricted” unitary approach appears to solve the main issues resulting 
from a lack of (official legal) distinction of principals and accessories in relation to the punishment, 
but it is questionable whether such an approach would be taken on in the future. Despite the 
differences between these two approaches, the disparity diminishes with the growing modification and 
elaboration of old and new participation models.503 Moreover, as van Sliedregt notes, these 
observations are based on the fact that through concepts such as “control over the crime” 
(Tatherrschaft) and “functional perpetration”, “commission” is stretched and thus capable of including 
“non-physical” and “intellectual perpetratorship.504 Accordingly, it has to be emphasised that, despite 
the fact that these two models are different in theory, the distinction becomes blurry, as in practice 
both models “borrow elements from each other”, making it difficult to spot a clear-cut line.505  
While German criminal law generally embraces a differentiated approach, a unitary approach is taken 
in relation to administrative offences. 506 Thus, two rather contrary solutions507 are employed in one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Ibid. 
502 Ibid. 
503 van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 73. 
504 Ibid. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Bloy speaks of a tendency towards a mixed system (“Tendenz zu einem Mischsystem”) in R Bloy, ‘Neuere 
Entwicklungstendenzen der Einheitstäterlehre in Deutschland und Österreich’ in K Geppert and others, 
Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag (1992) 33, 44. 
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legal system.508 Article 14 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) provides that if several individuals 
participate in a regulatory offence, each of them is regarded as the perpetrator of such regulatory 
offence.509 Despite general discussion as to the scope and “practicability” of the unitary approach in 
relation to administrative offences,510 the main question raised in the context of this discussion is the 
justification511 of such a dualistic approach within one legal system and more specifically why the 
German legal system has opted on the one hand for a differentiated approach in criminal law, at least 
in relation to intentionally committed offences, and on the other hand for a unitary approach regarding 
regulatory offences. This can be taken even further, by rephrasing this thought into the question – 
what is the reason for considering a unitary approach in relation to regulatory offences admissible but 
to opt for a differentiated approach regarding intentionally committed criminal offences or vice versa? 
The reason put forward for utilisation of the unitary approach in relation to regulatory offences is the 
simplification of the applicable law.512 The effect thereof is questionable, as scholarly debate 
suggests.513 However, when considering how much effort has been spent by German scholars to 
develop and elaborate theories designed to distinguish homogenously between principal and 
accessory,514 a unitary approach appears comparatively simpler,515 as the intrinsically challenging, 
complex and otherwise particularly material distinction is circumvented. Further, it is said to be 
admissible, because generally all participants in such an offence would anyway face the same 
Bußgeldrahmen (fine limit)516 whereby the assessment of the applicable fine merely requires 
appreciation for various contributions based on their actual meaning.517 The unitary approach is also 
embraced in relation to negligently committed crimes. Article 26 (Instigators) and Article 27 (Aiders), 
which establish the legal consequences attaching thereto, expressly restrict their application to 
offences committed intentionally: ‘[a]ny person who intentionally induces another person to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 There was sharp criticism shortly after the legislator abolished the differentiation between principal and 
participant in administrative offences and introduces the unitary system instead in 1968; see K Detzer, ‘Die 
Problematik der Einheitstäterlösung: Eine Untersuchung im Lichte der Reform des StGB und des OWIG unter 
Berücksichtigung des italiensichen und österreichischen Strafrechts’ (Inaug. Diss. Universität Erlangen 
Nürnberg 1972) 2. 
508 Detzer (n 507) 2. 
509 Unofficial translation by the author, section 14(1) OWiG states: ‘(1) Beteiligen sich mehrere an einer 
Ordnungswidrigkeit, so handelt jeder von ihnen ordnungswidrig. Dies gilt auch dann, wenn besondere 
persönliche Merkmale (section 9 Abs. 1), welche die Möglichkeit der Ahndung begründen, nur bei einem 
Beteiligten vorliegen’. 
510 See Rotsch (n 323) 192-195. 
511 Ibid 195. 
512 Ibid 195 with reference to Karlsruher Kommentar (OWIG), section 14 para 2. 
513 Rotsch (n 323) 195. 
514 See E Dreher, ‘Plädoyer für den Einheitstäter im Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht,’ in E Dreher, Bemühungen um 
das Recht, Gesammelte Aufsätze (C H Beck 1972) 212, emphasising the difficulties of distinguishing between 
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515 See for example C Roxin, Täterschaft und Teilnahme (8th edn, Gruyter 2006). 
516 Rotsch (n 323) 195; Dreher (n 514) 214. 
517 Rotsch (n 323) 196. 
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intentionally commit of an unlawful act’ (Article 26);518 and ‘[a]ny person who intentionally assists 
another’ (Article 27).519  
Ultimately, this discussion raises the question whether the introduction of a unitary approach would be 
thinkable in German criminal law.520 It would exceed the scope of this work521 to examine those 
questions further; nevertheless such a “dual system”,522 particularly in relation to negligently 
committed offences, appears to undermine the argumentation in favour of a “pure” differentiated 
model. Although employment of two different approaches in one legal system slightly reminds, in the 
wider sense, of the employment of a unitary and differentiated approach in international criminal law 
as reflected in current practice, it should be recalled that in German Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht such 
distinction is said to be immaterial as all participants in regulatory offences face the same fine 
limits,523 and thus it cannot be compared to the punishment in international criminal justice. As 
described above, a main reason for utilisation of the unitary approach is the complicated and time-
consuming distinction between principals and accessories for the purpose of punishment. Interestingly, 
an effort to distinguish between principals and accessories in international criminal law is present, 
although there is a lack of consensus in relation to the legal consequences thereof.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COMPARATIVE STUDY IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 
 
What also becomes clear from this comparative study when viewed in relation to international 
criminal law, is that judges of international courts and tribunals have drawn unilaterally on concepts of 
certain domestic criminal law systems, despite the fact that a variety of solutions and even almost the 
same concepts have been utilised by some other countries. While the ad hoc tribunals have largely 
drawn on the Anglo-American approach in relation to complicity laws,524 although frequently not in 
relation to the relevance of modes of liability in the context of sentencing, the ICC heavily draws on 
attribution concepts, as set out earlier in this chapter, which are deeply rooted in German criminal law. 
This inevitably poses the question whether it is legitimate to consult only two or three legal systems 
when invoking domestic criminal law, and why certain other legal systems, which provide for 
sophisticated solutions in relation to collective criminality, have not had an impact on the shaping of 
international criminal law. As is clear from the above study, solutions embraced by jurisdictions such 
as the criminal codes of Iceland and Lebanon, have not been consulted by purely international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (n 324) 43 section 26(1). 
519 Ibid section 27(1). 
520 Rotsch (n 323) 195. 
521 Ibid 190 seq. 
522 Roth speaks of Systemdualismus, see Rotsch (n 323) 190. 
523 Dreher (n 514) 214; Rotsch (n 323) 195. 
524 van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(n 106) 64. 
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tribunals,525 despite the fact that they provide a solution in between the unitary-differentiated 
dichotomy.526 Shany explains the phenomenon that international courts and tribunals mainly resort to 
concepts emanating from only a handful of legal systems with reference to the following reasons:  
First, Shany argues that  
 
[t]he preference accorded to such legal systems can be explained by reference to the 
sophisticated nature of the rules and doctrines developed by the more established legal systems, 
the considerable experience they have accumulated in applying criminal law in hard cases and 
the wealth of academic materials written about them. All of these attributes typically render the 
more developed legal systems as richer.527  
 
Secondly, Shany puts forward that, in order to maintain the claim ‘to speak on behalf of the 
community’, international criminal law ‘strives to apply universally accepted standards’.528 
Accordingly, principles which are common to the ‘world’s main legal systems’ or ‘at least resonate 
with the vast majority of them’ are applied.529 There is also the opinion that international criminal law 
does not need to be uniform when applying domestic concepts. Greenwalt argues that the international 
criminal legal system should rather apply laws which are prescribed by the respective legal system, 
which would normally have jurisdiction over the offender in question.530 Discussion of this position 
exceeds the scope of this work, but it should however be pointed out that this would also result in 
sentencing disparities concerning similar circumstances and crimes, and therefore opposes consistent 
punishment, which is one of the cornerstones of international and domestic criminal justice.  
 
Against the backdrop of the above discussion it can be observed that there is a lack of consistency in 
following a unitary or differentiated approach at the sentencing stage but on first sight the 
differentiated approach seems to prevail. Notwithstanding that, one can clearly see that the majority of 
jurisdictions selected follow a unitary approach. Nonetheless, this observation per se does not allow 
one to jump to conclusions: since the option of discretionary mitigation is in place, an analysis of 
pertinent practice such as in the US and the UK may still reveal that the differentiated approach is 
practised voluntarily at the sentencing stage. On the national level, it can be observed that 
differentiated and unitary systems do vary and even overlap. However, this is not of relevance for each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 There are more jurisdictions following this or a similar approach; see for instance the Penal Code of 
Argentina Article 45, 46, (The Penal Code, Law No. 11.179). 
526 Of course it is not intended to presume that such solutions would immediately fit the needs of international 
criminal justice, but they could serve as a starting point overcoming the immense discrepancy between pure 
unitary and differentiated approaches. 
527 Shany (n 470) 12. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid 13; Shany clarifies that: ‘(...) ICL presents an interesting venue for studying the harmonising effects of 
comparative law approaches to domestic law sources given the dual role of DCL, which is reflective of state 
practice, may represent pre-existing international customary law, or general principles of law; on the other hand, 
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international legal standards’. 
530 See A K A Greenwalt, ‘The Pluralism of International Criminal Law,’ (2011) 86 Indiana Law Journal, 1063, 
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domestic system respectively as a certain level of uniformity in sentencing practice is given within 
each domestic system. As soon as these systems are blended because various approaches have been 
deliberately “picked” and “mixed”, inconsistencies in sentencing practice are predetermined. An initial 
question is which approach which is capable of reflecting the true culpability of the offender, where 
most crimes are committed by a plurality of persons, frequently acting according to a common plan or 
under the instruction of an individual locally detached from the crime. As Vogel points out, ‘[t]he 
dualistic/pluralistic model is said to be closer to social reality where primary and secondary 
responsibility are distinguished’.531 Despite the fact that it remains questionable which approach seems 
more suitable in international criminal justice – it is first and foremost important to maintain a certain 
degree of consistency when choosing one or the other approach irrespective of the choice of approach. 
A reason for inconsistency in following a certain approach in relation to attribution or sentencing in 
international criminal law could be influenced by the origin of the respective judge. As Schabas notes 
in relation to the judges and lawyers in 1994 at the ICTY: 
They were of course experts in the system they had been educated in, but as a general rule the 
common lawyers had virtually no background, training, or familiarity with so-called civil law 
systems of criminal procedure, and the same was true for the civilian lawyers with respect to the 
common law.532 
The difference between the common and civil law systems also has significant implications on the 
concepts of attribution of liability and the legal consequences. Accordingly, mixing both approaches, 
coupled with misconceptions or the wrong use of legal terminology of the respective concept, leads 
inevitably to confusion. The latter was inter alia expressed by the fact that in the Decision on 
Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction533 the Trial Chamber criticised the terminology 
used by the Prosecution in the indictment.534 Thereby it made reference to the Prosecution’s statement 
in its indictment against Ojdanić, according to which the ‘use of the word “committed” was not 
intended to suggest that any of the accused physically perpetrated any of the crimes charged, 
personally’.535 It went on to repeat the phrasing used by the Prosecution, namely that ‘“[c]ommitting”, 
(…) refers to participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a co-perpetrator”’ and then implied that that 
the use of the term ‘“co-perpetration” in such a context’ appeared ‘inappropriate’.536 This emphasises 
the interchangeable use of the terms “co-perpetrator” and “participant in a joint criminal enterprise”, 
which leads to confusion as such terms do imply – subject to the approach taken – varying degrees of 
culpability. As the next chapter discusses, the ad hoc tribunals have frequently resorted to the 
differentiated approach, thereby ascribing more or less culpability to a particular label. As Fletcher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 Vogel, How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts (n 95) 153. 
532 W Schabas, ‘The Influence of International Law and International Tribunals on Harmonized or Hybrid 
Systems of Criminal Procedure’ (2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 651, 653; Elewa 
Badar (n 304) 3. 
533 Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction (n 164) para 20. 
534 Reference to Prosecutor v Milan Milutinović et al. (Second Amended Indictment) IT-99-37-PT (29 October 
2001) para 16.  
535 Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction (n 164) para 20 
536 Ibid. 
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clarifies, ‘whatever we say about criminal responsibility, we have no choice, but to express it in 
language, and the particular vocabularies and structures of diverse languages both facilitate and limit 
our communication. Every language develops its own vocabulary in an effort to capture the depths of 
guilt and punishment’.537 While a co-perpetrator in German criminal law is considered a principal, a 
member of a joint enterprise has sometimes been categorised as a secondary participant under English 
law, giving rise to debate. However, in R v Jogee, the Supreme Court recently clarified that ‘the 
expression “joint enterprise” is not a legal term of art’.538 It then observed with reference to R v A that 
the expression joint enterprise ‘is used in practice in a variety of situations to include both principals 
and accessories.’539 
These two different terms (co-perpetration and joint enterprise liability) therefore refer to different 
legal concepts, reflecting varying degrees of culpability and, at least in the case of the former, lead to 
harsher sanctions. However, despite the fact that JCE has widely been considered to constitute a form 
of principal liability, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has clarified that “joint criminal 
enterprise liability” in English law may embrace principals and accessories.540 These differences 
relating to legal terminology, which may lead to misconceptions, appear to be clearly linked to a 
judge’s legal cultural background.541 The next chapter focuses on the sentencing process in the light of 
a principal-accessory distinction in international criminal law. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 G Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International, Volume 1: 
Foundations (OUP 2007) 117. 
538 R v Jogee (n 396) para 77. 
539 Ibid; R v A [2011] QB 841, para 9. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PRINCIPALS, ACCESSORIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SENTENCING PROCESS 
 
PART I 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It was only relatively recently, on the 16th of December 2013, that the ICTR Appeals Chamber 
rendered the Ndahimana542 judgment, which included an exemplary articulation and application of the 
differentiated approach, thereby corroborating the view that the principal-accessory distinction is to 
date the prevailing approach followed by the ad hoc tribunals. Only a few months later, the ICC Trial 
Chamber announced in its most recent judgment that Article 25 Rome Statute does not entail a 
hierarchy of blameworthiness, thereby expressing preference for the unitary approach. With this recent 
statement it appears safe to say that the ICC has distanced itself from the differentiated approach 
primarily adopted by the ad hoc tribunals: 
(...) In effect, Article 25 of the Statute merely identifies various forms of unlawful conduct and, in 
that sense, the distinction between the liability of a perpetrator of and an accessory to a crime does 
not under any circumstances constitute a “hierarchy of blameworthiness”, let alone enunciate a 
tariff, not even implicitly. Hence, it is not precluded that having adjudged guilt, a bench may 
choose to mete out mitigated penalties to accessories, although to do so is not peremptory. The 
fact remains that neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence prescribe[s] a rule 
for the mitigation of penalty for forms of liability other than commission and the Chamber sees no 
automatic correlation between mode of liability and penalty. From this it is clear that a perpetrator 
of a crime is not always viewed as more reprehensible than an accessory.543 
Ultimately, the distinction between perpetrator of and accessory to a crime inheres in the Statute 
but does not, nonetheless, entail a hierarchy, whether in respect of guilt or penalty. Each mode of 
liability has different characteristics and legal ramifications which reflect various forms of 
involvement in criminality. However, this does not necessarily signify that accused persons will be 
found less culpable or will incur a lesser penalty.544 
The debated practice to ascribe specific legal consequences to various labels of individual criminal 
responsibility stands in direct conflict to a unitary approach. However, it serves primarily to illustrate 
in the light of the respective discussions in the ICC’s first three judgments, and in relation to the ICTY 
— the Krnojelac Trial Judgment, and Judge Hunt’s Separate Opinion in Ojdanic, that international 
judges are far from pulling together when it comes to the relationship of modes of liability and 
sentencing, thus contributing to a lack of consistency and unpredictability in international sentencing 
practice. Considering that the significance of a principal accessory distinction for the purpose of 
sentencing is rooted in domestic criminal law, it is a central question why judges resort to one or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2). 
543 Katanga Trial Judgment (n 197) para 1386. 
544 Ibid para 1387; see also Prosecutor v Katanga (Sentencing Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23 May 2014) para 
61. 
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other approach, which is examined in the next chapter. The main reason for discrepancies may be due 
to the fact that the statutes of the tribunals are largely silent in relation to the specific role of modes of 
liability in the sentencing process. In addition, none of the international judicial bodies has yet 
approached and discussed the relationship between the mode of individual criminal responsibility and 
sentence severity ‘systematically’.545 Nevertheless, judges have attempted to establish rationales and 
reasons for sentencing decisions, perhaps in some instances intuitively,546 which particularly differ in 
relation to the impact of modes of liability on the sentence. Hence, it may be assumed that the judge 
and his legal cultural background play a significant role. As a result, both approaches can be observed 
in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. 
Therefore, this chapter comprises a closer examination of the sentencing process in the light of such 
distinction and the weight attached to such modes in meting out the final penalty. In an attempt to find 
a rational underpinning of the sentencing process in international criminal law, it is essential to 
disentangle the general factors contributing to the sentencing process. Thus, prior to examining those 
factors in specific cases, a brief overview is given in relation to the statutory prescribed influential and 
“judge-created” factors in the sentencing process. The sentencing framework is only broadly discussed 
in order to lay a foundation for analysing the role of modes of liability therein. 
Olásolo maintains that the respective case law of the ICTY shows that Article 7(1) ‘does not establish 
a unitary system and has consistently embraced the distinction between perpetration of a crime giving 
rise to principal liability and participation in a crime committed by a third person giving rise to 
accessorial liability’. He goes even further by opining that decisions which employ a differentiated 
approach such as Krnojelac and Judge Hunt in his separate opinion, are merely ‘exceptional instances 
of disagreement and the approach overwhelmingly adopted by the ICTY case law (…)’.547 Indeed, 
when taking a closer look at the sentencing judgments of the ad hoc tribunals, it can be noted that the 
number of judgments in which judges have opted for a differentiated approach (see Table 3) go far 
beyond the cases already addressed in the previous chapter. Already in the ICTY’s early judgment in 
Tadić, the Appeal Chamber indicated what could be referred to as a preference for a differentiated 
approach, when it addressed the question as to how JCE could be distinguished from aiding and 
abetting:  
229. In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish between acting in 
pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting. (i) The 
aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal.548 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 B Holá, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
Amsterdamlawforum (VU University Amsterdam 2012) 14. 
546 See Chapter 4 below. 
547 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 25.  
548 Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) para 229. 
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However, a central question posed is whether a distinction between the direct or principal perpetrator 
and the secondary/indirect perpetrator is merely terminological or whether it is linked to penological 
consequences. 
 
3.2 GENERAL SENTENCING FACTORS  
 
3.2.1 THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS, THE ICC AND THE SCSL549 
 
A central question in the light of a principal-accessory distinction is where exactly the legal relevance 
of a particular liability label is assessed in relation to its legal consequence. Therefore, sentencing 
factors, which may “cover” such discussions are examined in this paper in more depth. As is seen 
below, the “dynamics” of modes of liability are reflected under different headings of the sentencing 
process, albeit in one more than the other. Statutory provisions in relation to international sentencing 
are fairly vague. In the sentencing regime of the ad hoc tribunals, “penalties” are provided for in 
Articles 24 ICTY and 23 ICTR respectively. Apart from their reference to the recourse of domestic 
law, both provisions are identical and provide generally that judges shall consider (i) general practice 
regarding prison sentences in the courts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, (ii) the gravity of the 
offence; (iii) and the individual circumstances. Further, Rule 101 B) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE ICTY/ICTR) is only marginally more detailed in that it adds that, in addition to the 
above factors, the chamber shall take into account (i) aggravating factors; (ii) mitigating factors 
‘including the substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after the 
conviction’; and (iii) ‘the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia’ and Rwanda. Thus, according to Article 24 ICTY (23 ICTR) and Rule 101 A), B), the 
following factors should be considered (i) the practice regarding the prison sentences in the FSRY and 
Rwanda; (ii) individual circumstances of the convicted person; (iii) mitigating factors (specifically the 
defendant’s cooperation with the prosecution); (iv) aggravating factors; and (v) the gravity of the 
offence. 
Similarly, Article 19(2) of the Statute of the SCSL provides that the Chamber shall consider the 
practice regarding prison sentences of the ICTR and national courts of Sierra Leone. Further, Article 
101(B) RPE adds, ‘(i) Any aggravating circumstances’; and ‘[a]ny mitigating circumstances including 
the substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction’. 
Thus, when determining the sentence, the SCSL shall consider: (i) the sentencing practice of the 
ICTR; (ii) the sentencing practice of the courts of Sierra Leone; (iii) the gravity of the offence; (iv) the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person; (v) any aggravated circumstances; and (vi) any 
mitigating circumstances. Hence it can be seen that the SCSL Statute is equally reserved in relation to 
the factors which have to be considered when determining the sentence. However, similar to the 
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practice of the SCSL takes place in this section. 
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statute of the ad hoc tribunals, the wording “such as” indicates that the list provided by Articles 19(1) 
and (2) is not exhaustive and accordingly only case law provides for a more detailed answer as to 
which factors have been cited. A distinctive feature of the SCSL sentencing provisions is the explicit 
reference to the requirement to consider the sentencing practice of the ICTR. 
The ICC Statute provides scarce guidance in relation to the factors which have to be taken into 
consideration when determining the sentence. Article 78(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that ‘the 
Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as 
the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person’. However, Article 
145 of the RPE is more specific in that it provides that, in addition to the factors listed in Article 78(1), 
the Court shall take into consideration (i) the circumstances which do not qualify as defences to 
criminal responsibility and (ii) the individual’s conduct after the commission of the act. Further, Rule 
145(2)(b) enumerates a few aggravating circumstances expressly. Thus, the RPE of the ICC expressly 
articulate that the list is “open”. In addition to the above factors, the Article 145(1) RPE offers more 
guidance by emphasising that the overall sentence has to reflect the guilt of the perpetrator550 and 
further that the Court shall ‘[b]alance all the relevant factors, including any mitigating and aggravating 
factors and consider the circumstances both of the convicted person and of the crime’.551  
Olásolo observes that Article 145(1)(c) RPE ‘implicitly recognises the principle of mitigation for 
accessorial liability insofar as it imposes upon the Chambers of the ICC the duty to “give 
consideration” to the “degree of participation of the convicted person” in their determination of the 
sentence pursuant to article 78(1) RS.’552 Nevertheless, he notes that due to the implicit nature of the 
principle of mitigation and thus the fact that the principle of mitigation is not expressly provided for in 
the ICC Statute, it has ample discretion to apply it and to decide how it is operated.553 In Situation in 
Kenya, the Pre Trial Chamber summarised the factors embedded in Rule 145(1)(c) and 145(2)(b)(iv) 
as follows: ‘(i) the scale of the alleged crimes (including assessment of geographical and temporal 
intensity); (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour or of the crimes allegedly committed; (iii) the 
employed means for the execution of the crimes (ie, the manner of their commission); and (iv) the 
impact of the crimes and the harm caused to victims and their families (…)’.554 Rule 145 is 
comparatively clear in relation to the factors which appear to constitute the abstract and concrete 
gravity of the offence; although no express reference is made to the latter, it includes that the Court 
shall give additionally consideration inter alia to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Rule 145(1)(a): ‘In its determination of the sentence pursuant to Article 78, paragraph 1, the Court shall: (a) 
Bear in mind that the totality of any sentence of imprisonment and fine, as the case may be, imposed under 
article 77 must reflect the culpability of the convicted person’. 
551 Article 145(2)(b) RPE includes inter alia, previous criminal offences of a similar nature (i) and the abuse of a 
position of power in an “official capacity” (ii). 
552 Olásolo, Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders (n 4) 27. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization 
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya) ICC-01/09 (31 March 2010) para 62. 
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the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, 
the nature of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of 
participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and 
location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person. 555 
 
Accordingly, in comparison to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC statutory instruments entail no reference 
to domestic sentencing practice, but do include comparatively detailed guidance in relation to the 
factors to be taken into account in the sentencing process.  
It is also not difficult to discern the controversial approaches in relation to a principal accessory 
distinction. On the one hand, recent practice of the ICC556 has demonstrated that judges are inclined to 
follow a principal-accessory distinction.557 On the other hand, this approach was harshly criticised in 
that it was stressed that the Article 25 Rome Statute embraces a unitary approach.558 In any case, the 
ICC, with its most recent judgment in Katanga,559 has clearly demonstrated its stance that it maintains 
that Article 25 does not create a hierarchy of seriousness. Hence, the ICC clearly develops a 
preference for the unitary approach 
 
3.2.1.1 RECOURSE TO NATIONAL LAW 
The factor or heading ‘recourse to national law’ is particularly significant when attempting to assess to 
the legal relevance attached to modes of liabilitiy in the sentencing process, because attribution 
theories derive from domestic law. Accordingly, the resort to the practice of domestic courts of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could provide guidance in that either a differentiated or a unitary 
approach is embraced. As stipulated by Article 24 ICTY (23 ICTR) and Rule 101 of the RPE, the ad 
hoc tribunals ‘shall have recourse’/ ‘take into account’ the sentencing practice of Rwanda and the 
SFRY respectively. This inevitably poses the question as to how strictly this statutory requirement is 
to be interpreted. In the Tadić Sentencing Appeal, the Appeals Chamber clarified that it ‘is not bound 
by any maximum term of imprisonment applied by a national system’.560 Rather, as the ICTY held in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Rule 145(1)(c) ICC RPE. 
556 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (n 46) paras 317-333. 
557 van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 79. 
558 Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (n 17) Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford 
(n 15). 
559 Katanga Trial Judgment (197) paras 1386, 1387; see also Katanga Sentencing Judgment (n 544) para 61. 
560 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment in Sentencing Appeals) IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis (26 January 2000) para 21; 
This was also confirmed in the Nikolić Sentencing Appeal in relation to lex mitior: ‘The Appeals Chamber, 
however, reiterates its finding that the International Tribunal, having primacy, is not bound by the law or 
sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia. It has merely to take it into consideration. Allowing the principle 
of lex mitior to be applied to sentences of the International Tribunal on the basis of changes in the laws of the 
former Yugoslavia would mean that the States of the former Yugoslavia have the power to undermine the 
sentencing discretion of the International Tribunal’s judges (…)’. Prosecutor v Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing 
Appeal) IT-94-2-A (4 February 2005) para 84; see also Blaškić Appeal Judgment (n 121) para 681; Akayesu 
Trial Judgment (n 108) para 501: ‘Given the presumption of innocence of the accused, and pursuant to the 
general principles of criminal law, the Chamber holds that the version more favourable to the accused should be 
upheld and finds that Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the definition of 
murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which "meurtre" (killing) is homicide committed with 
the intent to cause death’. 
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Krstić, it is also ‘not prevented from imposing a greater or lesser sentence than would have been 
imposed under the legal regime of the Former Yugoslavia’.561 Similarly, the ICTR Trial Chamber also 
expressed a rather reserved position in that it specified in Akayesu that ‘such reference is but one of 
the factors that it has to take into account in determining sentences’.562 In relation to the interpretation, 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber held in Nikolić that ‘these words have to be construed in accordance with 
the principles of interpretation applicable to the Statute of which they form part’.563 Moreover, when 
taking account of respective domestic provisions, the ICTY has provided more specific guidance in 
that it held that despite the fact that it was ‘not bound to apply the sentencing practice of the former 
Yugoslavia’, such a requirement ‘certainly goes beyond merely reciting the relevant criminal code 
provisions of the former Yugoslavia’.564 It further added that, if ‘they diverge, care should be taken to 
explain the sentence to be imposed with reference to the sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia, 
especially where international law provides no guidance for a particular sentencing practice’.565 
However, the Trial Chamber thereby stressed that, due to the ‘very important underlying differences’ 
which frequently ‘exist between national prosecutions and prosecutions in this jurisdiction, the nature, 
scope and the scale of the offences tried before the International Tribunal do not allow for an 
automatic application of the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia’.566  
In its jurisprudence, the ICTY has frequently made reference to Articles 34,567 38,568 and 142(1) CC 
SFRY along with Article 41,569 referring to factors which shall be considered in the sentencing 
process.570 Along with the criminalisation of ‘war crimes against the civilian population’, Article 142 
incorporates two modes of liability into the CC of the SFRY, namely ordering and committing. 
Accordingly, order givers and direct perpetrators of war crimes are to be punished with a minimum of 
five years’ imprisonment or the death penalty. In relation to the latter, it is clear that the ICTY’s range 
of penalties, which it can impose, is limited to imprisonment571 ‘for a term up to and including the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Prosecutor v Banović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003) para 89; among others also 
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567Article 34 CC SFRY provides inter alia for imprisonment as a form of punishment: ‘The following 
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fine; 4) confiscation of property’. 
568 Article 38 CC SFRY specifies the particulars, eg limits of the terms of imprisonment. 
569 Sets out the factors relevant for the determination of the sentence.  
570 See inter alia Prosecutor v Sentencing Judgment (n 561) paras 85, 86.  
571 Article 24 ICTY Statute and Article 23 ICTR Statute. 
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remainder of the convicted person’s life’.572 Article 41(1) CC SFRY stipulates that the court shall 
consider ‘in particular, the degree of criminal responsibility’. It is striking that much weight seems to 
be attached to the “degree of participation”. However, similarly to the terminology embraced by 
judges at ad hoc tribunals, the “degree of participation” appears to be understood as referring to 
concrete criminal conduct, such as the degree of involvement and specific acts in the context of the 
pertinent modes of liability, and is not viewed as comprising specific categories as such, which carry 
corresponding legal consequences. A suggestion in favour of this assumption is that the Criminal Code 
of the FSRY does not embrace a principal accessory distinction for the purpose of sentencing. Instead, 
accomplices, inciters and aiders are to be punished as principals, whereas discretionary mitigation may 
be invoked in case of the latter. Arguably, judges could adopt the approach opted for in domestic law, 
when assessing the legal consequences for a particular label. It is questionable whether the ad hoc 
tribunals also explicitly consider the domestic sentencing practice in relation to a principal accessory 
distinction, as all Criminal Codes of the countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia, including the 
Criminal Code of the SFRY provide for one or the other approach – with the unitary approach clearly 
dominating. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the Criminal Code of the FSRY embraces a unitary approach 
in relation to sentencing, in that aiders, instigators and accomplices are to be punished as principals 
and only aiders may receive discretionary mitigation.573 The same holds true for the Criminal Code of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides for discretionary mitigation in the case of aiders.574 
Similarly, the Criminal Code of Macedonia punishes joint perpetrators, instigators and aiders as 
principals, but on a discretionary basis, aiders may be punished more leniently.575 Equally, the 
Criminal Codes of Montenegro576 and Serbia577 embrace a unitary approach. As elaborated in Chapter 
2, the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo embraced a differentiated approach in that ‘members of 
criminal associations’ and aiders/those who provide assistance, are entitled to mitigated punishment in 
line with Article 65(2), which stipulates that the punishment should be ‘no more than three-quarters of 
the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence’. The new Criminal Code of Kosovo 
seems to build only partly on this approach by providing that ‘[w]hoever intentionally assists another 
person in the commission of a criminal offence may be punished more leniently’. Thus, it departs from 
a strict differentiated approach, by choosing a unitary approach with a differentiated element. The 
mitigation remains discretionary. Although the new code does not provide a provision identical to 
Article 65(2) PCCK, stipulating that the maximum punishment of an aider shall not exceed three-
quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence, Article 75 sets out 
mitigating penalties for assistants. Despite this similar provisions relating to the punishment of 
assistants, the wording of Article 31(1) clearly indicates the discretionary nature of the mitigation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Rule 101 (A) ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE. 
573 Articles 22, 22, 23 CC FSRY, discussed in depth in Chapter 2. 
574 Article 31 (1) Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
575 Article 24 (1) Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia. 
576 Article 35 (1) Criminal Code of Montenegro. 
577 Article 35 (1) Criminal Code of Serbia. 
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thus the new Criminal Code of Kosovo ultimately follows a unitary approach, albeit with a 
differentiated element in relation to the penalties which may be applicable to assistants.  
In theory, the ICTY could consider the applicable provisions, subject to rationale temporis and ratione 
loci, relating to the legal consequences for the purpose of sentencing and justify its respective 
approach based thereon, although this would depend on the time and place where the crime was 
committed. At first sight, this approach does not seem to contribute to more consistent and predictable 
sentencing practice in international criminal justice per se, but in fact it could foster predictability. 
However, although the ICTY and ICTR seem to follow their obligation to consider and discuss 
respective domestic legislation, a few points can be noted. It can be observed that the ICTY clarifies in 
a number of instances that it is not bound to apply national sentencing practice; moreover, it is 
noticeable that in a number of cases, reference to national case law can be found, which resembles 
frequently. In depth discussion or application of such provisions is scarce. In Serushago the ICTR 
clarified its preference for ‘unfettered discretion’ by explaining that the ‘reference to the practice of 
sentencing in Rwanda and to the Organic law’ was ‘just an indication’ and that it preferred ‘to lean 
more on its unfettered discretion each time that it has to pass sentence on persons found guilty of 
crimes falling within its jurisdiction, taking into account the circumstances of the case and the 
standing of the accused persons’.578 If one considers the domestic provisions relating to the 
punishment of principals and accessories, it can be observed that the applicable provision in relation to 
the punishment of principals and accessories is ultimately not considered, despite the fact that national 
jurisdictions clearly embody one or the other approach. Having said that, it should be emphasised that 
the Krstić case is one of the scarce instances where the Appeals Chamber referred to the practice of 
the SFRY in relation to the impact of modes of liability at the sentencing stage. Although the CC 
SFRY comprises a unitary approach in the stricter sense, in that it does not provide for mandatory 
mitigation, such mitigation may be invoked at the judges’ discretion if the accused was an aider.579 
Despite the fact that the decision to reduce Krstić’s sentence based on the finding that he was an aider 
and abettor as opposed to co-perpetrator seemed to be mainly based on the premise that aiding and 
abetting ‘generally warrants lower sentences’ as held in Vasiljević,580 it made reference to the practice 
of the courts of the former Yugoslavia: 
As regards the general sentencing practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia, the Appeals 
Chamber has already explained that the Tribunal is not bound by such practice, and may, if the 
interests of justice so merit, impose a greater or lesser sentence than would have been imposed 
under the legal regime of the former Yugoslavia. In the above discussion of this factor, the 
Appeals Chamber has considered the sentencing practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia 
applicable in this case, and has taken those practices into account. In particular, the sentence of a 
person who aided a principal perpetrator to commit a crime can be reduced to a sentence less than 
the one given to the principal perpetrator.581 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Prosecutor v Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-S, Trial Judgment, 5 February 1999, para 18. 
579 Article 24(1) CC SFRY, see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 above.  
580 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 182.  
581 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 270. 
	   111 
 
To date, it appears that domestic sentencing practice in relation to modes of liability has not had any 
significantly traceable impact on the sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals. This leaves room for 
the assumption that this “sentencing factor” does not seem to contribute significantly to the process of 
meting out the penalty or, if it did, it is not immediately obvious, particularly because the 
consideration of domestic sentencing practice is frequently summarised and does not contain express 
reference to actual practice, such as is contained in Čerkez, where national law was considered in more 
detail, with reference to specific cases.582 
When considering domestic sentencing law, the ICTR refers to the Rwandan Organic Law on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against 
Humanity, committed since 1 October 1990 (Rwandan Organic Law),583 in which perpetrators are 
grouped into four categories584 ‘according to the acts of participation’.585 While Category One inter 
alia covers the ‘masterminds of the crimes’586 and/or those with a certain level of authority, such as 
planners, instigators and organisers as well as ‘notorious murders who by virtue of the zeal or 
excessive malice (…) committed atrocities’,587 Category Two comprises ‘perpetrators, conspirators or 
accomplices in criminal acts (...) causing death’.588 Further, Category Three embraces individuals who 
‘in addition to committing a main crime, are guilty of other serious assaults’,589 while Category Four 
concerns perpetrators guilty of property offences. In addition, Article 14 of Rwanda’s Organic Law 
enumerates the pertinent penalties to those categories and thus it can be seen that each category 
attracts corresponding legal consequences, in accordance with the differentiated approach. According 
to Article 14, which divides them also into three categories ‘[t]he penalties imposed for the offences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment (n 67) para 849: ‘(...) The practice of the former Yugoslavia shows that the 
death penalty was imposed for such offences: for instance, by the District Court in Zagreb in 1986 on a former 
member of the so-called independent State of Croatia during the Second World War; by a military Court in 
Belgrade in 1992 on two members of paramilitary units; and in a similar case on the commander of a 
paramilitary unit who was sentenced for carrying out “the liquidation of quite a large number” of Serbs (...)’.  
583 Organic Law No. 8/96 of 30 August 1996, published in the Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 35th year, No 
17, 1 September 1996. 
584 Article 2 of Rwanda’s Organic Law: Persons accused of offences set out in Article 1 of this organic law and 
committed during the period between 1 October 1990 and 1994 shall, on the basis of their acts of participation, 
be classified into one of the following categories: ‘Category 1 a) persons whose criminal acts or those whose 
acts place them among planners, organisers, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime 
against humanity; b) Persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectural, communal, sector or 
cell, or in a political party, the army, religious organisations, or militia and who perpetrated or fostered such 
crimes; c) Notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed 
atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed; d) Persons who committed 
acts [sic] sexual torture; Category 2 Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place 
them among perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the 
person causing death; Category 3 Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them 
guilty of other serious assaults against the person; Category 4 Persons who committed offences against 
property’. Prosecutor v Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR 97-23-S (4 September 1998) para 18 seq; 
Prosecutor v Serushago (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR 98-39-S (5 February 1999) paras 17, 18. 
585 Serushago Sentencing Judgment (n 584) para 17.  
586 Ibid. 
587 Article 2 of Rwanda’s Organic Law. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Ibid. 
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(…) shall be those provided for under the Penal Code except (a) that persons whose acts place them in 
Category 1 are liable to the death penalty; (b) that for persons whose acts place them in Category 2, 
the death penalty is replaced by life imprisonment’590 and finally ‘(c) where a confession and guilty 
plea have been accepted, in which case Articles 15 and 16 of this organic law apply’.591  
In relation to the death penalty, the ICTR Trial Chamber clarified that ‘it is logical that in the 
determination of the sentence, it has recourse only to prison sentences applicable in Rwanda, to the 
exclusion of other sentences applicable in Rwanda, including the death sentence, since the Statute and 
the Rules provide that the Tribunal cannot impose this one type of sentence’.592 It does not appear that 
the ICTR has substantially drawn on Rwandan sentencing practice in general and particularly in 
relation to individual criminal responsibility and its legal consequences. Considering that Rwanda’s 
Organic Law neatly sets out four categories, for which it envisages corresponding penalties, influence 
on the practice of the ICTR would be immediately obvious. To the contrary, as is seen further below, 
there have been instances where the ICTR has embraced an approach in relation to modes of liability, 
which does not build on the structure provided for by Articles 2 and 14 of the Rwandan Organic 
Law,593 but on principles deriving from other national jurisdictions opting for a differentiated 
approach. Ultimately, it can be observed that although the ad hoc tribunals do follow their obligation 
to consider – and in some instances even discuss – the recourse to domestic sentencing practice on a 
regular basis, it is mostly very brief and to date it does not appear that it has had significant impact on 
international sentencing decisions so far, if not none at all. 
In relation to the SCSL’s requirement to consider the sentencing practice of national Courts in Sierra 
Leone it must be ascertained in the light of a discussion relating to a differentiated or unitary approach 
that the Abettors and Accessories Act 1861 applies in Sierra Leone and thus no mandatory mitigation 
is available for secondary perpetrators in accordance with national criminal law provisions. However, 
considering the adjacent requirement to consider the practice of the ICTR, there does not appear to be 
a set course in relation to an approach taken concerning the legal weight attached to modes of liability. 
Thus, specific examination of the jurisprudence in the light of a principal accessory distinction for 
sentencing purposes is necessary and is conducted later in this chapter. In the Taylor Sentencing 
Judgment the Trial Chamber considered both sources when addressing the liability of principals and 
accessories, but it rejected both approaches:  
The Trial Chamber notes that although the law of Sierra Leone provides for the sentencing of an 
accessory to a crime on the same basis as a principal, the jurisprudence of this Court, as well as the 
ICTY and ICTR, holds that aiding and abetting as a mode of liability generally warrants a lesser 
sentence than that imposed for more direct forms of participation. While generally, the application 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Article 19 Rwanda’s Organic Law. 
591 Ibid; see also Kambanda Judgment and Sentence (n 584) para 19. 
592 Kambanda Judgment and Sentence (n 584) para 22. 
593 See Serushago Sentencing Judgment (n 584) para 18, where the Chamber clarified that ‘the practice of 
sentencing in Rwanda and to the Organic Law is just an indication’, while expressing its preference for 
‘unfettered discretion each time that it has to pass sentence on persons found guilty’. 
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of this principle would indicate a sentence in this case that is lower than the sentence that have 
been imposed on the principal perpetrators which have been tried and convicted by this Court, the 
Trial Chamber considers that the special status of Mr Taylor as a Head of State puts him in a 
different category of offenders for the purpose of sentencing. 
(…) Although Mr Taylor has been convicted of planning as well as aiding and abetting, his 
conviction for planning is limited in scope. However, Mr Taylor was functioning in his own 
country at the highest level of leadership, which puts him in a class of his own when compared to 
the principal perpetrators who have been convicted by this Court.594 
Thus, the SCSL does not follow the ad hoc tribunals in this regard. As indicated above, it provides an 
example of considering domestic sentencing practice in relation to the role of liability in sentencing, 
although it did not ultimately follow the path provided for by municipal law. 
 
3.2.1.2 ATTRIBUTES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MITIGATING AND 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS  
A principal-accessory distinction has sometimes been expressed when assessing aggravating and 
mitigating factors relating to the accused. There is no doubt that the lists of mitigating and aggravating 
factors as enumerated in Articles 24(2) ICTY Statute and 23(2) ICTR Statute along with those in Rule 
101 B) RPE ICTY/ICTR are of a non-exhaustive nature. Hence, judges have ample discretion in 
relation to the factors they may consider. In addition to the mitigating and aggravating factors, which 
are frequently cited by the ad hoc tribunals,595 judges have considered physical perpetration as 
aggravating and vis-à-vis indirect perpetration as mitigating factors.596 The overlapping character of 
the gravity of the crime and aggravating and mitigating factors respectively have been addressed in 
few cases. In Babić, the Trial Chamber considered the ‘limited extent of participation’ of the 
defendant under the heading of mitigating factors. Further, the Appeals Chamber subsequently 
clarified that addressing this factor under the heading of mitigating factors would not be prejudicial to 
the accused as long as it is not double-counted: 
With regard to whether the alleged limited participation of the Appellant must be considered as a 
mitigating factor or, as the Prosecution argues, as “diminishing the gravity of the offence”, the 
Appeals Chamber recalls its previous finding in the Aleksovski Appeals Judgment, in which it 
endorsed the finding of the Trial Chamber in the Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment that “[t]he 
determination of the gravity of the crime requires a consideration of the particular circumstances 
of the case, as well as the form and degree of the participation of the accused in the crime”. The 
Trial Chamber did so here, stating in the course of its discussion of the gravity of the Appellant’s 
offence that his participation was “significant” and that he had “pleaded guilty as a co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Prosecutor v Taylor (Sentencing Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T (30 May 2012) paras 100, 101. 
595 See for instance Blaškić Appeal Judgment (n 121) para 728, where it was held: ‘As mitigating circumstances 
proved on the balance of probabilities: (i) the Appellant’s voluntary surrender to the International Tribunal; (ii) 
his real and sincere expression of remorse; (iii) his good character with no prior criminal convictions; (iv) his 
record of good comportment at trial and in detention; (v) his personal and family circumstances, including his 
health; (vi) his having been detained for over 8 years pending a final outcome in his case; and (vi) his particular 
circumstances at the outbreak of and during the war’.  
596 See for example Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-96-10 & 
ICTR-96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 912, where the Chamber considered as aggravating that Ntakirutimana 
‘personally shot’ Tutsi refugees and thus ‘directly and personally contributed to the sheer death toll (…)’.; see 
also Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001) para 61. 
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perpetrator”. Although these references are fairly brief, they are sufficient to demonstrate that the 
Trial Chamber duly considered the issue, particularly given that the Trial Chamber’s conclusions 
regarding the significance of the Appellant’s participation are further fleshed out in the course of 
its discussion of mitigating factors. Moreover, even if the Trial Chamber had addressed this factor 
only in the context of mitigation and not in the context of the gravity of the offence, this erroneous 
placement would not have been prejudicial; because the Trial Chamber did not commit any error 
in concluding that the Appellant’s participation was in fact significant, a more extensive 
discussion in the context of the gravity of the offence could not have been of assistance to the 
Appellant.597 
This does not constitute a differentiated approach in the stricter sense, and neither is it based on a rigid 
normative distinction, but it seems to lead to similar results if a certain pattern in the evaluation 
process of modes of liability as aggravating/mitigating factors arises. Nonetheless, it seems difficult to 
draw a line between the impact of a principal-accessory distinction when evaluated under the heading 
of mitigating/aggravating factors or under the heading ‘gravity of the crime’. 
 
3.2.1.3 GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE AND INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
As clarified in Aleksovski, ‘[c]onsideration of the gravity of the conduct of the accused is normally [a] 
starting point for consideration of an appropriate sentence’,598 as the gravity of the crime occupies a 
central if not the most important role in the sentencing process of the ad hoc tribunals.599 In the 
Celebici case, the Trial Chamber stated that the gravity of the offence was ‘by far the most important 
consideration, which may be regarded as the litmus test for the appropriate sentence’.600 Due to the 
fact that there is no statutory definition, it is the responsibility of the tribunals to develop a pattern 
consisting of relevant factors in order to assess the gravity. Hence, a closer look at the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals will reveal the factors considered as a means to ascertain the gravity of the crime. 
However, it has been argued that the concept of gravity of the crime is ‘too complex to be defined in a 
few words’, as ‘it is determined by a complex set of factors which need to be defined and are 
interrelated’.601 In Kupreškić, the Trial Chamber clarified that ‘the determination of the gravity of the 
crime requires a consideration of the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and 
degree of the participation of the accused in the crime’.602 Accordingly, two elements play a central 
role in assessing the gravity of the crime, namely (i) the particular circumstances of the case and (ii) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 Prosecutor v Babić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-03-72-A (18 July 2005) para 39. 
598 Aleksovski Appeal Judgment (n 138) para 182; 598 Banović Sentencing Judgment (n 561) para 36. 
599 See for example Prosecutor v Delalić et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 1225. 
600 Delalić et al. Trial Judgment (n 599) para 731; see also among others Simić et al. Trial Judgment (n 23) para 
1062; see also in relation to the importance of the gravity element, Sentencing Judgment (n 561) para 36: ‘The 
overriding obligation in sentencing remains, however, the consideration of the inherent gravity of the crime. This 
factor has been described as the “primary consideration” and the “cardinal feature” in sentencing. It has been 
said that “consideration of the gravity of the conduct of the accused is normally the starting point for 
consideration of an appropriate sentence.” This Trial Chamber cannot but agree. Indeed, the overriding 
obligation in determining sentence is that of fitting the penalty to the gravity of the criminal conduct’.  
601 K Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume II: The Crimes and Sentencing (OUP 2014) 291. 
602 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment (n 35) para 852; cf contrary, Prosecutor v Galić (Trial Judgment) IT-98-29-T 
(5 December 2003) para 758: ‘The Tribunal has often reiterated in its Judgments that the primary factor to be 
taken into account in imposing a sentence is the gravity of the offence, including the impact of the crimes on the 
victims. This is true irrespective of the form of criminal participation of the individual’. 
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the form and degree of the accused’s participation in the crime. While it is obvious that the latter is the 
key element in relation to the applicable mode of liability and thus may reveal the particular approach 
taken by judges in assessing the weight attached to a pertinent mode, the former is discussed briefly as 
they overlap. The SCSL assesses the gravity of the crime in similar manner.603 
The Rome Statute entails two different forms of gravity. As discussed above, Article 77(1)(b) of the 
Rome Statute makes an express reference to the ‘extreme gravity of the crime’.604 In addition, Rule 
145(3) RPE explicitly states that ‘[l]ife imprisonment may be imposed when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, as evidenced by the 
existence of one or more aggravating circumstances’. It seems that “extreme gravity” presupposes that 
there is also “normal” gravity, leading to ‘imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may 
not exceed a maximum of 30 years’, as provided for in Article 77(1)(a). Ambos clarifies that the latter 
form of gravity can be referred to as “normal” or “simple” gravity. Hence, judges of the ICC not only 
have to assess what constitutes the “gravity of the crime” in a particular case, they also have to draw a 
line or come up with a threshold, which enables them to differentiate between the two different 
concepts of gravity of a crime or two different degrees. In assessing the gravity of the crime the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber clarified that both a ‘quantitative perspective, ie by considering the number of 
victims’ and a ‘qualitative’ position had to be considered.605 
 
3.2.1.3.1 Particular Circumstances of the Case: 
 
In Blagojević and Jokić, the Trial Chamber recalled that ‘the Appeals Chamber has stressed that the 
sentence should be individualised and that the particular circumstances of the case are therefore of 
primary importance’.606 Both tribunals have referred in their jurisprudence inter alia to the following 
factors when considering the individual circumstances of the case:607 (i) ‘the scale and cumulative 
effect’ of the crimes committed;608 (ii) ‘the authority (…) exercised over the personnel’;609 (iii) the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 Taylor Sentencing Judgment (n 594) paras 19, 20; Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu (Sentencing 
Judgment) SCSL-04-16-T (19 July 2007) para 19; Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (Sentencing Judgment) 
SCSL-04-14-T (9 October 2007) para 33. 
604 As Ambos notes, the gravity is already assessed in the context of Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute and 
thus a preliminary consideration ‘as an admissibility threshold within the framework of the complementarity 
test’. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, vol II (n 601) 292. 
605 In relation to the qualitative dimension, see Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya) 
ICC-01/09 (31 March 2010) para 62; Prosecutor v Abu Garda (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-
02-/05-02/09 (8 February 2010) para 31. 
606 Blagojević and Jokić (Trial Judgment) IT-02-60-T (17 January 2005) para 832. 
607 Cf contrary for factors, which have not been accepted, Taylor Sentencing Judgment (n 594) para 79: 
Following the submission of the Defence that ‘Mr Taylor’s age, health and family circumstances “constitute the 
essence of the individual circumstances contemplated in Article 19(2) of the Statute” and that they may be 
regarded as mitigating factors’. However, the Trial Chamber contended: ‘His age and the fact that he is married 
with children are not, in the Trial Chamber’s view, mitigating factors in this case. Further, his social professional 
and family background, which the Defence submits shows the likelihood of rehabilitation, is not a mitigating 
factor in the Trial Chamber’s view’. 
608 Simić et al. Trial Judgment (n 23) para 1063. 
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‘possibility of rehabilitation’; and (iv) the ‘terrible impact on the victims and their relatives’.610 
Furthermore, the SCSL has summarised the elements constituting the gravity of the offence with 
reference to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as constituting  
‘(…) inter alia, the general nature of the underlying criminal conduct; the form and degree of 
participation of the [a]ccused or the specific role played by the [a]ccused in the commission of 
the crime; the degree of suffering, impact or consequences of the crime, for the immediate 
victim in terms of physical, emotional and psychological effects; the effects of the crimes on 
the relatives of the immediate victims and/or the broader target group; the vulnerability of the 
victims; and the number of victims’.611  
 
It becomes immediately obvious that the definition of the terminology referring to the elements 
constituting “gravity” poses a major problem. While some judges have in some cases considered 
“personal circumstances” in the stricter sense to constitute factors relating to the personal background 
by listing personal details of the perpetrator,612 (eg marital status, whether the perpetrator is a parent, 
or whether he graduated from university) others have focused on the perpetrator’s particular role in the 
commission of the offence when considering the “personal circumstances”. This in itself does not 
create a problem as long as all factors are considered and evaluated only once in the sentencing 
process and not double counted.613 This has been stressed in a number of cases.614 In the Deronjić, the 
Appeal Chamber clarified that: ‘factors which a Trial Chamber takes into account as aspects of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 Proseutor v Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-205-84-I (12 June 2006) para 47. 
610 Popović et al. Trial Judgment (n 115) Volume II, para 2151. 
611 Brima, Kamara and Kanu Sentencing Judgment (n 603) para 19; see also for example Brima, Kamara and 
Kanu Sentencing Judgment (n 603) paras 53, 55. 
612 See inter alia Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) 
para 11 where the Chamber considered the following factors as Kayishema’s individual circumstances: 
‘Kayishema was born 1954 in Bwishyura (...) He is married and has two children. He graduated from the 
national University of Rwanda (...) The Prosecution has not proved that Kayishema has any previous criminal 
convictions’. See also para 21 respectively for Ruzindana’s individual circumstances. 
613 Harmon and Gaynor, who criticise commensurately short sentences in the sentencing practice of the ICTY 
opine: ‘It appears that some ICTY Sentencing Chambers apply either a remarkably low formula to calculate the 
length of time to be spent in prison in relation to the total quantum of human suffering caused, or afford quite 
extraordinary weight to mitigating factors. It is impossible to know which is correct. (...) Mitigating factors, 
which need only be proven on the balance of probabilities, may add up quickly. The cumulative effect of a Trial 
Chamber recognising multiple factors of mitigation may result in a significant sentence reduction. (...) 
Contributing to the high proportion of low sentences at the ICTY may be other factors, ranging from undue 
emphasis on mitigating factors, particularly those mitigating factors of particular importance to the Tribunal, (...) 
and the practice of using global sentences to reflect the overall criminality of the accused, rather than allocating a 
separate sentence to each conviction’. M B Harmon and F Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary 
Crimes’, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 683, 689. See also Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav 
alias Duch (Appeal Judgment) File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-SC (3 February 2012) para 373 where 
the Supreme Court Chamber criticised that in determining the sentence the Trial Chamber ‘attached undue 
weight to mitigating circumstances and insufficient weight to the gravity of crimes and aggravating 
circumstances’. 
614 Prosecutor v Deronjić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-02-61-A (20 July 2005) para 106; Krnojelac 
Trial Judgment (n 3) para 517: ‘The Trial Chamber has already taken into account other matters put forward by 
the Prosecution as aggravating circumstances when it considered the gravity of the offences proved (...). The 
Trial Chamber considers that it would be impermissible double counting to take these matters into account again 
as matters of aggravation as well’. Prosecutor v Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39&40/1-S (27 February 
2003) para 58: ‘While the Trial Chamber further accepts that the other factors identified by the Prosecutor, ie the 
vulnerability of the victims and the depravity of the crimes, are capable of amounting to aggravating factors, it 
considers that in the circumstances of this case, these factors are essentially subsumed in the overall gravity of 
the offence. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber will not treat them as aggravating factors separately’. 
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gravity of the crime cannot additionally be taken into account as separate aggravating circumstances, 
and vice versa’.615 Pruitt observes in his empirical study of aggravating and mitigating factors at the 
ICTR that the ‘judgments of the ICTR tended to interchange gravity as an aggravating factor and as a 
statutory sentencing factor’.616 
In Kordić and Čerkez, the Trial Chamber clarified that the ‘categories of mitigating circumstance 
cannot be considered as closed’ and that ‘[s]uch factors will vary with the circumstances of each case, 
as must be contemplated by the reference to ‘individual circumstances’ in Article 24 of the Statute’.617 
Accordingly, “individual circumstances” appear to compose the individualised part of general 
aggravating or mitigating factors, constituting the gravity of the crime. However, in a more technical 
context, the gravity of the crime can be divided into ‘abstract gravity’, which refers to the seriousness 
of the crimes, and ‘concrete gravity’, which comprises the underlying personal circumstance.618 As 
Ambos notes, abstract gravity is only the starting point, which should be followed by consideration of 
concrete gravity.619 The ad hoc tribunals have largely rejected the idea that crimes constituting abstract 
gravity can be ranked in relation to their inherent gravity.620 Thus, concrete gravity is the key factor in 
that its weight will be the main determinant in relation to the length of the final sentence.621 Moreover, 
Harmon and Gaynor articulate three ‘principal elements’, for the assessment of the gravity of the 
crime, namely: (i) the abstract gravity of the crime; (ii) the concrete gravity of the crime; and (iii) the 
level of intent and the level of participation of the convicted person in the commission of the crime. It 
is suggested to measure concrete gravity by assessing the ‘total quantum of suffering inflicted on, and 
social and economic harm caused to, direct and indirect victims of the crime, taking into account the 
number of victims, and the nature and duration of their suffering at the time of the crime, since the 
crime, and that which they are likely to continue to experience’. Similarly, Boas and others observe 
four ‘sub-components’ constituting the gravity of the crime: (i) the inherent gravity of the crime; (ii) 
the gravity of the crime committed; (iii) the role of the accused; and (iv) the impact on the victims.622 
Holá and others identified that the factors which are frequently weighted as aggravating factors at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Deronjić Judgment on Sentence Appeal (n 614) para 106; the Appeal Chamber referred inter alia to the 
Krnojelac Trial Judgment (n 614) para 517. 
616 W R Pruitt, ‘Aggravating and Mitigating Sentencing Factors at the ICTR – An Explanatory Analysis’, (2014) 
14 International Criminal Law Review, 148, 158, with reference to R D Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of 
the Crimes”’, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 713. 
617 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment (n 67) para 848. 
618 Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, vol II (n 601) 293, 294. 
619 See Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31) para 953; Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, vol II 
(n 601) 294; J P Book, Appeal and Sentencing in International Criminal Law (BWV 2011) 123. 
620 Cf Kambanda Judgment and Sentence (n 584) para 14, where the Trial Chamber held that war crimes are less 
serious than crimes against humanity; cf Tadić Judgment in Sentencing Appeals (n 540) para 69, where this idea 
was rejected. The Appeals Chamber later followed the latter proposition in Prosecutor v Furundžija (Appeal 
Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) para 243; Prosecutor v Stakić (Appeal Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22 
March 2006) para 375; see for a more detailed discussion Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals (n 
34) 561 seq. 
621 Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, vol II (n 601) 294. 
622 G Boas and others, International Criminal Procedure, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, 
Volume III (CUP 2011) 396, 397. 
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ICTY, include the following five: (i) abuse of superior position/position of authority or trust (accepted 
in 35 cases); (ii) special vulnerability of victims (accepted in 31 cases); (iii) extreme suffering or harm 
inflicted on victims (accepted in 25 cases); (iv) large number of victims (accepted in 15 cases); and (v) 
cruelty of the attack (accepted in 14 cases).623 Moreover, despite the express reference to the 
consideration to the “form and degree of liability” element, the form of participation has also been 
addressed under the gravity of the offence heading. Thus, in Banović, the Trial Chamber indicated 
when discussing the gravity of the crimes, direct participation renders a crime more serious: 
The offence for which the Accused has been convicted [persecution] is made all the more serious 
by considering the underlying criminal offences. The Accused has acknowledged his direct, 
personal involvement in inflicting severe pain and bodily harm through violent beatings of 
detainees at the Keraterm camp. More significantly, Predrag Banović has been convicted for 
participating in the beatings that caused the death of five detainees. His crimes are particularly 
serious in terms of the protected interests which he violated (…).624 
Such emphasis on “direct, personal involvement” throughout the discussion concerning the 
gravity of the crime corroborates the apparent predominant proposition that physical perpetration 
is considered as more blameworthy.  
 
3.2.1.3.2 Form and Degree of Liability 
 
The relevance of assessing the form and degree of liability as part of the gravity of the crime has inter 
alia625 been expressed in Strugar, where the Trial Chamber stated that the ‘Accused’s participation in 
the commission of the crimes’ is ‘of relevance to the gravity of the offence’.626 Meernik and King 
opine that ‘[k]ey to any assessment of the appropriate punishment for the accused is the degree of 
responsibility the accused exercised in the commission of criminal offences’.627 This poses the 
question as to how the ad hoc tribunals have interpreted the element of “form and degree of liability”. 
Contrary to what the wording of this element suggests, it does not appear to denote a specific label 
which leads to different legal results. Instead, the individual’s “concrete role” in the commission of the 
crime and the “underlying criminal conduct” play a significant role in assessing the gravity of the 
crime.628 In Milutinović et al.,629 the Trial Chamber held in relation to the assessment of the gravity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Holá, Smeulers and Bijleveld ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable?’ (n 33) 85, 86. 
624 Banović Sentencing Judgment (n 561) para 91. 
625 See also Prosecutor v Milan Milutinović et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) Volume 3, 
para 1147. 
626 Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Judgment) IT-01-42-T (31 January 2005) para 462; see also Prosecutor v 
Miroslav Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 154: ‘It is necessary to consider the 
nature of the crime and “the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the 
participation of the accused in the crime” in order to determine the gravity of the crime’. Prosecutor v Nikolić 
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2013) para 144. 
627 Meernik and King, The Sentencing Determinants (n 70) 736. 
628 See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment (n 606) para 833: ‘By “gravity of the offence” the Trial Chamber 
understands that it must consider the crimes for which each Accused has been convicted, the underlying criminal 
conduct generally, and the specific role played by Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić in the commission of the 
crime. Additionally, the Trial Chamber will take into account the impact of the crimes on the victims’. See 
similarly Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) paras 20, 21. 
629 Milutinović et al. Trial Judgment (n 625) vol III. 
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the offence that ‘the gravity of the offence is the primary consideration in determining the sentence’,630 
which includes inter alia the ‘form and degree of participation’.631 Furthermore, in Deronjić, the Trial 
Chamber stated that ‘[i]t is necessary to consider the nature of the crime and “the particular 
circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of participation of the accused in the crime” 
in order to determine the gravity of the crime’.632 One could discern that these statements do not in 
themselves exclude the idea of ascribing a lower or higher degree of responsibility corresponding with 
accessorial or principal liability, while different facets of culpability within one mode of liability are 
considered in the light of the individual’s specific conduct. Although it seems safe to note that a 
preference for the differentiated approach is reflected in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, 
there is clearly the view that no classification of modes of liability is necessary for the purpose of 
sentencing. In Krnojelac, the Trial Chamber stressed that ‘[c]ategorising offenders may be of some 
assistance, but the particular category selected cannot affect the maximum sentence which may be 
imposed (…)’.633 However, despite this statement, the Appeals Chamber subsequently made it clear in 
Mrkšić, that the above considerations include the categorisation of modes of liability for the purpose 
of sentencing:  
The Appeals Chamber agrees with Šljivančanin that the fact that an accused did not physically 
commit a crime is relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence. Indeed, the 
determination of the gravity of the crime requires not only a consideration of the particular 
circumstances of the case, but also of the form and degree of the participation of the accused in the 
crime. However, while the practice of the International Tribunal indicates that aiding and abetting 
is a lower form of liability than ordering, committing, or participating in a joint criminal enterprise 
and may as such attract a lesser sentence, the gravity of the underlying crimes remains an 
important consideration in order to reflect the totality of the criminal conduct.634 
It is not difficult to discern the controversial positions. Despite the position that no principal accessory 
distinction for the purpose of sentencing is present in international criminal justice, there seems to be a 
controversial stance that accessories, and particularly aiders and abettors, attract lower sentences than 
principal perpetrators. A number of cases at the ad hoc tribunals have been decided based on this 
premise. In Vasiljević, the ICTY Appeals Chamber reduced Mitar Vasiljević’s sentence from 20 years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Ibid para 1147. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Deronjić Sentencing Judgment (n 626) para 154 (check again), See also Mrđa Sentencing Judgment (n 628) 
para 21. 
633 Krnojelac Trial Judgment (n 3) para 77: ‘This Trial Chamber does not hold the same view as Trial Chamber I 
as to the need to fit the facts of the particular case into specific categories for the purposes of sentencing. There 
are, for example, circumstances in which a participant in a joint criminal enterprise will deserve greater 
punishment than the principal offender deserves. The participant who plans a mass destruction of life, and who 
orders others to carry out that plan, could well receive a greater sentence than the many functionaries who 
between them carry out the actual killing. Categorising offenders may be of some assistance, but the particular 
category selected cannot affect the maximum sentence which may be imposed and it does not compel the length 
of sentences which will be appropriate in the particular case. This Trial Chamber, moreover, does not, with 
respect, accept the validity of the distinction which Trial Chamber I has sought to draw between a co-perpetrator 
and an accomplice. This Trial Chamber prefers to follow the opinion of the Appeals Chamber in Tadić, that the 
liability of the participant in a joint criminal enterprise who was not the principal offender is that of an 
accomplice. For convenience, however, the Trial Chamber will adopt the expression “co-perpetrator” (as 
meaning a type of accomplice) when referring to a participant in a joint criminal enterprise who was not the 
principal offender’. 
634 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment (n 30) para 407. 
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imprisonment to 15 years because of its opinion that  
the sentence needs to be adjusted due to the Appeals Chamber’s finding that the Appellant was 
responsible as an aider and abettor with respect to murder as a violation of the laws or customs of 
war under Article 3 of the Statute (Count 5) and persecution by way of murder and inhumane acts 
as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute (Count 3), instead of being 
responsible as a co-perpetrator as was found by the Trial Chamber.635  
It further clarified that it is ‘of the view that aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which 
generally warrants a lower sentence’ and therefore, ‘taking into account the particular circumstances 
of this case as well as the form and degree of the participation of the Appellant in the crimes, the 
Appeal Chamber finds that a sentence of 15 years appropriate’.636 This reasoning is probably the most 
frequently cited “principle” at the ICTY when following a differentiated approach. Due to the fact that 
the above examples serve as a basis for the same reasoning in a number of subsequent cases, the 
sources upon which the Appeals Chamber based its reasoning are examined in more detail further 
below. In support of its view that aiding and abetting liability attracts milder sentences, the Appeals 
Chamber cited inter alia pertinent provisions of domestic penal codes/sentencing guidelines, some of 
which are listed below:637 
• 2003 United States Sentencing Guidelines sections 2X2.1, 3B1.2 
• 1997 Chinese Penal Code, Article 27(2) 
• Article 32(2) and 55 of the 1988 Penal Code of South Korea 
• Sections 27(2), 49 of the German Penal Code 
• Section 34(1) no. 6 of the Austrian Penal Code 
As addressed in Chapter 2, Article 27(2) of the 1997 Chinese Penal Code adopts a differentiated 
approach in that it establishes that accessories are to be punished less severely than principals.638 
Article 32(2) of the South Korean Criminal Code reads as follows: ‘[t]he punishment of accessories 
shall be mitigated to less than that of the principals’. Further, Article 32(1) stipulates that ‘[t]hose who 
aid and abet the commission of a crime by another person shall be punished as accessories’, while 
Article 55 specifies the statutory mitigation available.639 Equally Article 27(2) of the German Criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) para 181, see Chapter 1. 
636 Ibid para 182. 
637 Ibid 182, fn 291. 
638 See Article 27 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China: ‘A person who plays a secondary or 
auxiliary role in a joint crime is the accomplice. An accomplice shall be given a lighter or mitigated punishment 
or be exempt from punishment’. 
639 Article 55 of the Criminal Code [Republic of Korea], 3 October 1953, amended 1 January 1998, Article 55 
(Statutory Mitigation) unofficial translation: 
(1) Statutory mitigation is as follows: when a death penalty is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced to 
imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labour, either for life or not less than ten years; when 
imprisonment for life or imprisonment without prison labour for life is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced to 
limited imprisonment or limited imprisonment without prison labour for not less than seven years; when limited 
imprisonment or limited imprisonment without prison labour is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced by one half of 
the term of the punishment; when deprivation of qualifications is to be reduced, suspension of qualifications for 
not less than seven years shall be imposed; when suspension of qualifications is to be mitigated, it shall be 
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Code640 establishes that secondary participants are entitled to mitigation while Article 49(1) provides 
for the particulars of mitigation available. The above three legal systems, relied upon by the Appeals 
Chamber, clearly embrace a differentiated system in the stricter sense and thus serve as an adequate 
basis. However, given the fact that Austria is a system generally viewed as belonging to the group 
opting for a unitary approach, it is questionable why the Appeals Chamber made reference to section 
34(1) No.6 of the Austrian Criminal Code,641 which provides that: ‘A reason for mitigated punishment 
is present, if the perpetrator (...) merely acted as a subordinate in one of several committed criminal 
acts’.642 When reading this provision in the light of Article 12,643 it becomes clear that secondary 
participants are not statutorily entitled to mitigation, but it is at the judge’s discretion to invoke such 
mitigation, which is a typical characteristic for the largest part of countries following a rather unitary 
approach, despite the minor differences. The Austrian Penal Code embraces a unitary system in the 
wider sense, because it does distinguish between principals and accessories, despite the fact that it 
does not recognise the ‘derivative nature of participation’.644 Thus, technically every contribution 
leads to the fulfilment of the actus reus, although it is at the judge’s discretion to mitigate the 
punishment at the sentencing stage. In the light of the foregoing it appears contradictory, to quote 
Article 34(1) No.6 of the Austrian Penal Code together with the Penal Codes of three countries 
embracing a differentiated approach. Similarly, reference to the US sentencing guidelines in support of 
a differentiated approach appears inadequate, considering that the “Background Application Note” of 
the cited provision section 2X2.1 reads ‘A defendant convicted of aiding and abetting is punishable as 
a principal.’ However, reference645 was also made to section 3B1.2, which reads:  
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: 
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
(c) In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.646 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reduced by one half of the term thereof; when a fine is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced by one half of the 
maximum amount thereof; when detention is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced by one half of the maximum 
term thereof; and when a minor fine is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced by one half of the maximum amount 
thereof. (2) When there are several reasons for which the punishment is to be reduced by Acts, it may be 
repeatedly mitigated’. 
640 For a detailed discussion see Chapter 2 above. M Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (n 323) 43: section 
27(1) Any person who intentionally assists another in the intentional commission of an unlawful act shall be 
convicted and sentenced as an aider. (2) The sentence for the aider shall be based on the penalty for a principal. 
It shall be mitigated pursuant to section 49(1). 
641 Section 34(1) StGB: (1) Ein Milderungsgrund ist es insbesondere, wenn der Täter (...) an einer von mehreren 
begangenen strafbaren Handlung nur in untergeordneter Weise beteiligt war. 
642 Unofficial translation of the author. 
643 Austrian Penal Code. 
644 Olásolo, ‘Developments in the Distinction between Principal and Accessorial Liability’ (n 166) 340, fn 5. 
645 It appears that this reference is based on the 2011 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, although not 
specified explicitly. Accessed at: http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2011/2011-3b12. 
646 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, although not specified explicitly.  
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Although mitigation may be applied at the sentencing stage, this approach must clearly be 
distinguished from a differentiated approach, in which mitigation is automatically triggered if the 
convicted is found to be guilty as an aider and abettor. 
While the ICTY Appeals Chamber based its approach taken in Vasiljević mainly on domestic law, the 
ICTR Trial Chamber justified its stance that secondary forms of liability attract lower sentences on the 
practice of the ICTR and specifically on two judgments rendered by the ICTR namely Ruggiu647 and 
Ntakirutimana.648 In the Kajelijeli Trial Judgment, which was rendered before the Vasiljević judgment, 
the Chamber stated that it had considered the ‘sentencing practice of the ICTR and the ICTY’649 and 
stressed that ‘the penalty must first and foremost be commensurate to the gravity of the offence’.650 It 
further recalled that primary perpetrators ‘convicted of either genocide or extermination (…) or both 
have been punished with sentences ranging from fifteen years to life imprisonment’ whereas 
‘[s]econdary or indirect forms of participation have generally resulted in a lower sentence’.651 It then 
referred to Ruggiu652 and Ntakirutimana,653 stating that the former ‘received a 12-year sentence for 
incitement to commit genocide after a plea of guilty’654 while Ntakirutimana ‘received a ten-year 
sentence for aiding and abetting genocide, with special emphasis on his advanced age’.655 In a similar 
vein, in Krstić, when discussing the gravity of the offence, the Appeals Chamber reduced Radislav 
Krstić’s sentence inter alia based on the premise that aiding and abetting results in lower sentences, 
with reference to the Vasiljević Appeal. It thereby held in the context of the gravity of the alleged 
offences that ‘as the Appeals Chamber recently acknowledged in the Vasiljević case, aiding and 
abetting is a form of responsibility, which generally warrants lower sentences than responsibility as a 
co-perpetrator [member in a JCE]’.656 It further emphasised that ‘[t]his principle has also been 
recognized in the ICTR and in many national jurisdictions’657 while stressing that the finding that 
Krstić did not fulfil the mens rea of genocide, in that ‘he lacked genocidal intent significantly 
diminishes his responsibility’.658 It thus concluded that ‘the revision of Krstić’s conviction to aiding 
and abetting these two crimes merits a considerable reduction of his sentence’.659 In support of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Prosecutor v Ruggiu (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-32-I (1 June 2000). 
648 Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and Sentence (n 596) see particularly para 897, where the Trial Chamber also 
emphasised in the context  
649 Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31) para 963. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Ibid. 
652 Ruggiu Judgment and Sentence (n 647). 
653 Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and Sentence (n 596) see particularly para 897, where the Trial Chamber also 
emphasised in the context of mitigating circumstances that Elizaphan Ntakriutimana ‘did not personally 
participate in these killings, nor was he found to have fired on refugees or even to have carried a weapon’. 
654 Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31) para 963, the identical reference was made only a few months before 
by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 563, see fn 653 below. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 268. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid. 
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finding, the Appeals Chamber relied on the above addressed, flawed660 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment,661 
including its references to ‘seven common law and civil law jurisdictions’662 and on the Kajelijeli Trial 
Judgment.663  
In Simić, the Appeals Chamber applied the same reasoning based on Vasiljević and Krstić when 
addressing the gravity of the crime. Thus, when assessing the gravity of the crime it took into 
consideration that ‘aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower 
sentence than is appropriate to responsibility as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise’.664 
In relation to the ICTR it is striking that although the Semanza judgment665 was rendered before the 
Kajelijeli Judgment,666 most subsequent judgments have made reference to Kajelijeli, which seemed to 
have drawn on Semanza, despite the lack of a direct reference. Accordingly, the ICTR referred to its 
previous case law for guidance and first observed that ‘[p]rincipal perpetrators convicted of either 
genocide or extermination as a crime against humanity, or both, have been punished with sentences 
ranging from fifteen years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment. Secondary or indirect forms of 
participation have generally resulted in a lower sentence’. 667 It then continued to draw on Ruggiu668 
and Ntakirutimana669 by stating that ‘Georges Ruggiu received a 12-year sentence for incitement to 
commit genocide after a plea of guilty, and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana received a ten-year sentence for 
aiding and abetting genocide, with a special emphasis on his advanced age’.670 In a similar vein the 
ICTR Trial Chamber observed in Gacumbitsi with reference to the sentencing practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals that ‘[s]econdary or indirect forms of participation are generally punished with a less severe 
sentence’.671 Again, it then drew on Ruggiu672 and Ntakirutimana673 and recalled that ‘Georges 
Ruggiu, for example, received a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment for incitement to commit 
genocide after having pleaded guilty, whereas Elizaphan Ntakirutimana received a sentence of ten 
years’ imprisonment for aiding and abetting the commission of genocide, on account of his advanced 
age’.674  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 In relation to some of the sources used to legitimise the differentiated approach. 
661 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
662 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 268, fn 435. 
663 Reference to para 963 of the Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31). See also Babić Judgment on 
Sentencing Appeal (n 597) para 40, where the Appeals Chamber relied again on the pertinent part of the 
Kajelijeli Judgment and on the above quoted paragraph of the Krstić Appeal. 
664 Simić Appeal Judgment (n 125) para 265. 
665 Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149). 
666 Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31). 
667 Ibid paras 562, 563.  
668 Ruggiu Judgment and Sentence (n 647). 
669 Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and Sentence (n 596). 
670 Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 563. 
671 Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment (n 119) para 354. 
672 Ruggiu Judgment and Sentence (n 647). 
673 Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and Sentence (n 596). 
674 Ibid. 
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However, two years later, the Appeals Chamber established that a ‘higher sentence is likely to be 
imposed on a principal perpetrator vis-à-vis an accomplice in genocide’675 when it held that 
Semanza was liable as a direct perpetrator ‘in the form of ordering’ (and not as an aider and 
abettor), which entailed ‘a higher degree of culpability’ than the mode of aiding and abetting:676  
Despite the Trial Chamber’s conscientious treatment of the Appellant’s sentence, the Appeals 
Chamber is not satisfied that the 15-year sentences for complicity in genocide and aiding and 
abetting extermination that the Trial Chamber imposed are commensurate with the gravity of the 
Appellant’s offences, as determined by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber has 
concluded above that the Appellant’s actions at Musha Church amounted to perpetration in the 
form of ordering rather than mere complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting extermination. 
This form of direct perpetration entails a higher level of culpability than complicity in genocide 
and aiding and abetting extermination convictions entered by the Trial Chamber. The Appeals 
Chamber recently held in Krstić that “aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which 
generally warrants lower sentences than responsibility as a co-perpetrator”. The Appeals Chamber 
endorses this reasoning to the extent that a higher sentence is likely to be imposed on a principal 
perpetrator vis-à-vis an accomplice in genocide and on one who orders rather than merely aids and 
abets exterminations.677 
It then concluded: 
On balance, the Appeals Chamber concludes, Judge Pocar dissenting, that the 15-year sentences 
for complicity in genocide and for aiding and abetting extermination should be increased by 10 
years to reflect the Appellant’s responsibility for ordering genocide and extermination at Musha 
Church. Thus, the Appeals Chamber determines that the Appellant’s sentence for these offences 
should be 25 years’ imprisonment.678 
A few months later, this reasoning in Semanza, according to which principal perpetration attracts 
higher sentences, was relied upon by the ICTR Trial Chamber in Simba679 with an unambiguous 
statement, confirming the proposition that in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ICTR ‘principal 
perpetration generally warrants a higher sentence than aiding and abetting’.680 This sentence was also 
quoted in Nchamihigo.681 However, the Trial Chamber also introduced an additional categorisation for 
the purpose of sentencing by stating, ‘[a]t this Tribunal, a sentence of life imprisonment is generally 
reserved for those who planned or ordered atrocities and those who participated in the crimes with 
special zeal or sadism’.682 In Muhimana,683 the Trial Chamber repeated the premise that ‘lesser or 
secondary forms of participation generally receive a lower sentence’.684 Thus no reference was made 
to specific case law, except that it added, ‘[t]he Ntakirutimana Trial Chamber Judgment, recently 
upheld on appeal, found Elizaphan Ntakirutimana guilty of aiding and abetting genocide. That 
Chamber also took into account the convicted pastor’s good work, his age, and his frail health, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 388. 
676 Ibid. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid para 389. 
679 Simba Judgment and Sentence (n 181). 
680 Ibid para 434. 
681 Prosecutor v Nchamihigo (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-01-63-T (12 November 2008) para 388. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Prosecutor v Muhimana (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1B-T (25 April 2005). 
684 Ibid para 593. 
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sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment.’685 Again, it becomes clear that it is doubtable whether the 
said case serves as an adequate basis for the assumption that ‘[l]esser or secondary forms of 
participation generally receive a lower sentence’.686 Furthermore, in Bisengimana687 the Trial Chamber 
stated as well that in accordance with the sentencing practice of the ICTY ‘principal perpetrators 
convicted of crimes against humanity such as murder and extermination have received sentences 
ranging from ten years’ to life imprisonment. Persons convicted of secondary forms of participation 
have generally received lower sentences.’688 In Ndindabahizi689 the Appeal Chamber addressed the 
issue of ‘alternative convictions for several modes of liability’690 and held that it was incompatible 
because ‘a judgment has to express unambiguously the scope of the convicted person’s criminal 
responsibility’.691 The Appeals Chamber clarified that according to the principle it is essential to 
ensure that the totality of the perpetrator’s culpability is reflected in the sentence. It added that ‘[t]his 
totality of guilt is determined by the actus reus and mens rea of the convicted person’692 and that due 
to the fact that ‘modes of liability may either augment (eg commission of the crime with direct intent) 
or lessen (eg aiding and abetting a crime with awareness that a crime will probably be committed) the 
gravity of the crime’,693 it is required that ‘the criminal liability of a convicted person has to be 
established unequivocally’.694 The Appeals Chamber made inter alia reference to Krstić,695 where the 
court referred to the practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia when stating that the sentence of 
an aider and abettor can be reduced. In Ntawukulilyayo,696 the Appeals Chamber reduced 
Ntawukulilyayo’s sentence from 25 to 20 years after reversing his conviction for ordering genocide, 
which established the only form of primary perpetration with which he was charged697 and reasoned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Prosecutor v Bisengimana (Trial Judgment) ICTR 00-60-T (13 April 2006). 
688 Ibid para 199; see also similarly, Prosecutor v Bagaragaza (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-2005-86-S (17 
November 2009) para 42 (inter alia with reference to the Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 388): ‘The 
Chamber recognizes that a higher sentence is more likely to be imposed on the principal perpetrators of an 
offence than on their accomplices. After examining the sentencing practice of this Tribunal and that of ICTY, the 
Chamber is mindful that principal perpetrators convicted of genocide have been punished with sentences ranging 
from fifteen years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment, and that a principal perpetrator in relation to the Kesho 
Hill massacre and another event, with a social background similar to that of Michel Bagaragaza, was sentenced 
to 20 years’ imprisonment by the Trial Chamber. Secondary or indirect forms of participation have generally 
resulted in a lower sentence. The Chamber is aware that the sentence should reflect the totality of the criminal 
conduct of the accused. In this case, the Chamber finds that extraordinary mitigating circumstances exist, which 
warrant a substantial reduction of the sentence that the Accused’s actions would otherwise carry’. 
689 Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-01-71-A (16 January 2007). 
690 Ibid para 122. 
691 Ibid. 
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid. 
695 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28) para 270. 
696 Prosecutor v Ntawukulilyayo (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-05-82-A (14 December 2011).  
697 Ibid para 244, the Appeals Chamber made inter alia references to some of the above addressed judgments, 
such as to the Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1), the Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118), the Krstić Appeal 
Judgment (n 28) the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment (n 119), and to the Simić Appeal Judgment (n 125). However, 
additionally reference was made to para 334 of the Appeal Judgment (n 125), although this paragraph merely 
	   126 
that ‘aiding and abetting is a mode of responsibility which has generally warranted lower sentences 
than forms of direct participation such as committing or ordering’.698 The Appeals Chamber 
subsequently reduced Ntawukulilyayo’s sentence based on ‘the reversal of his conviction for 
ordering’.699 The most recent judgment where the Appeals Chamber opted once again for a 
differentiated approach is Ndahimana.700 
Consequently it can be said that the factor “form and degree of participation” involves assessment of 
the specific conduct of the convicted in a relatively large number of cases over a long period of time. 
However, it may be safe to say that there is enough proof to conclude that the ad hoc tribunals seem to 
interpret Articles 6(1) and 7(1) as entailing a differentiated approach. Ultimately, it has to be added 
that there is an even larger number of cases where it has not been expressly articulated that modes of 
liability carry specific legal consequences, as the above analysis has shown. This calls for a 
quantitative analysis, conducted in the next chapter. 
 
3.2.2 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
 
The above discussion looked at the reference of the tribunals to previous jurisprudence, whereby 
particularly early cases, such as Semanza and Vasiljević have been placed under close scrutiny in the 
light of the question how the application of the differentiated theory was initially justified in the early 
case law of the tribunals, before it was “transferred” to subsequent case law. Interestingly, it can be 
observed that reliance of both tribunals has been heavily based on rather questionable, fragmented 
explanatory statements, supported by contradictory sources as can be concluded in relation to 
Vasiljević – or specifically in the case of the ICTR, alleged principles construed based on single cases 
such as Ruggiu.701 It thus appears particularly problematic that the tribunals have based their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reflects the Prosecution’s reliance on the principle established in the Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1) that aiders 
and abettors are generally punished less severely. 
698 Ibid para 244. 
699 Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment (n 696) para 244. 
700 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2). 
701 It is not entirely clear where the Trial Chamber deduced this statement from. In a number of cases reference 
can be found to Ruggiu; see for instance the Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 563: ‘Principal 
perpetrators convicted of either genocide or extermination as a crime against humanity, or both, have been 
punished with sentences ranging from fifteen years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment. Secondary or indirect 
forms of participation have generally resulted in lower sentences. For example, Georges Ruggiu received a 
twelve-year sentence for incitement to commit genocide after a plea of guilty, and Elizaphan Ntakirumtimana 
received a ten-year sentence for aiding and abetting genocide, with a special emphasis on his advanced age’. It is 
difficult to deduce from this the principle that secondary participation attracts less severe punishment. 
Additionally, there does not seem to be an express statement in this regard in Ruggiu. However, reference is 
made to page 19 – thus, it is likely that the Trial Chamber refers to paras 77 and 78 of Ruggiu Judgment and 
Sentence (n 647): ‘77. The accused did not personally commit any acts of violence. He did not strike a blow or 
fire a shot. In the Prosecutor v Omar Serushago, the ICTR in imposing a penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment 
considered as aggravating circumstances Serushago’s high political and military role and the fact that he killed 
Tutsi and ordered the killing of several others who were killed as a consequence of his order. 78. The accused 
did not personally participate in the massacres and did not use his pistol. The Chamber takes due account of 
this’. Similarly, in Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Judgment and Sentence (n 596) no express statement in 
this regard can be found. The Trial Chamber in Semanza made reference to paragraphs 898, 906 and 921 of the 
Trial Chamber’s Judgment in Ntakirumtimana, which reads: ‘898. Finally, 78 years of age at the time of 
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subsequent justifications to legitimise the principle of mitigation on insufficiently substantiated 
sources, and even worse, frequently the origin or validity of such an “allegedly established principle” 
does not seem to have been questioned or examined systematically. However, considering the 
“natural” resort to the differentiated approach without adequate scrutiny, it almost appears as if the 
milder punishment of aiders and abettors is a solidly established international principle, which does 
not require extensive and adequate proof of existence – would it not otherwise be discussed 
systematically? It must be noted that the phrasing of the “principle”702 is, in a number of instances, 
identical, as referenced above, this is particularly true in relation to the ICTR. Would this suggest that 
it has sometimes just been taken over from previous cases – and thus precedent after all prevails? It 
appears as if the question whether a differentiated or a unitary approach should be taken depends on 
the specific judge and related factors. Is the answer pre-determined by the legal cultural background, 
or do judges, in the absence of any statutory guidance, merely follow previous decided cases of the ad 
hoc tribunals? Chapter 4 considers these factors from various angles, which may contribute to a better 
understanding of the decision-making process in international criminal law. 
 
3.2.3 EXPRESS REFERENCE TO A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH IN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
While the above discussion is based on a wide range of judgments, which broach the issue of a 
principal accessory distinction, Table 3 below is based on a compilation of judgments rendered by the 
ad hoc tribunals (each perpetrator listed separately), in which a differentiated approach has been 
articulated at the sentencing stage and actually taken into consideration when meting out the 
punishment. Only cases where the consideration of the principal-accessory distinction has been clearly 
demonstrated at the sentencing stage – as opposed to mere reference thereto703 – have been included. 
Judgments where the alleged principle that “secondary participation warrants lower sentences” has 
been merely quoted without clear implications for the respective sentence and as such has not been 
applied more or less expressly, have been excluded. The table includes the composition of the bench 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sentencing, the Accused has spent more than four years in detention. His wife, among other witnesses, has 
testified about his frail health, due to a condition from which he has suffered for years. His poor health was 
evident throughout the trial proceedings. Considered together, the Chamber finds that these are important 
mitigating circumstances in Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s case. (...) 906. Having reviewed all circumstances in the 
Accused’s case, individual, mitigating and aggravating, the Chamber declared itself sympathetic to the 
individual and mitigating circumstances of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. Special weight has been given, in reaching 
its decision on the sentence, to his age, his state of health, his past good character and public service. (...) 921. 
For the crime upon which conviction was entered against the Accused, the Chamber sentences Elizaphan 
Ntakritutimana to: imprisonment for 10 years’. When reading these paragraphs in the light of the principle they 
are alleged to establish, it appears doubtful whether such principle would objectively be deduced from such 
paragraphs. 
702 If one was to suppose that the differentiated approach can be subsumed under Article 38 ICJ statute, then as a 
general principle of law. Given the result of the comparative study in Chapter 2, which revealed that jurisdictions 
go both ways, it appears impossible to establish the existence of a rule of customary international law. 
703 Cases where this issue has been addressed at the stage where individual criminal responsibility is attributed 
are not included in the absence of any additional reference at the sentencing stage. However, these cases are inter 
alia discussed in the previous chapter. 
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for each of the cases (the jurisdiction the judge represents, the legal system and the sentencing 
approach of the respective jurisdiction), which is particularly relevant for the next chapter. 
 
TABLE 3: THE DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
 
 
Case / 
Perpetrator 
 
 
Tribunal / 
Instance 
 
Mode of 
Responsibility 
 
Judges / 
Nationality / 
Legal System / 
Sentencing 
Approach 
 
 
Quote/Extract 
1999 (25.06.) 
 
Aleksovski 
 
 
 
 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-14/1-T 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
Almiro Rodrigues 
(Portugal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Lal Chand Vohrah  
(Malaysia / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Rafael Nieto-Navia  
(Colombia / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 236: ‘The Trial 
Chamber has taken into 
consideration (…) the good 
character (…) the Trial 
Chamber has found that the 
accused’s direct 
participation in the 
commission of acts of 
violence was relatively 
limited (…). It is obvious 
(…) that the accused had a 
secondary role in the totality 
of the crimes (…)’. 
 
2000 (01.06.) 
 
Georges Ruggiu 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-97-32-1 
 
 
Committing Navanethem Pillay 
(South Africa / 
Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Erik Møse  
(Norway / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Pavel Dolenc 
(Slovenia / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 77: ‘The accused did 
not personally commit any 
acts of violence. He did not 
strike a blow or fire a shot’. 
 
Para 78: ‘The accused did 
not personally participate in 
the massacres and did not 
use his pistol. The Chamber 
takes due account of this’. 
 
2001 (31.07.) 
 
Stevan 
Todorović 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-9/1-S 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
 
Committing 
 
Ordering 
Patrick Robinson 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Richard May 
(UK / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mohamed Fassi 
Fihri 
(Morocco / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 61: ‘(…) His direct 
participation in the crimes, 
as well as his abuse of his 
position of authority and of 
people’s trust in the 
institution, clearly constitute 
an aggravating factor’. 
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2001 (02.11.) 
 
Miroslav 
Kvočka 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-98-30/1-T 
JCE Almiro Rodrigues 
(Portugal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Fouad Riad 
(Egypt / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Patricia Wald 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 717: ‘The Trial 
Chamber takes note of the 
fact that Kvočka was not 
convicted of physically 
perpetrating crimes’. 
2001 (02.11.) 
 
Dragoljub Prcać 
 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-98-30/1-T 
 
JCE Almiro Rodrigues 
(Portugal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Fouad Riad 
(Egypt / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Patricia Wald 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 722: ‘The Trial 
Chamber takes note that 
Prcać voluntarily gave a 
statement to the Prosecution 
and has not been convicted 
of physically perpetrating 
crimes’. 
 
2001 (13.11) 
 
Duško Sikirica 
 
 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-8-S 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
 
Committing 
 
 
 
Patrick Robinson 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Richard May 
(UK / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mohamed Fassi 
Fihri 
(Morocco / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 233: ‘The gravity of 
Duško Sikirica’s crime is 
distinguished from that of 
his co-accused on account of 
the breadth or the underlying 
criminal conduct and, more 
significantly, on the basis of 
the extent of his direct 
personal involvement in the 
crimes. He alone has been 
convicted for committing a 
murder in the camp by 
shooting one of the detainees 
at close range within view of 
other detainees and camp 
guards. (…)’. 
 
2001 (13.11) 
 
Dragan 
Kolunžija 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-8-S 
 
 
 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
Patrick Robinson 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Richard May 
(UK / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
 
Mohamed Fassi 
Fihri 
(Morocco / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 241: ‘Although Dragan 
Kolunžija has been 
convicted of the crimes of 
persecution, in the 
Chamber’s view, the gravity 
of his crime is considerably 
diminished by the fact, as set 
forth in the Plea Agreement, 
that there was no evidence 
of his direct, personal 
involvement in any of the 
underlying criminal 
conduct’. 
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2001 (13.11) 
 
Damir Došen 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-8-S 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
Patrick Robinson 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Richard May 
(UK / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mohamed Fassi 
Fihri 
(Morocco / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 237: ‘(…) [t]he 
Chamber, in assessing the 
gravity of the offence, has 
borne in mind that, while 
Damir Došen has admitted 
to being aware of beatings 
occurring on his shift, the 
Plea Agreement does not 
suggest his direct 
involvement on any of those 
beatings’. 
 
2002 (17.10.) 
 
Milan Simić 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95-9/2-S 
 
 
JCE Florence Ndepele 
Mwachande 
Mumba 
(Zambia / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Sharon A Williams 
(Canada / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Per-Johan Viktor 
Lindholm 
(Finland / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 55: ‘The Trial Chamber 
finds that the direct and 
intentional participation of 
Milan Simić in the 
perpetration of the offences, 
as well as his presence when 
others joined in the attack on 
these victims are factors that 
must be considered in 
determining his sentence’. 
2003 (15.05.) 
 
Laurent 
Semanza 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-97-20-T 
 
 
 
Committing 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
 
Instigating 
Yakov 
Ostrovsky 
(Russia / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Lloyd G Williams 
(Saint Kitts and 
Nevis / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Pavel Dolenc 
(Slovenia / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 557: ‘With the 
exception of his personal 
participation in the torture 
and murder of Rusanganwa, 
the Accused was not a 
principal perpetrator of the 
other crimes for which he 
has been found guilty (…). 
The accused has been 
convicted of complicity in 
genocide, of aiding and 
abetting (…) and of 
instigation (…). The 
Accused’s acts of 
complicity, aiding and 
abetting, and instigating are 
crimes of indirect 
participation’. 
 
Para 563: ‘(…) Secondary or 
indirect forms of 
participation have generally 
resulted a [sic] lower 
sentences’. 
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2003 (01.12.) 
 
Juvenal 
Kajelijeli 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-98-44A-T 
Superior 
Responsibility 
 
Ordering 
 
Aiding & 
Abetting 
 
Committing  
William H Sekule 
(Tanzania / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Winston C. 
Mananzima 
Maqutu 
(Lesotho / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Arlette Ramaroson 
(Madagascar / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 963: ‘The Trial 
Chamber has taken into 
consideration the sentencing 
practice in the ICTR and the 
ICTY, and notes particularly 
that the penalty must first 
and foremost be 
commensurate to the gravity 
of the offence. Principal 
perpetrators convicted of 
either genocide or 
extermination as a crime 
against humanity or both 
have been punished with 
sentences ranging from 
fifteen years to life 
imprisonment. Secondary or 
indirect forms of 
participation have generally 
resulted in a lower sentence. 
For example, Georges 
Ruggiu received a twelve-
year sentence for incitement 
to commit genocide after a 
plea of guilty and Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana received a 
ten-year sentence for aiding 
and abetting genocide, with 
special emphasis on his 
advance age’. 
 
2003 (21.02.) 
 
Gerard 
Ntakirutimana 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-96-17-T 
 
 
Committing Erik Møse 
(Norway / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Navanethem Pillay 
(South Africa / 
Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Andrésia Vaz 
(Senegal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 912: ‘Other aggravating 
circumstances taken into 
consideration are: (…) that 
he personally shot at Tutsi 
refugees and that he thus 
directly and personally 
contributed to the sheer 
death toll among (…) [the] 
Tutsi population (…)’. 
 
2004 (25.02.) 
 
Mitar Vasiljević 
 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
IT-98-32-A 
 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil  
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Wolfgang 
Schomburg 
(Germany / Civil 
Para 181: ‘(…) [T]he 
Appeals Chamber is of the 
view that the sentence needs 
to be adjusted due to the 
Appeals Chamber’s finding 
that the Appellant was 
responsible as an aider and 
abettor (…), instead of being 
responsible as a co-
perpetrator as was found by 
the Trial Chamber. The 
Appeals Chamber considers 
that it has the mandate to 
revise the sentence by itself 
without remitting it to the 
Trial Chamber’. 
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Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Inés Mónica 
Weinberg de Roca 
(Argentina /Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
Para 182: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber is of the view that 
aiding and abetting is a form 
of responsibility which 
generally warrants a lower 
sentence than is appropriate 
to responsibility as a co-
perpetrator. (…) Therefore, 
taking into account the 
particular circumstances of 
this case as well as the form 
and degree of participation 
(…) a sentence of 15 years is 
appropriate’. 
 
2004 (31.03.) 
 
Darko Mrđa 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-02-59 
 
 
Committing Alphons Orie 
(The Netherlands / 
Civil Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Amin El Mahdi 
(Egypt / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Joaqin M Carnival 
(Spain / Civil Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 31: ‘The Trial Chamber 
accepts that Darko Mrđa was 
not the “architect” of the 
massacre and that he was 
acting pursuant to orders 
(…). Nevertheless, the fact 
that he personally 
participated in the selection 
of the civilians who were 
going to be killed (…) 
makes the crimes charged 
especially serious’. 
 
2004 (19.04.) 
 
Radislav Krstić 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
IT-98-33-A 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy / Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Wolfgang 
Schomburg 
(Germany / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 268: ‘Regarding the 
gravity of the crimes 
alleged, as the Appeals 
Chamber recently 
acknowledged in the 
Vasiljević case, aiding and 
abetting is a form of 
responsibility which 
generally warrants lower 
sentences than responsibility 
as a co-perpetrator. This 
principle has also been 
recognised in the ICTR and 
in many national 
jurisdictions. (…) As such, 
the revision of Krstić’s 
conviction of aiding and 
abetting these two crimes 
merits a considerable 
reduction of his sentence’. 
 
2004 (17.06.) 
 
Sylvestre 
Gacumbitsi 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-2001-64-T 
 
 
 
Committing 
Planning 
Instigating 
Ordering 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
 
Andrésia Vaz 
(Senegal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Jai Ram Reddy 
(Fiji Islands / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Para 354: ‘The Chamber has 
also taken into consideration 
the sentencing practice of 
ICTR and ICTY [sic], and 
notes that the penalty 
should, first and foremost, 
be commensurate with the 
gravity of the offence. (…) 
Secondary or indirect forms 
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Sergei Alekseevich 
Egorov 
(Russia / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
of participation are generally 
punished with a lighter 
sentence. Georges Ruggiu 
(…) received a 12-year 
sentence for incitement to 
commit genocide (…), 
whereas Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana received a 
ten-year  sentence for aiding 
and abetting (…), with 
special emphasis on his 
advanced age’. 
 
2004 (15.07.) 
 
Emmanuel 
Ndindabahizi 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-2001-71-I  
 
Committing 
 
Instigating 
 
Aiding & 
Abetting 
Erik Møse 
(Norway / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Khalida Rachid 
Khan 
(Pakistan / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Solomy Balungi 
Bossa 
(Uganda / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 500: ‘The Chamber has 
also considered the principle 
of gradation in sentencing, 
according to which the 
highest penalties are to be 
imposed upon those who 
planned or ordered 
atrocities, or those who 
committed crimes with 
particular zeal or sadism’. 
 
Para 510: ‘The Chamber has 
taken into consideration the 
sentencing practice of the 
ICTR and the ICTY, and 
notes particularly that the 
penalty must first and 
foremost be commensurate 
to the gravity of the offence. 
Principal perpetrators 
convicted of either genocide 
or extermination as a crime 
against humanity, for both 
which the Accused has been 
found guilty, have been 
punished with sentences 
ranging from fifteen years to 
imprisonment for the 
remainder of the convicted 
person’s life. (…)’. 
 
2005 (28.02.) 
 
Zoran Žigić 
 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
IT-98-30/1-A 
JCE Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy / Civil Law / 
Unitary)  
 
Florence Ndepele 
Mwachande 
Mumba 
(Zambia / Common 
Law / Unitary)  
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Para 716: ‘(…) The Appeals 
Chamber notes that Žigić, of 
all the Applicants, was the 
one who physically 
committed the highest 
number of crimes. (…) The 
Appeals Chamber especially 
wishes to emphasize the 
seriousness and gravity of 
the crimes committed by 
Žigić, and thus affirms the 
sentence imposed by the 
Trial Chamber’. 
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Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Inés Mónica 
Weinberg de Roca 
(Argentina / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
2005 (18.04.) 
 
Mikaeli 
Muhimana 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-95-1B-T 
 
 
Committing 
 
Instigating 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Khalida Rachid 
Khan 
(Pakistan / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Lee Gacuiga 
Muthoga 
(Kenya / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Emile Francis 
Short 
(Ghana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 593: ‘On examination 
of the sentencing practice of 
the ICTR and ICTY, the 
Chamber notes that principal 
perpetrators convicted of 
genocide have received 
sentences ranging from 
fifteen years’ imprisonment 
to imprisonment for life. 
Lesser or secondary forms of 
participation generally 
receive [a] lower sentence. 
(…)’. 
 
Para 603: ‘Genocide, and 
murder and rape as crimes 
against humanity rank 
amongst the gravest of 
crimes. The Trial Chamber 
has no doubt that principal 
perpetrators of such crimes 
deserve a heavy sentence’. 
 
Para 614: ‘The Chamber 
finds that Mika Muhimana’s 
active participation in the 
decapitation of Assiel 
Kabanda, and the subsequent 
public display of his severed 
head, constitute an 
aggravating factor’. 
 
2005 (28.07.) 
 
Milan Babić 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
IT-03-72-A  
 
JCE Florence Ndepele 
Mwachande 
Mumba  
(Zambia / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy /Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 40: ‘(…) While 
generally it may be said that 
a finding of secondary or 
indirect forms of 
participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise relative 
to others may result in the 
imposition of a lower 
sentence, the Appeals 
Chamber finds that the Trial 
Chamber’s conclusion in this 
case that, nevertheless, the 
Appellant’s participation in 
the joint criminal enterprise 
was not as limited as the 
parties suggest, was the 
correct one in the light of the 
totality of his acts 
demonstrating significant 
support for the joint criminal 
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Wolfgang 
Schomburg 
(Germany / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
enterprise’. 
 
2005 (20.05.) 
 
Laurent 
Semanza 
 
ICTR 
 
ICTR-97-20-A  
Appeal 
 
Committing 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Ordering 
Instigating 
 
 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy /Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Ines Monica 
Weinberg de Roca 
(Argentina / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
Para 388: ‘(…) The Appeals 
Chamber has concluded 
above that the Appellant’s 
actions at Musha Church 
amounted to perpetration in 
the form of ordering rather 
than mere complicity in 
genocide and aiding and 
abetting extermination. This 
form of direct perpetration 
entails a higher level of 
culpability than complicity 
in genocide and aiding and 
abetting extermination 
convictions entered by the 
Trial Chamber. The Appeals 
Chamber recently held in 
Krstić that “aiding and 
abetting is a form of 
responsibility which 
generally warrants lower 
sentences than responsibility 
as a co-perpetrator”. The 
Appeals Chamber endorses 
this reasoning to the extent 
that a higher sentence is 
likely to be imposed on a 
principal perpetrator vis-à-
vis an accomplice in 
genocide and on one who 
orders rather than merely 
aids and abets 
exterminations’. 
 
2005 (13.12.) 
 
Aloys Simba 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-01-76-T 
 
 
 
JCE Erik Møse 
(Norway / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Sergei Alekseevich 
Egorov 
(Russia  / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Dennis C M Byron 
(Saint Kitts and 
Nevis / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 434: ‘In the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence, principal 
perpetration generally 
warrants a higher sentence 
than aiding and abetting. 
However, this does not mean 
that a life sentence is the 
only appropriate sentence for 
a principal perpetrator of 
genocide and extermination. 
In this Tribunal, a sentence 
of life imprisonment is 
generally reserved those 
[sic] who planned, or 
ordered atrocities and those 
who participate in the crimes 
with particular zeal or 
sadism’. 
 
Para 435: ‘(…) In addition, 
the manner in which Simba 
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participated in the joint 
criminal enterprise did not 
evidence any particular zeal 
or sadism on his part. In 
particular, he did not 
physically participate in 
killings and did not remain 
at the sites of the massacres 
for more than a brief period’. 
 
Para 436: ‘Although Simba’s 
crimes are grave, the 
Chamber is not satisfied that 
he is deserving of the most 
serious sanction available 
under the Statute. The 
Chamber finds some 
guidance from cases that 
include convictions for 
direct participation in 
genocide and extermination 
that did not result in life 
sentences’. 
 
Para 437: ‘In Semanza, the 
Appeals Chamber 
determined twenty-five 
years’ imprisonment to be 
the appropriate sentence for 
direct perpetration of 
genocide and extermination 
at a massacre site’. 
 
2006 (02.06.) 
 
Joseph 
Serugendo 
 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-2005-84-I 
 
Committing  
 
 
 
Erik Møse 
(Norway /Civil 
Law /Unitary) 
 
Jai Ram Reddy 
(Fiji Islands / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Sergei Alekseevich 
Egorov 
(Russia / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
Para 83: ‘(…) In the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence, 
principal perpetration 
generally warrants a higher 
sentence than aiding and 
abetting. However, this 
alone does not mean that a 
life sentence is the only 
appropriate sentence for a 
principal perpetrator of 
genocide and crimes against 
humanity. In this Tribunal, a 
sentence of life 
imprisonment is generally 
reserved those [sic] who 
planned or ordered atrocities 
and those who participate in 
the crimes with particular 
zeal or sadism (…)’. 
 
2006 (28.11.) 
 
Blagoje Simić 
 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
IT-95-9-A 
 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana / Common 
Para 265: ‘Regarding the 
gravity of the offence, the 
Appeals Chamber recalls 
that aiding and abetting is a 
form of responsibility which 
generally warrants a lower 
sentence than is appropriate 
to responsibility as a 
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Law / Unitary) 
 
Liu Daqun 
(China / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Andrésia Vaz 
(Senegal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Wolfgang 
Schomburg 
(Germany / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise. Thus in assessing 
the gravity of the offence, 
the Appeals Chamber takes 
into consideration that it has 
set aside the Appellant’s 
conviction under Article 7(1) 
of the Statute for his 
participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise, and has 
found him responsible for 
aiding and abetting (…)’. 
 
Para 300: ‘In imposing the 
appropriate sentence, the 
Appeals Chamber recalls 
that, in addition to having re-
qualified the Appellant’s 
individual criminal 
responsibility as that of an 
aider and abettor, it has set 
aside his conviction for 
persecution (…). The 
Appeals Chamber finds that 
this warrants an adjustment 
of the Appellant’s sentence 
(…). Taking into account the 
particular circumstances of 
the case (…) the form and 
degree of participation (…) a 
sentence of fifteen years is 
appropriate’. 
 
2007 (23.02.) 
 
Joseph 
Nzabirinda 
 
 
 
 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-2001-77-T 
 
 
 
Mode of liability 
not specified 
 
 
Arlette Ramaroson 
(Madagascar / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
William Hussein 
Sekule 
(Tanzania / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Solomy Balungy 
Bossa 
(Uganda / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
 
 
 
Para 109: ‘The Chamber is 
mindful of the reasoning in 
the Semanza Judgment that a 
higher sentence is likely to 
be imposed on “one who 
orders rather than merely 
aids and abets 
exterminations”. The 
Chamber further recalls that 
“modes of liability may 
either augment (eg 
commission of the crime 
with direct intent) or lessen 
(eg aiding and abetting a 
crime with awareness that a 
crime will probably be 
committed) the gravity of the 
crime”’. 
 
Para 110: ‘On examination 
of the sentencing practice of 
this Tribunal and that of the 
ICTY, the Chamber notes 
that principal perpetrators 
convicted of crimes against 
humanity, such as murder, 
have received sentences 
ranging from ten years’ to 
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life imprisonment. Persons 
convicted of secondary 
forms of participation have 
generally received lower 
sentences. The Chamber is 
mindful that the sentence 
should reflect the totality of 
the criminal conduct of the 
accused’. 
 
2007 (12.06.) 
 
Milan Martić 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-95.11-T 
 
JCE Bakone Justice 
Moloto 
(South Africa / 
Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Janet Nosworthy 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Frank Höpfel 
(Austria / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 491: ‘(…) The impact 
and long-lasting effects of 
these crimes, for which 
Milan Martić is individually 
criminally responsible, 
including as a direct 
perpetrator, render them 
especially grave’. 
 
2008 (03.04.) 
 
Lahi Brahimaj 
 
 
 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-04-84-T 
 
 
Committing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alphons Orie 
(The Netherlands / 
Civil Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Frank Höpfel 
(Austria / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Ole Bjorn Stole 
(Norway / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 493: ‘(…) The Trial 
Chamber has considered the 
inherent seriousness of these 
crimes and that Lahi 
Brahimaj, who held high-
ranking positions in the 
KLA, participated directly in 
the commission of them. 
(…) All these factors make 
up the gravity of these 
offence and the totality of 
the conduct in this case’. 
 
2009 (05.05.) 
 
Veselin 
Šljivančanin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICTY  
 
Appeal 
 
IT-95-13/1-A 
 
 
 
Aiding & 
Abetting 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law /Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy / Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Liu Daqun 
(China / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Andrésia Vaz 
(Senegal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 407: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber agrees with 
Šljivančanin that the fact that 
an accused did not 
physically commit a crime is 
relevant to the determination 
of the gravity of the crime 
requires not only a 
consideration of the 
particular circumstances of 
the case, but also of the form 
and degree of the 
participation of the accused 
in the crime. However, while 
the practice of the 
International Tribunal 
indicates that aiding and 
abetting is a lower form of 
liability than ordering, 
committing, or participating 
in a joint criminal enterprise 
and may as such attract a 
lesser sentence’. 
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2009 (20.07.) 
 
Milan Lukić 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-98-32/1-T 
 
 
 
Committing Patrick Robinson 
(Jamaica / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Christine van den 
Wyngaert 
(Belgium / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Pedro David 
(Argentina / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 1084: ‘Having 
considered all the evidence 
relating to sentencing, 
including matters of 
mitigation, the Trial 
Chamber maintains the 
position that on the basis 
alone of Milan Lukić’s guilt 
for personally, physically 
and in cold blood killing the 
five people at Drina River 
(…), the maximum penalty 
is warranted’. 
 
2009 (17.11.) 
 
Michel 
Bagaragaza 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-05-86-S 
 
 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Vagn Joensen 
(Denmark / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Bakhtiyar 
Tuzmukhamedov 
(Russia / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Gberdao Gustave 
Kam 
(Burkina Faso / 
Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
Para 42: ‘The Chamber 
recognizes that a higher 
sentence is more likely to be 
imposed on the principal 
perpetrators of an offence 
than on their accomplices 
(…). Secondary or indirect 
forms of participation have 
generally resulted in a lower 
sentence. The Chamber is 
aware that the sentence 
should reflect the totality of 
the criminal conduct of the 
accused. In this case, the 
Chamber finds that 
extraordinary mitigating 
circumstances exist, which 
warrant a substantial 
reduction of the sentence 
that the Accused’s actions 
would otherwise carry’. 
 
2010 (03.08.) 
 
Dominique 
Ntawukulily-ayo 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-05-82-T 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
 
Ordering 
Khalida Rachid 
Khan 
(Pakistan / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Lee Gacuiga 
Muthoga 
(Kenya / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Aydin Sefa Akay 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Para 473: ‘He did not 
physically participate in 
killings (…)’. 
 
2010 (20.10.) 
 
Emmanuel 
Rukundo 
 
ICTR 
 
Appeal 
 
ICTR-2001-70-A 
 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Fausto Pocar 
(Italy /Civil Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Para 262: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber also dismisses the 
Prosecution’s assertion that 
the Trial Chamber erred in 
stating that secondary or 
indirect forms of authority 
have usually entailed a lower 
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 Differentiated) 
 
Liu Daqun 
(China / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Carmel Agius 
(Malta / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
sentence. The Prosecution 
itself concedes that this 
statement is generally 
correct, and only challenges 
the cases the Trial Chamber 
cited in support of this 
statement. (…)’. 
 
Para 269: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber recalls that it has 
set aside Rukundo’s 
conviction for committing 
genocide and murder and 
extermination as crimes 
against humanity (…) and 
instead found him 
responsible for aiding and 
abetting these crimes. (…) 
In the circumstances of this 
case, the Appeals Chamber, 
Judge Pocar dissenting, 
reduces Rukundo’s sentence 
of 25 years of imprisonment 
to 23 years of 
imprisonment’. 
 
2010 (1.11.) 
 
Gaspard 
Kanyarukiga 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-2002-78-T 
 
 
Planning Taghrid Hikmet 
(Jordan / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Seon Ki Park 
(Korea / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Joseph Masanche 
(Tanzania / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
Para 676: ‘Although 
Kanyarukiga’s crimes are 
grave, the Chamber is not 
satisfied that he is deserving 
of the most serious sanction 
available under the Statute, 
given that it has not been 
established that he directly 
participated in, or was 
present during the 
destruction of Nyange 
Church itself’. 
 
2011 (14.12.) 
 
Dominique 
Ntawukulily-ayo 
ICTR 
 
Appeal 
 
ICTR-05-82-A  
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Carmel Agius 
(Malta / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Mehmet Güney 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Liu Daqun 
(China / Civil Law 
/ Differentiated) 
 
Arlette Ramaroson 
(Madagascar / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Andrésia Vaz 
(Senegal / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
Para 244: ‘The reversal of 
Ntawukulilyayo’s conviction 
for ordering genocide 
removes the only direct form 
of responsibility by which he 
was found to have 
participated in the Kabuye 
Hill killings. The Appeals 
Chamber therefore considers 
that a reversal of 
Ntawukulyayo’s conviction 
for ordering genocide calls 
for a reduction of his 
sentence. It notes, 
nonetheless, that 
Ntawukulilyayo remains 
convicted of an extremely 
serious crime’. 
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2011 (30.12.) 
 
Gregoire 
Ndahimana 
 
ICTR 
 
Trial 
 
ICTR-01-68-T 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Florence Rita 
Arrey 
(Cameroon / 
Common and Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Bakhtiyar 
Tuzmukhamedov 
(Russia / Civil Law 
/ Unitary) 
 
Aydin Sefa Akay 
(Turkey / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
Para 861: ‘The Majority 
considers that (…) [h]e did 
not physically participate in 
the killings. Accordingly, 
these are not found to be 
aggravating factors, as 
suggested by the 
Prosecution’. 
 
Para 865: ‘The Majority has 
considered that he did not 
personally participate in 
these killings. (…) His 
criminal responsibility is 
derived from his tacit 
approval combined with his 
presence at the crime scene’. 
 
2013 (27.03.) 
 
Stojan Župljanin 
 
ICTY 
 
Trial 
 
IT-08-91-T 
JCE 
 
 
Burton Hall 
(The Bahamas / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Guy Delvoie 
(Belgium / Civil 
Law / 
Differentiated) 
 
Frederik Harhoff 
(Denmark / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Para 948: ‘Župljanin’s active 
and direct participation in 
the JCE was undertaken in 
his official capacity (…). 
This constitutes an abuse of 
his superior position and 
thus aggravates his 
culpability’. 
 
2013 (16.12.) 
 
Gregoire 
Ndahimana 
 
 
ICTY 
 
Appeal 
 
ICTR-01-68-A 
 
 
Superior 
Responsibility 
 
JCE 
Theodor Meron 
(USA / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
William H. Sekule 
(Tanzania / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
Arlette Ramaroson 
(Madagascar / Civil 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Carmel Agius 
(Malta / Common 
Law / Unitary) 
 
Khalida Rachid 
Khan 
(Pakistan / 
Common Law / 
Unitary) 
 
 
Para 250: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber is of the opinion 
that its findings of errors 
relating to the mitigating 
factors together with its re-
characterisation of 
Nadahimana’s criminal 
responsibility for the killings 
of 16 April 1994 as that of a 
participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise call for a 
reconsideration of the 
sentence imposed on 
Ndahimana by the Trial 
Chamber. This part of the 
Prosecution’s sentencing 
appeal has therefore become 
moot (...)’. 
 
Para 252: ‘The Appeals 
Chamber considers that, in 
the circumstances of this 
case, the elevation of 
Ndahimana’s responsibility 
from that of an aider and 
abettor to that of a 
participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise results in an 
increase of his overall 
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culpability which calls for a 
higher sentence’. 
 
253: ‘(…) Having 
considered the extraordinary 
gravity of the crimes for 
which Ndahimana is being 
convicted, the form and 
degree of his participation in 
these crimes, as well as the 
appropriate mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, 
the Appeals Chamber sets 
aside Ndahimana’s sentence 
of 15 years of imprisonment 
and sentences him to a term 
of 25 years of 
imprisonment’. 
 
 
The table reveals that, although all of the judgments have in common that a differentiated approach is 
embraced terminologically, they differ in relation to their implication on the sentence, in that the 
phrasing of the respective parts differs and may only reflect certain nuances of the principle. While the 
Vasiljević 704 and Krstić 705 Appeal Judgments or the Bagaragaza Sentencing Judgment,706 among 
others, are examples of probably the most concretely manifest form of such distinction and the legal 
consequences thereto, other judgments such as the Simić et al.707 and Ntawukulilyayo708 Trial 
Judgments and the Sikirica et al.709 Sentencing Judgment are instances where the differentiated 
approach has been considered in a rather crude form. Interestingly, these judgments extend over a 
period of 14 years and thus it does not appear that such distinction emerged or disappeared at a 
specific point. Rather, the principle is embraced as a recurring theme from the very beginning until 
now. As indicated above, there are, however, different nuances in its appearance. While it seems 
generally established that JCE is a form of commission liability,710 the principle may part the concept 
in some instances, where it is applied within the doctrine of JCE, which does not necessarily require 
physical contribution to the actus reus. This can be seen for instance in the Kvočka et al. Trial 
Judgment,711 where Miroslav Kvočka was convicted based on his membership in a JCE, but the Trial 
Chamber took into consideration that he was not convicted of ‘physically perpetrating crimes’.712 
Moreover, the cases differ in relation to the stage at which they address the principle within the 
broader sentencing stage. While it may in some instances be referred to when addressing the gravity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
705 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28). 
706 Bagaragaza Sentencing Judgment (n 689). 
707 Simić et al. Trial Judgment (n 23). 
708 Ntawukulilyayo Trial Judgment. 
709 Sikirica et al. (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-8-S (13 November 2001). 
710 See for instance (n 176) above. 
711 Kvočka et al. Trial Judgment (n 22). 
712 Ibid para 717.  
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the crime, as for instance in relation to Dragan Kolundzija in Sikirica et al.,713 the Kanyarukiga714 
Trial Judgments and the Simić Appeal Judgment,715 it may also be considered when discussing 
mitigating and aggravating factors,716 which are discussed in depth later in this chapter. A closer look 
at the judicial bench in pertinent cases reveals that it is of similar composition in some instances. In 
fact, the Appeals judicial bench in Krstić717 and Vasiljević718 was composed of almost the same judges, 
except one. Again, in Kvočka et al.,719 four of the five judges were Appeals judges in Vasiljević. In a 
similar vein, the composition of the Trial Chamber bench in Todorović720 conforms with the judges 
who composed the bench in Sikirica et al.721 Akin to that distribution, in the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin 
Appeal,722 the judicial bench was composed of three of the judges who were part of the judicial bench 
in the Simić 723 and Krstić 724 Appeals cases. Moreover, four of the judges which composed the bench 
in in the Krstić Appeal were also part of the judicial bench in the Babić Appeal725 and, except one, the 
judges in the former appeal also composed the bench in the Semanza Appeal.726 Of course, it can be 
argued that this could be down to mere coincidence but, conversely, it may be a factor contributing to 
the explanation why a principal accessory distinction is endorsed. In this context it seems crucial to 
scrutinise the sources upon which judges relied when embracing a principal accessory distinction, 
which has been done in the context of the sentencing framework later in this chapter.  
Judgments in this table may be divided horizontally into two groups, which vertically reflect varying 
degrees of the differentiated approach. The horizontal layer accommodates on the one hand those 
judgments, including statements, which clearly articulate a solid principle, inherently leading to 
mitigation and on the other hand, those cases which address a principal-accessory distinction primarily 
in the context of mitigating and aggravating factors (secondary horizontal layer). The latter 
emphasises first and foremost attributes such as “physical” and “direct”, which is meant to raise the 
degree of culpability and a concrete effect on the sentence is not expressly mentioned in most of the 
cases belonging to this secondary horizontal layer; however, it could be inferred, when read in context, 
considering that the intention of such discussion under a given heading is to address the gravity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Sikirica et al. Sentencing Judgment (n 709) para 241. 
714 Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2002-78-T (1 November 2001). 
715 Simić Appeal Judgment (n 125). 
716 See inter alia Muhimana Judgment and Sentence (n 683) Para 614; Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and 
Sentence (n 596) para 897 where the Trial Chamber considered as a mitigating factor that Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana did not ‘personally participate in these killings, nor was he found to have fired on refugees’; cf 
Ntakirutimana et al. Judgment and Sentence (n 596) para 912 where the Trial Chamber considered in relation to 
Gerard Ntakirutimana that the fact that he ‘he personally shot at Tutsi refugees and that he thus directly and 
personally contributed to the sheer death toll’ as aggravating factors.  
717 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28). 
718 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
719 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment (n 155). 
720 Todorović Sentencing Judgment (n 596). 
721 Sikirica et al. Sentencing Judgment (n 709). 
722 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment (n 30). 
723 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28). 
724 Simić Appeal Judgment (n 125). 
725 Babić Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (n 597). 
726 Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118). 
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offence and as such the culpability of the accused. Nevertheless, both “groups” can occur together. In 
some cases, for instance, it is emphasised that the accused was not a principal perpetrator when 
assessing the gravity of the offence, thus implying contextually a lesser degree of responsibility. In 
addition, the chamber may note at some other point in the judgment that ‘secondary or indirect forms 
of participation generally resulted in lower sentences’.727  
In the light of this discussion it is essential to clarify the relevant terminology. When interpreting the 
literal meaning of the wording “direct” and “indirect”, one could assume that the term “direct 
perpetrator” embraces only the physical perpetrator, whereas the term “indirect perpetrator” denotes 
all other forms of participation. However, while there is ample evidence in the jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc tribunals that indirect perpetration refers only to aiding and abetting, whereas direct perpetration 
denotes all other forms, such as instigating, ordering, planning, participation in a JCE and commission, 
as noted by the Appeals Chamber in Mrkšić and Šljivančanin,728 the ICTR Trial Chamber in Semanza 
pointed out that ‘the accused’s acts of complicity, aiding and abetting and instigating are crimes of 
indirect participation’.729 This subsumes instigation under the heading of indirect perpetration. This 
gradation of culpability, created by modes of liability, is expressed differently. Both tribunals 
generally tend to emphasise the “physical”, “active”, or “direct” involvement (or indirect and “non-
physical”730 nature respectively) when describing the specific criminal conduct, thereby mostly 
implying the high degree of culpability resulting from “hands-on” perpetration/commission. Indeed, 
Meernik and King observed in their empirical enquiry concerning the ICTY that those accused, where 
non-active participation (“not active participant”) was cited in mitigation, received an average 
sentence of 16.9 years, which was lower compared to those where it was not expressly cited as a 
mitigating circumstance.731 In addition to emphasising the “active participation” of a perpetrator in 
some instances, the ICTR articulates the “principle of gradation” in relation to modes of participation 
whereby it stresses in particular the high culpability of order givers and planners. In Ndindabahizi, the 
Trial Chamber asserted that: 
The Chamber has also considered the principle of gradation in sentencing, according to which the 
highest penalties are to be imposed upon those who planned or ordered atrocities, or those who 
committed crimes with particular zeal or sadism. Whether an accused is found guilty of genocide, 
of crimes against humanity or of violations of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol II 
thereto, the principle of gradation enables the Chamber to punish, deter, and consequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 One of many instances is Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 563. 
728 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment (n 30) para 407: ‘[T]he practice of the International Tribunal 
indicates that aiding and abetting is a lower form of liability than ordering, committing, or participating in a joint 
criminal enterprise and may as such attract a lesser sentence’. See also inter alia the Orić Trial Judgment (n 67) 
para 281: ‘[A]iding and abetting is commonly considered as a less grave mode of participation (…)’. See also 
van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility (n 4) 78.  
729 Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 557. 
730 See for example Prosecutor v Ntawukulilyayo (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-05-82-T (3 August 2010) para 
473. 
731 Meernik and King, ‘The Sentencing Determinants’ (n 70) 745. However, it should be noted that this empirical 
analysis was conducted in 2003 when only 27 judgments had been rendered. The mitigating circumstance “not 
active participant” was stated in the case of two convicted persons. 
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stigmatise the crimes considered at a level that corresponds to their overall magnitude and reflects 
the extent of suffering inflicted upon the victims.732 
Likewise, the Trial Chamber held inter alia in Simba, Serugendo and Karamera that ‘a sentence of 
life imprisonment is generally reserved for those who planned or ordered atrocities’.733 It is noticeable 
that this “principle” is almost in all of the pertinent cases phrased identical, corroborating the view 
that, in relation to the differentiated approach, judges rely overwhelmingly on precedent. Although the 
high culpability of order givers and planners has not been pointed out as extensively in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, it has been insinuated differently. In the Stakić Trial Judgment, the Trial 
Chamber noted that ‘the perpetrator behind the direct perpetrator, the perpetrator with white gloves – 
might deserve a higher penalty than the one who physically participated depending on the particular 
circumstance’.734 First, it should be recognised that this statement represents one of the few instances 
where a differentiated approach has been dismissed expressly and secondly, the terminological 
discrepancies can be noticed. While, as addressed above, the term “direct perpetration” has been held 
to embrace the modes participation in a JCE, commission, planning, ordering and instigating – the 
term “direct perpetrator” can and has also been held to be confined to the physical perpetrator. 
Thus, this Trial Chamber statement rather illustrates the discrepancy in relation to the hierarchal order 
of culpability reflected by the respective modes of individual criminal responsibility but at the same 
time it underlines the common approach i) to distinguish between different modes of liability; ii) to 
ascribe varying degrees of responsibility to such modes; and iii) which ultimately affects the sentence 
severity. It can therefore be observed that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals bears different 
facets of the differentiated approach: i) the classic differentiated approach in form of a principal 
accessory distinction, whereby the latter is punished less severely; and ii) a modified differentiated 
approach where direct participation is again divided and embraces those, which are considered to be 
more blameworthy than others, as for instance in the case of JCE, those who physically commit a 
crime, and particularly in relation to the ICTR, those who order or plan or commit an offence with 
specific zeal. 
Although the number of judgments expressly opposing a differentiated approach is rather scarce,735 
there are also cases in which a “modified” differentiated approach attracts attention. In the Tolimir736 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2001-71-I (15 July 2004) para 500. 
733 Simba Judgment and Sentence (n 181) para 434; Serugendo Judgment and Sentence (n 609) para 83; 
Prosecutor v Karamera et al. (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-44-T (2 February 2012) para 1720. The latter is 
not included in Table 3 above, as it does not seem that the differentiated approach was embraced at the 
sentencing stage, it rather seems like a general remark under the heading “Introduction and applicable law”. In 
addition to the above quotation, the Trial Chamber affirmed in all three of the above stated judgments that 
principal perpetrators attract more severe penalties with reference to the Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 
388. Notably, the principle is articulated identically. 
734 Prosecutor v Stakić Trial Judgment (n 23) para 918. 
735 See for instance, Gotovina et al. Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Judgment, 15 April 2011, para 2602: ‘(...) the 
Trial Chamber considers that Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač participated to a significant degree in the 
crimes, which constitutes an important factor when assessing the totality of their conduct. The fact that neither of 
them acted as principal perpetrator does not reduce their responsibility in any way’. However, it must be noted 
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Trial Judgment, when addressing the aggravating factors previously considered by the ICTY, the 
Chamber identified ‘the active and direct participation under Article 7(1) of the Statute if linked to a 
high-ranking position of command’.737 Accordingly, such direct perpetration merely seems to be a 
cumulative factor leading to a higher degree of culpability, albeit it is not entirely clear whether this 
quote is meant to differentiate between principal and secondary participation, or whether it is meant to 
distinguish between superior responsibility, entailing omission liability, as provided for in Article 7(3) 
on the one hand and all other forms of active wrongdoing established by Article 7(1), as aiding and 
abetting as a form of indirect participation is enumerated in Article 7(1). In any case, the sui generis 
nature of superior responsibility has been emphasised in the past. In the Orić Trial Judgment the 
Chamber noted that this ‘allows for an even greater flexibility in the determination of the sentence’.738 
Moreover, the Trial Chamber clarified in Hadžihasanović and Kubura739 that: 
(…) [T]he sui generis the nature of command responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute may 
justify the fact that the sentencing scale applied to those Accused convicted solely on the basis of 
Article 7(1) of the Statute, or cumulatively under Articles 7(1) and 7(3), is not applied to those 
convicted solely under Article 7(3), in cases where nothing would allow that responsibility to be 
assimilated or linked to individual responsibility under Article 7(1).740 
Hence, it appears that superior responsibility, which is sui generis, is viewed as a mode of liability, 
incurring a lesser degree of responsibility. As already indicated in other judgments, the Trial Chamber 
clarified in the Setako that ‘not every conviction for direct participation in genocide requires life 
imprisonment’.741 It may be argued that this statement denotes an implication towards the need of 
judicial discretion in this regard and – albeit very far-fetched – a statement against the differentiated 
approach in a wider sense approach. However, a closer look suggests that such “observation” does not 
run counter to a differentiated approach. Contrarily, it may as well show that direct perpetration 
indicates a high degree of culpability, although not every conviction based on direct perpetration must 
attract the severest penalty. In the light of the foregoing, it should be recalled that a differentiated 
approach does not require fixed penalties, corresponding with principal or accessorial liability 
respectively. Rather, it presupposes the distinction between principals and accessories, whereby the 
latter is regarded as less blameworthy, which is reflected in the final penalty in that the convicted 
person is entitled to mandatory mitigation. Accordingly, even such a statement as that rendered by the 
Trial Chamber in Setako opposes the view that Article 6(1) embraces a unitary system.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that this is not an intrinsic dismissal of the differentiated approach, as both of them were members of a JCE, 
which, as a form of commission, liability attracts in line with the differentiated approach harsher punishment. 
736 Prosecutor v Tolimir (Trial Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December 2012). 
737 Ibid para 1221. 
738 Orić Trial Judgment (n 67) para 724. 
739 Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović and Kubura (Trial Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006). 
740 Ibid para 2076. 
741 Prosecutor v Setako (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-04-81-T (25 February 2010) para 503. 
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3.2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
As the above analysis reveals, the appreciation of modes of liability and potential penological 
consequences attached thereto takes place under different headings throughout the sentencing process. 
While it can be observed that the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC generally follow the requirement to 
take recourse to national law, although rather briefly, one cannot deduce from sentencing judgments 
explicit references to a differentiated approach justified by reference to domestic law. Conversely, the 
SCSL on the other side provides an example of considering domestic law in relation to the relevance 
of modes of liability for punishment, but it did not ultimately follow it.742 Moreover, in accordance 
with the analyses in Chapter 1 and the above, it can be concluded that the SCSL clarified its stance in 
this regard, clearly expressing that ‘there is no hierarchy or distinction for sentencing purposes 
between forms of criminal participation’.743 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber negated the applicability 
of the frequently recited alleged “principle” that ‘aiding and abetting generally warrants a lesser 
sentence than other forms of criminal participation’ at the SCSL.744 Accordingly, it is obvious that in 
general there is a potential impact of international criminal law decisions on points of law on the 
practice of the SCSL. However, the Appeals Chamber has evaluated the principle and chosen to opt 
against it. Thus there is a conditional impact, but in terms of the legal weight attached to modes of 
liability in sentencing, the SCSL has clearly positioned itself by not following the frequently cited 
“principle”, according to which aiders and abettors are less blameworthy. Moreover, in the light of the 
above, it is not difficult to understand the criticisms levelled at the reasoning of judges in certain 
instances. It could be argued that the reliance on a not sufficiently scrutinised principle deriving from 
one precedent is particularly worrying. One may go as far as to criticise that some sources have been 
“blindly” cited in the absence of adequate and required scrutiny. For instance, the Vasiljević case – 
where a seemingly established principle was based on partially inadequate sources to justify a 
principal accessory distinction for the purpose of sentencing, was subsequently cited in numerous 
cases. It seems problematic that such reasoning is “transferred” to justify a principal-accessory 
distinction in subsequent cases. This approach could imply that a degree of “implicitness” is involved, 
which might be caused by the fact that a differentiated approach is firmly established in a large 
number of national legal systems – which is, after all, the origin of all judges’ education, practising at 
international courts and tribunals. Despite the above findings in relation to the analysis of 
jurisprudence, it should be recalled that the process of weighting modes of liability in a certain way, 
must not necessarily be obvious and expressly mentioned. Moreover, due to the fact that in the 
practice of international tribunals a single sentence is pronounced, it is difficult to extract the impact of 
modes of liability on the sentence, unless it is a) expressly mentioned, or b) can be deduced from a 
wording. The process of decision-making may include subconscious determinants, which will not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 Taylor Sentencing Judgment (n 594) paras 100, 101. 
743 Taylor Appeal Judgment (n 204) para 670. 
744 Ibid para 666. 
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traceable in a jurisprudential analysis, limiting the efficiency of this approach as these barriers remain 
in place. Thus it is helpful to conduct an empirical enquiry, which may allow an assessment and 
perhaps verification of such findings.  
 
3.3 THE INTERPRETATION OF DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY BY HYBRID TRIBUNALS 
 
The main characteristic and common feature of internationalised tribunals is their application of 
domestic law, whereby the degree of application can vary amongst them. This naturally results in 
more stability and foreseeability in relation to issues, which are not yet sufficiently established in 
international criminal justice. However, the fact that such tribunals also apply international criminal 
law and are generally heavily influenced by it, can result in the automatic transfer of issues influencing 
the criminal justice process in hybrid tribunals. It is therefore important to identify and examine 
whether such an impact is present and – if so – to what extent. The international criminal law term 
“gravity of the crime”, which is generally understood to comprise also the “form and degree of 
responsibility”, is found in a large number of judgments rendered by hybrid tribunals. Thus, although 
the same terminology is used, it is questionable if the term refers to categories of modes of liabilities, 
which lead to different legal results, or if they only refer to the specific conduct in relation to the 
responsibility of the accused.  
 
3.3.1 SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON & SUPREME IRAQI CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
 
Due to the lack of a sufficient number of judgments necessary for a jurisprudential analysis, the 
analysis of these three tribunals does not go beyond Chapter 2. The focus of the empirical analysis 
below mainly lies on the ad hoc tribunals and to a limited extend on the SCSL, ECCC and the ICC. In 
relation to the quantitative empirical enquiry it must be noted that only the WCCBiH, the East Timor 
Panels and the ad hoc tribunals are included, as they have rendered a number of judgments which may 
serve as the basis for potentially significant results.  
 
3.3.2 KOSOVO PANELS 
 
Access to judgments of the Kosovo Panels has been very limited. Therefore it has not been possible to 
analyse the practice of the Panels in relation to their approach to individual criminal responsibility in 
depth. However, in the Appeals case Krasniqi, Zyberaj and Kransiqi,745 the degree of liability was 
discussed in the context of different contributions of different members of a JCE. The appellants 
claimed that the judgment was unfair as each of the defendants received the same punishment of seven 
years and that the first judge had not taken ‘into consideration the different conducts, ages and the 
degree of the criminal responsibility’.746 Moreover, the appellants argued that the punishment was 
unfair, as the first judge had compared their case with ICTY judgments, which were, according to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 Selim Krasniqi, Bedri Zyberaj and Agron Krasniqi Appeal Verdict (n 290). 
746 Ibid 85. 
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appellants, ‘pronounced for more serious crimes’. 747 The Panel agreed with the first judge and held 
that the suffering inflicted upon the victims was grave; however, it also stated that, while reference to 
ICTY may provide a useful point of reference, it shall not be treated as ‘leading precedent’.748 The 
Panel then held in relation to the appellants inter alia that ‘the limits imposed by article 65 PCCK’ for 
the participation in the criminal association, which provides for mitigated punishment for attempt, 
aiders and members of criminal associations, had to be taken into consideration.749 Although it is 
difficult to deduce a certain approach, it becomes clear that the differentiated approach, embodied in 
the PCCK, may have influenced the approach of the panels, as the Panels expressly referred to Article 
65 PCCK, which stipulates that those who aid or are members in a criminal association shall receive 
‘no more than three-quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence’.  
This may only be an indication as no systematic application of the principle can be inferred from the 
above discussion of jurisprudence. 
 
3.3.3 EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
 
Sentencing at the ECCC is governed750 by the ECCC Agreement,751 the Internal Rules752 and the 
ECCC Law,753 which provide rather scarce guidance. Rule 98(5) provides: ‘5. If the Accused is found 
guilty, the Chamber shall sentence him or her in accordance with the Agreement, the ECCC Law and 
these IRs. However, these instruments do not clarify whether ‘sentencing before the ECCC is 
governed by international or Cambodian legal rules, or some combination of each’,754 comparable to 
Article 24 of the ICTY Statute755 or Article 23 of the ICTR Statute respectively. Hence, the Trial 
Chamber acknowledged in Duch that due to the diverse sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals and 
the SCSL, which are different from that of the ICC, no uniform guideline can be deduced from current 
practice.756 It thus concluded that ‘there is no single international sentencing regime directly applicable 
before the ECCC’.757  
 
In relation to the direct application of Cambodian law, the Trial Chamber stated that it ‘considers that 
the international nature of the crimes for which the Accused has been convicted, and the uncertainties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747 Ibid. 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid 62 (Selim Krasniqi), 71 (Bedri Zyberaj), 86 (Agron Krasniqi). 
750 See inter alia Article 10 of the ECCC Agreement for applicable penalties: ‘The maximum penalty for 
conviction for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be life imprisonment’. 
Article 39 (new) of the ECCC Law: ‘Those who have committed any crime as provided in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 8 shall be sentenced to a prison term from five years to life imprisonment (...)’. 
751 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.  
752 ECCC Internal Rules (Rev 9). 
753 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 
27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). 
754 Duch Trial Judgment (n 211) para 575. 
755 Ibid fn 996. 
756 Ibid para 576. 
757 Ibid. 
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and the complexities evident in the evolution of Cambodian criminal law from the 1956 Penal Code 
onwards, rules out direct application of Cambodian sentencing provisions’.758 As regards the gravity of 
the crime committed, the ECCC seems to be influenced by both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. In 
the Duch Trial Judgment, the Trial Chamber stated that ‘“[i]nternational jurisprudence” has 
established that the gravity of the crime committed is the “litmus test for the appropriate sentence”, 
and requires “consideration of the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree 
of participation of the [a]ccused in the crime”’.759 Moreover, it quoted Rule 45(1)(c) of the ICC’s RPE 
and Article 96 of the 2009 Cambodian Penal Code.760 According to the latter, ‘[t]he court pronounces 
penalties based on seriousness [sic] of the penalty and circumstances of the offence, of personality 
[sic] of the accused, of his/her mental state of mind, resources and burdens, motives as well as his/her 
conduct after committing the offence, in particular towards the victim’.761  
 
It is notable that no reference is made to the degree of individual responsibility. In relation to the 
mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber made reference to Rule 145(2)(a) of the ICC RPEs. In sum, it 
can be said that, from the limited judgments available, no approach in either direction can be deduced.  
 
3.3.4 SPECIAL PANELS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES762 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the principle of individual criminal responsibility is provided for 
in section 14.3 of Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction 
over Serious Criminal Offences (Regulation 2000/15). This mirrors Article 25 of the Rome Statute. 
Section 10.1(a) of Regulation 2000/15, which is the only sentencing provision of Reg 2000/15, does 
not provide much information in relation to the sentencing process. It lays down the applicable 
penalties as well as the factors which have to be taken into account when meting out the sentence.763 
According to section 10.2, when imposing a sentence the penal shall consider the ‘gravity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 Ibid para 577. 
759 Ibid para 582. 
760 Ibid. 
761 2009 Criminal Code.  
762 Hereinafter referred to as Special Panels. 
763 10.1 Reg 2000/15: ‘A panel may impose one of the following penalties on a person convicted of a crime 
specified under sections 4 to 7 of the present regulation: 
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 25 years. In determining 
the terms of imprisonment for the crimes referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the present regulation, the panel shall 
have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of East Timor and under 
international tribunals; for the crimes referred to in sections 8 and 9 of the present regulation, the penalties 
prescribed in the respective provisions of the applicable Penal Code in East Timor, shall apply. 
(b) A fine up to a maximum of US$ 500,000.  
(c) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from the crime, without prejudice 
to the rights of bona fide third parties.  
10.2 In imposing the sentences, the panel shall take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 10.3 In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the panel 
shall deduct the time, if any, previously spent in detention due to an order of the panel or any other court in East 
Timor (for the same criminal conduct). The panel may deduct any time otherwise spent in detention in 
connection with the conduct (underlying the crime)’. 
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offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person’. However, more information 
regarding the sentencing process can be extracted from the jurisprudence of the Special Panels. In 
Umbertus Ena and Carlos Ena, the Panel stated:  
105. According to Sec 10.1 (a) UR 200/15, for the crimes referred to in section 5, in determining 
the terms of imprisonment for those crimes, the Panel shall have recourse to the general practice 
regarding prison sentences in the courts of East Timor and under international tribunals. “In 
imposing the sentences, the panel shall take into account such factors as the gravity of the 
offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person” (Sec 10.2). 
108. The Panel considered all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances upheld both by the 
practices of East Timorese courts in applying the Indonesian Penal Code (IPC) and the standards 
derived from the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Tribunals for 
Rwanda, apart from those provided for under UR-200/15 as well as under general principles of 
law.764 
Similarly it was held that:  
The Panel considered all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances upheld both by the 
practices of East Timorese courts in applying the Penal Code of Indonesia (KUHP) and the 
standards derived from the ICTY and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, apart from those 
provided for under UR-2000/15 as well as under general principles of law.765  
Accordingly, the following sources for assessment of mitigating and aggravating features are 
consulted by the tribunal: (i) jurisprudence of the East Timorese courts, (ii) the Indonesian Penal 
Code, (iii) UNTAET Regulation No.2000 and (iv) general principles of law. 
First, it can be said that section 10.2 is not exhaustive and thus a list of specific mitigating 
circumstances can be found in the jurisprudence, and secondly, due to the fact that the Panel can apply 
the Indonesian Penal Code, the ‘standards derived from the ad hoc tribunals’ and general principles of 
law, it is possible that both approaches in relation to a principle accessory distinction are applied. As 
described in Chapter 2, Indonesian criminal law provides for a differentiated approach by virtue of 
Article 57 of the Indonesian Penal Code. According to Article 57(1), ‘The maximum of the basic 
punishments [sic] imposed upon the crime in complicity shall be mitigated by one third’. Furthermore, 
according to section 2, accessories are entitled to receive a maximum of 15 years, if the crime in 
question gives rise to life imprisonment or capital punishment. Due to the fact that the law on 
individual criminal responsibility is not discussed in detail in most judgments, it is frequently not even 
clear based on which mode the defendant was convicted, because the legal provision (section 14.3) 
related to individual criminal responsibility is merely quoted and not subsumed at all.766 Nevertheless, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 Prosecutor v Umbertus Ena and Carlos Ena (Judgment) Case No. 5/2002, SPSC (23 March 2003) paras 105, 
108. 
765 Joni Marques et al. Trial Judgment (n 221) para 981. 
766 See for instance Prosecutor v Alarico Mesquita et al. (Judgment) Case No. 28/2003, SPSC (6 December 
2004), see also the indictment of this case, which does not specify the specific mode of responsibility with which 
the accused are charged. Despite the fact that the modes of responsibility are not discussed in appropriate depth 
in the majority of cases, the panels discussed in the Anton Lelan Sufa Verdict the situation when an individual is 
charged with superior and individual responsibility, where it held that: ‘(...) when certain facts of the case 
support both types of liability, one of them cannot simply be “characterized” as another or “subsumed” under the 
provision of the other, because this would imply that the Court has some sort of discretion to choose one or the 
other, although this would violate one of the basic principles of criminal law (...). Rather, in a first stage, it has to 
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one can observe that the Panels resort to domestic law in relation to certain areas of law – for instance 
in relation to maximum penalties.767 Despite the fact that Indonesian criminal law opts for a 
differentiated approach, one cannot assume that this approach is invoked by the Special Panels, at least 
not expressly. In the Anton Lela judgment, the Panels held that there was a specific hierarchy of modes 
of liability established in section 14.3 when discussing the circumstance where an individual is 
charged with both, individual and superior responsibility: 
(…) Since a superior, who orders a crime (Sec14.3 (b) Reg 2000/15) must also be regarded as 
committing it “through another person” in the sense of Sec 14.3 (a) Reg 2000/15, and since the 
various forms of individual responsibility enumerated in Sec 14.3 have a distinct ranking – from 
the most direct form of commission in lit. (a) to the most indirect form of participation in lit (d) – 
the more indirect form of responsibility incurred for the same conduct must be subsidiary to a 
more direct one, if violation of the principle ne bis in idem is to be avoided (…).768 
The approach to distinguish modes of liability based on a hierarchy may suggest that the respective 
mode(s) of liability an individual is convicted for has implications on the sentence. However, in none 
of the accessible cases have the Special Panels resorted to the Indonesian Penal Code in relation to the 
punishment of principals and accessories. Considering that a differentiated approach is followed in 
Indonesian law, it is striking that no relevance seems to be paid to a principal-accessory distinction or 
its relevance for sentencing purposes. Thus, a quantitative study may reveal more. 
 
3.3.5 THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
The CC BiH provides for general sentencing principles in Article 48. According to the sentencing 
determinants enumerated in Article 48(1) are (i) extenuating circumstances; (ii) aggravating 
circumstances; (iii) the degree of criminal liability; (iv) the motive of perpetrating the offence; (v) the 
degree of danger or injury of the protected object; (vi) circumstances in which the offences was 
committed;, (vii) past conduct of the perpetrator; (viii) personal situation and conduct after the 
commission of the offence; and (ix) other circumstances related to the personality of the perpetrator. 
In a large number of judgments, those statutory considerations are discussed under different sections, 
but not exactly as listed above. Instead, most factors are addressed slightly intertwined in that 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are discussed in the context of the other remaining headings.  
Thus, many of the sentencing parts of judgments rendered by the WCCBiH comprise a specific 
structure, which includes the discussion of statutory considerations, which are then ‘used in terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be acknowledged that both types of responsibility exist, and in a second stage it must be decided whether they 
continue to co-exist or whether one is displaced by the other’. Prosecutor v Anton Lelan Sufa (Judgment) Case 
No 4a/2003, SPSC (25 November 2004) para 21. 
767 Alarico Mesquita et al. Judgment (n 766) 30, where the panel made reference to Article 65 of the Indonesian 
Criminal Code in relation to maximum penalties, which reads: ‘The maximum of this punishment shall be the 
collective total of the maximum punishments imposed of the acts, but not exceeding one third beyond the most 
severe maximum punishment’. 
768 See Anton Lelan Sufa Judgment (n 766) para 22. In Januario da Costa Mateus Punef aka Neno Ulan 
(Judgment) Case No 22/2003, SPSC (25 April 2005) where the panel discussed the situation when the mode of 
liability is not specified. 
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances’.769 These considerations are in rather detailed sentencing 
judgments expressed in the following order: i) the degree of liability; ii) the conduct of the perpetrator 
prior to the offence, at or around the time of the offence; and since the offence iii) the motive; and iv) 
the personality of the perpetrator.770 In the Nenad Tanasković First Instance Verdict,771 the Panel 
explained:  
These considerations can be used in terms of aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the 
sentence, as the facts warrant. The point of these considerations is to assist the Panel in 
determining the sentence that is not only necessary and proportionate for the purposes and 
considerations already calculated in connection with the act itself and the effect on the community 
(…).772  
More specifically, the Panel addressed “double counting”, inter alia in the first Instance Verdict of 
Željko Lelek,773 where it stated under the heading “motive” that ‘motive in this case is synonymous 
with the intent to discriminate on ethnic and religious grounds and has already been calculated as an 
element of the offence, and therefore will not be calculated again as an additional factor of 
aggravation’.774 In the context of a principal-accessory distinction for sentencing purposes, the “degree 
of liability” appears on first sight particularly significant.775 Although – under this heading – the 
specific mode of liability may be addressed, it goes beyond or rather omits a discussion relating to 
specific actus reus and mens rea requirements of a pertinent mode, by addressing individual nuances 
of behaviour throughout the commission/participation in the offence.776 One may therefore draw a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 Prosecutor v Nenad Tanasković (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR/06/165 (24 August 2007) 81. 
770 See for example, Nenad Tanasković First Instance Verdict (n 769) 81 specifically regarding “degree of 
liability”: ‘The degree of liability in this case is a mitigating factor. The evidence establishes that the Accused 
was not a decision-maker, but rather a soldier of low rank, carrying out orders given to him, and who did not 
devise any of the crimes in which he willingly participated. That having been said, it is clear that the Accused 
was permitted some degree of autonomy regarding the manner in which he executed his orders, choosing to be 
violent and aggressive in his actions. However, as the Prosecutor pointed out in his closing argument, given the 
sentencing limitations within which we are constrained by law, our sentence must recognize that there are others 
whose responsibility was greater and for whom greater sentences should be reserved’. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Prosecutor v Željko Lelek (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR/06/202 (23 May 2008). 
774 Ibid 55; see also Prosecutor v Petar Mitrović (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/24-1 (4 February 
2009) 137 under the heading of “Degree of Liability” in relation to the gravity of the crime and aggravating 
circumstances. See also Prosecutor v Momir Savić (Second Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KRZ-07/478 (19 
February 2010) 32: ‘The fact that victims of the actions of the Accused were civilians, who mainly belonged to 
one ethnicity, does not represent an aggravating circumstance, and contrary to the appeal averments of the 
Prosecutor, the fact which is decisive for establishing the important elements of the criminal offence cannot at 
the same time be considered as an aggravating circumstance (discriminatory intent)’. 
775 It is striking, however, that the pertinent mode of liability is not always precisely articulated. In some 
judgments Article 180(1), which is similar to 6(1) / 7(1), is merely cited along with the word “committed”. In 
contrast, in other cases, 180(1) is the only reference to individual criminal responsibility, despite the fact that the 
court found that the accused aided and abetted. Thus it is not always clear, which mode of liability the accused is 
found guilty of due to the lack of specification. However, discussion of this issue would go beyond the scope of 
this work. See for instance Prosecutor v Gordan Đurić (First Instance Verdict) X-KR-08/549-2 (10 September 
2009). 
776 See for instance, Milorad Trbić First Instance Verdict (n 260) para 858: ‘The Accused (...) is directly 
responsible for the crimes he committed as part of a joint criminal enterprise to destroy all the Muslim men 
brought into this area of responsibility during the period following the fall of Srebrenica. The Trial Panel has 
found some significant mitigating factors as well as aggravating factors. First, it is clear from the evidence that 
he was not involved in the planning of these crimes at the initial stage. Secondly, he did agree to cooperate to a 
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comparison to the discussion of “individual circumstances” in the sentencing practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals.  
The jurisprudence of the War Crimes Chamber does not allow for a clear general answer as to whether 
this “heading” embraces the legal classification with implications on the sentence or whether it merely 
addresses the perpetrator’s specific conduct (although of course both are possible). Some cases include 
a discussion, which is primarily focused on the rank or in the wider sense the influence777 of the 
perpetrator, his specific role and related factors, while others address the pertinent mode of liability 
expressly and then specific circumstances.778 Although the specific content of the discussion under this 
heading cannot be confined to one or the other, it can be said that, generally, a discussion restricted to 
the pertinent mode of liability and its role in the sentencing framework is mostly not present. For the 
purpose of modes of liability, the heading “degree of liability” should not be overemphasised for two 
reasons: first, some judgments are not structured accordingly and thus this heading may be absent; 
secondly, even if it is present, it may not contain information as to the impact of a pertinent mode of 
liability on the sentencing process. Irrespectively, one can observe that the Panel refers in a number of 
cases to the importance of the ‘degree of liability’ in the sentencing process, although one cannot 
deduce that a mandatory principal accessory distinction is in place. Nevertheless, as observed in the 
previous chapter, the absence of an express distinction between principals and accessories in relation 
to sentencing must not necessarily imply that a categorisation into either direct perpetrator or 
accessory cannot augment or lessen the penalty. Instead, more culpability may be allotted to a direct 
perpetrator by counting physical perpetration as an aggravating circumstance. Similarly, in the Andrun 
Nikola,779 where the degree of liability was also addressed as an aggravating factor, the War Crimes 
Chamber held that ‘the high degree of criminal responsibility’ was an aggravating factor.780 In Pedrag 
Bastah and Goran Višković, the Panel ‘took into account as an aggravating circumstance the fact that 
the accused, in the majority of situations, were direct perpetrators of the actions of which they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain level with the ICTY investigators. To the extent that he cooperated honestly he assisted in adding to the 
understanding of what took place as well as to the understanding of his role and his level of accountability’. 
777 See for instance for a discussion of the rank, Prosecutor v Petar Mitrović (First Instance Verdict) Case No. 
X-KR-05/24-1 (20 July 2008) 137: ‘The Accused was a Special Police officer, trained in both combat and police 
work. He had no role in the command structure. As a Special Police officer at the time of the offense he had an 
obligation to obey the law and protect civilians in his custody. However, that dereliction of duty is subsumed in 
the greater crime of genocide, the gravity of which has already been calculated’. See also Prosecutor v Marko 
Radić et al. (Second Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/139 (9 March 2011) 301: ‘(…) the Panel concluded 
that Marko Radić participated in the establishment of the Vojno camp, and although he is not convicted under 
the command responsibility it should be noted that he was de facto superior to the personnel of the Bojno camp 
(…)’; Nenad Tanasković First Instance (n 769) 81: ‘The degree of liability in this case is a mitigating factor. The 
evidence establishes that the Accused was not a decision maker, but rather a soldier of a low rank, carrying out 
orders given to him, and who did not devise any of the crimes in which he willingly participated (…)’. 
778 See inter alia Milorad Trbić First Instance Verdict (n 260) para 858: ‘The Accused, Milorad, is directly 
responsible for the crimes he committed as part of a joint criminal enterprise to destroy all the Muslim men 
brought into his area of responsibility during the period following the fall of Srebrenica. The Trial Panel has 
found some significant mitigating as well as aggravating factors’. 
779 Prosecutor v Andrun Nikola (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/42 (14 December 2006). 
780 Ibid. 
	   155 
found guilty’.781 Conversely, indirect perpetration may count as a mitigating circumstance. In Marko 
Samardžija, the Panel stated: ‘In meting out the penalty the Court considered all the circumstances 
referred to in Article 48 of CC BiH influencing [sic] type and length of penalty. So, the Court 
considered, as mitigating circumstances, the age of the Accused, he is 70, the fact that he is a family 
man, the fact that he has not violated the law so far, and the fact that his individual criminal 
responsibility in the perpetration of the said criminal offense consisted of accessory’.782 However, 
there are some instances, such as the Maktouf case and Pelek and Savić, where the Panel expressed 
that mitigation is available for accessories with direct or indirect reference to Article 31(1):  
In individualizing the sentences, the Panel also took into account Article 31(1) of the CC BiH 
which prescribes that the person who intentionally helps another to perpetrate a criminal offence 
may be punished by a reduced punishment. Therefore, the Panel imposed on the accused Pekez a 
more lenient punishment in relation to the accused Savić, having found that the imposed sentences 
are appropriate to the extent of criminal liability of each Accused individually.783 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Appeals Panel held in the Petar Mitrović, Second Instance 
Verdict that the accused was liable as an accessory as opposed to a co-perpetrator and reduced the 
sentence from 38 years to 28.784 Moreover, in the Todorović (Vaso) First Instance Verdict, where the 
Panel determined that the accused was liable as an accessory under Article 31 CC BiH,785 it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Prosecutor v Predrag Bastah and Goran Višković (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/122 (4 
February 2010) 102. 
782 Prosecutor v Marko Samardžija (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-05/07 (3 November 2006) 39; see 
also Abduladhim Maktouf Second Instance Verdict (n 252) 25. 
783 See Chapter 2, Mirko Pekez and Milorad Savić Second Instance Verdict (n 250) 177, where the panel 
considered Article 31(1) CC BiH when meting out the sentence. Article 31(1): ‘Whoever intentionally helps 
another to perpetrate a criminal offence shall be punished as if he himself perpetrated such offence, but the 
punishment may be reduced’. See Abduladhim Maktouf Second Instance Verdict (n 252) 18: ‘Deciding on type 
and duration of punishment the Panel was guided by general rules for meting out the penalty referred to in 
Article 48(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH, considering the circumstances influencing to impose heavier or 
lenient punishment. The Panel took into consideration the degree of criminal responsibility of the Accused and 
the fact that he assisted in commission of the criminal offence and that the Criminal Code of BiH includes 
possibility of more lenient punishment for accessory in commission of criminal offenses. The Panel also 
considered concrete contribution of the Accused to the commission of the criminal offense (...). Considering the 
degree of criminal responsibility of the Accused and consequences of the criminal offense, and considering the 
mitigating circumstances in favour of the Accused, the Panel applied the provision on reduction of punishment 
and reduced the sentence to the maximum extent possible (…)’. See also Prosecutor v Abduladhim Maktouf 
(First Instance Verdict) Case No. K-127/04 (1 July 2005) 25, 26, where the panel considered the accessory role 
when addressing mitigating circumstances, expressly referring to Article 31(1) CC BiH. See also on Article 31, 
Prosecutor v Veiz Bjelić (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-07/430-1 (28 March 2008) 19: ‘Assessing all 
the circumstances on the part of the accused (both aggravating and extenuating) as well as the general range of 
punishment from the concluded guilty plea agreement, and applying Article 49(1)(b) of the CC BiH, the Court 
has imposed a 5 (five)-year prison sentence on the accused for the criminal offense of War Crimes against 
Civilians referred to in Article 173(1)(c) and (e) in conjunction with Article 180(1) of the CC BiH, and the same 
sentence for the criminal offense of War Crimes against Prisoner of War referred to in Article 175(1)(a) and (b) 
in conjunction with Article 31 of the CC BiH, all in conjunction with Article 31 of the CC BiH, all in 
conjunction with Article 180(1) of the sentence for the criminal offenses at issue (the legal minimum is 10 
years), pursuant to Article 150(1)(a) of the CC BiH. The Court assesses that the individually established 
punishments are criminal sanctions adequate and proportionate to the gravity of the criminal offenses and the 
degree of criminal liability of the accused, who is perpetrator of these offenses’. 
784 Prosecutor v Predrag Kujundžić (Second Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KRZ-07/442 (4 October 2010) paras 
232-236. 
785 However, beforehand the panel acknowledged the mitigation available to accessories: ‘An accessory to a 
crime, who intentionally helps another to perpetrate a criminal offence, may have the punishment reduced 
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emphasised that ‘[a]s an aider and abettor in deportation and murder, because he undertook those 
actions with direct intent the Accused bears a high degree of criminal liability’.786 
It is not difficult to discern from the above discussion that a variety of approaches exists. While some 
judgments reveal an approach which closely resembles a differentiated approach, other judgments 
comprise a unitary approach. This once again demonstrates that a sentencing framework which 
provides for discretionary mitigation, by virtue of pertinent criminal law provisions, always leaves 
room for one or the other approach, thus allowing for discrepancies. What can be discerned is that no 
noticeable references are made to the law of the ad hoc tribunals when it comes to the role of modes of 
liability in the sentencing framework. This indicates that the law of the ad hoc tribunals has not 
heavily influenced, if at all, the practice of the War Crimes Chambers in relation to role of modes of 
liability in the sentencing process.787  
In conclusion, in view of the above discussion, it appears that there is a preference for a differentiated 
approach at the ad hoc tribunals, while the SCSL and lately also the ICC opt more for a unitary 
approach. Although such tendencies can be observed, controversial approaches are still present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Article 31(1) CC BiH). Article 31(2) CC BiH provides examples of accessorial conduct in helping the 
perpetrators of a criminal offence. Relevantly to the facts of this case, accessorial conduct includes, in particular, 
“removing obstacles to the perpetration of a criminal offence” and “supplying the perpetrator with the means of 
committing the offence”. The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, from the statement and testimony of 
Vaso Todorović himself, that his conduct amounted to an accessory to the crime of a Crime against Humanity’. 
786 Prosecutor v Vaso Todorović (First Instance Verdict) Case No. X-KR-06/180-1 (22 October 2008) 27. 
787 Although in 2002, the consultants Peter Bach, Kjell Björnberg, John Ralston and Almiro Rodriguez, who 
were appointed to identify the issues relating to the future of domestic war crimes prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Consultants’ Report to the Office of the High Representative, The Future of Domestic War Crimes 
Prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (May 2002) addressed in M Bohlander, see below), had initially opined 
that ‘the jurisprudence of the ICTY should be persuasive authority in procedural, as well as criminal matters, in 
the interpretation of legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina courts on all levels’, later realised that ‘an obligation 
for local courts to follow the jurisprudence of the Tribunal’ was ‘completely impossible’. Hence the 
recommendation was instead that ‘the courts should take into account the jurisprudence of the Tribunal’. M 
Bohlander, ‘Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prosecution from the International Tribunals to 
Domestic Courts’ (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum, 59, 78. The report was also cited by M Bohlander, see 66 (fn 
25). 
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PART II 
 
3.4 QUANTITATIVE STUDIES AND THE MODES OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
 
As described further above, a ‘jurisprudential’ analysis alone may not accurately reflect the impact of 
liability labels on the sentencing process if no express reference is made in this regard. A 
differentiated approach may not be visible when examining the chain of reasoning of judges during the 
evaluation of sentencing factors throughout the sentencing process, if it is not expressly articulated 
that this approach is taken. Moreover, a certain approach may be opted for subconsciously by 
ascribing more (or less) culpability to a certain mode of liability, which will inevitably be reflected in 
the sentence. The latter may only be verified by means of quantitative studies. To date there are a few 
quantitative studies which have taken different positions in relation to the impact of modes of liability 
on the sentence.788  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, King and Meernik, Ewald, and D’Ascoli distinguish between individuals 
found guilty under Articles 7(1) or/and 7(3) respectively. To the knowledge of the author, only Holá 
and others distinguish between each mode of liability in pertinent studies. Moreover, these findings 
are confined to the sentencing practice of both ad hoc tribunals, or only to the ICTY. Meernik and 
King found that only a marginal difference exists in relation to the punishment of those convicted 
under a mode enumerated in 7(1) and those held liable as superiors.789  
 
In contrast, Ewald observes almost seven years later that the average sentence of those whose 
conviction is based on superior responsibility under 7(3) is lower.790 According to D’Ascoli, the 
modes of liability under 7(1)/6(1) and/or 7(3)/6(3) as well as the form – be it direct or indirect 
participation – do not appear to be significant for sentencing purposes.791 Holá and others, who inter 
alia statistically examined the ICTY sentencing practice by conducting multiple regression based on 
data collected up to August 2008, observe that, at the ICTY, superiors receive the lowest sentences, 
followed by aiders and abettors and then members in a JCE (first instance).792 Moreover, their findings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 See for instance: Meernik and King, ‘The Sentencing Determinants’ (n 70); Meernik and King, ‘The 
Effectiveness of International Law and the ICTY’ (n 70); Holá, Smeulers and Bijleveld ‘Is ICTY Sentencing 
Predictable?’ (n 33); Ewald (n 70); D’Ascoli (n 70); Jodoin (n 70); Meernik ‘Sentencing Rationales and Judicial 
Decision Making’ (n 70); Holá, Smeulers and Bijleveld ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures‘(n 70); Holá 
and others ‘Consistency of International Sentencing’ (n 70). 
789 Meernik and King, ‘The Sentencing Determinants’ (n 70) 738. 
790 Ewald (n 70). 
791 D’Ascoli (n 70) 260. 
792 Holá and others, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable?’ (n 33) 91. See also for numerical analysis of ICTR and 
ICTY sentencing practice by Holá and others: Holá and others, ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures‘(n 
70) 429. This analysis (comparative and analytical) was conducted on sentences rendered by the ICTY and 
ICTR. The authors compared the median sentences for each tribunal separately. The findings revealed that while 
at the ICTY the lowest and second lowest sentences are received by superiors and aiders and abettors 
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reveal that on appeal the lowest sentences are also received by superiors followed by those convicted 
based on JCE.793 Aiders and abettors only receive the third lowest sentences.794  
 
3.4.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
Due to the fact that the sentencing process is influenced by a number of factors cumulatively, it is 
impossible to determine the specific value of each separate sentencing factor for the purpose of 
imposing a sentence. Regression analysis is a statistical tool which allows the examination of the 
impact of one or more factors on a specific outcome.795 Thus, regression allows a determination of the 
impact of individual sentencing factors (independent variables) on the sentence (dependent variable). 
The assessment of the relationship of modes of liability and sentence severity was carried out in two 
steps. Dichotomous data were coded with 0 and 1 while all other categorical data were coded 
consecutively starting with 1 as value.  
 
First, multiple regression was used in order to analyse data extracted from judgments rendered by the 
ad hoc tribunals, the WCCBiH and the Special Panels of East Timor. In a second step, a mixed model 
analysis was used for a more in-depth analysis of the sentencing predictors of the ad hoc tribunals. All 
data, subject to this study, are based on written versions of judgments (Trial and Appeal),796 published 
on the websites of the tribunals, with a few exceptions where cases were not accessible for various 
reasons.  
	  
3.4.2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Multiple regression analysis predicts one dependent variable from a number of independent or 
explanatory variables. This method seems particularly adequate ‘to the analysis of data about 
competing theories for which there are several possible explanations for the relationships among a 
number of explanatory variables’.797 Due to the intention to examine how modes of liability correlate 
with the sentence length, a number of factors, which are widely considered as sentencing 
determinants, have been included. 
 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
respectively, at the ICTR those convicted based on JCE receive the shortest sentences, followed by planners. 
Aiders and abettors receive the third lowest sentences according to their fndings. 
793 Holá and others, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable?’ (n 33) 91. 
794 Ibid. 
795 Demographic Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices: An Update of the Booker Report’s Multivariate 
Regression Analysis, United States Sentencing Commission (March 2010) 4. 
796 Up to January 2014. 
797 D L Rubinfeld, ‘Reference Guide on Multiple Regression’ in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3rd 
edn Federal Judicial Center, 2011) 303, 305. 
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3.4.2.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
The independent variables in this analysis are those which are widely accepted to constitute 
determinants within the international sentencing process.798 In the first analysis the dependent variable 
is the length of the sentence, while the independent variables are: (i) number of counts; (ii) category of 
crimes; (iii) mode of liability; (iv) number of mitigating factors; (v) number of aggravating factors; 
(vi) guilty plea; and (vii) the political/military/social rank/influence of an individual. Accordingly 
these factors were extracted for all individual cases.  
 
3.4.3 MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
A second analysis (multilevel analysis) subsequently allows for a more in-depth statistical analysis, as 
it provides the advantage that each mode can be analysed separately at a different level. Statistically 
speaking, a comparison from regression to mixed model is not possible, because in mixed models 
additional variables were added therefore creating a new model without any connection to the 
regression. However, as is seen below, when evaluating the findings of each analysis, technical 
considerations may allow for comparison in the wider sense. 
 
3.4.3.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
New sets of data were created by collecting and coding additional information relating to the 
composition of the bench and the type of opinion. Due to the increase of observations per convicted 
perpetrator (three per trial case and five per appeal case respectively), as each judge’s decision was 
coded separately, the N for multilevel analysis substantially increased to 579.799 Moreover, the 
instance was coded as an additional independent variable (trial/appeal). Finally, the information was 
coded and included in the sets of data. Akin to the first analysis, mixed model analysis is therefore 
based on dependent and independent variables, whereby the latter additionally contains the individual 
judges’ decisions and the instance. The dependent variable is again the sentence.  
 
3.4.4 REPRESENTATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The analyses were carried out specifying the length of the sentence in months and accordingly each 
diagram and each table reflects the respective length of the sentence (independent variable) in months. 
However, for ease of understanding and to avoid confusion, the months have been converted into 
years throughout the evaluation of the findings of these studies. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 Ibid. 
799 Akin to multilevel analysis, decisions which were phrased ambiguously in relation to the modes of liability 
charged, have been left out. 
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3.4.5 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
This work bears problems of statistical nature, which induced specific tactical considerations. It has 
not been possible to code each mode of liability separately (eg planning, ordering, committing etc), as, 
in cases where a perpetrator is convicted based on several counts, each of them is normally charged 
with a specific mode of liability, leading to the result that perpetrators are frequently convicted based 
on a combination of various liability modes. Thus, a high number of “mixed liability groups” required 
codification. However, because some “combinations” of modes of liability charged only appear in a 
small number of cases, the overall appearance of this specific mode (or combination of modes) is too 
scarce to allow for significant results against the backdrop of the number of data sets (individuals 
sentenced by the tribunals). In any case, the number of mixed groups would have been above 20, 
rendering such results more or less confusing. Therefore, this study has attempted to circumvent the 
problem by creating groups, subsuming either one or more modes of liability under those groups.800  
Initially, the categorisation of modes of liability was undertaken as follows: (i) aiding and abetting 
(A&A) as a mode of indirect perpetration; (ii) commission as a form of “hands-on” perpetration; (iii) 
JCE, which covers the concept of co-perpetration; (iv) all combinations of direct perpetration, namely 
commission planning/instigating/ordering/commission/JCE; (v) a combination of forms of direct and 
indirect perpetration, save for commission and JCE alone, as the combination of those two is covered 
by categories 2 and 3; (vi) superior responsibility; (vii) superior responsibility combined with indirect 
perpetration; (viii) superior responsibility combined with direct perpetration; and (ix) superior 
responsibility combined with direct and indirect forms of participation.  
 
However, as is seen below, this categorisation did not lead to significant results and thus further 
narrower groups had to be created (see Table 5). Moreover, it has been taken into consideration that 
the number of cases included from each tribunal varies. In relation to the ICTR, the WCCBiH and the 
SPSC, it can be said at the outset that the number of cases may be statistically too small to allow for 
separate analyses of each tribunal. A fortiori, a distinction between trial and appeal judgments of each 
institution was impossible. Moreover, due to the imbalance of judgments rendered, the findings may 
be influenced to a greater extent by one or the other.801  
 
All judgments rendered up to January 2014 by the ad hoc tribunals have been included for regression 
analysis. While the ICTY (N=109) has rendered more judgments than the ICTR (N=57) and thus may 
play a more dominant role, the lengthier sentences, and the high number of life sentences (considering 
the high number of genocide convictions, particularly compared to the ICTY) imposed by the ICTR 
may also increase the average sentence. Moreover, judgments rendered by the WCCBiH (N=92) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 Judgments where the modes of liability charged were not specified have been left out.  
801 Or in relation to the hybrid tribunals. 
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SPSC (N=32) have been included to the extent accessible.802 Hence, the dataset is inevitably 
imbalanced. Other disparities, such as jurisdictional and procedural peculiarities characterising 
different hybrid tribunals apply particularly to the regression analysis involving them. The main 
differences in this regard derive from their hybrid nature, denoting a strong national element, but they 
also concern the nature of the crimes tried and characteristics of the perpetrators (usually lower 
ranked) and must be recalled when considering the findings of regression analysis. Nonetheless, to a 
certain degree, all of the tribunals are part of the international criminal justice system and therefore 
form part of this study, which seeks to assess the impact of modes of liability on sentence severity. 
Since the concept of individual criminal responsibility is rooted in domestic law and as such led the ad 
hoc tribunals to apply domestic law to a certain (modified) extent, the hybrid nature of 
internationalised tribunals should not pose difficulties when looking at the role of modes of liability in 
sentencing. Nevertheless, due to the limitations set out above, the findings of this study serve rather as 
an indicator and should be treated with caution. 
 
3.4.6 TERMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As previously addressed, terminological misunderstandings lead to different categorisation of modes 
of liability. While some may categorise aiding and abetting as the only mode of indirect perpetration, 
and all others, save for superior responsibility, as direct forms, others regard only modes of liability, 
which imply physical perpetration (or at least allowing for the possibility in case of JCE) as direct 
forms, whilst categorising all other modes as indirect. For tactical considerations restricted to this 
quantitative enquiry, as set out under limitations of this study below, only aiding and abetting is 
regarded as an indirect form of liability, while all other forms, except for superior responsibility, are 
considered forms of direct perpetration.803 
 
 3.4.7 PRE-ANALYSIS, EVALUATION AND PREPARATION OF DATA 
 
After pre-analysing the data sets for the purpose of creating categories of modes of liability, the sets 
were labelled, recoded, and so on. Thereafter, the complete set of data was created in Stata 13.1,804 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 Despite the fact that a large number of judgments from different jurisdictions were incorporated in the 
research and every attempt at completeness was made, some jurisdictions did not provide their decisions in a 
language the author could understand, and the financial costs of sifting trough the case law and obtaining 
translations of relevant decisions would have been prohibitive. The base for the empirical research is thus not 
exhaustive and the conclusions reached should be viewed under this proviso.	  
803 As previous chapters have demonstrated, the case law of international(ised) tribunals and courts is rather 
controversial. Due to the fact that it is argued that only the mode of aiding and abetting is in a sentencing context 
inferior to other modes of liability, it is the only mode referred to as “indirect perpetration”. See also Semanza 
Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 388, where the Appeal Chamber considered ordering to be a direct form of 
perpetration. See also Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment (n 696) para 244: ‘The reversal of Ntawukulyayo’s 
conviction for ordering genocide removes the only direct form of responsibility by which he was found to have 
participated in the Kabuye Hill killings. The Appeals Chamber notes that aiding and abetting is a mode of 
responsibility which has generally warranted lower sentences than forms of direct participation such as 
committing and ordering’. 
804 Stata is a statistical software programme. 
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which was used for regression analysis as well as for the mixed models. After conducting regression, 
the residuals were analysed with the Shapiro-Wilk Test, in order to examine whether they were 
distributed normally, which is a main requirement for regression.805  
As Figure 1 below reveals, the residuals were distributed normally, at least it can be seen that there 
was no strong evidence for a violation of this assumption. 
 
FIGURE 1: HISTOGRAM OF RESIDUALS (OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
 
 
 
After looking at the residual distribution (regression diagnosis), problematic cases in the regression 
analysis were looked at in detail by Cook’s Distance. Cook’s Distance indicates how much the 
residuals of all cases change or adjust, once a case is excluded from the estimate of the regression 
equation – it shall not be greater than 4/N, while N denotes the number of cases left in the regression.  
 
Thus, in order to filter the problematic cases, Cook’s Distance and leverage values were calculated 
(see Table 1). Accordingly, the cases enlisted in Table 4 were excluded. Following the exclusion of 
pertinent cases, the adjusted R2 for the regression based on such values changed from 60.22% to 
72.08%, which is an improvement and can be referred to as a decent value, providing the basis for 
carrying out regression analysis. 
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TABLE 4: PROBLEMATIC CASES IN THE DATASETS ON P < .01 (RESIDUALS) AND COOK’S DISTANCE 
 
 
 
3.4.8 LIFE SENTENCE 
 
Due to the fact that a life sentence in international criminal law does not constitute a numerical806 
value as it is indeterminate, a symbolic value had to be chosen in order ascribe a numerical value to 
the data-sets constituting life sentences. As such, the number 50 was chosen, which equals 600 months 
of sentence length in the respective sets of data. Initially, it was considered to ascribe either the 
symbolic value of 55, and thus 660 months to sets constituting life sentence, or 50 years and 600 
months respectively. However, to date, the highest sentence handed down, not referred to as a life 
sentence, is 45 years807 (552 months); therefore, the gap between the chosen symbolic value for a life 
sentence, 552 months and 50 years (600) and 55 years (660 months) varies. Due to the fact that linear 
regression is based on continuous variables (in this study), which should include neither larger gaps 
nor fractions, as this could lead to distortion of the data, the symbolic value of 50 years has been 
chosen.808 This seems to be a compromise between the objective of closing or minimising the gap, 
without reducing the importance/meaning of the content of those persons sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
 
3.4.9 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
At the outset, it was envisaged to analyse how different forms of individual criminal responsibility 
influence the sentencing process of each tribunal. Moreover, the objective of this analysis was to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 Apart from the fact that the duration of life sentence is to be determined by the international tribunals, 
decisions on early release are also within their discretion. See Prosecutor v Galić (Reasons for the President’s 
Decision to deny the early release of Stanislav Galić and Decision on Prosecution Motion) MICT-14-83-ES (23 
June 2015).  
807 Kajelijeli (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-98-44A-A (23 May 2005). 
808 Statistical data are distorted. 
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distinguish between trial and appeal separately. However, as mentioned in the context of the 
limitations of this study further below, it has not been possible to code each mode of liability and thus 
all pertinent combinations thereof separately. Therefore, throughout the course of this analysis, several 
narrower categories of modes of liability neither lead to significant results. As set out above, the same 
is true for distinctions between all of the different judicial bodies analysed, as well as the 
differentiation between trial and appeal. Thus, regression was conducted several times, each time with 
different categories of modes of liability – most did not lead to significant results. Accordingly, a 
distinction was neither made between the different international(ised) courts, nor between trial and 
appeal when carrying out the regression.809 
Table 5 below displays the different categories of liability modes, used for regression. As Table 5 
shows, multiple regression was conducted on the basis of 290 data sets. 
 
TABLE 5: MODES OF LIABILITY 
 
Modes of Liability Frequency Percent 
A&A 30 10.34 
Commission 21 7.24 
JCE 92 31.72 
Direct Perpetration 
/ Indirect (Mix) 50 17.24 
Direct Perpetration 38 13.10 
Superior 
Responsibility 16 5.52 
SR and Indirect 
(A&A) 10 3.45 
SR and Direct 23 7.93 
Superior Direct / 
Indirect (Mix) 10 3.45 
Total 290 100.00 
 
3.4.9.1 REGRESSION OF ALL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS TOGETHER 
 
First, all of the courts and tribunals were analysed together, and regression was conducted with the 
modes of liability categorised as shown in Table 5 above. For the sake of completeness, the other 
sentencing factors (for example the findings relating to the counts and the category of the crime), 
although not the main subject of this study, are also briefly considered. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809 It may be argued that this does not produce reliable results, as the characteristics of the courts and tribunals 
are too different. This is particularly true for the characteristics of international courts, and internationalised 
tribunals respectively. Accordingly these results should be treated with caution. 
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3.4.9.2 FINDINGS OF REGRESSION 
 
3.4.9.2.1 Modes of Liability 
 
Regression analyses, which have independent categorical variables, are always based on reference 
categories. The reference categories in this study are the following: (i) war crimes for the group 
‘category of crimes’; (ii) aiding and abetting for ‘mode of liability’; (iii) No for ‘guilty plea’ and 
medium for ‘rank’. 
 
TABLE 6: ANALYSIS WITHOUT JUDGES FOR ALL TRIBUNALS AND COURTS TOGETHER 
 
 Variable b t p 
 Number of Counts 8.390 6.387 0.000 
Category of 
Crime 
(base: War 
Crimes) 
CaH 6.969 0.515 0.607 
CaH/WC 31.865 1.918 0.056 
Genocide 296.249 13.049 0.000 
Genocide/CaH 308.751 12.849 0.000 
Genocide/CaH/WC 319.966 13.347 0.000 
Modes of 
Liability 
(base: A&A) 
Commission 47.111 2.113 0.036 
JCE 37.663 2.228 0.027 
Direct Perpetration/Indirect 
(Mix) 40.238 2.152 0.032 
Direct Perpetration 0.713 0.036 0.971 
Superior Responsibility 7.058 0.301 0.764 
Superior Responsibility and 
Indirect Perpetration A&A -21.654 -0.712 0.477 
Superior Responsibility and 
Direct Perpetration 5.849 0.271 0.786 
Superior Direct 
Perpetration/Indirect (Mix) 21.410 0.634 0.527 
 Mitigating Factors -12.385 -5.652 0.000 
 Aggravating Factors 16.157 7.035 0.000 
Guilty Plea 
(base: no) yes -2.164 -0.175 0.861 
Rank 
(base: medium) 
high 74.537 5.530 0.000 
low -24.288 -2.274 0.024 
 _cons 107.554 4.819 0.000 
 
According to the findings shown in Table 6, which indicate statistical significance,810 those convicted 
on the basis of commission liability are punished to considerably lengthier prison terms, four years 
longer (M= 3.92 years / 47.11 months) than aiders and abettors, and three years longer (M= 3.13 years 
/ 37.66 months) than members of a JCE. However, someone convicted on the basis of direct and 
indirect perpetration, which embraces all various forms of liability in combination with aiding and 
abetting, save for superior responsibility, is sent to prison for an additional three and a half years (M= 
3.35 years / 40.23 months). Thus, as Table 6 shows, this creates a hierarchy of modes of liability, 
whereby “hands-on” perpetrators receive an average prison term of 22 years (M= 22.01 years / 264.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 Commission, JCE, Direct and Indirect Perpetration (Mix) and A&A, as can be seen in Table 5.  
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months). This is followed by members in a JCE, who are sentenced to 21 years (M= 21.22 years / 
254.70 months), and finally, indirect perpetrators, aiders and abettors, who are sentenced to 18 years 
(M= 17.81 years / 213.81 months). Direct and indirect perpetrators are, on average, imprisoned for 21 
years (M= 21.06 years / 252.76 months). Thus there is only a negligible difference in sentence length 
for members of a JCE. This gradation of modes of liability and corresponding penalties, as manifested 
in these findings, strongly points to a gradation of blameworthiness, which may be characterised by 
specific modes of liability. Ultimately, in accordance with these statistical findings, it may be at least 
concluded that aiding and abetting is regarded as a mode of liability expressing a lower degree of 
culpability than “hands-on” perpetration. The prediction of the sentence via modes of liability is not 
significant for all categories of modes of liability.811 Figure 2 below (and more specifically the blue 
points) show the predicted values per category of modes of liability with a 95% confidence interval 
(CI), which describes the 95% range of prediction for sentence via modes of liability. 
 
FIGURE 2: PREDICTION OF THE SENTENCE VIA LIABILITY MODES FOR ALL INTERNATIONAL(ISED) 
TRIBUNALS 
 
Furthermore, Table 7 shows the exact values as indicated in Figure 2 above. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 Direct Perpetration, Superior Responsibility, Superior Responsibility and Indirect A&A, Superior 
Responsibility and Direct Perpetration and Superior (Responsibility Direct Perpetration/Indirect Mix did not 
produce significant results. 
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TABLE 7: PREDICTION OF THE SENTENCE VIA LIABILITY MODE 
Modes of Liability predicted sentence 
A&A 213.81 
Commission 264.16 
JCE 254.71 
Direct Perpetration / 
Indirect (Mix) 252.77 
Direct Perpetration 233.75 
Superior 
Responsibility 213.93 
Superior 
Responsibility and 
Indirect Perpetration 
A&A 
215.49 
Superior 
Responsibility and 
Direct Perpetration 
239.37 
Superior Direct 
Perpetration / 
Indirect (Mix) 
222.62 
 
3.4.8.2.2 Findings Relating to Other Independent Variables 
 
As Table 6 reveals, each mitigating factor extends the sentence by one year (M= 1.03 years / 12.38 
months) whereas each aggravating factor increases the sentence by one and a half years (M= 1.34 
years / 16.15 months). Similarly, there are clear-cut distinctions between the different types of crimes 
in terms of their sentence prediction. Someone who is guilty of genocide is sent to prison for 24.5 
years (M= 24.68 years / 296.24 months), longer than those convicted solely for war crimes (reference 
category). Harsher punishment is only reserved for those convicted for all three types of crimes 
together, with an average prison term of 26.5 years (M= 26.66 years / 319.96 months). Thus, this 
finding may suggest that genocide is indeed treated as the worst crime, supporting the point of those 
who consider a hierarchy of crimes to be in place in international criminal justice, with genocide as the 
“crime of the crimes”. 
Another strong predictor is the rank of the perpetrator. Someone who occupies a lower rank receives a 
sentence two years less (M= 2.02 years / 24.8 months) than someone of medium rank, whereas 
someone with a high rank is sentenced for six years longer (M= 6.21 years / 74.53 months) than 
someone with a medium rank. Hence a high ranking perpetrator is generally sent behind bars for an 
extra eight years compared to someone who holds a low rank – this is a considerable difference, 
emphasising the interplay of power, influence and culpability.  
However, more importantly, this statistical finding supports the understanding of the nature of macro 
crimes, thereby taking into account a major characteristic of such large-scale crimes, involving a high 
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number of perpetrators, mostly acting under the authority of a high-ranking individual, who may also 
be physically absent from the scene of the crime. 
As suggested above, the findings based on a differentiation between the various courts and tribunals 
did not prove to be significant.812 The same holds true for the analysis of trial and appeal groups 
already distinguished in line with the respective tribunal/court. Accordingly, based on the data 
available, it is neither possible to distinguish between each court and tribunal, nor between trial and 
appeal, because none of the separated sets of data produced valid results. As already addressed, this 
may be due to the fact that the given “liability groups” do not occur sufficiently frequently. The initial 
solution proposed to this issue was a re-categorisation of the liability groups (in the context of coding 
the independent variables and more specifically, the modes of liability). Therefore, in order to achieve 
this objective, four further liability groups, containing broader categories,813 were created in addition 
to the first categorisation consisting of nine liability groups. Thereafter, the analysis was run for each 
of those groups again.814 Unfortunately, none of the groups produced any significant findings. 
Accordingly, the intended assessment of respective results is impossible and thus failed.815 
 
3.4.10 THE MIXED MODEL (MULTILEVEL) 
 
Following regression, multilevel analysis was conducted for the ICTY and the ICTR with the sets of 
data including judges and type of opinion (ie majority, separate opinions and pertinent combinations 
thereof). A multilevel model (mixed model) enables the analysis of each mode of liability as a separate 
level. The advantage of such mixed models in comparison to linear regressions is that the former may 
comprise both fixed effects as well as random effects, and thus they are predestined to be used in cases 
where repeated measurement of the same units are carried out.816 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 p = 0.272; moreover the deterioration is also observed when looking at the R, which is lower. 
813 The degree of specificity decreases, so that each group covers several different combinations of modes of 
liability for which an individual has been convicted. 
814 Group 1: (i) A&A; (ii) Commission; (iii) JCE; (iv) Direct Perpetration/Indirect (Mix); (v) Direct Perpetration; 
(vi) Superior Responsibility; (vii) Superior Responsibility and Indirect Perpetration (A&A); (viii) Superior 
Responsibility and Direct Perpetration; (ix) Superior Responsibility/Direct Perpetration/Indirect Perpetration 
(Mix). Group 1 (new): (i) A&A; (ii) JCE; (iii) Commission; (iv) Direct Perpetration/Indirect Perpetration; (v) 
Direct Perpetration; (vi) Superior Responsibility; (vii) Superior Responsibility Mix with Direct and/or Indirect 
Perpetration. Group 2: (i) A&A; (ii) JCE/Commission; (iii) Direct Perpetration; (iv) Direct Perpetration/Indirect 
Mix; (v) Direct Perpetration; (vi) Superior Responsibility. Group 3: (i) A&A; (ii) JCE/Commission; (iii) Direct 
Perpetration; (iv) Direct Perpetration/Indirect; (v) Superior Responsibility Solo and Mix with Direct/Indirect. 
Group 4: (i) A&A; (ii) Direct Perpetration; (iii) Direct Perpetration/Indirect Perpetration; (iv) Superior 
Responsibility Solo and Mix. 
815 Following a distinction between trial and appeal, for instance, the result of the finding was not significant and 
the R2 decreased. Moreover, liability values, which were significant in the first regression, turned out to be 
subsequently insignificant. Similarly, this happened after regression of separate trial and appeal groups for each 
court/tribunal was conducted. 
816 In this case the same judges. 
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3.4.10.1 FINDINGS RELATING TO MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
The grand mean for this analysis is 293.83 months (24.5 years). First, the tribunals were analysed 
separately and a distinction was made between trial and appeal. However, the results reveal that the 
difference between trial and appeal in relation to the influence of the modes of liability (or specifically 
the respective liability groups) on the sentence is marginal if not absent.817 A difference can only be 
observed between the overall sentence length (Figure 3 below). Those findings are however 
statistically significant. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: FINDINGS OF MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS FOR ICTY/ICTR/TRIAL/APPEAL 
 
 
Based on the grand mean of 24.5 years (M= 24.48 years / 293.83 months) one can observe that, on 
average, the ICTY Trial Chamber handed down sentences which are 2.5 years shorter (M=2.57 years / 
30.94 months) than the grand mean of 24.5 years (M= 24.48 years / 293.83 months). Therefore, it can 
be seen that ICTY Trial Chamber sentences perpetrators on average to 22 years’ imprisonment (M= 
21.90 years / 262.89 months). In contrast, the ICTY Appeals Chamber punishes perpetrators on 
average to 24.9 years’ imprisonment (M= 24.95 years / 299.42 months), which could be considered to 
be substantially harsher. As regards the ICTR, the Trial and Appeals Chambers do not differ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817 Distinction of 0.00000003. 
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considerably in relation to their punishment, although it can be observed that the Appeal Chamber 
imposed slightly lengthier sentences with an average of 25.5 years (M= 25.59 years / 307.11 months). 
However, the difference of the average sentences imposed by the ICTY Appeal Chamber is, in 
comparison to those handed down by the ICTR Trial Chamber, vanishingly small. While the average 
prison term imposed by the ICTR Trial Chamber is 25.5 years (M= 25.49 years / 305.89 months), the 
Appeals Chamber imposed on average sentences which were only marginally lengthier. Accordingly, 
a substantial difference between the length of the sentence handed down can only be observed with 
regard to the ICTY Trial and Appeal Chambers and between the two tribunals respectively. Despite 
the absence of significant discrepancies between the duration spent behind bars by perpetrators tried at 
the ICTR or ICTY, the deviation of the sentence length between the ICTY and the ICTR is not 
surprising, given the higher number of convictions for life sentences handed down by the latter.  
3.4.10.1.1 Modes of Liability 
 
Figure 4 below shows the modes of liability, which were calculated as a separate level of the analysis. 
 
FIGURE 4: FINDINGS OF MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS (MODES OF LIABILITY) 818 
Sentence compared to grand mean 
(sort, less sentence) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 Based on Group 1 (new). 
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As the bar chart reveals, the average sentence handed down by both tribunals is 24.5 years for all 
individuals included in this analysis. Thus, it can be observed that aiders and abettors receive the 
lowest sentence, with six years less than the grand mean, and accordingly the mean sentence for aiders 
and abettors constitutes 18 years (M= 18.23 years / 218.76 months). The second lowest mean sentence 
is imposed on members of a JCE, who were on average sentenced to 22 years (M= 21.93 years / 
263.25 months). This is in line with statements rendered inter alia in the Ndahimana Appeals 
judgment, where it was held that the “elevation” of criminal responsibility from an aider and abettor to 
that of a member of a JCE ‘results in an increase of his overall culpability’.819 Interestingly, members 
in a JCE are followed by perpetrators, who are convicted based on commission liability. These 
“hands-on” perpetrators receive prison terms of 24 years (M= 23.57 years / 282.95 months). To the 
contrary, superiors, who are liable for omitting as opposed to directly committing criminal acts, are 
punished to 25 years’ imprisonment (M= 24.80 years / 297.64 months), a punishment marginally 
harsher than that of direct perpetrators guilty of commission. It must however be noted that superiors 
normally hold a specific rank, which is inherently higher than that of the low rank of subordinates, 
who receive sentences which are on average five years shorter than the sentence of medium rank 
perpetrators, and eight years shorter than those occupying a high rank in the political, economic or 
military hierarchies.  
Those convicted for direct forms of perpetration, namely planning, ordering, instigating, JCE and 
commission, as well as all combinations thereof,820 receive on average 27 years’ imprisonment (M= 
27.02 years / 324.28 months). Moreover, superiors who are additionally found guilty of another form 
of perpetration, either a form of direct and/or indirect perpetration, are (on average) punished to 27 
years’ imprisonment (M= 27.14 years / 325.72 months). The most severe punishment is reserved for 
those convicted for both direct and indirect forms of participation (all possible combinations thereof), 
who were on average sent to prison for 28.5 years (M= 28.68 years / 344.22 months). 
Again, akin to the findings of regression, these results reveal that, to date, the lowest sentences have 
been handed to aiders and abettors. These are followed by JCE members who received the second-
lowest sentences. “Hands-on” perpetrators received the third lowest sentence. The reason for the 
comparatively mild punishment of “hands-on” perpetrators, convicted based on commission liability, 
in comparison to the punishment received by those convicted on direct and indirect modes of liability 
jointly, may be explained by the higher number of counts, implying that each count is linked to a 
mode of liability. Due to the fact that each count is normally charged with a corresponding mode of 
liability, someone convicted of indirect perpetration in addition to direct perpetration may be assumed 
to be at least guilty of two counts and a plurality of criminal acts, leading inevitably to a higher degree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 Ndahimana Appeal Judgment (n 2) para 252; see also paras 250 and 253 respectively. 
820 Commission and JCE alone are not covered by this category, as they are already dealt with separately with 
own categories. This group covers them only linked to other modes. Planning, instigating and ordering, however, 
are covered alone. 
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of culpability.821 Thus, a harsher sentence may be imposed due to the cumulative effect of several 
forms of direct and indirect perpetration as well as other sentencing factors, such as mitigating and 
aggravating factors and the number of counts, which may be particularly influential in this instance as 
a higher degree of involvement by more criminal activity is reflected in that a perpetrator is likely to 
be convicted on several counts. This is supported by the findings of regression, which shows that for 
each count the sentence increases on average by eight months. 
Finally, although commission liability does not seem to attract the highest sentences, it can be 
observed that aiders and abettors receive the lowest sentences. This may imply that activities covered 
by the mode aiding and abetting tend to be perceived or considered as being less blameworthy. 
Contrary to what one might have expected, superiors receive marginally lengthier sentences than those 
convicted for commission liability, although they are not physically committing an offence. Instead, 
superiors commit a crime by omitting to utilise their authority to prevent their subordinates from 
committing atrocities. A possible explanation could be that, due to the influence they exercise over 
others, and the cruelty of allowing such acts of brutality to happen despite such influence, the degree 
of culpability is augmented. Thus, the blame ascribed to superiors seems to be equal or marginally 
greater than the culpability ascribed to physical perpetrators. Moreover, as Figure 4 reveals, direct 
perpetrators, those who either plan, instigate, or order, either alone or in combination with commission 
or JCE liability (direct perpetration) receive on average a prison term of 27 years (M= 27.02 years / 
324.28 months). This supports the statement of the ICTR that the highest sentences are reserved for 
those who plan, order or instigate crimes.822  
Higher sentences, in accordance with these findings, are only imposed on those who are guilty of 
superior responsibility in addition to either direct and/or indirect perpetration, 27 years (M= 27.11 
years / 325.42 months), and those who are guilty of perpetrating a crime directly and indirectly. The 
latter can include someone who is guilty of a number of modes of liability, including aiding and 
abetting. It is noteworthy to underline that if a superior is not solely convicted of superior 
responsibility, but instead also based on other modes of liability, the sentence is immediately increased 
by an extra three years. However, it must be recalled that although all liability modes may of course be 
charged along with several counts but, particularly, those mixed liability groups as Superior/Direct 
(Mix) and Direct/Indirect, imply immediately a higher number of counts, which could be the reason 
for the imposition of lengthier sentences. 
What remains the same for both analyses is the hierarchy established between aiding and abetting, 
JCE and commission liability, in that the sentences imposed suggest that culpability gradually 
increases, starting with aiding and abetting. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 Although it should be added that judgments transparently listing each pertinent mode of liability charged with 
each count are rather rare. 
822 See Simba Judgment and Sentence (n 181) para 434. 
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3.4.10.1.2 Findings Relating to the Other Independent Variables 
 
The findings in Table 8 below show that, save for the plea and instance, all independent variables, 
namely the category of the crimes, the mitigating and aggravating factors, the rank of the perpetrator 
and whether it was a majority opinion or a minority opinion, are significant and thus can be said to 
form predictors of the sentence (Table 7). Whether the perpetrator pleaded guilty or not and whether it 
was a first or second instance judgment does not appear to be significant. Again, as in regression 
analysis, the same sentencing predictors along with additional factors were part of the analysis. 
Accordingly, they are briefly addressed below. 
	  
TABLE 8: FINDINGS OF MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
 variables coefficient std err p 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
 Number of Counts 10.5979 1.3781 0.000 7.8969 13.2989 
Category of Crime 
(base: WC) 
CaH 136.4793 21.6513 0.000 94.0436 178.9150 
CaH/WC 99.6508 21.1404 0.000 58.2164 141.0852 
Genocide 205.4086 28.3562 0.000 149.8315 260.9857 
Genocide/CaH 295.8670 23.1295 0.000 250.5341 341.1999 
Genocide/CaH/WC 280.6442 21.5666 0.000 238.3745 322.9139 
 Mitigating Factors -7.6448 2.2435 0.001 -12.0420 -3.2477 
 Aggravating Factors 13.6099 2.5866 0.001 8.5403 18.6795 
Guilty Plea 
(base: no) yes -24.6922 17.7541 0.164 -59.4895 10.1052 
Rank 
(base: medium) 
high 40.5310 11.7098 0.001 17.5803 63.4817 
low -61.7936 14.9661 0.000 -91.1266 -32.4607 
Instance 
(base: 0) 1 -11.5696 10.5200 0.271 -32.1883 9.0491 
Document 
(base: majority) opinion 53.1800 16.1399 0.001 21.5465 84.8136 
 
Generally, it can be observed that individuals convicted for crimes other than war crimes alone are 
sent behind bars for considerably lengthier terms. Those convicted based solely on crimes against 
humanity have generally been sentenced to an extra 11 years (M= 11.37 years / 136.47 months) than 
those convicted for war crimes alone. Perpetrators guilty of genocide were even sentenced 17 years 
more (M= 17.11 years / 205.40 months) than those convicted for war crimes. The highest sentences 
seem to be reserved for those convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity jointly and for those 
convicted for all three categories of crimes jointly. Both receive sentences of 24.5 years (M= 24.65 
years / 295.86 months) and 23 years (M= 23.38 years / 280.64 months), and thus longer sentences than 
those convicted solely based on war crimes. Moreover, the model shows that per increase of the 
mitigating factors by the value one, the sentence decreases on average by seven and a half months 
(M= 0.63 years / 7.64 months), while it increases for one year (M= 1.13 years / 13.6 months) per 
increase of the aggravating factors by one. The number of counts form another strong sentencing 
predictor. Per increase of the count by one, the sentence length is extended by 0.8 years (M= 0.88 / 
10.59 months). 
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Regarding the rank of the perpetrator either in a military hierarchy or in terms of the general influence 
of the perpetrators, it can be observed that high-ranking perpetrators receive sentences an average of 
three years longer (M= 3.37 / 40.53 months) compared to the sentences of those who hold a medium 
rank, and perpetrators with low ranks receive on average sentences five years shorter (M= 5.14 years / 
61.79 months) than medium-ranked perpetrators. Interestingly, it can also be seen that judges who 
deviate from the majority opinion, generally punish perpetrators on average four and a half years more 
harshly (M= 4.43 years / 53.18 months).  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The primary objective of this study was the examination of the impact of modes of liability on the 
sentencing process and, more specifically, whether aiders and abettors are perceived to be less 
blameworthy. Is the differentiation between different modes of liability merely terminological or is it 
linked to corresponding penalties? The above findings reveal a clear answer to the question posed. 
Despite the fact that the tribunals/courts subjected to the two analyses vary, one major similarity in 
both findings can be observed: aiders and abettors are punished more mildly than all other 
perpetrators. This supports the preliminary conclusion derived from the jurisprudential analysis 
concerning the ad hoc tribunals and answers the central question of this dissertation: the distinction 
between principals and accessories in the practice of the tribunals is not merely terminological. In fact, 
modes of liability are sentencing predictors and a gradation of blameworthiness can clearly be 
observed. 
It is striking that regression, which involved the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, denotes a lower 
sentencing range (17.5-21 years) for all modes of liability, while multilevel analysis, exclusively based 
on the ad hoc tribunals, shows sentences between 18 and 28 years. This difference in years may be 
down to the inclusion of hybrid tribunals, which have generally not handed down sentences as lengthy 
as the ad hoc tribunals and particularly the ICTR. However, against this backdrop, it is even more 
striking that aiders and abettors are, according to both analyses, sentenced to an average of 17.5/18 
years imprisonment. These findings are almost identical. 
While regression reveals that members of a JCE receive the most severe sentences, the multilevel 
model places them second, after aiders and abettors. A possible explanation could be the wide scope 
of JCE in that a perpetrator may or may not be physically involved. As the jurisprudential analysis in 
Chapter 3 has shown, judges have repeatedly placed much greater emphasis on the direct or physical 
form of participation in a crime and the high culpability linked to it. Based on the proposition that 
physical perpetration is psychologically considered to be a graver form of participation, this may 
explain why sentences based on JCE, which is viewed as a form of commission liability, may be 
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extremely discrepant (this is, of course, also subject to other factors, as both analyses show that the 
high rank of the perpetrator significantly raises the sentence).  
Furthermore, the combination of direct and indirect forms of liability attracts the highest sentences. As 
mentioned above, the combination of modes of liability for which a perpetrator is convicted, implies a 
multitude of counts and at least two, which may explain the more severe punishment. 
When looking at regression, it can be observed that those perpetrators responsible based on superior 
responsibility (17.82 years) are punished almost as mildly as aiders and abettors (17.5 years) and 
superior responsibility in combination with aiding and abetting (18 years). Moreover, the findings 
show that, as soon as acts are covered by a mode of the group “Direct Perpetration” (19.47 years), 
which denotes all forms of direct perpetration (instigating, ordering, planning, committing and 
membership in a JCE) the punishment is immediately increased by two years.  
In contrast, multilevel analysis, restricted to the datasets extracted from the ad hoc tribunals, reveals 
that superiors at the ad hoc tribunals are not punished as mildly.823 Considering that the high rank of a 
perpetrator increases the sentence, the harsher punishment of superiors by the ad hoc tribunals may be 
explained by the fact that these have tried higher-ranking perpetrators than some hybrid tribunals, 
which predominately try low and medium ranked individuals. 
These results also indicate that, in relation to modes of liability, a consistent pattern seems to have 
emerged, thereby confirming the numerous instances where judges confirmed the lower culpability of 
aiders, usually by reference to previous case law. This reliance on precedent, as can be seen in the next 
chapter, may have contributed to this prevalent approach, despite no statutory basis for the application 
of the differentiated theory. Ultimately, it appears safe to conclude that secondary liability attracts 
lower sentences, as confirmed by the empirical findings. 
However, because the analysis of each hybrid tribunal separately did not produce significant results, 
the question of whether the differentiated approach predominantly chosen by the ad hoc tribunals has 
influenced the practice of pertinent hybrid tribunals in this regard, remains unanswered – further 
quantitative research will be needed in this respect. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 It has to be recalled, however, that for statistical reasons, superiors were not grouped in three categories as for 
the regression, but instead it was only differentiated between two groups: Superior (Solo) and Superior (Mix), 
embracing a combination with all other forms of participation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, LEGAL CULTURAL BACKGROUND AND THE IMPACT ON 
SENTENCING 
 
Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking the 
oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all 
predictions, becomes a passionless thinking machine.824 
 
 4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Judges come from diverse legal cultural backgrounds. They may have been judges, prosecutors, or 
defence counsel in the jurisdictions they represent; in different legal fields, in common or civil law, 
and adversarial or inquisitorial legal systems. They may have also served as diplomats or are 
established academics. These professional experiences are likely to influence their acquired legal 
skills, which they have to utilise and enhance within the international criminal justice system. 
Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is to explore whether there is a correlation between the legal 
cultural background of judges and the legal weight they ascribe to principal perpetrators and 
accessories respectively in the context of sentencing. 
In the light of the above discussion, some central questions arise. Perhaps the most important of these 
is why some judges opt for a unitary approach, while others maintain a principal-accessory distinction 
for sentencing purposes. Considering that the significance of such a distinction for the purpose of 
sentencing is not established by international instruments but instead rooted in domestic criminal law, 
it is essential to ask why judges resort to one or the other approach. Is their decision related to their 
legal cultural background? Or is it possibly mere coincidence in the absence of a black letter 
provision? Could a lack of judicial experience or experience in criminal justice explain the 
inconsistency? Perhaps there is no obvious rationale explaining a certain path taken. As Ewald 
suggests, behavioural economics may help – amongst other perspectives – to explain the decision-
making process as one may not be aware of sub-conscious processes825 influencing the decision-
making process.826 This of course may be true for all human beings, and the mere fact of being a judge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 M Lachs, The Teacher in International Law: Teachings and Teaching (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 
206. 
825 See for example, L Mlodinow, Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior (Pantheon 
2012). 
826 See generally Ewald (n 70). 
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does not exclude such influence. There has been some research from a psychological perspective, 
however, in relation to the role of psychology in judicial decision-making in a domestic context.827 
Given that the ICTR, ICTY, ICC and hybrid tribunals do not expressly provide for a differentiated 
approach, one can assume that such distinction and the concomitant consequence of mitigated 
punishment for accessories is an established international criminal law principle as it is not prescribed 
by the statutory instruments establishing the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.828 The starting point when 
trying to extract the reason for a particular decision is therefore to examine closely these judgments in 
which the judicial bench has ascribed a specific legal value to modes of liabilitiy for sentencing 
purposes to direct and indirect perpetrators respectively. More specifically, this chapter scrutinises the 
composition of the bench in pertinent cases. Due to the fact that a solidly articulated attitude towards 
one or the other approach can only reasonably deduced829 in the practice of the ICTY, ICTR, and the 
ICC, although only limited to the few judgments, only the ad hoc tribunals will be examined closely in 
relation to the cultural legal background of judges. As could be seen in the previous chapters, the 
ECCC, the SICT, Kosovo Panels, the East Timor Special Panels and the STL have neither addressed 
this issue in a manner which is noteworthy, nor can a clear approach be identified. The SCSL has 
broached the issue in the Taylor judgment, but due to the small number of judgments and the lack of 
information on judges, the focus remains on the ad hoc tribunals, which have, at the time of writing, 
produced the largest body of purely international jurisprudence. 
 
4.2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS  
 
When judges know more about some issues than others, or in the past, have drawn 
analogies to one kind of outcome, they might be more likely to unintentionally find in a 
direction consistent with past judgments.830 
Ewald rightly observes that it is ‘somewhat surprising’ that judicial and thus human decision-making 
is ‘understudied in the analyses of international sentencing’,831 thereby suggesting that case-based 
reasoning (CBR) could contribute to an explanation as to why a specific choice is made. This 
approach embraces the idea that the decision maker, the judge, appears to ‘compare a new case against 
the backdrop of completed cases, initially guided by certain perpetrator and offence related key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827 See for instance different contributions to D E Klein and G Mitchell (eds), The Psychology of Judicial 
Decision Making (OUP 2010); L S Wrightsman, Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant? 
Perspectives in Law and Psychology (Springer 2012). 
828 Although interpretation of the applicable provisions may indicate that such a distinction is intended, this is 
disregarded for the purpose of this argumentation. 
829 Or at least this issue has been addressed expressly. 
830 B A Spellman, ‘Judges, Expertise and Analogy’ in D E Klein and G Mitchell (eds), The Psychology of 
Judicial Decision Making (OUP 2010) 162 seq. 
831 Ewald (n 70) 385 referring to M Oswald and W Langer, ‘Versuch eines integrierten Modells zur 
Strafzumessungsforschung: Richterliche Urteilsprozesse und ihre Kontextbedingungen’ in C Pfeiffer and M 
Oswald (eds), Strafzumessung – Empirische Forschung und Strafrechtsdogmatik im Dialog (Ferdinand Enke 
Verlag, 1989) 197-228. 
	   178 
variables’.832 Accordingly, as Ewald writes, some findings ‘indicate that some offender-related 
features, indicating the dangerousness and culpability of a perpetrator, have a particular impact on the 
initial decision for an appropriate sentencing range’.833 In the light of a principal-accessory distinction, 
it may be argued that, should a mode of participation be assumed to be an offender-related feature for 
the purpose of this observation, the fact that a perpetrator committed an offence “physically” could 
theoretically be a potential factor implying a higher degree of culpability, given that the physical 
nature of a specific contribution is frequently emphasised by judges in the collective decision-making 
process.  
Nevertheless, it must be recalled that sometimes no rational underpinning may be immediately 
obvious. Going back to the instance of the physical character of a contribution, an important question 
raised should be whether it is possible that a judge may simply be subconsciously convinced of the 
idea that physical perpetration is an offence which is more blameworthy than indirect or non-physical 
perpetration. If a representative of a jurisdiction has a civil law background, is for instance German, 
and is therefore – due to his domestic judicial experience (used to applying the statutory manifest 
principle that aiders and abettors are punished more mildly), will this be treated as a relational 
similarity in the decision-making process? Similarly, it may also be asked whether it is likely that the 
majority of judges with such a background deeply believe that the specific contribution of an aider and 
abettor and thus a secondary perpetrator, or indirect perpetrator may never raise the same degree of 
culpability as the conduct of a principal perpetrator. 
Spellman points out, although in a domestic legal context, that:  
Political scientists have shown that one can anticipate how a judge will decide a case more often 
than chance, or a reading of the facts, might allow. Using various predictors – party affiliation, 
party of appointment, the judges’ own decisions on earlier similar cases – regression analyses can 
demonstrate that judges are behaving in a manner consistent with their explicit prior beliefs.834  
As a possible explanation, Spellman suggests an interpretation which is a rather ‘extreme version of 
the “legal-realist” view’ in that she puts forward that ‘[t]he simplest explanation for such behavior is 
that judges first decide what they want the outcome of the case to be, then go back and find the 
precedents that justify their opinions’. 835 However, she adds that a more “nuanced” view is that judges 
are ‘sensitive to both attitudinal and jurisprudential concerns’.836  
4.2.1 ANALOGICAL REASONING 
 
Spellman provides two examples which can serve to illustrate the meaning of law-related analogical 
reasoning:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Ewald (n 70) para 385. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Spellman (n 830) 149. 
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid fn 1. 
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Analogical reasoning typically involves several steps including retrieval and mapping. As an 
illustration, consider that one is a lawyer, and a potential client would like to know whether she 
has a strong negligence claim against a cruise line. She had been asleep in her locked cabin when 
someone reached through a window and stole her handbag including $500 in cash.837  
According to Spellman, three steps can be distinguished when it is intended to find  
potentially analogous source cases in memory (…). First, you recall a case in which a businessman 
was asleep on a train berth in an open sleeping car and had his expensive cell phone stolen from 
the pocket of the coat he was using as a blanket. Second, you recall a case in which a man in a 
resort hotel had his wallet stolen from his room while he slept. Third, you recall a case in which a 
woman on a cruise ship was hit by another woman on the ship who used her handbag as a 
weapon.838  
Spellman then explains that the next stage of analogical reasoning is to ‘create a mapping—find a set 
of appropriate correspondences between elements of the source and target’.839 Hence, Spellman 
concludes that the choice made depends on the resemblance to facts of cases already known, and says 
with reference to the above examples: 
You might think of your client as the business traveller, the cruise ship as the train, and handbag as 
the cell phone. Alternatively, you might think of your client as the man on vacation, the ship as the 
hotel, and the handbag as the wallet. If you think your case is most like that of the businessman on 
the train (who lost), you will expect the same outcome as in the case; if you think it is most like 
that of the vacationing man in the hotel (who won), you will expect that result. But despite the fact 
that the third case involves a woman, a cruise ship and a handbag—just like your own—it 
probably doesn`t seem very similar to your case because the objects that are the same don`t stand 
in the same relations [sic] to each other – and relations are the key to analogy.840 
 
4.2.1.1 ANALOGICAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW  
There is a number of characteristics that make international criminal law distinguishable from 
domestic criminal law, such as the nature of macro-crimes, the plurality of persons frequently 
involved in the commission of international crimes, the hierarchical structures within the organisation 
of criminal entities as well as a perpetrator's respective mode of participation, with the masterminds of 
the offence usually being physically detached from the crime scene. Accordingly, analogical 
reasoning, as described above, would not immediately seem adequate. Of course, and this is probably 
the most important reason for the necessity of some judicial discretion, it is clear that each case is 
different, and that it has to be assessed individually, thereby taking all specific circumstances into 
account. In Semanza, the ICTR Appeal Chamber stressed the limited value of comparison to other 
cases and held that the ‘comparison to other cases in support of a move to have the sentence increased 
may indeed provide guidance’841 on the assumption that the offence in question is the same and more 
specifically if the crimes in question were committed in ‘substantially similar circumstances’.842 It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
837 Ibid 150. 
838 Ibid 150. 
839 Ibid 150. 
840 Ibid 150, 151. 
841 Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 294; M A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 
(CUP 2007) 59, 60. 
842 Ibid. 
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stressed, however, that ‘such comparison may be of limited value given that each case has its own 
particular circumstances and that the aggravating and mitigating factors may dictate different 
results’.843 Thus, ‘[u]ltimately, the decision as to the length of sentence is a discretionary one, turning 
on the circumstances of the case.’844 
In a similar manner the Appeals Chamber referred to the “limited assistance” of comparison to similar 
cases, by stating that, in Babić, ‘the differences are often more significant than the similarities’ and 
that ‘the mitigating and aggravating factors dictate different results’.845 In Stakić the Appeals Chamber 
then went even further as to deny the appropriateness of case comparison in Stakić by arguing that the 
‘appellant’s case was “unique”’,846 and that comparison to other cases was accordingly inadequate.847 
In fact, it appears that reaching such a conclusion presupposes a comparison. In casu it appears that the 
point of reference was the mode of liability, on which ground similarity to Krstić was ultimately 
denied.  
In Semanza the Appeals Chamber recalled that there is a general principle according to which 
‘comparison to other cases in support of a move to have the sentence increased may indeed provide 
guidance if it relates to the same offence’.848 It clarified, however, that against the backdrop of the 
individual particulars of each case ‘such comparison may be of limited value’.849 This inevitably poses 
the question whether a judge, as a human being, is able to “switch off” the process of finding 
relational similarities to other (international or domestic) cases while analogical reasoning is taking 
place. If this is possible, how can analogical reasoning be conducted in the absence of comparable 
cases, as this was the situation at the beginning of the operation of international and hybrid courts and 
tribunals? Would an international judge attempt to find relational similarities to domestic cases if a 
similarity was given (eg the mode of liability)? If the answer is no, there would be the presumption 
that judges are able to distance themselves or abstain from allowing domestic jurisprudence, or more 
specific, “relational similarities” linked to domestic jurisprudence, to influence their decision. 
International courts and tribunals may in the absence of pertinent legal instruments also resort to 
Article 38 c) referring to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. Accordingly, 
analogical reasoning within international criminal law may have to take place under the heading of 
general principles manifest in domestic law. In the light of the idea that this may prevent lacunae, it is 
clear that it is the last fallback option. However, it seems logical as it appears to be reasonable that the 
application of varying domestic principles by an international bench may inevitably lead to clashes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Ibid. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Babić Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (n 597) para 33; Drumbl (n 841) 60. 
846 Stakić Appeal Judgment (n 620) para 382, (n 841) 60. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118) para 394. 
849 Ibid. 
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which may be an explanation for the discussion revolving around the differentiation between 
principals and accessories for the purpose of sentencing. 
Analogical reasoning is an established element of a jurist’s work. Law school and vocational 
education also focus on analogical reasoning.850 Spellman concludes that ‘judges (like laypeople) 
know that when using analogies it is important to look for relational similarities and – because of their 
specialised training in legal content – they know which relational similarities matter within their 
domains of expertise’.851 Yet the question remains – how do these mechanisms function within the 
process of analogical reasoning? Are they automated to some extent, or are they solely applied based 
on conscious choice? International criminal justice is a relatively recently developed field of law and 
accordingly the naturally established sentencing patterns are far from being solid, if not rather 
fragmentary. Some of the representatives of various jurisdictions have domestic criminal (judicial) 
experience. Therefore, it is arguable that, in their international capacity, judges may not isolate their 
domestic sentencing experience from pertinent international sentencing practice. According to 
Spellman, the ‘retrieval of analogies’ may take place automatically: 
(…) as the WWII/Vietnam study shows, unconscious remindings of known analogs that are not 
present can affect judgments even though, when made explicit, the analogues are not viewed as 
any better or worse than other ones. In addition to this automatic retrieval of analogies, judges` 
knowledge and interests may influence how they mentally represent and use different analogs 
[sic]. When judges know more about some issues than others, or in the past, have drawn analogies 
to one kind of outcome, they might be more likely to unintentionally find in a direction consistent 
with past judgments – in part because of what they see as more (or less) similar, in part because of 
the level of abstraction (ie how deep the relations) they use, and in part because of an effort to 
maintain coherence in their beliefs. Thus, although judges might decide consistently with 
predictions, it is possible that they do so not for any intentional (and sometimes seemingly 
“nefarious”) reasons suggested by legal realism.852 
Accordingly, it might be argued that within the framework of analogical reasoning, subconscious 
memories may be recalled and even unintentionally consistent directions may be taken throughout this 
process. A reason why this reasoning would not apply to international judges is not immediately 
obvious. 
 
4.3 THE LACK OF SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED CASE PATTERNS 
 
At the beginning of the operation of the ICTY, gradually developed sentencing patterns were 
inevitably absent. Instead, one could observe how comparative analyses were conducted whereby 
domestic legal doctrines were addressed and as a result thereof fundamental differences became 
apparent.853 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
850 Spellman (n 830) 154. 
851 Ibid 162. 
852 Ibid 162, 163. 
853 See particularly in the context of modes of liability for instance Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) paras 224 seq, 
where the Appeals Chamber engaged in a comparative analysis concerning the participation in an offence by a 
plurality of persons in domestic legal systems. Principally, the Tadić Judgments include discussions of important 
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As described above, judges may be influenced by past judgments, which may – especially when a 
body of international criminal case law is not yet existent – be derived from their (judicial) legal 
experience in national legal systems. Moreover, international judges are appointed for limited periods 
and compose the bench with ad litem judges. It has to be recalled that “there’s always a first time”, 
where the above mentioned issues may be more severe. Therefore, some judges, who do not hear as 
many international cases as other judges, may be rather inclined to draw on analogical reasoning based 
on judicial experience within the jurisdiction they represent. Ewald suggests, with reference to 
Ariely’s work Predictably Irrational, that ‘case-based reasoning’ in combination with arbitrary 
coherence may contribute to a deeper understanding of the ‘underlying’ decision-making process. He 
indicates that, in a situation such as the Tadić trial, which produced one of the early decisions of the 
ICTY, for instance, ‘judges cannot draw from historically grown sentencing patterns comparable to 
national jurisdictions’.854 Ariely describes arbitrary coherence in an economic frame of reference as 
follows: ‘The basic idea of arbitrary coherence is this: The initial prices (...) are “arbitrary”, once those 
prices are established in our minds they will shape not only present prices but also future prices (this 
makes them “coherent”)’.855 Accordingly, if one replaces the “price” with the “sentence”, 
[and] [a]ssuming that a similar psychological mechanism could work for sentencers (...) in specific 
situations, the principle of “arbitrary coherence” can be applied to international sentencers, in 
particular in a situation of insufficient sentencing history, and would translate into relatively 
arbitrary translation of first sentences which then serve as an “anchor value” for future cases.856  
 
Ewald further concludes in the context of international sentencing that  
[t]he notion of “arbitrary coherence” applied to sentencing where historically coherent sentencing 
patterns do not exist, means that there is an “anchor value” for sentencing which is relatively 
“arbitrary”; yet, once set and established in the minds of sentencers, it frames the range for future 
related cases and this makes sentencing coherent.857  
 
This suggests that issues for the purpose of analogical reasoning could not only arise due to the 
absence of international criminal case law and the implied resort to national legal reference points as 
relational similarities, but also where the course of newly emerging patterns is set incorrectly. The 
implications in the context of the role of modes of liability in international sentencing were inter alia 
demonstrated in Vasiljević,858 where the ICTY Appeals Chamber reduced Mitar Vasiljević’s sentence 
from 20 years’ imprisonment to 15 years’ imprisonment based on the finding that he was guilty as an 
aider and abettor instead of being guilty as a co-perpetrator. What emanated therefrom was a statement 
(aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence) which was 
later treated in a number of cases as a general principle. Not only was it treated blindly as a solid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
points of international law. However, a thorough discussion exceeds the scope of this work. For a thorough 
analysis of the Tadić case, see M Bohlander, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić: Waiting to Exhale’ (2000) 11 Criminal 
Law Forum, 217-248. 
854 Ewald (n 70) 387. 
855 D Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions (Harper 2009) 26. 
856 Ewald (n 70) 387. 
857 Ewald (n 70) 387, 388; Ariely (855) 30. 
858 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
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principle, it was cited over and over again, despite the fact that the sources which were cited in 
Vasiljević in order to corroborate this view, were partially wrong, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Notwithstanding that, the alleged principle that ‘aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which 
generally warrants a lower sentence’ was cited in all shapes and nuances possible (from Vasiljević, 859 
to Krstić,860 Simić,861 Semanza;862 from Krstić to Semanza, from Krstić and Kajelijeli863 to Babić 864 
and so forth). It was thrown back and forth across several cases. In some cases Vasiljević 865 was cited 
directly; in others, Krstić was referenced, which drew on Vasiljević. Parallel to that, the ICTR, which 
also referred to Krstić and Vasiljević in this regard, cited (even before the Vasiljević judgment was 
rendered) Ruggiu and Ntakirutimana, and then Kajelijeli, which built on Ruggiu and Ntakirutimana. 
An interactive map displaying the journey of this “alleged principle” and the sources referred thereto, 
through the case law of the tribunals, would include arrows in all directions, rendering it confusing.  
Accordingly, it is striking that this alleged principle, which is indeed a codified principle in a number 
of legal systems, was cited with a naturalness which could imply that analogical reasoning was 
conducted against the backdrop of domestic law (if the jurisdiction embraces a differentiated 
approach) or international criminal law, as for instance seems to have happened with the Vasiljević 
Appeal Judgment. This could indicate that an overreliance on domestic systems was in place, but it 
could also suggest that, in the absence of a scrutinised and systematic approach, a principle emanating 
from a seemingly rushed and partially wrongly conducted comparative analysis has spread. Of course, 
uniformity and predictability are only warranted if cases are compared; nevertheless, newly emerging 
concepts, and particularly concepts rooted in domestic law, should only be applied under close 
scrutiny, as they may be easily applied incorrectly in an international setting by international judges.  
The process of analogical reasoning is a valuable tool in a jurist’s day-to-day work and generally it 
seems to serve as a good starting point. This may under certain circumstances also be true for 
international judges. However, although by now one can speak of a body of international 
jurisprudence, this was not always the case, and therefore judges were (and are still sometimes) faced 
with lacunae. The important role of domestic criminal law principles being applied in international 
criminal law is reflected in Article 38 b) and c) ICJ Statute. Although the non-exhaustive list, set out 
in Article 38 ICJ Statute, looks extensive, one must not underestimate the number of specific 
situations or issues not explicitly covered by the legal instruments enumerated in Article 38 a) or even 
b).866 As a result, judges will have to resort to doctrines emanating from national law. That this may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
859 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
860 Krstić Appeal Judgment (n 28). 
861 Simić Appeal Judgment (n 125). 
862 Semanza Appeal Judgment (n 118). 
863 Kajelijeli Judgment and Sentence (n 31). 
864 Babić Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (n 597). 
865 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
866 In its very first judgment, the ICTY identified as a general principle common to all nations that crimes against 
humanity attract the severest punishment in national legal systems: ‘The Trial Chamber thus notes that there is a 
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cause inconsistency and misapprehensions has been demonstrated by means of the above 
jurisprudential analysis. 
This examination in the light of the psychology of decision-making does not, of course, provide a 
definite answer to all the questions raised, but it may still (in a probably rather unconventional way) 
contribute to more understanding of international sentencing, as this perspective seems to have been 
neglected, or possibly has its impact been underestimated. As Mlodinov states: ‘We humans also 
perform many automatic unconscious behaviours. We tend to be unaware of them, however, because 
the interplay between our conscious and our unconscious minds is so complex. This complexity has its 
roots in the physiology of our brains’.867  
 
4.4 NATIONALITY AND THE LEGAL CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGE: RELEVANT – 
IRRELEVANT? 
 
International criminal law is a dynamic and complex system and international judges have – as the 
connotation reveals – diverse backgrounds. Article 36(8)(a) ICC Statute, setting out the nationality 
criteria, provides that throughout the selection process of judges, the States’ Parties shall inter alia 
consider the ‘representation of principal legal systems of the world’868 and ensure ‘[e]quitable 
geographical representation’.869 What may be underestimated sometimes is the heterogeneity caused 
by diversity, which inextricably leads to conflicts, clashes and/or misunderstandings. In the worst case 
these may be unrecognised as such. As much as judicial cultural diversity may contribute to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
general principle of law common to all nations whereby the severest penalties apply for crimes against humanity 
in national legal systems. It thus concludes that there exists in international law a standard according to which a 
crime against humanity is one of extreme gravity demanding the most severe penalties when no mitigating 
circumstances are present’. Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) 
para 31. Cf, see contrary Tadić Appeal Judgment (n 23) paras 224, 225, where the Appeals Chamber clearly 
distinguished between customary law and mere reference to national case law to show an ‘underpinning in many 
national systems’. It did so in relation to the liability of participants in a common plan for foreseeable acts 
committed by another participant. Para 224 : ‘(…) Other countries also uphold the principle whereby if persons 
take part in a common plan or common design to commit a crime, all of them are criminally responsible for the 
crime, whatever the role played by each of them. However, in these countries, if one of the persons taking part in 
a common criminal plan or enterprise perpetrates another offence that was outside the common plan but 
nevertheless foreseeable, those persons are all fully liable for that offence. These countries include civil law 
systems, such as that of France and Italy. They also embrace common law jurisdictions such as England and 
Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia and Zambia’. Para 225 : ‘It should be emphasised that reference to 
national legislation and case law only serves to show that the notion of common purpose upheld in international 
criminal law has an underpinning in many national systems. By contrast, in the area under discussion, national 
legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a source of international principles or rules, under the doctrine 
of the general principles of law recognised by the nations of the world: for this reliance to be permissible, it 
would be necessary to show that most, if not all, countries adopt the same notion of common purpose. More 
specifically, it would be necessary to show that, in any case, the major legal systems of the world take the same 
approach to this notion. The above brief survey shows that this is not the case. Nor can reference to national law 
have, in this case, the scope and purport adumbrated in general terms by the United Nations Secretary-General in 
his Report, where it is pointed out that “suggestions have been made that the international tribunal should apply 
domestic law in so far as it incorporates customary international humanitarian law”. In the area under 
discussion, domestic law does not originate from the implementation of international law but, rather, to a large 
extent runs parallel to, and precedes, international regulation’. 
867 L Mlodinov, How your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behaviour (First Vintage Books Edition 2013) 13. 
868 Article 36(8)(a)(i). 
869 Article 36(8)(a)(ii). 
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sophisticated legal solutions, it may at the same time be considered a weakness when looking at it 
against the backdrop of the practice in national courts, where cases are adjudicated in “culturally 
homogeneous settings”.870 However, the notion of legal culture comprises a variety of facets. Almqvist 
refers to the concept of culture as embracing ‘(1) language skills, and tools (cultural equipment); (2) 
socio-cultural norms; and (3) culture-specific convictions about justice’,871 which may serve as a 
starting point. It is self-evident that while some of these attitudes may closely resemble each other, or 
be congruent, others may be rather distinct, if not opposing. 
The ICTY has emphasised its awareness of the impact of distinct legal traditions inter alia in the 
context of legal interpretation of provisions in Delalić et al., where it recalled that the statutory rules 
of the tribunal ‘consist of a fusion and synthesis of two dominant legal traditions, these being the 
common law system (…) and the civil law system (…)’.872 It further stressed that it has ‘thus become 
necessary, and not merely expedient, for the interpretation of their provisions, to have regard to the 
different approaches of these legal traditions’.873 The Tribunal further ‘conceded that a particular legal 
system’s approach to statutory interpretation is shaped essentially by the particular history and 
traditions of that jurisdiction’.874 Moreover, due to the fact that the objective of legal interpretation is 
to ‘discover the true purpose and intent of the statute in question, invariably, the search of the judge 
interpreting a provision under whichever system, is necessarily the same’.875 The Tribunal thus 
stressed the need ‘to discuss some of the rules which could be usefully applied in the interpretation 
(…)’.876 The following paragraphs provide a generic example of inter-cultural decision-making by 
reflecting a well-structured analysis concerning the means of interpretation available to the ICTY 
whilst taking into account the varying legal backgrounds of the bench. It is not particularly surprising 
that the bench was composed of representatives of the common and civil legal systems (ratio 2 to 1). 
161. In every legal system, whether common law or civil law, where the meaning of the words in a 
statute is clearly defined, the obligation of the judge is to give the words their clearly defined 
meaning and apply them strictly. This is the literal rule of interpretation. If only one construction 
is possible, to which the clear, plain or unambiguous word is unequivocally susceptible, the word 
must be so construed. In cases of ambiguity, however, all legal systems consider methods for 
determining how to give effect to the legislative intention. 
162. Where the use of a word or expression leads to absurdity or repugnance, both common law 
and civil law courts will disregard the literal or grammatical meaning. Under the golden rule of 
interpretation, the common law court as well as the civil law court will modify the grammatical 
sense of the word to avoid injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, as clearly not to have 
been intended by the legislature. (...) 
163. The “teleological approach”, also called the “progressive” or “extensive” approach, of the 
civilian jurisprudence, is in contrast with the legislative historical approach. The teleological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
870 J Almqvist, ‘The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal Proceedings’, (2006) 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 745, 747. 
871 Ibid. 
872 Delalić et al. Trial Judgment (n 599) para 159. 
873 Ibid. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Ibid. 
876 Ibid. 
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approach plays the same role as the “mischief rule” of common law jurisprudence. (...) 
164. The mischief rule (also known as the purposive approach), is said to have originated from 
Heydon’s case, decided by the ancient English Court of Exchequer in 1584. In Heydon’s case, 
four questions were posed in order to discover the intention of the legislation in question: (a) what 
was the common law before the making of the Act; (...). This approach to interpretation is 
generously relied upon in Continental and American courts. In the important case of AG v Prince 
Ernest Augustus of Hanover, Viscount Simonds spelled out what he regarded as the meaning of 
context in the construction of statutes, as follows: (a) other enacting provisions of the same 
Statute; (b) its preamble; (c) the existing state of the law; (d) other statutes in pari materia; (e) the 
mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. (...) 
165. The method of judicial ‘gap-filling’, which may be adopted under the teleological 
interpretation of the civilian jurisprudence, would, under a common law approach, suggest two 
approaches. The first of these is to consider that, because the observation of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers preserves the judicial function to the judiciary, any judicial law-making 
would be an abuse of the legislative function by the judiciary. The second view is that courts are 
established to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Filling any gap is also a 
means of securing this objective. The common law has rejected both views, despite an attempt to 
argue that the filling of gaps is part of the judicial role in the interpretation of statutes. The 
interpretative role of the judiciary is, however, never denied.877 
Self-evidently, the bench draws on different concepts of interpretation specific to either common or 
civil law. In order to make a representative of the counterpart understand a concept, not manifest in his 
or her own jurisdiction, it is explained with reference to domestic case law. Although criticism may be 
voiced that such a thorough and systematic discussion of legal civil and common law concepts may 
not always be possible, this seems the only way to overcome the differences parting distinct families 
of law. If issues were identified and dealt with in a similar manner to the statement above and cultural 
differences acknowledged and solved at best, misapprehensions and conflicts would certainly be 
reduced. Ultimately, it must be recalled that cultural differences can have vast implications on the 
international criminal justice process, as well as for victims, perpetrators and witnesses. Every effort to 
contribute to more common understanding will enable judges to work together in order to create more 
sophisticated and reliable solutions as a response to complex legal issues. 
 
4.4.1 LANGUAGE AND MODES OF LIABILITY 
 
Decisions—interim and final—at the ICTY are issued in both English and French, but 
only one is the authoritative version and I am told that there are often not insubstantial 
variations in the two versions.878 
Dealing with the language differences in international trials is perhaps the most critical 
aspect. Technology can certainly help in breaching the gap (I know of no judge in such a 
tribunal who does not acknowledge that he or she is totally at the mercy of the translator 
in the courtroom).879 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 Ibid paras 161-165. 
878 P M Wald, ‘Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy’ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 
1559, 1571; Judge Wald also added: ‘In my own case, if it were drafted in French, it would have to await my 
final approval until translated into English (reportedly, some judges were willing to sign on to a document in a 
different language on faith; I was not). Often my collegial colleagues [sic] blinked first and were willing to 
approve a final version in English after our legal assistants mediated the discussion in both languages’. 
879 Ibid 1570. 
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As discussed above, a closer examination of the role of modes of liability in the sentencing process 
and the attempt to identify potential reasons for the discrepant approaches in this regard revealed inter 
alia that there are terminological issues arising in the context of a principal-accessory distinction and 
more notably in relation to the terms “direct” and “indirect” perpetration. While pertinent 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals proves that the term “direct” embraces only physical 
perpetration, “indirect” perpetration appears seems to denote non-physical contributions to a crime. 
However, there are also instances which prove that the terms “direct” and “indirect” are not as clearly 
defined as assumed.  
In Semanza, the ICTR Trial Chamber clarified that instigation was a mode of indirect perpetration by 
stating that ‘[t]he Accused’s acts of complicity, aiding and abetting, and instigating are crimes of 
indirect participation’,880 thus subsuming instigation under the head of indirect perpetration. 
Notwithstanding that, the majority seems to regard aiding and abetting as the only mode of liability, 
belonging to the group of ‘indirect participation’. Accordingly, there is a tendency to regard aiding and 
abetting as the sole mode of liability, which is inferior to the others. Paradoxically, the gradation of 
blameworthiness, as expressed by both ad hoc tribunals includes the words “physical”, “active” or 
“direct” involvement, which implies that “hands-on” perpetration is viewed as the mode of liability, 
reflecting the highest culpability. This is again in line with the literal meaning of the words direct and 
indirect as mentioned above – direct perpetration includes only direct contributions, and thus hands-on 
perpetration, while indirect perpetration embraces all forms of non-physical perpetration. 
It is obvious that terminological misunderstandings seem to be in place when it comes to the 
evaluation of labels, which are part of a doctrinal theoretical framework, for the purpose of sentencing. 
Despite potential clashes of doctrines arising from the common-civil law contrast, it appears that these 
misunderstandings may also be caused by translation issues, judicial lack of command of English 
language skills, and so on. 
Judge Wald pinpointed the issue of multi-language translation in international proceedings by 
providing a very pictorial description of events, observing that ‘[t]he ICTY courtrooms are supplied 
with first-rate translators who provide the judges with instantaneous translation through high-tech 
audio, supplemented by close-captioned television monitors in English, French, and Serbo-Croat – the 
native language of most defendants, witnesses, and many defense counsel’.881 She then went on to 
describe the issue of command of language of the judges as follows:  
In the Trial Chamber in which I served the presiding judge spoke in French; I spoke in English with 
limited French; the third judge alternated between the two. Typically the Prosecution asked a question in 
English, pausing while it was translated to the witness in Serbo-Croat, whose answer in Serbo-Croat was 
translated into both French and English for the Court and Prosecution.882  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 Semanza Judgment and Sentence (n 149) para 557. 
881 Wald (n 878) 1571. 
882 Ibid. 
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Bohlander notes that ‘the languages spoken by the judges do not correlate directly to those spoken by 
their assistants or clerks’.883 He further stresses that ‘we need to remind ourselves that it is the judges 
who (should) decide which sources merit inclusion as proper sources, not their assistants’.884 By 
conducting a survey among the 35 legal officers employed by the ICC in order to identify the 
languages used by them and comparing them to the languages spoken by former and current judges, he 
observed: 
It becomes apparent (…) that there appears to exist a definite filtering effect from the array of 
languages spoken by legal officers, through the languages used by them for research, for 
communication with the individual judges they worked for and finally the Chamber as a whole. 
Most curious is the apparent self-censure by some legal staff with regard to which languages they 
use for research. At the final stage, the language that is left is mostly English and some French. 
With mixed background panels, it would almost appear that English trumps all other languages as 
long as there is one judge on the panel who does not speak any language but English.885 
This concern is also supported by an answer given by an ICTY judge in the context of a survey 
conducted by Terris and others inter alia about the challenges of linguistic diversity.886 The ‘non-
native English-speaking polyglot’ said that it would be reasonable to require judges to speak at least 
two of the official working languages.887 In this context, he underlined the detriment of the help from 
legal assistants by observing: ‘When you have two languages only, you should select candidates who 
have at least a good basic knowledge of both, otherwise it can’t work. Sometimes, for judges who 
speak just one language, I have the impression that they are maybe led to a certain extent by their 
bilingual assistants’.888 
Moreover, when recalling that, as discussed in the previous chapter, the terms direct and indirect 
participation, which form in relation to the legal label the distinguishing feature of a principal-
accessory distinction, are understood in at least two different ways, linguistic misunderstandings may 
lie at the core of this issue. In addition, domestic concepts, such as Claus Roxins’s control theory889 
used by the ICC in order to distinguish between principals and accessories, may simply not exist in 
other legal systems. It must be recalled that language is frequently inextricably linked to the 
articulation of specific legal doctrines of a domestic legal system, which may not be “readily” 
translated.890 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
883 M Bohlander, ‘Language, Culture, Legal Traditions, and International Criminal Justice’ (2014) 12 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 491, 498. 
884 Ibid. 
885 Ibid 499. 
886 D Terris and others, The International Judge: An Introduction of the Men and Women Who Decide the 
World’s Cases (OUP 2007) 74. 
887 Ibid. 
888 Ibid. 
889 See Roxin (n 515). 
890 R Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges, Principle, Process and Politics, International Courts 
and Tribunals Series (OUP 2010), 43. 
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Judge Patricia Wald describes a scenario corroborating this issue, which causes the inconsistent use of 
terminology: 
[I]f the judges had to huddle together to make a ruling on some procedural matter, we usually had 
to do so in vaguely imperfect English with asides in French. In Chambers’ deliberations – again 
without translators – it was perceptibly more difficult to debate or argue; there was first the 
problem of finding the counterpart words in the other language for what you wanted to say, but, 
perhaps more basically, finding the contextual analog in a different legal system for the procedure 
or the concept you want to discuss – which in the end might not even exist outside your own legal 
system.891 
Although Judge Wald’s observations are linked to procedural law, it is conceivable that such a 
scenario may also occur in relation to questions of substantive law, such as the attribution of modes of 
liability. As it becomes apparent, the potential reasons for inconsistent approaches in this regard may 
differ, or even overlap. However, the inaccurate use of terminology is certainly more likely to occur in 
an international setting, where the majority of judges do not speak their mother tongue and may 
therefore be prone to misconceptions caused by a lack of language competence. This may then itself, 
or in combination with the imprint of the judges’ legal cultural influences, cause misunderstandings. 
 
4.4.2 LEGAL CULTURAL BACKGROUND – CIVIL VS COMMON LAW  
 
One of the most obvious influences in this regard is a legal representative’s common or civil law 
background respectively,892 as the “overriding role of geographical representation” is peculiar to 
international courts and tribunals.893 However, one can distinguish between two main families of law – 
civil and common law, or Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon law.894 Despite the fact that both 
belong to the ‘larger Western law family’,895 both possess distinguishing features, such as the different 
position of the judge in the trial, which is probably the most prominent difference. Nevertheless, a 
distinction based on restricted reference points, or characteristics, needs to be treated with caution, as 
their ‘summary character bears in itself potential for distortion by oversimplification’.896 As far as the 
role of modes of liability in the sentencing is concerned, they differ categorically, as has been 
addressed in previous chapters. Given the fact that the majority of judges have been educated either in 
a civil or common law jurisdiction, one could assume that this could cause conflicts in the application 
of concepts, emanating from domestic law. Bohlander notes this common and civil law divide ‘results 
in the clash of doctrines and sometimes fundamental attitudes inherited by the representatives of the 
jurisdictions making up the spectrum of opinions at any international criminal court’.897 This could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891 Wald (n 878) 1571. 
892 This categorisation should merely serve as a rough guidepost. As Bohlander denotes, ‘There is no such thing 
as “the” common or civil system. Over the course of history the countries belonging to each of those families of 
legal systems have all given their idiosyncratic national cultural imprint to any template they may have inherited 
through political affiliation or colonial influence’. Bohlander, ‘Language, Culture, Legal Traditions’ (n 883) 493. 
893 Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges (n 890) 60. 
894 Others are religious and mixed jurisdictions. 
895 Terris and others, The International Judge (n 886) 248. 
896 Bohlander, ‘Language, Culture, Legal Traditions’ (n 883) 493. 
897 Ibid 495. 
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imply that judges may be inclined to adhere to legal skills developed in the jurisdiction they represent, 
leading to conflicts in their application.  
That the common-civil law divide is one of the most prominent issues and potentially perceived as 
impeding a fair trial if no judicial balance is maintained in this regard, was demonstrated in the 
decision concerning the request of Katanga for re-composition of the judicial bench.898 The ground for 
the request for re-composition of the bench was that it did not include a judge with a common law 
background. The defence counsel submitted that ‘the current composition of the bench’899 was ‘too 
narrowly drawn’900 in that it did not include a ‘judge with a common law background’.901 He then 
drew the attention to the objectives of Article 36(8) of the Statute, arguing that the provision ‘would 
be void of any meaning if judges from similar legal systems were then concentrated in the same 
Chamber’.902 In support of this submission it was stressed that ‘in particular, common law and civil 
law traditions operate in a fundamentally different manner’.903  
According to D'Ascoli, up to 2010, the judicial bench was in 82 cases composed of a majority of civil 
law judges at the ICTY and in 53 at the ICTR respectively. In comparison, a majority of common law 
judges sat on the bench in 34 cases at the ICTY and in eight cases at the ICTR.904 Therefore, one could 
be inclined to assume from such numbers that, in a majority of the judgments rendered by the ad hoc 
tribunals, a majority of civil law judges composed the judicial bench. If transferring this chain of 
reasoning to the provisional conclusion that the ad hoc tribunals show a preference for a differentiated 
approach, it may be inferred that such preference could be connected to their civil or common law 
origin respectively. However, some judges may have practised in civil law countries where a unitary 
approach was embraced, such as Denmark, Norway or Italy. Others may in theory not have had any 
experience practising in one of the main legal traditions. After all, the requirement to combine both 
main legal traditions and their specificities appears to be one of the major challenges posed.905  
Accordingly, an examination of the previous judicial/legal experience of the judges who composed the 
bench in the cases where a differentiated approach was embraced (see Table 4, Chapter 3) may 
contribute to greater understanding as to why the differentiated approach was taken and, more 
specifically, it might provide an answer to the question as to whether there is a correlation between a 
judge’s background (civil-common law/differentiated-unitary) and the differentiated approach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
898 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Decision concerning the Request of Mr Germaine Katanga of 14 
November 2008 for re-composition of the bench of Trial Chamber II), Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07) 
21 November 2008. 
899 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Katanga Defence observations on the composition of the bench) 
ICC-01/04-01/07 (14 November 2008) 3. 
900 Ibid. 
901 Ibid. 
902 Ibid. 
903 Ibid. 
904 D’Ascoli (n 70) 258. 
905 Terris and others, The International Judge (n 895) 17. 
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followed. For the purpose of this work, a distinction is made only within the context of a civil-
common law dichotomy. 
 
4.4.3 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE OF ICTY AND ICTR JUDGES IN THE LIGHT OF THE PREVAILING 
DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH 
 
Before taking a closer look at the professional background of ICTY and ICTR judges, it is useful to 
provide a brief outline of the requirements as set out in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.906 Article 
13 of the ICTY Statute requires permanent and ad litem judges to be ‘persons of high moral character, 
impartiality and integrity’. Moreover, they shall be in possession of the ‘qualification required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices’. Thus, as regards the ‘overall 
composition of the bench’, emphasis shall be added to the criminal and international law experience of 
the judges, ‘including humanitarian law and human rights law’. Article 12 of the ICTR is almost 
identical by providing the same selection criteria. As can be observed in the context of the required 
qualifications, the reference to ‘respective countries’ implies a variety of requirements for appointment 
to the highest judicial offices in their respective domestic systems. As Bohlander stresses, these may 
differ immensely: 
It cannot be accepted that if one country, for example, allows people without any legal training at 
the age of 18 to be appointed their Supreme Court bench, while others require an academic 
education and years of judicial experience, the lower standard will in effect prevail if that 
country’s 18 year-old candidate for some obscure political reasons manages to attract more votes 
in the General Assembly than a seasoned trial judge of 20 years’ standing with added knowledge 
of international law. This is, admittedly, an extreme scenario, but it represents the bandwidth of 
possibilities under the existing law and practice.907 
Indeed, this statement pinpoints the issue of diversity relating to the experience of international judges. 
That is to say, in terms of the domestic professional experience of international judges, there are 
several paths to a judicial office at the ad hoc tribunals, which do not seem conditional upon each 
other. This means that as a result of these very narrowly articulated selection criteria, some judges 
may have significant domestic judicial experience, while others do not. Some may have focused on 
criminal litigation in their previous professional careers, while others did not. To articulate it more 
specifically: the diversity of judges spans from non-judicial experience to senior trial experience in 
complex criminal cases over decades. Self-evidently, although ‘some people have shown to be very 
quick learners’,908 it may be regarded as common sense to see that the former coupled with diverse 
international (criminal) law experience suits the needs of international criminal law probably much 
better. Moreover Articles 13 and 12 respectively of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are silent as to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
906 A thorough discussion exceeds the scope of this work. See particularly, M Bohlander ‘The International 
Criminal Judiciary – Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics’ in M Bohlander (ed) 
International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures (Cameron May 2007) 325 seq. 
See also Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges, (n 890) and Terris and others, The International 
Judge (n 857). 
907 Ibid 60. 
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pertinent language requirements. Table 9 below provides an overview of the domestic professional 
background of certain former and current judges.909 This selection is based on Table 3 in Chapter 3, 
which identified the composition of the bench in cases where a differentiated approach was not only 
considered but also “directly” and “indirectly” applied. Hence, in these instances, the modes of 
participation demonstrably influenced the sentence in that they either augmented or extenuated the 
penalty. It is therefore interesting to extract the information related to the composition of the bench 
and to identify the judges’ professional experience and whether this experience is predominantly 
governed by common or civil law. The selection of judges of respective jurisdictions is therefore 
confined to those displayed in Table 3 in Chapter 3.910  
The second column identifies the legal family of the jurisdiction represented. Column three goes 
further by specifying the sentencing approach in relation to principals and accessories as embraced by 
the respective jurisdiction the judge represents. Thus, a distinction is only made between the unitary 
and differentiated approaches respectively. As mentioned before, for the purpose of this work, a 
jurisdiction may only be considered to embrace a differentiated approach if it expressly sets out 
mandatory mitigation for accessories. Accordingly, all other approaches, including cases where 
discretionary mitigation in relation to accessories may be invoked by judges, are considered to 
constitute unitary paths. The fourth column identifies judicial experience. This includes only domestic 
experience; international judicial experience is disregarded.911 Finally, the fifth column entails 
relevant912 extracts of the judges’ CVs to allow for a more coherent account of a judge’s relevant 
professional experience. 913 
 First and foremost, in can be observed more generally that the professional qualifications of judges 
are not only quite diverse, but also denote very different levels of judicial experience, spanning from 
non-existent to extensive. While some judges do not have a criminal judicial or judicial background at 
all, others have national criminal judicial experience, even coupled with international (criminal) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
909 Due to the fact that the ad hoc tribunals do not anymore provide biographies of former judges on their 
websites, some biographical notes had to be obtained from other sources (exclusively UN sources and in very 
rare instances other official sources), rendering them different in relation to structure and attention to detail. 
Where there is no information as to the origin of the curriculum vitae (CV), it is obtained from the ICTY website 
(biographical notes). 
910 Another reason for confining the selection of judges to those in Table 3 is the high number of former and 
current ICTY/ICTR judges. Due to the fact that the biographical notes of the former are no longer accessible on 
the ICTY and ICTR websites, it is impossible to find official/original CVs with similar attention to detail. A 
large number of biographical notes may not be found at all, rendering a complete compilation impossible. 
911 Due to the fact that it is not always obvious whether a judge with judicial experience also has experience in 
criminal law matters, reference to criminal experience has only been made where express reference thereto is 
included in the accessed CV. Vice versa, judicial criminal experience is not excluded where only judicial 
experience is referred to in column three. 
912 The extracts are based on accessible CVs. They are neither meant to reflect the complete professional 
education of a respective judge, nor shall they provide a complete, coherent account of a judge’s achievements. 
They should merely serve as indicators for his/her criminal (judicial) experience, or experience in other relevant 
fields. The information is limited to that which publicly accessible and further restricted to information from a 
specific, public CV. Accordingly, where no judicial experience is expressly stated, it will be inferred that a judge 
has no previous domestic judicial experience.  
913 Fields marked with * indicate that no public CV has been found. 
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judicial experience. The latter of these clearly forms the minority in this instance. Some are reputable 
academics in the field of international law; some have judicial experience but not criminal. Others 
appear to have a background restricted to public international law, where no previous criminal 
experience is immediately visible. The experience of some judges seems to revolve mainly around 
politics and international relations. While such diversity may constitute a valuable contribution to the 
decision-making process, deliberations may not only require ample time and good cooperation in 
order to enable judges to discuss adequately each point of law addressed, they may even be impeded 
by such an imbalance of practical judicial experience. As Bohlander notes, there is a ‘worrying 
tendency at the international level to disregard the experience of practitioners and legal policy makers 
gained from domestic context’.914 A lack of judicial experience may not necessarily always pose an 
obstacle to the ability to apply law, particularly if the person has extensive academic legal experience 
and the ability to grasp and apply new legal concepts competently. Although domestic criminal 
judicial experience may enhance international judicial skills, it can also be argued that previous 
domestic experience potentially “preoccupies” international judges, as discussed in the context of the 
psychology of law-making, thereby hampering judges’ ability to respond to the unique nature of 
international crimes. 
The table reveals that judges educated in civil law countries clearly outnumber judges with common 
law backgrounds. An important question raised, therefore, is whether the composition of the bench 
and potentially the imbalance of judges’ legal backgrounds may impact the role attributed to modes of 
liability in view of the sentence pronounced. Having said that, a closer look at the sentencing approach 
reveals that a high number of the enumerated civil law jurisdictions, such as Norway, Russia, Austria 
and Denmark, do not embrace a differentiated approach, but rather a unitary approach. Therefore, with 
reference to the sentencing approach, it can be observed that the judges representing jurisdictions 
opting for a unitary approach strongly outnumber judges from countries where a differentiated 
approach is entrenched. The number of the former is more than twice as high as the number of the 
judges representing jurisdictions opting for a differentiated approach. Although it might be doubtful 
whether the respective sentencing approach is relevant where international judges did not serve as 
domestic judges (or at least as defence counsel), it can be observed that even when only including 
those judges with domestic judicial experience, the number of judges from unitary-favouring countries 
constitute the vast majority. This observation may not be true for all former and current ad litem and 
permanent judges of the ad hoc tribunals. Notwithstanding that, due to the fact that the judges 
represented in Table 9 are those who composed the bench when a differentiated approach was 
followed, one could infer that the approach specific to their home jurisdiction may not have influenced 
them (at least not when the bench was by majority composed of judges from unitary-favouring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
914 Bohlander, ‘The International Criminal Judiciary’ (n 906) 60. 
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countries), at least not primarily. Again, this is of course also dependent on other factors,915 such as the 
specific ratio of civil/common, differentiated/unitary jurisdictions represented on the bench. 
This raises the question as to what leads judges to follow a differentiated approach not expressly set 
out in the statutory instruments (neither materially, nor procedurally manifest) of international judicial 
institutions. When looking again at Table 3 in Chapter 3 in the light of the above considerations, it 
becomes clear that, in a large number of cases, judges with civil law backgrounds composed the 
majority of the bench. In fact, there was a majority of civil law judges in 22 cases, and a majority of 
common law judges in nine cases.916 In the light of the above discussion, however, when placing the 
focus on the sentencing approach of the jurisdiction a judge represents, the ratio changes in that not 
only do the overwhelming majority of judges represent countries following a unitary approach, but 
they also compose the bench by a majority in most cases, despite the fact that a differentiated 
approach has been expressly followed in these cases. Interestingly, one of the few instances where the 
bench was mainly composed of judges representing civil law countries, embracing a differentiated 
approach, was the Vasiljević Appeal judgment,917 which served in this regard as the most prominent 
precedent in subsequent case law. Could the discrepancies in relation to the professional judicial 
experience of judges have led some of them to rely heavily on precedents in relation to complex issues 
of law, and thus explain the development of an alleged differentiated approach in the sentencing 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals? In view of these diverse qualifications of judges, it does not appear 
surprising that the complex theoretical doctrines of attribution as well as their place within the 
sentencing framework seem to cause difficulties.  
 
4.4.4 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE OF ICC JUDGES 
 
For the sake of completeness, a brief outline of the selection criteria for ICC judges is provided. 
However, due to the low number of judgments rendered by the ICC it is not possible to examine 
whether there is a correlation between the legal cultural background of ICC judges and the approach 
taken in relation to the treatment of accessories. Therefore the professional background of ICC judges 
is not examined here. What can be certainly concluded in relation to the prevalent approach is that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 However, it must be emphasised that several factors may distort a proper account of the situation. For 
instance, the selection of judges limited to those enlisted in Table 4 of Chapter 3 and accordingly Table 9 does 
not provide an overview of all judges who have ever served as judges at the ad hoc tribunals. Moreover, a 
decisive circumstance, or at least an indicator for a potential correlation between the judges’ legal background 
and the approach taken, would be a bench composed of civil law judges from countries favouring a 
differentiated approach, where the same approach was embraced. Accordingly, such a list does not provide a 
basis for such inferences. Other considerations include criminal experience. If, as the table above reveals, a judge 
with domestic judicial experience served as a judge only in constitutional cases, one could assume (if there is no 
experience as defence counsel, or prosecutor) that the judge has not previously been faced with the consideration 
of penalties for principals and accessories to an offence. In such instances the legal background of a judge may 
even be disregarded. 
916 Cases where individuals were tried together and the bench was composed therefore identically have only been 
counted once. 
917 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
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Katanga Judgment has ultimately made clear that the ICC intends to distance itself from the 
differentiated approach that is accommodated at the ad hoc tribunals. 
In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC specifies language criteria in Article 36(3)(c)918 of the 
Rome Statute. First, in relation to professional qualification and experience, there are the general 
requirements that ‘judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality 
and integrity, who possess the qualification required in their respective States for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices’. Again, this may cause significant discrepancies in relation to the level of 
judges’ previous experience. Second, judges ‘must be drawn’ from two lists, namely List A and List 
B, enumerated in Article 36(3) lit b (i) and (ii). Accordingly, a judge is required either to have a 
criminal law background, be it as judge, prosecutor or defence counsel, or to have ‘extensive 
experience in a professional legal capacity, which is relevant to the judicial work of the Court’. The 
latter role appears difficult to define. In the past, there have been countries which defined this criterion 
as not necessarily requiring professional experience as a practising lawyer.919 The implications of this 
low threshold may be regarded as self-evident when considered in the light of the application of 
sophisticated domestic doctrines on an international level. This is supported by the view of several 
interviewees in a survey conducted by Mackenzie and others concerning inter alia the career profiles 
of judges of the ICC: ‘This tension between common law and civil law perspectives was evident 
across the board. Several interviewees held the strong view that in addition to substantive legal 
knowledge, international courts need judges who have practical judicial experience, particularly in the 
ICC’.920 Furthermore, there is a view that domestic judicial experience may be a disadvantage. One 
interviewee said that ‘international courts are different from national courts and that national judges 
operating in an international environment are limited by their conception of their role and what a 
national court does; this may “inhibit their vision” and their ability to think laterally about 
international law’.921 Finally, judges with both solid domestic criminal law experience as well as 
international experience, account for the smallest part.922  
 
4.4.5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter sought to explore the reasons for pertinent practice. This has been done on different 
levels. First, the psychology of law-making was addressed within the context of the legal cultural 
background of judges. As mentioned in the foregoing chapters, the civil-common law dichotomy plays 
a central role in that it may in many instances be an indicator for the approach manifested in the 
respective jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the comparative study in Chapter 2, combined with the findings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 ‘Every candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of 
the working languages of the Court’. 
919 Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges (n 890) 50, 51. 
920 Ibid 54. 
921 Ibid 56. 
922 Based on the official ICC biographical note on the ICC website.  
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of Table 3 (Chapter 3) and Table 4 (Chapter 4) reveal that the civil-common law dichotomy is a 
slightly overestimated cause for the unitary-differentiated divide in international criminal law. In fact, 
a large number of civil law systems embody a unitary approach akin to the traditional common law 
approach. Therefore some civil law judges come from civil jurisdictions embracing a unitary 
approach, but the differentiated approach nevertheless prevails.  
 
At the outset, the question was posed whether judges predominantly rely on differentiated theory as a 
result of analogical reasoning, in that judges recall their domestic judicial experience in this regard. As 
Spellman denotes: ‘When judges know more about some issues than others, or in the past have drawn 
analogies to one kind of outcome, they might be more likely to unintentionally find in a direction 
consistent with past judgments’.923 These subconscious mechanisms may influence the path a judge 
may take throughout decision-making, as long as there is ample judicial discretion in place (ie opting 
for a differentiated or unitary approach). One cannot oppose the view that judges are also humans,  
and therefore also subject to subconscious trains of thought, which may be potentially influential. 
Moreover, one can argue that not all judges have previous domestic judicial experience and therefore 
may not be affected by the above; it should be recalled that experience in this regard may also be 
gained by criminal barristers/lawyers. Accordingly this argument is not confined to previous judges 
only and thus widens the group potentially affected. Given the fact that this study has shown that by 
now a pattern has emerged in that a differentiated approach has established itself in the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals, and thus secured a more or less stable position within international criminal law, the 
analogies international judges may draw on may also be international judgments, such as Vasiljević, 
which was rendered at a time when such a pattern had not yet developed. Thus, as discussed above, 
one could assume that at the time of Vasiljević,924 given the lack of sufficiently established case 
patterns, judges may have resorted to analogical reasoning with reference to domestic judgments. In 
more recent years, since a solid body of international decisions is in place and as a result a pattern has 
already developed, analogical reasoning may have taken place against the backdrop of previous 
international decisions marked by a differentiated approach, such as Vasiljević 925 and subsequent 
cases. This may explain the frequent cross-references to the case law of the ICTY and ICTR in 
relation to the alleged principle that aiding and abetting warrants a lower sentence. While other 
factors, such as professional experience, language issues and resulting misapprehensions may have 
cumulatively contributed to the transfer and establishment of the alleged principle, the chapter has 
shown that the civil-common law dichotomy does not appear to be a main influential factor in this 
regard. As Table 9 reveals, many civil law countries do not follow a differentiated approach in that 
mitigation for accessories is merely discretionary, as opposed to mandatory. Thus, the civil or 
common law background of a judge may not be a significant factor. A judge who represents a civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923 Spellman (n 830) 162, 163. 
924 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment (n 1). 
925 Ibid. 
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law country which embraces a unitary approach, may, for instance, not have any practical legal 
experience, but instead may be a leading scholar in the field of international (criminal) law. In such an 
instance, one may perhaps preclude the possibility that the judge has previously practised law as legal 
counsel or a domestic judge and/or was as such influenced by a certain approach.  
 
However, irrespective of the cultural background, the expressive capacity of such labels should be 
questioned. As this study revealed, judges at the ad hoc tribunals have shown an affinity for the 
differentiated approach, which also includes judges from a common law background. This poses the 
question whether judges in unitary systems, who have the discretion to punish aiders more mildly, are 
still inclined to make use of this discretionary power. Although, as addressed above, a study of the 
sentencing practice of a traditional common law legal system, such as England, in this regard, would 
help to answer the question, it would nonetheless exceed the scope of this work. A potential 
explanation may denote the expressional capacity of liability labels, which may influence the 
culpability level one naturally ascribes to liability modes. As addressed throughout this work, it is 
striking how frequently judges resorted to words such as “active”, “physical” or contrary to the 
“indirect” acts to describe the conduct of an accused. While “indirect” characterises an accessory, the 
features “active” or “physical” will always directly relate to a principal perpetrator (potentially also to 
a member of a JCE or a co-/indirect-perpetrator). As addressed in previous chapters, judges have used 
such features as aggravating or mitigating factors respectively. In the face of this reality only the 
abolishment of these terms may guarantee an assessment of the specific criminal conduct entirely 
detached from apt, socially imprinted connotations. Apart from the expressional capacity of pertinent 
legal terminology, cultural social imprints may also lead us to perceive a person pulling the trigger, 
and thus the physical perpetrator, as more blameworthy. The question is whether this, probably 
subconscious perception, may be defeated by recalling the unique dynamics of international crimes. 
Feasible sentencing guidelines, embodying black letter attribution provisions adjusted to the 
peculiarities of international crimes, seem to be the only option to overcome such preconceptions. In 
the light of the above, language issues and varying previous legal professional experience may not be 
the primary reasons for the status quo – they may nevertheless contribute to confusion and foster 
opposing statements. 
 
These suggestions may merely serve as potential indicators, as a thorough study would exceed the 
scope of this work. Interdisciplinary research in this regard may contribute to more understanding of 
the challenges faced by the dynamic, multifarious nature of international criminal justice. 
 
4.4.6 THE PRINCIPAL – ACCESSORY DISTINCTION AS SENTENCING DETERMINANT 
 
The objective of this work has been to analyse coherently the role of modes of liability within the 
international sentencing framework and, more precisely, whether the normative distinction between 
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the direct or principal perpetrator and the secondary or indirect perpetrator is merely of a 
terminological nature or whether is it linked to corresponding penological consequences. In order to 
answer this question, the study was broadly divided into three parts, namely: (i) the introduction and 
identification of the problem against the backdrop of pertinent practice and a comparative study of 
domestic practice in this regard, in order to allocate and understand the concepts applied by 
international courts and tribunals; (ii) jurisprudential and quantitative analyses (the latter was 
conducted in order to verify results of the jurisprudential analysis); and finally (iii) exploration of 
reasons for pertinent developments (why do international judges have an affinity to opt for a 
differentiated approach?).  
 
This study has revealed that recent discussions concluding that aiding and abetting does not per se 
attract lower sentences, appear to be rather perfunctory. The findings of the jurisprudential study, 
which have largely been verified by the quantitative findings, reveal that, despite voiced criticism and 
statements relating to the irrelevance of a differentiation of liability modes for sentencing purposes, 
the ad hoc tribunals clearly opt for a differentiated approach. Thus, it can be seen that, in the practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals, aiders and abettors are perceived as less blameworthy, which is ultimately 
reflected in the sentence. Despite the difficulty in discerning a clear approach in relation to most 
hybrid tribunals, regression analysis has indicated that the SPSC and the WCCBiH also punish aiders 
more mildly than offenders convicted on all other modes. The ICC, as discussed in the jurisprudential 
analysis, initially also embraced a differentiated approach, distancing itself therefrom in its latest 
judgment. Thus, the implications of modes of liability are not merely terminological but in fact impact 
on the punishment. This may also explain the ample discussions relating to the differentiation of 
modes of liability at the attribution stage. If modes of liability did not have any penological 
implications, why would judges embark on such time-consuming attribution procedures, when they 
could instead describe the specific criminal conduct and judge upon it?  
 
Nevertheless, it can be observed that the practice of hybrid judicial institutions is not greatly affected 
by the practice of the ad hoc tribunals as regards the manifestation of a differentiated approach. This 
may in some instances be down to the fact that, in many cases, no reference is made to the mode of 
liability per se, let alone to its role at the sentencing stage. Although an analysis of the sentencing 
practice of the SCSL has clearly shown that it has been influenced by the ad hoc tribunals, and now 
probably more so by that of the ICC, it has set an impressive example, by scrutinising the frequently 
cited principle in Vasiljević,926 thereby escaping the overreliance on “precedent” and the danger of 
citing wrongly established principles. Whether or not the SCSL will follow a unitary approach remains 
to be seen. It is immensely difficult to discern an approach in relation to the practice of the ECCC as it 
has never embarked on an elaborate discussion in this regard; nor has it made an express reference in 
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either direction. The practice of the SPSC does not reveal transparency in relation to the weight 
accorded to different modes of liability. Despite the fact that the SPSC inter alia consult both the 
jurisprudence of East Timorese Courts and the Indonesian Penal Code. The latter embraces a 
differentiated approach by providing that the ‘punishment of an accessory shall be mitigated by one 
third from the maximum of the basic punishment’, the SPSC lack not only 'clarity' concerning the 
legal reasoning in attributing responsibility, but transparency in respect to the legal value of modes of 
liability for sentencing purposes. Considering that a differentiated theory is embodied in the 
Indonesian Penal Code, one may be inclined to assume that accessories receive milder punishment. 
After all, as regards the practice revolving around modes of liability and sentencing, the SPSC do not 
seem to be heavily influenced by the ad hoc tribunals or the ICC. If this were the case, more express 
references could be found in the jurisprudence of the SPSC. Similarly, the SICT Statute stipulates 
inter alia the resort to national law, which sharply differentiates between principals and accessories. 
Thus, the latter may be considered principal perpetrators under two circumstances provided for in the 
code. Notwithstanding that, no generic legal consequences relating to the penalty are in place. 
Moreover, the Dujail case did not provide more clarity in this regard. It can be observed, therefore, 
that the impact of the ad hoc tribunals concerning the role of modes of liability in sentencing is rather 
limited. At the time of writing, the STL has not yet rendered judgment on its first case, which 
commenced in 2014. The Statute of the STL specifically provides that, amongst others, the rules 
concerning the punishment for specific acts as well as the rules of criminal participation are applicable 
at the STL and thus Article 220 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, which differentiates between 
principals and accessories, provides a source of law for the STL. The approach of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code could be referred to as a modified differentiated or combined unitary differentiated 
approach as it distinguishes between two kind of accessories; while those accomplices ‘without whose 
assistance the offence would not have been committed shall be punished’ as principals, all others 
receive penalties which correspond to the principal’s penalties in that they are milder. However, also 
in the case of the STL, it remains to be seen which approach will be taken, whether the issue will be 
broached at all in detail, and whether the ad hoc tribunals or the ICC will play an influential role. 
Moreover, despite the vast number of WWCBiH judgments consulted, it can be observed that the 
distinction between principals and accessories does not entail an equally prominent position at the 
WWCBiH as it occupies at the ad hoc tribunals. Both the SFRY CC and the CC BiH embrace a 
unitary approach, which may be the reason for the limited attention paid to the principal-accessory 
distinction evident in international criminal practice. Although terminological distinctions are made, 
legal implications for sentencing purposes are not expressly mentioned. Moreover, the terminology 
utilised by judges in the context of a principal-accessory distinction may in some instances reveal that 
accessories are perceived to be less blameworthy. Again, this suggests that, despite the fact that a 
unitary approach may be statutorily manifest, a differentiated approach may be followed without 
violating rules, thus leading to inconsistency. Notwithstanding that, the judgments lack transparency in 
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this regard and the influence of the ad hoc tribunals is very limited. Finally, in relation to the Kosovo 
Panels, which were not analysed thoroughly due to limited access to judgments, a clear approach 
cannot be deduced either. 
 
Ultimately, the final part of this work, which embarked on a partially interdisciplinary study by 
considering psychological challenges in the decision-making process on an international level, set out 
various potential causes, which may be responsible for the prevalence of the differentiated approach 
and thus the establishment of a principle of mitigation as referred to by Olásolo927 in international 
criminal law. There are various influences, such as the legal cultural background, the legal 
professional experience and analogical reasoning, which are inevitably attached to the international 
nature of the tribunals and courts and multifarious trials and which may have encouraged a reliance on 
previous decisions and the establishment of this alleged “principle”. Notwithstanding the existence of 
factors which may have encouraged the cross references of the tribunals to previous (flawed) decisions 
such as Vasiljević,928 it remains one of the main characteristics of complex, international trials with 
international jurists that legal concepts are regularly placed under close scrutiny, resulting in critical 
sophisticated discussions; but why has this high standard of care not been applied when relying on 
Vasiljević? It stands to reason that – as the jurisprudential and quantitative analyses both suggest – 
aiding and abetting is generally and viewed as a mode denoting a lower degree of culpability.  
 
It has frequently been argued that labels are not supposed to dictate a level of culpability and that the 
specific criminal conduct of the accused should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Notwithstanding 
that it is argued against the backdrop of the above considerations, that as long as liability labels remain 
in place as they are now, and as long as the terminology is maintained by international legal 
instruments while not providing black letter provisions restricting ample judicial discretion in this 
regard, it simply does not seem possible to disregard the implications of culpability as embodied by 
their expressional capacity. An accessory is an accessory – not only is the liability of an accessory 
merely of a derivative nature in most legal systems, but the expressional capacity of the term 
accessory has strongly rooted connotations in the day-to-day lives of most if not all societies, which 
speaks for itself. Notwithstanding that, the differentiation between liability modes per se only makes 
sense if they have a value for the sentencing process.  
 
4.4.6.1 A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH – BASED ON “PRECEDENT”? 
The jurisprudential and quantitative studies suggest that the differentiated theory is ostensibly 
practised. Yet a closer look reveals a minority of opposing approaches and rather questionable 
justifications allegedly supposed to legitimise the use of a principal-accessory distinction. In the face 
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of this reality, inconsistencies and confusion as to the legitimatisation to follow a differentiated 
approach in international criminal justice are inevitable. 
As a result, this may create a significant problem, leading to the application of wrongly established 
and potentially incorrectly applied principles. Such misapprehensions, irrespective of their origin, can 
have vast implications, if they result in fragile, potentially incorrect principles, which repeatedly occur 
in subsequent case law, as was discussed in the context of the role of modes of liability in Vasiljević 929 
above. Meron observes, although in the context of customary law, that there is an increased reliance 
on case law by international courts and tribunals: 
In addition to a generally more relaxed approach to customary international law, the ICJ and other 
international courts are increasingly relying on precedent rather than repeatedly engaging in 
detailed analysis of the customary status of the same principles in every case. We might perhaps 
discern in this practice something similar to a stare decsiis principle amongst the international 
tribunals.930 
As a consequence, judgments and the application of law by judges gain much more importance as a 
source of international criminal law, thus rendering each decision and the legal (comparative) analysis 
crucial. Yet in this context it should be recalled that international judges are not bound to follow 
previous decisions of each other, and thus could decline to take cognisance and apply concepts 
emanating from pertinent previous decisions. So why is the differentiated approach cited frequently 
with reference to previous case law across both ad hoc tribunals if there is no obligation to adhere to 
such decisions? It stands to reason that aiders and abettors are perceived to be less blameworthy, 
which leads to the consequence that the penalty has to reflect this “reality”.  
It should also be acknowledged that potential conflicts which occur as a result of insufficient language 
competence may not necessarily be caused by the judicial bench. Although there always seems to be a 
potential risk of misunderstanding domestic concepts when trying to apply them in an international 
setting for the reasons mentioned above, “other courtroom relationships”931 may also be the trigger for 
misunderstandings. As Judge Wald describes, there can be day-to-day difficulties for judges during 
trials: 
Defense counsel came from all over the world, often drawn by salaries higher than at home; 
many were not familiar with the adversarial mode of trial and at best were initially maladroit at 
cross-examination. Although all counsel were supposed to have fluency in either English or 
French, the requirement was often waived for Balkan counsel because their clients insisted on a 
native speaker. The result was that questioning often proceeded in a slow and awkward fashion, 
and the crackling give-and-take of cross-examination as we know it in the American courtroom 
was impossible. Briefs written by counsel who were not really comfortable with the operative 
language – French or English – proved hard to follow, and the judge often had to work overtime 
even to understand arguments that she had then to evaluate. The prosecutors on the other hand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
929 Ibid. 
930 T Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench, Selected Speeches (OUP 
2012) 31. 
931 Wald (n 878) 1572. 
	   202 
were usually well trained regulars in the courtroom and possessed greater language skills. Fifty 
years of technology have not solved this inherent problem of international courts.932 
  
The difficulty in dealing with both complex facts and issues arising from points of law within a 
dynamic international legal sphere, which has not yet solidly established patterns, may of course be 
immensely exacerbated by a number of other factors inherent to the international nature of tribunals 
and courts. A discussion of those factors exceeds the scope of this work and these are therefore not 
addressed here. Nevertheless, a judge’s lack of language competence, or monotonous civil- or 
common-law dominated professional legal experience (or even the absence of criminal legal or 
judicial experience) may be a driving force behind certain issues, but ultimately they may not be the 
only factors. It is clear from the above analysis that the answer to the question as to why judges resort 
to a differentiated approach is far more complex. A correlation between the conviction that a 
secondary party to a crime is less culpable and entitled to mitigation and the practice of the jurisdiction 
a judge represents is rather doubtful on the basis of the above. However, this does not exclude the 
possibility that other cultural, educational, and experience-related factors may be influential in this 
regard. Due to the complex and multifarious nature of international trials, one may speak of the 
cumulative effect of factors bearing the potential for overreliance on (inter)national case law, and 
leading to misapprehensions which may cause inconsistent approaches, thus preventing legal certainty. 
Jodoin argues that ‘judges in ICs [international courts] exercise a measure of discretion that can only 
be explained by non-legal factors’.933 
As mentioned above, views differ as to which previous professional experience is the preferred one, 
but the prevalent position requires more practical judicial experience. Yet it appears that a good 
mixture of public international law, international criminal law academic knowledge, coupled with 
solid criminal judicial experience, good language skills and a solid knowledge of the common and 
civil law systems may after all be most adequate. 
 
4.4.6.2 IS THE DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH IN ICL DE FACTO A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH? 
Throughout this work the notion of a differentiated attribution model was generally considered in a 
wider sense in that it was not only examined whether principals are generally punished more harshly 
than secondary participants or, more precisely, aiders. In addition, this work also embraces an analysis 
as to how other modes of liability are treated for the purpose of sentencing. For this purpose, the 
jurisprudential analysis took due account of the key characteristics of pertinent modes of liability, such 
as “direct” (commission and in some cases JCE), “physical” (commission and sometimes JCE), 
“indirect” (aiding and abetting, although in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals there is no consensus 
and may embrace JCE, ordering and instigating) and whether they were articulated and used in an 
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extenuating or aggravating manner in view of the punishment. Thus, the focus was shifted to different 
aspects of the differentiated approach, as utilised in international criminal sentencing law. 
Nonetheless, even if one opposes the conclusion that a differentiated approach is manifested in the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals because there is no mandatory mitigation for aiders and abettors 
embodied in the founding instruments of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, it can still be argued in the 
absence of statutory prescribed mitigation that such express remarks can be found in the case law of 
the ad hoc tribunals and thus a clear pattern has evolved.  
This reflects a broader notion of the differentiated approach. While some sentencing judgments state 
directly that aiders and abettors attract lower sentences, others have included such “key 
characteristics” of liability labels in the evaluation (mitigating or aggravating) for sentencing purposes. 
The outcome of these two approaches could be regarded as similar. If, for instance, Statute A provides 
for mandatory mitigation based on accessorial liability, every aider and abettor is punished more 
mildly in comparison to a principal. If Statute B does not provide for mandatory mitigation, this leaves 
space for both approaches. Notwithstanding that, if the decision makers perceive the non-physical or 
indirect nature of accessories as less blameworthy and vice versa, they may express this when 
considering the mitigating factors. Thus, ultimately, although the latter leaves space for both 
approaches, it does not prevent judges from following a differentiated approach without any 
restrictions and thus the outcome might be the same – particularly if the bench is composed of judges 
who are inclined to follow the differentiated theory due to their previous professional legal experience. 
Moreover, it could be observed that the emerging structure of hierarchies of blameworthiness in the 
context of modes of liability within the case law of the ad hoc tribunals differs. While some perceive 
physical perpetrators of atrocities to possess the highest level of culpability, others have held 
repeatedly that the highest penalties are reserved for instigators, order-givers and planners. This may 
change the sequence of modes of liability in such a hierarchy of blameworthiness but, in the wider 
sense, it may still be regarded as a differentiated approach, as the normative distinction between 
various modes of liability for the purpose of sentencing and corresponding adjustments of the 
penalties resulting thereof are a foundational principle of the differentiated approach. If this was not 
the case, why would the ad hoc tribunals devote so much time to the differentiation between principals 
and accessories, thinking of JCE and its categorisation as either commission or accessory liability? 
 
4.4.6.3 THE EXPRESSIONAL CAPACITY OF MODES OF LIABILITY: CONNOTATIONS WITH ADVERSE 
EFFECTS? 
There is the impression that the notion of the degree of culpability and the connotation of the label, 
describing criminal conduct, are inextricably connected and that a certain degree of culpability is 
always implied by a specific label, irrespective of the presence of any prescribed legal implications. 
When looking at the word “accessory” in a non-legal context, the Oxford Dictionary describes an 
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accessory as: ‘[a] thing which can be added to something else in order to make it more useful, 
versatile, or attractive’.  
It is therefore obvious that, in everyday use, an accessory is something of minor importance, attached 
to the main object. Accordingly, it could be argued in line with a grammatical interpretation that an 
accessory to a crime is less blameworthy than the principal perpetrator. Moreover, in a substantive law 
context, it must be recalled that the liability of an accessory derives from the liability of the principal 
perpetrator. There is no accessory without a principal and the threshold mens rea requirements for an 
accessory are generally lower. So is it really possible to disregard cultural linguistic imprints in 
words/labels, which by nature embody an appreciation or a specific value and to “borrow” those in 
order to denote the degree of culpability? It is difficult to presume. This line of reasoning would lead 
to the idea that in order to implement a system ensuring that specific labels do not imply 
corresponding cultural linguistic imprints, which already signal their gravity in terms of 
blameworthiness, modes would have to be denoted differently. Accordingly the question here is: does 
the label “accessory” already dictate less culpability?  
Going back to a characteristic of the basic form of commission liability (as opposed to liability as a 
member of a joint criminal enterprise), the obvious key element is the denotation “physical” or 
“directly”: words which may be associated with control and choice and potentially force. When 
considered in the light of criminal conduct, both terms overlap. On the one hand, “directly” describes 
the conduct in an abstract manner, suggesting that no intermediary was involved; the term “physical” 
does the same, but specifying the conduct figuratively. The same could be run through with “aider and 
abettor” and principal perpetrator. A major question that arises is whether those forceful words, 
associated with a number of scenarios in day-to-day life activities, thereby carrying a specific value, 
can be ignored. This may be possible in a unitary system, but it is doubtful that, in the absence of a 
black letter provision in international criminal justice, judges used to a differentiated approach will be 
able to view such labels as mere a instrument to impute liability, without appreciating the legal value 
by ascribing immediate legal relevance for sentencing. As Stewart notes, ‘[a] differentiated model uses 
legal terms to express graduated degrees of blame’.934 Are these expressions not already connoted in 
pertinent labels (thinking of an accessory)? It follows that such labels, even in the absence of a 
statutory provision embodying a differentiated approach, could “invite” judges to apply them. After 
all, these are the terms expressly provided for in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. 
 
4.4.6.4 MODES OF LIABILITY – A MIRROR OF A HIERARCHY OF CULPABILITY? 
The analyses of the foregoing chapters should have demonstrated that the peculiar nature of 
international criminal law requires a sophisticated attribution model suiting the needs of international 
criminal justice, by acknowledging the nature of macro crimes and the specifics of modalities of 
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commission and participation in an international macro criminal context. The ICC has departed from 
the approach of the ad hoc tribunals by choosing to rely on German doctrine and yet, there is also no 
consensus as to the legal implications of different modes of liability. It is obvious that the solution to 
this issue is first and foremost that a uniform approach is followed.  
A central question is whether a unitary approach is really “unitary” or if, even in the absence of an 
established hierarchy of blameworthiness, judges may be drawn towards ascribing hierarchical legal 
relevance to modes of liability. It would be interesting if research in this area would be conducted, for 
instance by carrying out quantitative research based on judgments rendered in a common law 
jurisdiction such as England. Is it possible that, despite the ample discretion to punish accessories as 
harshly as principals, the former would still be generally considered as less culpable and thus punished 
more mildly? Moreover, concerning a differentiated approach, it has been asked why modes of 
liabilitiy ‘must do all the expressive work’ and ‘what prevents the judgment itself shouldering some of 
this work’?935 Does a differentiated approach preclude the individualisation of a sentence? It might be 
argued that in fact it does not prevent a judge from evaluating the gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the accused and reflecting the results in the corresponding final penalty. In 
Milutinović et al.,936 the five accused were sentenced and Milutinović was acquitted. While the Trial 
Chamber sentenced Šainović, Pavković and Lukić, all three convicted as members of a JCE, to 22 
years, the other two defendants, Lazarević and Odjanic, were held to be liable as aiders and abettors 
and were sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Despite the fact that this points towards the application 
of the differentiated theory, the Appeals Chamber criticised the sentences imposed by the Trial 
Chamber as being insufficiently individualised.937 Following an appeal, the Appeals Chamber reduced 
the sentence of Šainović to 18 years, Lukić to 20 years and affirmed Pavković’s sentence. Lazarević’s 
sentence was reduced to 14 years. The Chamber thereby held that: 
(…) the Trial Chamber erred in failing to individualise the sentences of the Appellants. 
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber has duly considered the gravity of the crimes imputed to each 
of the Appellants. Moreover, it has carefully taken into account the conduct and contribution of 
Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić to the JCE, and Lazarević’s acts of assistance to the forcible 
displacement, as well as the Appeals Chamber’s reversal of some of its findings in this respect.938  
Despite the impression that a differentiated approach was followed, the subsequent individualisation 
may still not change the impression that a differentiated approach was embraced. Why would a 
differentiated approach prevent judges from individualising a case? If it is assumed that Statute X 
provides that aiders and abettors may not be punished more harshly than principal perpetrators, or 
even if it would provide that and aider and abettor could only be sentenced to three quarters of the 
overall penalty prescribed for the offence (if one would exist) – would this prevent a judge to invoke 
mitigating or aggravating factors to punish him somewhere below this? It seems difficult to see how 
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such fine-tuning would seem impossible, as judges would still have immense discretion to adjust the 
sentence in accordance with individual circumstances. The difference to a unitary approach in this 
regard is only that there would not be ample discretion anymore on part of judges. 
 
4.4.6.5 A UNIFORM APPROACH 
Drawing on this work it can be seen that a differentiated approach and thus the principle of mitigation, 
as Olásolo refers to it, is firmly established in international criminal law. Yet due to the fact that a 
deviation from the differentiated approach in international criminal law is qualified as legitimate, it is 
to be expected that there will be plenty of thorough discussions revolving around this issue and that, in 
the absence of a black letter provision, tribunals may choose which path they take.  
After all, sentencing inconsistency based on the legal relevance of modes of liability can have vast 
implications. It cannot be considered fair if an aider and abettor is entitled to what sounds like 
“mandatory” mitigation, whereas another aider might be treated like a principal. What can be said with 
certainty is that the approach taken will entirely depend on the composition of the bench. 
Throughout this work it was attempted to identify the reasons for approaches taken by judges in the 
context of a principal-accessory distinction in order to grasp the possible reasons thereof. As expected 
at the outset, these reasons are deeply intertwined and significantly characterised by cultural legal 
imprints. Therefore, it seems unrealistic to expect that a uniform approach will ever be followed in the 
absence of a firmly established (codified) principle. The question is whether such a principle would 
resemble a differentiated or a unitary approach. It could also be argued that attribution modes are 
superfluous and the specific criminal conduct could be precisely described in the absence of a specific 
category or label. Stewart holds that ‘plain language explanation within a judgment suffices’.939 He 
maintains that ‘a unitary theory of perpetration might better preserve (and advertise) culpability as the 
benchmark for international criminal responsibility ending the various phases of international courts 
mimicking of domestic practice and shifting academic debates to issues of sentencing, where these 
discussions belong’.940 Moreover, Stewart wonders ‘why a court could not simply state whatever 
collective structures enabled the offence as part of its narrative’.941 Greenwalt suggests a completely 
different approach in that he does not advocate uniformity. He argues for ‘a hybrid or “pluralistic” 
model of ICL that does not assume ICL to be a closed system of criminal laws of the State or States 
which, under normal circumstances, would be expected to assert jurisdiction over a case’.942 When 
applying this notion of plurality of attributing liability to perpetrators of mass atrocities, it seems 
problematic whether some domestic legal attribution mechanisms would be able to acknowledge and 
reflect the complex structure of such large scale crimes and as such the culpability of perpetrators. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939 Stewart, ‘The End of Modes of Liability’ (n 103) 65. 
940 Ibid 69. 
941 Ibid 65. 
942 Greenwalt (n 530) 1067, 1068. 
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the light of the importance and impact of individual criminal responsibility on the penalty imposed, 
this could, in addition to a potential violation of the principle nulla poeana sine lege, lead to immense 
discrepancies, as cases which are based on substantially the same facts could result in discrepant 
penalties, rendering such an approach in this context unfair. An interesting approach is suggested by 
Ashworth and Horder, albeit in the context of English criminal law. They stress that a suitable 
approach to provide ‘for all degrees of complicity’ would be to retain the judges’ power to ‘impose 
any lawful sentence on the principal’ and ‘to respect the accomplice’s right not to be punished more 
severely than is proportionate to the gravity of his contribution’.943 They thus suggest that this could be 
ensured by ‘declaring a general guideline that accomplices should receive no more than half the 
sentence of the principal; and to permit courts to exceed this normal level in cases where the 
accomplice’s role was unusually influential, and to sentence below it if the accomplice’s contribution 
was minor’.944 This would provide a frame relating to judges’ discretion allowing for more 
consistency, and would at the same time allow for sufficient discretion to individualise a penalty 
fitting the specific circumstances of the nature and commission of the offence in question. Ideally, 
such an approach would over time crystallise in a specific threshold test, deciding as to when an 
accessory’s role would be exceptionally influential or vice versa. This would solidify consistency in 
this regard. Ultimately, this approach could serve as a compromise between the unitary and 
differentiated approaches respectively. 
Accordingly, the central question, which approach would lead to more uniformity, remains in place, 
but it should also be considered whether each approach per se could achieve more uniformity while 
meeting the individual needs and peculiarities of international crimes. Could such an approach be 
unitary, differentiated or even embrace no labelling at all, as has been suggested elsewhere? Is it 
necessary to relinquish modes of liability?  
 
4.5 FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
The principles revolving around the attribution and evaluation of modes of liability in sentencing that 
have emerged over the past decades are rather fragmentary. This can be seen as inherently given. 
International criminal law is in fact a mosaic system, stemming from a not yet sufficiently established 
body of international (criminal law) as well as judgments and domestic concepts and doctrines rooted 
in different legal systems. Judges, who are entrusted to decide those cases, are from diverse origins 
from all over the world. The objective is and should always be a geographical representation of the 
world reflected in the judiciary, for only then is it possible to speak of a court adjudicating cases which 
concern the world, but it remains to be stressed that the addressed issues result from such a 
multinational setting embracing different notions of several points of material and procedural law, as 
well as different perceptions of justice, as these are inextricably linked thereto. Accordingly, there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943 Ashworth and Horder (n 66) 422. 
944 Ibid. 
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no way of circumventing the issues deriving from diverse cultural legal backgrounds and traditions, 
but it is necessary to address them adequately and to find solutions. Only then will it be possible to 
avoid misapprehensions.  
The foregoing chapters may not provide a definite solution. However, they may serve as a starting 
point for further research as they identify one of the shortcomings of international criminal law in 
relation to sentencing, thereby attempting to shed some light on the possible origins of such issues.  
This study revealed that, while on first sight positions as to the existence of a principle of mitigation 
appear to be contradictory, a closer look reveals that it has already occupied a solid position in the 
international sentencing jurisprudence. Time will tell whether the recent approach of the ICC to 
distance itself from a differentiated approach will succeed. It remains to be stressed that, as long as 
judges are not able to find a common denominator, a fair and just trial is impeded by overriding 
inconsistency as similar cases may be treated differently in relation to the punishment of the 
perpetrator, thus leading to a lack of predictability. If no uniform solution is articulated, it will remain 
a matter of choice whether a unitary or a differentiated approach is followed.  
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Appendix  
Table 9: Qualification945 of ICTY and ICTR Judges Based on Table 3946 
 
 
Judge/ 
Country 
 
 
Legal 
System 
 
Sentencing 
Approach  
 
Previous 
Domestic 
 
 
Specific Experience 
 
CV Extract 
Carmel 
Agius947 
 
Malta 
 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Senior Judge, Court of Appeal of Malta 
and the Constitutional Court of Malta 
Acting Chief Justice 
Head of the Maltese Delegation at all 
annual meetings of the United Nations 
Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in Vienna 
Acting Head of Delegation and Adviser 
of the Government of Malta at the 
United Nations Plenipotentiary 
Conference on the International 
Criminal Court 
http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers
/president  
 
Burton 
Hall 
 
The Bahamas 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Probation Officer and Clerk, House of 
Assembly  
Assistant Counsel, Office of the 
Attorney General  
Stipendiary and Circuit Magistrate  
Solicitor General  
Justice of the Supreme Court (presiding 
over criminal, civil, constitutional and 
family matters)  
Judge Court of Appeal 
Chairman, National Crime 
Commission  
Chief Justice and Head of the Judiciary  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/pj_hall_Bio_en.pd
f  
 
Almiro Simões 
Rodrigues 
  
Portugal 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary - Deputy to the Deputy Prosecutor, 
Loures and Lisbon  
Deputy Prosecutor, Reguengos de 
Monsaraz, Lisbon, Loures, Alijó  
Lecturer, Consultant and Researcher, 
Legal Studies Centre, Lisbon 
Prosecutor in Sintra, Aveiro and 
Coimbra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
945 Due to the fact that the ad hoc tribunals do not provide biographies of former judges on their websites any 
more, it has not been possible to transfer similarly structured CVs into the table. As a result, some biographical 
notes had to be obtained from other sources, rendering them different in relation to the structure and attention to 
detail. In order to standardise them as much as possible for the purpose of this work, some information have 
been omitted. Thus, for the complete official curricula vitae, please refer to the original sources. 
946 Table 3 in Chapter 3. 
947 However, the civil-common law distinction serves more to underline the general differences in legal culture. 
As mentioned before: a civil law country may well embrace a unitary approach similar to its common law 
counterparts.  
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Drafter of Portuguese report on 
implementation of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child presented to the 
United Nations General Assembly.  
Deputy Attorney-General  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55773.pdf  
 
Lal Chand Vohrah 
 
Malaysia 
Common 
Law 
Unitary 
 
Judicial Judge, High Court, Malaya 
Judge, High Court (Criminal Law 
Division), Kuala Lumpur Relief Judge, 
Temerloh High Court 
Judge, High Court, Alor Setar 
Judge, High Court, Shah Alam  
Judge, Head of Civil Division, High 
Court, Kuala Lumpur  
Judge, Head of Criminal Division, 
High Court, Kuala Lumpur 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55773.pdf  
 
Rafael 
Nieto Navia 
 
Colombia 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Judge and President, Argentine-
Chilean International Arbitral Tribunal 
to delimit the boundary between 
Marker 62 and Mount Fitz-Roy  
Judge and President, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 
Associate Judge, Constitutional 
Division of the Supreme Court of 
Justice of Colombia  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55773.pdf 
 
Navanethem 
Pillay 
 
South Africa 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Senior Partner, Law Firm 
Acting Judge, Supreme Court of South 
Africa 
Lecturer, Natal University, Department 
of Public Law 
http://ictrcaselaw.org/ContentPage.asp
x?cid=3014   
Eric 
Møse 
 
Norway 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial 
 
Head of Division, Ministry of Justice  
Deputy Judge 
Supreme Court Advocate at the 
Solicitor General’s Office  
Judge, Court of Appeals in Oslo  
http://ictrcaselaw.org/ContentPage.asp
x?cid=3013  
 
Pavel 
Dolenc  
 
Slovenia 
Civil 
Law 
 
Unitary * * 
Patrick Lipton 
Robinson 
 
Jamaica 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Crown Counsel, Office of the Director 
of the Public Prosecutions 
Legal Adviser to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Crown Counsel, 
Attorney General’s Department Senior 
Assistant Attorney-General 
Director, Division of International Law 
Deputy Solicitor-General 
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http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers
/former-presidents  
 
Richard George  
May  
 
UK 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Barrister, essentially criminal 
prosecution for the Thames Valley 
Police and some defence work 
Deputy Circuit Judge 
Recorder, South-Eastern Circuit 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55773.pdf   
Mohamed El 
Habib 
Fassri 
Fihri 
 
Morocco 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Judge, Regional Tribunal of 
Casablanca  
Vice-President, Regional Tribunal of 
Casablanca  
Crown Procurator  
Principal Private Secretary to the 
Minister of Justice 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Justice 
Trial attorney at the Supreme Court  
Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Justice  
Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the 
King of Morocco to the Hellenic 
Republic 
Divisonal President, Supreme Court 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55919.pdf  
Fouad Abdel-
Moneim  
Riad 
 
Egypt 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary - Professor of Law, Cairo University (he 
also taught at New York, Paris, and 
The Hague) 
Arbitrator and international legal 
consultant 
Chair, Plenary Committee of the UN 
Conference on State Succession to 
Treaties 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7228  
Patricia M 
Wald 
 
United States 
 
 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Law clerk to Judge Jerome N Frank of 
the US Second Circuit, Court of 
Appeals  
Assistant Attorney General for 
Legislative Affairs, Department of 
Justice 
Judge, US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit Chief 
Judge, US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/appointm
ent-judge-patricia-m-wald-succeed-
judge-gabrielle-kirk-mcdonald-
november-1999  
 
Florence Ndepele 
Mwachande  
Mumba 
 
Zambia 
Common 
Law  
Unitary Judicial Assigned counsel at a trial court before  
Assigned counsel at a trial/appeals 
court  
Assigned counsel at the Supreme Court  
Director of the Department of Legal 
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 Aid 
Judge trial court  
President of several ad hoc national 
investigating commissions 
Judge, Supreme Court of Zambia 
http://www.icty.org/sid/8158  
Sharon A 
Williams 
 
Canada 
Common 
Law  
Unitary - Professor of Public International Law 
and International Criminal Law, 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto 
Member, Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, The Hague  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55919.pdf  
 
Per-Johan Viktor 
Lindholm 
 
Finland 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Acting Assistant Professor, University 
of Helsinki, Faculty of Law 
Counsellor of Legislation, Ministry of 
Justice 
Director of Legislative Affairs  
Judge, City Court, Helsinki 
Judge, Court of Appeal, Turku, Finland 
Justice, member of the Supreme Court 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55919.pdf  
 
Yakov A 
Ostrovsky 
 
Russia 
 
 
 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary - Professor of International Law, 
Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations 
Consultant on International Public Law 
and Humanitarian Law to the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation  
Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russia Federation. 
http://ictrcaselaw.org/ContentPage.asp
x?cid=3015  
Lloyd Williams 
 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary 
 
 
* * 
William H 
Sekule  
 
Tanzania 
 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Judge, High Court of Tanzania 
Director of Public Prosecutions, United 
Republic of Tanzania 
State Attorney 
Senior State Attorney and Principal 
State Attorney, Attorney General’s 
Chambers of Tanzania 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/judge-
william-hussein-sekule-sworn-
member-appeals-chamber  
Winston C 
Mantanzima 
Maqutu 
 
Lesotho 
Common 
Law  
Unitary Judicial Advocate before the High Court, 
Lesotho 
Advocate before the Court of Appeal, 
Lesotho 
Senior Lecturer and Deputy Dean, 
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 Faculty of Law, National University of 
Lesotho 
Judge, High Court of Lesotho 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/newly
-elected-judges-sworn  
 
Arlette 
Ramaroson 
 
Madagascar 
 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Deputy State Prosecutor, Diego Suarez, 
Madagascar  
Examining Magistrate and Judge, 
Criminal Court of Appeals, Antanarivo  
President of Criminal Division, 
Criminal Court of Appeals, Antanarivo 
Acting President of the Supreme Court, 
Criminal Division  
Director of International Relations, 
Ministry of Justice, Madagascar  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/pj_ramaroson_Bio
_en.pdf  
 
Andrésia 
Vaz 
 
Senegal 
 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary Judicial Examining Judge, Tribunal Première 
Instance de Dakar 
President, Labour Tribunal in Saint 
Louis, Senegal 
Chief of the Examining Judges in 
Dakar 
Vice President, Tribunal de Premiere 
Instance de Dakar 
Judge, Court of Appeal  
Judge, Supreme Court 
President, Court of Appeal  
President, High Court of Senegal 
President, Supreme Court (…) 
http://ictrcaselaw.org/ContentPage.asp
x?cid=3012  
 
Theodor Meron 
 
United States 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Served as a member of the US 
Delegation to the Rome Conference on 
the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court  
Served on the Preparatory Commission 
for the Establishment of the ICC 
Acted as counsel for the United States 
before the International Court of 
Justice 
Served as Counselor on International 
Law in the US Department of State 
Served on several committees of 
experts of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), including 
those on Internal Strife, on the 
Environment and Armed Conflicts, and 
on Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law 
Professor of International Law, 
Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, Geneva 
Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard 
University  
Visiting Professor of Law, University 
of California (Berkeley) 
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http://www.icty.org/en/press/judge-
meron-and-judge-agius-elected-
president-and-vice-president-icty  
 
Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen 
 
Guyana 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Attorney General, Guyana 
Minister of Legal Affairs, Guyana 
Judge, International Court of Justice  
Arbitrator and Consultant in 
International Law 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/shahabuddeen.html  
 
Mehmet 
Güney  
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated - Barrister 
Senior Legal Counsellor, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  
Chief Legal Adviser, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Judge, European Nuclear Energy 
Tribunal in Paris, France 
Ambassador of Turkey to Cuba 
Ambassador of Turkey to Singapore 
Ambassador of Turkey to Indonesia 
Elected by United Nations General 
Assembly as a member to the 
International Law Commission (ILC)  
Arbitrator in International Panel of 
Accredited Arbitrators for the 
Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre 
Headed the Turkish delegation to the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries in the 
establishment of the International 
Criminal Court. 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/PJ_Guney_Bio_e
n.pdf   
 
Wolfgang  
Schomburg 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Judge, Federal High Court, Karlsruhe, 
First Chamber (criminal matters) and 
Investigating Judge 
Lawyer in Berlin, assisting clients 
(victims and suspects) in international 
criminal cases  
Senior Public Prosecutor in Berlin 
(West) 
Judge (criminal matters) at the Berlin 
Regional Court (West) 
Seconded to the Federal Prosecutor. 
Seconded to the German Parliament 
(Bundestag/Lower House), Bonn 
(Research Assistant/Criminal Law and 
Law of Criminal Procedure). 
Seconded to the Federal Prosecutor 
Public Prosecutor in Berlin (West)  
Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law 
at the Freie Universität Berlin 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55773.pdf  
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Inés M 
Weinberg de Roca 
 
Argentina 
 
 
Civil 
Law  
Differentiated Judicial Lawyer  
Judge, National Civil Court, Buenos 
Aires  
Judge, Administrative Court of 
Appeals, Buenos Aires  
Advisor on international law to the 
Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Argentina’s representative to 
UNIDROIT  
Professor of International Law, the 
Faculty of Law, University of Buenos 
Aires  
Professor of International Law, 
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/roca.html  
 
Alphons M. M 
Orie 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Civil 
Law  
Differentiated - Lacturer, Leiden University, Criminal 
Law 
Partner, Law Firm Wladimiroff & 
Spong, The Hague, Specialised in 
criminal law and international criminal 
cases 
Assigned defence counsel, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia 
Justice of the Supreme Court, The 
Netherlands (2nd Chamber – criminal 
cases) 
Crown Appointed Judge, Disciplinary 
Court of Appeal for the Dutch Bar 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/PJ_Orie_Bio_en.p
df  
 
Amin El Abassi El 
Mahdi 
 
Egypt 
 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary * * 
Joaquín Martín 
Canivell 
 
Spain 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Judge, criminal courts of first instance 
and investigation  
Trial Judge, criminal matters  
Judge, Tribunal for the Protection of 
Competition 
Vice-President, Tribunal for the 
Protection of Competition  
Judge, Senior Judge, (Criminal) 
Division II, Supreme Court of Justice 
Lecturer, Institute of Criminology, 
University of Madrid  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55919.pdf  
 
Fausto 
Pocar 
 
Italy 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary - Professor of International Law, Law 
Faculty of the University of Milan 
Lecturer, The Hague Academy of 
International Law 
Vice-President, San Remo’s Institute of 
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 International Humanitarian Law 
Member, Human Rights Committee 
under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights  
Chairman, Human Rights Committee 
under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
Rapporteur, Human Rights Committee 
under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
Appointed Special Representative of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights for visits to Chechnya and the 
Russian Federation  
Italian delegate to the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and 
its Legal Subcommittee 
http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/ContentPag
e.aspx?cid=3021  
 
Jai Ram Reddy 
 
Fiji Islands 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Crown Counsel, Attorney-General’s 
Office 
Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-
General’s Office 
Senior Partner, Law Firm  
President, Fiji Court of Appeal  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/reddy.html  
 
Sergey 
Alekseevich 
Egorov 
 
Russia 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary - Senior Legal Officer, Executive 
Committee of the USSR Union of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
Headed delegations of the Soviet Red 
Cross including the delegation to the 
European Seminar on International 
Humanitarian law in Poland  
Assistant Professor and Deputy Head 
of the Department in International 
Law, Diplomatic Academy of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation 
Member of the expert council on 
international law under the President of 
the State of Duma Federal Assembly 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/egorov.html  
 
Khalida Rachid 
Khan 
 
Pakistan 
 
Common 
Law  
Unitary Judicial Senior Civil Judge of Peshawar  
District and Sessions Judge of 
Peshawar  
Judge, High Court of Peshawar  
Judge, Superior Judiciary of Pakistan  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/pj_khan_Bio_en.p
df  
 
Lee Gacuiga  
Muthoga 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Advocate before the High Court of 
Kenya  
Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya 
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Kenya 
 
 
President, African Bar Association 
Chairman, African Forum of the 
International Bar Association 
Chairman, International Commission 
of Jurists (Kenya Section)  
Founder-Director, Public Law Institute 
and Director of Liberty International 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/muthoga.html  
 
Emile Francis 
Short 
 
Ghana 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Chairperson, Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice in 
Ghana 
Head head of a Law Firm in Ghana  
Consultant, UNDP 
Consultant, Commonwealth Secretariat 
in London 
Consultant, Carter Center (USA) 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/short.html  
 
Charles Michael 
Dennis 
Byron 
 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Chief, Eastern Caribbean Supreme 
Court 
Chairman, Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission 
President, Commonwealth Judicial 
Education Institute Bencher, Chairman, 
Commonwealth Judicial Distance 
Learning Committee  
Private Practice throughout the 
Leeward Islands with Chambers in the 
Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis and 
Anguilla  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/byron.html   
Liu Daqun 
 
China 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated - Ambassador, People’s Republic of 
China to Jamaica 
Permanent Representative of the 
People’s Republic of China to the 
International Seabed Authority 
Deputy Head and Chief Negotiator of 
the Chinese Delegation to the Rome 
Conference on the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court 
Lecturer on the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Beijing 
University 
Professor of International Law, China’s 
University of Law and Political 
Science 
Director of International Law Division, 
Treaty and Law Department, Foreign 
Ministry 
Lecturer on International 
Environmental Law, Environmental 
Centre, Wuhan University 
http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers
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/vice-president  
 
Solomy Balungi  
Bossa  
 
Uganda 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Judge, East African Court of Justice  
Judge, High Court of Uganda sHas 
held office in a number of Ugandan, 
East African, and International NGOs. 
(…) 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/bossa.html  
 
Bakone 
Moloto  
 
South Africa 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary Judicial Judge, Land Claims Court South Africa 
Judge, High Court of South Africa, 
Transvaal Provincial Division 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/PJ_Moloto_Bio_e
n.pdf  
 
Janet 
Nosworthy  
 
Jamaica 
 
Common 
Law 
Unitary - Prosecutor, Jamaican Resident 
Magistrate's Court Defence Crown 
Counsel prosecuting for the State of 
Antigua in its Supreme Court  
Appeals Counsel, Eastern Caribbean 
Court of Appeal. 
Criminal Defence Counsel, Jamaican 
Supreme Court (Criminal Circuit 
Division), Gun Court and Court of 
Appeal 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-
stl/biographies/judges-of-the-special-
tribunal-for-lebanon/1176-trial-
chamber-judge-janet-nosworthy  
 
Frank 
Höpfel 
 
Austria 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary - Professor, University of Innsbruck 
Professor, University of Vienna 
Visiting Professor, St Mary’s 
University San Antonio, Texas, USA 
Lawyer in criminal cases in Austrian 
Courts and as defender in the European 
Court for Human Rights 
https://www.unodc.org/doc/e-
lectures/CVs/HOPFEL-
Frank_Biography.pdf  
 
Ole Bjørn Støle  
 
Norway 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary * * 
Christine 
Van den Wyngaert 
 
Belgium 
 
 
 
Civil 
Law  
Differentiated - Professor of Law, University of 
Antwerp (criminal law, criminal 
procedure, comparative criminal law 
and international criminal law) 
Visiting Fellow, University of 
Cambridge (Centre for European Legal 
Studies and Research Centre for 
International Law , Visiting Professor, 
Law Faculty of the University of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa 
Ad hic judge, International Court of 
Justice, (Congo/Belgium case) 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
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55/a55919.pdf  
 
Vagn  
Joensen 
 
Denmark 
 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Judge, Danish High Court, Eastern 
Division, Copenhagen  
Judge, City Court, Copenhagen  
Member of several expert committees 
of the Council of Europe International 
Judge, UNMIK in Kosovo  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/joensen.html  
Bakhtiyar 
Tuzmukhamedov  
 
Russia 
 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary - Counsellor of the Court, Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation  
Professor of International Law, 
Diplomatic Academy of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry  
Research Fellow at the Law of Sea 
Division, Institute of Merchant Marine 
Civil Affairs Officer, United Nations 
Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia, 
member of a group of experts of the 
UN Institute for Disarmament 
Research 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/pj_tuzmukhamedo
v_Bio_en.pdf  
 
Aydin Sefa 
Akay  
 
Turkey 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated - Legal Counsellor, Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Legal Counsellor, Turkish Permanent 
Representations to the UN 
Legal Counsellor UNESCO  
Legal Counsellor, Council of Europe 
Lawyer 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/akay.html  
 
Gberdao Gustave 
Kam 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
Civil 
Law  
Unitary Judicial National Coordinator of the 
Democracy, Rule of Law and Good 
Governance Support Program, Ministry 
of Justice of Burkina Faso 
President, Koudougou and Bobo 
Dioulasso Regional Courts Lawyer 
before the courts in Ouagadougou  
Public Prosecutor, Ouagadougou 
Appeals Court 
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/kam.html  
 
Tgahrid 
Hikmet 
 
Jordan 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Judge, Jordan High Criminal Court  
Attorney-at-Law and  
Jordan Assistant Prosecutor General  
Apppointed Judge, Appeal Court  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/hikmet.html  
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Joseph 
Masanche 
 
Tanzania 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Judge, High Court of Tanzania  
Resident Magistrate 
District Registrar 
Judge in-Charge 
Advocate of the High Court of 
Tanzania  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/masanche.html  
 
Florence 
Mumba 
 
Zambia 
Common 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Assigned Counsel, trial court  
Assigned Counsel, trial/appeals court  
Assigned Counsel, Supreme Court 
Director, Department of Legal Aid  
Judge, trial court  
President, of several ad hoc national 
investigating commissions 
Ombudsman 
Judge, Supreme Court of Zambia  
http://www.icty.org/sid/8158  
 
Seon Ki 
Park 
 
Korea 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated - General Counsel, Ministry of National 
Defence of the Republic of Korea  
Major-General, Korean Army  
Lawyer, own Law Firm  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/park.html  
 
Florence Rita 
Arrey 
 
Cameroon 
Common 
Law (in 
Anglo-
phone 
regions) / 
Common 
law 
(Franco-
phone) 
Unitary Judicial State Counsel 
Judge, Cameroonian Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, Court of Appeal  
President, Court of First Instance  
http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLIS
H/factsheets/arrey.html  
Pedro R 
David 
 
Argentina 
Civil 
Law 
Differentiated Judicial Judge for Juvenile Offenders, State of 
Salta, Argentina 
Judge of the Appellate Labor Court, 
State of Salta, Argentina 
Justice of the State Supreme Court, 
State of Salta, Argentina 
Justice, National Appellate Criminal 
Court of Buenos Aires 
Judge, National Court of Criminal 
Cassation of Argentina  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/ALJ_David_Bio_
en.pdf  
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Frederik 
Harhoff 
 
Denmark 
Civil 
Law 
Unitary Judicial Assistant trial attorney  
Assistant Professor in international law 
at the Law, Faculty of Copenhagen 
University  
Senior Legal Officer in Chambers, 
ICTR, Arusha, Tanzania  
Associate Professor in international 
law, Copenhagen University  
Judge, Danish Eastern High Court  
Senior Legal Officer in Chambers, UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
55/a55919.pdf  
 
Guy 
Delvoie 
 
Belgium 
Civil 
Law  
Differentiated Judicial Attorney, Brussels Bar  
Assistant Professor on Family Law, 
Free University of Brussels  
Judge, Brussels Court of First Instance  
Lecturer, Free University of Brussels  
Judge, Brussels Court of Appeal  
Court Manager, Brussels Court of 
Appeal  
Judge and Section President, Brussels 
Court of Appeal  
President, Brussels Court of Appeal 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Cham
bers/judges_bios_en/pj_delvoie_Bio_e
n.pdf  
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The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979 
Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907) (Japan) 
Criminal Code (Law No. 5237 of September 26, 2004, as last amended by Law No. 6217 of March 31, 
2011) (Turkey) 
Model Penal Code (USA) 
United States Code (USA) 
 
 
International Legal Documents  
 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNSC Res 955 (adopted 8 November 
1994) UN Doc S/RES/955  
 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNSC Res 827 (adopted 25 
May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827 
 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UNSC Res 1315 (adopted 14 August 2000) UN Doc 
S/RES/1315 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 
 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
 
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Attachment to UNSC Res 1737 (30 May 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1737  
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.7 (1996), entered into force 14 March 1994, amendments adopted 8 January 
1996. 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000) 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc 
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), entered into force 29 June 1995  
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (last amended 28 May 2010) 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon UN Doc STL/BD/ 2009/ 01 
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules [Rev 9] as revised on 16 January 
2016 
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Treaties  
 
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000) 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, UN Doc A/RES/57/228 (2003) 
 
